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Abstract 
This thesis IS a detailed account of Zimbabwe's controversial fast-track land reform 
programme. Zimbabwe's land reform history has been discussed extensively, with a focus on 
land redistribution. The fast-track land reform programme transferred eleven million hectares 
ofland from 4 000 white commercial farmers to 51 543 landless peasant families. 
The thesis begins by offering some land reform theories and gives an overview of the land 
question in Southern Africa. This is followed by a discussion of Zimbabwe's land question 
from a historical perspective. Next is a periodised account of the successes and failures of 
land reform attempts made by the Zimbabwean government from independence in 1980 to 
1998 when the fast-track land reform programme was conceived. Zimbabwe's political and 
economic situation at this time is significant. The context for fast-track land reform includes 
a discussion about the national question in Zimbabwe and the deteriorating status of white 
citizenship; the rise of Zimbabwe's liberation war veterans as a formidable force and the 
formation of the Movement for Democratic Change as a strong political party that was 
challenging, among others, the dominance of the ruling Zanu-PF party and its policies. 
The blueprint for fast-track land reform is discussed in order to contrast it to how the reform 
unfolded in practice. In this regard, the response of the international community to the 
violence and lawlessness that characterised fast-track land reform is worth mentioning, 
especially since it has bearing on how Zimbabweans are trying to cope with life in a radically 
altered physical and social environment, following the land reform exercise. 
The consequences of fast-track land reform are analysed in terms of development and the 
plight of Zimbabwe's farm workers; the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of 
farm workers, white commercial farmers and others in Zimbabwe's countryside and whether 
or not fast-track land reform beneficiaries can successfully engage in agriculture to improve 
their standard of living. The Vumba and Burma Valley case study is illustrative of how fast-
track land reform was implemented and its socio-economic impact on Zimbabwe's poor and 
marginalised groups, for instance, female farm workers. The case study offers valuable 
insights about the survival strategies that ordinary people affected by the land reform 
exercise are adopting in order to cope with their new circumstances. 
Data was gathered from a focus group discussion (pilot study), in-depth semi-structured 
interviews and observation on three farms, as well as interviews with a few government 
officials, government documents and newspaper reports. 
The study is useful to countries that are planning or already implementing land reform, for 
example, South Africa. 
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Picture 1: AP PhotolRob Cooper (on cover of Buckle, 2002). 
Members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association erecting a sign at 
the entrance to Parklands Farm, which they invaded and occupied. The farm was renamed 
after one of Zimbabwe's liberation war heroes, Josiah Magama Tongogara. 
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Introduction 
This chapter begins with a general discussion on the imperatives for land reform. Selected 
theories about how land (and agrarian) reform should be implemented are also discussed 
because they are relevant to the study of Zimbabwe's chequered land reform history. This 
section is followed by a contextualisation of this study on Zimbabwe's land reform from 
1998 to the present. The rest of the chapter provides an overview of the thesis by chapter. 
1.1 Land Reform Theory 
Land is the primary means of generating a livelihood for most poor people in developing 
countries and governments play a role in promoting and contributing towards socially 
desirable land allocation and utilisation through policies, including land reform, especially in 
economies with highly unequal land ownership distribution. Deininger (2003) and 
Christodoulou (1990) advise that where land distribution is highly unequal or large tracts of 
productive land are un-utilised or under-utilised, alongside deep poverty, governments should 
take redistributive measures including expropriation or the activation of rental markets to 
induce land transfers to increase ordinary people's access to land if markets fail to address 
the problem. Such measures are necessary because grievances about unequal land 
distribution can trigger social strife and political instability, particularly in the context of 
economic hardship (Deininger, 2003; Christodoulou, 1990; Prosterman and Riedinger, 
1987:35-71). 
Land reform is part of a wider development plan which can offer better livelihoods to the 
poor and should be combined with other measures like access to non-land assets and working 
capital (EI-Ghonemy, 1990). Integrating land reform into the broader context of economic 
and social policies that are aimed at development and poverty reduction goes a long way 
towards ensuring a land reform progranune's sustainability (Deininger, 2003; EI-Ghonemy, 
1990). According to Deininger (2003:28-29), most countries' constitutions have provisions 
that give governments the right to override private ownership rights and compulsorily acquire 
land for the broader public benefit. In such instances, land is redistributed so that the society 
can share ownership and the benefits derived from land more equally. 
Deininger (2003:173), Prosterman and Riedinger (1987) and Warriner (1969) believe that 
land reform must be transparent and that in most instances, landowners should be 
compensated for losses incurred. In theory, land reform is participatory, non-partisan and 
involves consultation with all stakeholders (current landowners, the landless or potential 
beneficiaries, various state bodies and ministries, possible donors) in its planning, financing 
and implementation. Deininger (2003) adds that needs-based approaches are preferable when 
selecting beneficiaries or allocating expropriated land during a land reform exercise. 
In any context, compulsory land acquisition and redistribution implies breeching landowners' 
property rights or eroding their tenure security. Moyo (1999:2 & 8) emphasises the 
importance of equity in any land reform exercise because it shows whether or not a 
government is genuinely committed to addressing the land question in a fair and equitable 
manner. Governments can limit multiple land ownership and recommend maximum farm 
sizes, in conjunction with land taxes, to limit speculative land concentrations, thus facilitating 
the break-up of large farms and the sale of land to those that do not have land (Deininger, 
2003; Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987; Warriner, 1969). The induced sale of excess un-
utilised or under-utilised land through the imposition of land taxes force landowners to use 
land more intensively. According to Deininger (2003 :124, 166 & 168) land tax is either 
levied per square metre of land area (including or excluding building space) or is based on 
the land's productive capacity, with tax levied off the value of unimproved or under-utilised 
land. Effective land tax administration requires property tax laws that assign clear property 
rights and tax obligations, together with the keeping of updated official records of property 
registers and the ownership status of each tract of land, the size of each tract of land and the 
value of each property (Deininger, 2003,124,166 & 168; Warriner, 1969). 
Deininger (2003:124) notes, however, that land ownership ceilings and land taxes generally 
have a marginal impact on land redistribution because landowners simply sub-divide their 
land to circumvent the restrictions imposed by land ownership ceilings and land taxes. 
Deininger (2003: 124) also points out that the success of these interventions is often limited 
because governments make exceptions for landowners engaged in the production of high 
value export crops. This partiality generates considerable latitude for arbitrariness and 
corruption, which ultimately, creates loopholes for individuals to own more than their fair 
share of land. Compulsory land acquisition is normally the remedy for such problems but 
Deininger (2003) and Prosterman and Riedinger (1987) emphasise the need for checks and 
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balances to monitor the state ' s powers (prerogative) to expropriate land. Ideally, compulsory 
land acquisition should be in accordance with well-defined judicial processes. Sustained 
political will is required of a country's leadership if genuine land refonn is to be carried out 
(Prostennan and Riedinger, 1987: 177). 
Land refonn can be conservative (modest or minimal in its extent) or revolutionary in tenns 
of the rights (access to and control over land) that it seeks to promote and protect as well as 
the processes (legal and policy-led changes/ interventions in land use rights) through which it 
aims to transfonn land ownership patterns (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:25). Warriner (1969:41-
43) cites the Russian agricultural revolution as an example of a revolutionary reform that 
violently displaced the Kulaks and successfully introduced state-farming but failed to support 
the changes that had been set in motion by the revolution. Deininger (2003: 140) on the other 
hand cites Russia as an example of a country that undertook extensive land refonn to redress 
land imbalances inherited from the days of the revolution. He notes that out of an estimated 
total of 195 million hectares of agricultural land, 126 million hectares (65% of the total) was 
transferred into private ownership by 2000 (Deininger, 2003). Out of the 126 million 
hectares, 118 million hectares were privati sed through the issuing ofland shares to 12 million 
agricultural workers, retired agricultural workers, teachers and healthcare professionals. The 
remaining land was privatised through land transfers for the creation of private farms and for 
use as household plots (Deininger, 2003: 140). 
Warriner's (1969) comparative survey of land policy refonns in India, Egypt, Denmark, 
Italy, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Persia, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Cuba, Bolivia and 
Venezuela shows many reforms as being radical/revolutionary. Unfortunately, however, 
Warriner notes that many of these refonns are largely unsuccessful, for instance, in Latin 
America under communist dictatorships during the cold war era. Warriner (1969) suggests 
that better planned, gradual approaches to land refonn are more likely to be successful and 
sustainable than their radical counterparts. Von B1anckenburg (1994:11) suggests that the 
reason for these failures lie in the fact that many govemments that have undertaken radical 
land refonn have tended to overemphasise political goals (with race at the core) without 
considering the short-medium tenn economic ramifications. This has often led to inequitable 
outcomes and economic collapse because of disruptions in agricultural production and loss of 
jobs in agricultural and related sectors (Von Blanckenburg, 1994:3). Warriner (1969:376-
377) supports Von B1ackenburg's view and notes that the more revolutionary land refonn is, 
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the greater the likelihood of reducing agricultural production. Although radical land reform 
policies succeed in expropriating land and reallocating it, they usually fail to follow-through 
with the administrative decisions needed for sustained agrarian reform. 
The principles and contentions above are used below to assess the successes of Zimbabwe's 
land reforms, particularly the fast-track land reform programme undertaken from 1998 
onwards. 
1.2 The Agrarian Question 
From an economic and social point of view, the agrarian question refers to the extent to 
which capitalism penetrates and transforms rural areas by establishing socio-economic 
relations based on wage labour, with concomitant class formation and differentiation 
(Hendricks, 1995a:45-46; Hendricks, 1995b:39). This transition requires secure land tenure 
for land owners who want to accumulate wealth from agricultural production by using the 
wage labour offered by those that do not own land. 
Land tenure reform is ideally an integral part of any land reform and is meant to provide rural 
dwellers (not just people with private or titled property) with greater security of tenure by 
giving them permanent or legally protected rights to the land they use (Hendricks, 200 I; 
Palmer, 1997:85 & 293; Moyo, 1995:282; Warriner, 1969:11 & 14). Tenure security refers to 
the nature and extent of people's access to land (communal and individual), following 
comprehensive land reform. Deininger (2003:1-2, 4-5, 36-39 & 42-48) notes that more than 
50% of Africa's peri-urban population and more than 40% in Asia has informal and insecure 
land tenure rights (usufruct/access to land without ownership). In terms of gender, Muthoni-
Wanyeki (2003) notes that women have limited or no land ownership rights in most of sub-
Saharan Africa. It is common practice for women to have insecure, secondary usufruct rights 
in countries like Ethiopia, Cameroon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Uganda. 
Women's rights in these societies are gained either through marriage or through the women's 
male kin. These rights also change when women's social status changes (widowed, 
marries/re-marries ). 
Secure land tenure is an essential consideration when planning land reform because it 
reduces the risk of eviction at a later stage and gives individuals rights to allocate, use and 
sell land according to their circumstances (Moyo, 2003:18; Mbiba, 1999 cited in Larsson-
Liden, 2000:159-160). Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:35-71) advocate for land tenure 
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reform along the same lines as the land-to-the-tiller programmes that were implemented in 
Asian countries like South Vietnam in the 1960s, as well as EI Salvador in the 1980s. This 
form of tenure is different from the various tenancy arrangements that existed in many 
countries before that. Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:35-71) maintain that land-to-the-tiller 
reforms create smaller landholdings that are more productive per hectare compared to large 
farms. This is because the land-to-the-tiller system is based on the family farm model; 
whereby the farm owner and his family utilise their own labour ("sweat-equity"). 
Christodoulou (1990: 15-21) outlines the main land tenure types as they have been applied 
over the years in different contexts as follows: 
• Traditional communal tenure under chiefs or headmen (custodians) who hold land 
in trust for the community and decide how land is allocated for different uses. 
• Labour tenancy where individuals offer their labour to the landowner in exchange 
for use of part of the land. 
• Share-cropping (partnerships) on someone else's land. Part of the produce from 
the land is surrendered to the owner. 
• Fixed-term tenancy whereby individuals are given permission by the land owner 
to use his land against payment of a rental fee, for a fixed period of time. 
• 99-year leasehold permits on state-owned land. 
• Private or individual titled freehold land (Christodoulou, 1990:15-21). 
Policy makers need to agree on the most appropriate forms of tenure for smallholder farmers 
because financial institutions require formal individual land titles as collateral for loans and 
access to other agricultural resources and services that enable farmers to work their land 
profitably. Tenure security is particularly important in developing countries that have 
agriculture as their main economic activity (Moyo, 2003:34). Prosterman and Riedinger 
(1987:35-71) maintain that secure land tenure empowers and motivates new land owners 
(previously landless) and generally increases productivity and self sufficiency. However, 
Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:35-71) admit that whilst tenure security appears to be a 
precondition for improved productivity, it is not enough to sustain high productivity among 
new or established land owners. 
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Politically, the agrarian question refers to the opportunities for the fonnation of an alliance 
between rural peasants and the urban proletariat. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels believed 
than an alliance could be fonned if politicians convinced the peasantry that their land and 
related rights would be protected (false pledge) if they supported an urban-based working 
class party (Hendricks, 1995a; Hendricks, 1995b). The strategy was also based on the 
assumption that the peasantry would become extinct as capitalism advanced. However, the 
strategy was used with mixed success in Gennany (by the Social Democratic Party) and in 
Russia (under Lenin) because the peasantry is not a homogenous class and gaining their 
support is not as simple as it might seem in theory. There are different, yet overlapping 
interests and relations within the peasant class because some peasants are poor, others are 
average and a few are considered rich (Hendricks, 1995a:42-45; Hendricks, 1995b:41). 
In tenns of the political aspects of the agrarian question, Hendricks (1995a:41 & 46; 
1995b:41-42) is sceptical about the possibilities for inter-class alliances between the urban 
working class and the peasantry in Southern Africa because most countries in the region have 
so far experienced low levels of capitalist accumulation in agriculture which would put them 
on an equal footing with the urban working class. 
1.3 The Context of the Study 
Zimbabwe's land reform history has been documented extensively since independence, 
mostly with a focus on land redistribution (Moyo, 1995:287). Moyo (1995:71) impresses the 
need for change in the scale of analysis of land reform, development and sustainability. 
Moyo (1995) suggests a change from international and national levels (macro) to local levels 
(micro) in order to adequately inform the premises on which appropriate land refonn policies 
evolve. The topic is still worth studying because it highlights the importance of integrated 
approaches to land reform which link land redistribution to tenure refonn and infrastructure 
provision in order to meet people's social and economic needs. This enquiry was precipitated 
by Zimbabwe' s land refonn efforts from the year 2000 onwards and began with the 
proposition that the way in which fast-track land refonn was carried out in the Vumba and 
Bunna Valley area east of the city of Mutare in Zimbabwe's Manicaland Province was 
different from the rest of the country. Most landholdings in Vumba and Burma Valley were 
listed for compulsory acquisition under the fast-track land refonn programme, yet some of 
them are still in the hands of white farmers. Although the compulsory land acquisition 
procedures (on paper) implied a unifonn process overall, with some differences in respect of 
different agro-ecological zones, there were differences in the way in which land reform 
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occurred in practice, with particular reference to the land invasions that characterised the 
fast -track land reform programme. The Vumba and Burma Valley case study is illustrative of 
fast-track land reform generally and provides insight into the land reform' s consequences in 
this locality. 
The assumptions for this enquiry were informed by one main reason; the fact that the most 
intense conflicts over land in Zimbabwe have traditionally (dating back to the second 
Chimurenga war of liberation) been around Kadoma, Mazowe, Marondera, Chinhoyi and Mt 
Darwin (Mashonaland East, West and Central provinces) (Chitiyo, 2003 : 170). Moyo 
(2000a:90) suggests that illegal land occupations were more prevalent in these same areas 
from 2000 onwards perhaps because the least land redistribution had occurred there since 
independence in 1980. Mashonaland East, West and Central provinces have some of the best 
soils in the country and as late as 2000, 70% of the land in these provinces was still owned by 
white commercial farmers (Moyo, 2000a:90). In contrast, the government had gazetted 
thirteen productive white-owned farms covering 17 000 acres in Mutare district in 1991, 
although seven of the thirteen farms where subsequently undesignated (Meredith, 2003: 124-
126). Further, it is believed that Mashonaland East province was most affected by political 
violence in the period between the onset of farm invasions in February 2000, the June 2000 
parliamentary election and the 2002 presidential election because it registered the highest 
"No" votes in the February 2000 constitutional referendum (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 
2002: 1 05). Apart from the main urban centres, Mashonaland East had a concentration of 
white large commercial farmers who supported the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change. The province canle to be regarded as an oppositionlMDC stronghold by the 
government because of its resounding rejection of the revised constitution and was targeted 
for chastisement when the illegal land invasions broke-out (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002). 
The low incidence of land invasions in Mutare district (including Vumba and Burma Valley) 
can also be explained, partly, in terms of the significant number of Mozambican immigrants 
who are detached from the Zimbabwe's struggle for land. Mashonaland East, West and 
Central provinces are located in the centre of the country and experienced the most intense 
political violence and farm invasions during the fast-track land reform, whereas Mutare 
district is virtually situated on the border with Mozambique (Bond and Manyanya, 2003 :79; 
Meredith, 2003:184; Moyo, 2000a:90). The worst outbreak of violent land invasions 
occurred in August 2001 in the Chinhoyi farming district (60 miles south-west of Harare) 
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where squatters and war veterans laid siege on farming communities. The violent land 
occupations rapidly spread to Mhangura and Doma north of Chinhoyi, to Hwedza to the east 
of Chinhoyi. The land grab progressed from its epicentre in the Chinhoyi area to Karoi, 
Hwedza, Acturus, Bindura, Mvurwi, Mutepatepa, Macheke, Enterprise, parts of the Midlands 
province and parts of Manicaland province, mostly in the Headlands, Chimanamani and Odzi 
areas (Meredith, 2003:18,176 & 220). 
War veterans, Zanu-PF youth militias and other landless people went on a rampage 
destroying crops and equipment, cutting-off water supplies and polluting water sources, 
slaughtering cattle and often driving off entire herds of livestock, ruining timber plantations, 
setting fire to grazing land, looting and burning down farmhouses, stealing tractors, vehicles 
and fertiliser, pulling down fencing, forcing farmers to provide them with food and transport, 
extorting from farmers, assaulting and threatening them as well as issuing them with false 
eviction orders (Meredith, 2003:196-221 , Buckle, 2002). In contrast, Vumba and Burma 
Valley did not experience land invasions on this scale or intensity, and land occupations were 
mostly short-lived when they did occur. The case study addresses why illegal land invasions 
did not affect Vumba and Burma Valley in the same way as the rest of the country. 
1.4 Outline of the Study 
Chapter 2 traces Zimbabwe's land reform history (successes and failures) from independence 
in 1980 until the inception phase of the fast-track land reform programme in 1998. This 
period is broken down into two main phases. Zimbabwe's land reform Phase 1 covers the 
period from independence in 1980 to the adoption of the first economic structural adjustment 
programme in 1990. Phase 2 is from the 1990 economic structural adjustment programme to 
the inception phase ofthe fast-track land reform programme in 1998. 
Chapter 3 discusses the political and economic context for the fast-track land reform 
programme from 1998 to the present, including the national question and white citizenship, 
economic decline, Zimbabwe's ill-timed military intervention in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the strategic position of war veterans at the time that the reform was conceived and 
implemented and the June 2000 parliamentary elections and the 2002 presidential elections. 
Fast-track land reform was aimed at addressing the huge imbalances in landholding patterns 
between blacks and whites that remained intact for almost 20 years after independence. In 
1998, 70% of the country's fertile land was still owned by 4 500 white commercial farmers 
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(Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 177; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314); proving that market forces (the 
willing seller-willing buyer approach) had failed to overhaul the deep-rooted colonial legacy 
of racially unequal land distribution (Hall, 2003:278). The government's objective with the 
fast-track approach was to compulsorily acquire and redistribute eleven million hectares of 
land on which to resettle 71 000 families between the inception of the fast-track land refonn 
programme III 1998 and 2005 (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Refonn and Resettlement, 
2004:20-22). 
Chapter 4 outlines the fast-track land refonn policy adopted by the Zimbabwean government 
for comprehensive (accelerated) land refonn following the 1998 Donors' Conference. The 
chapter outlines the institutional framework for land reform policy fonnulation and 
implementation, the criteria for the identification of land for compulsory acquisition, the land 
acquisition process itself, the budget outline and the time frame set for the programme. 
Chapter 5 discusses how the fast-track land refonn programme unfolded in practice. It 
discusses the constitutional amendments and presidential decrees that were issued regarding 
land refonn and the controversial settler identification and emplacement process, especially 
with regards to farm workers. The chapter discusses what fast-track land refonn achieved in 
terms ofland acquisition and redistribution from the Inception Phase to the present, including 
the monitoring and evaluation procedures that were put in place. The fast-track land reform 
programme was highly controversial and critics, including the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition 
(2003), described it as "chaotic", "opaque" and "problematic." In tenns of distributional 
outcomes, the fast-track land refonn programme was heralded by Zimbabwe's Ministers and 
other government officials as a successful "revolution about agrarian empowennent" 
(Chitiyo, 2003:166; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004) because it increased 
smallholder control of land from 56% to 70% (Moyo, 2004:25-26). The Presidential Land 
Review Committee on the implementation of the fast-track land refonn programme for the 
period July 2000-August 2002 (Utete Commission) was inaugurated by the President 14 May 
2003 with Dr Charles Utete as its chainnan. The Utete Commission also hailed the successes 
of the land refonn programme. 
However, although the fast-track land refonn programme revolutionised Zimbabwe's 
agricultural landscape, the Utete Commission also drew attention to numerous problems 
including difficulties encountered in the process of acquiring and distributing land as well as 
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the variety of legal issues that remained unresolved in respect of these acquisition procedures 
(Utete Report, 2003). The Utete Commission also commented on the government's limited 
financial and other resources and the administrative difficulties encountered by an over-
stretched bureaucratic apparatus because the fast-track land reform was hastily implemented 
(Utete Report, 2003). 
Commentators, including Chitiyo (2003; 166) and Bush and Szeftel (2000: 178), have 
criticised the fast-track land reform programme's implementation because it ignored laid 
down procedures and in the process undermined and infringed on people's human rights. 
Many others have concluded that instead of its stated aims, fast-track land reform reduced 
Zimbabwe to a pariah or rogue state that is despised, ridiculed, isolated and beset by 
violence, lawlessness, famine and a growing welfare crisis (Jenkins and Knight, 2002). 
Chapter 6 discusses the consequences of Zimbabwe's land reform phase 3. It evaluates the 
land reform's impact on peasants, farm workers, white farmers, opposition political parties, 
the media, the economy as well as the Zimbabwean government's diplomatic relationships 
with the international community (donor and non-donor). 
The chapter analyses the fast-track land reform programme m terms of development 
(Coetzee, 2001:119; Thomas, 2000:34; Pearson, 2000:393 ; Swanepoel 1997a:48; Preston, 
1996:245 & 246; Seers, 1979) and McDowell's (1996) theory of displacement and 
impoverishment. It discusses development issues and people's dwindling socio-economic 
prospects, partly because of the unrealistic targets that the government set for itself after 
independence, a situation that was compounded by government corruption and failed 
economic structural adjustment (Chan, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002). The fast-track land 
reform programme is analysed from a developmental point of view (displacement and 
poverty) because one of the main motivations for its implementation was the desire to 
distribute the country's main means of production (land) more evenly, thereby giving 
ordinary people the means to earn a decent living. The Utete Report (2003: 15-20) cites, 
among others, the following reasons for the fast-track land reform programme: 
• To positively transform people 's socio and economic circumstances and 
• To transform the rural economy by increasing agricultural production to enhance 
national food security and industrial development. 
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According to LandWeb (2000c), to meet these aims, the government initially committed 
itself to following a process of consultation, gender sensitivity and equity to reduce the 
marginalisation of vulnerable groups. However, in reality, instead of alleviating poverty by 
increasing the people' s income base, ordinary poor people became economically worse-off 
than they were before the reform (LandWeb, 2000c). In terms of the two outcomes above, 
Jenkins and Knight (2002:102) are equally sceptical and contend that the way in which land 
reform erupted in violence and caused so much destruction from 2000 onwards makes it 
highly unlikely that it can enhance people's socio-economic circumstances. The plight of 
Zimbabwe's farm workers and their dependents illustrates this point well. This constituency 
represented 20% of the country' s popUlation and more than half of them became destitute 
because of fast-track land reform (Mlambo, 2003:201). McDowell's (1996:6) comment that 
forced displacement, whether due to war, political upheaval or natural disaster has far-
reaching consequences that ingrain the "multidimensionality of impoverishment and social 
disintegration" accurately describes farm workers' struggle to survive after the reform. 
Chapter 6 explains the birth of the first significant political opposition to Zimbabwe's ruling 
Zanu-PF party from widespread feelings of disillusionment with the government's policies. 
The chapter shows how the government became increasingly reactionary and authoritarian 
when it was threatened by a fermenting legitimacy crisis, just before the 2000 parliamentary 
election, and after it (Karume, 2005; Meredith, 2003; Chan, 2003). Salmi's (1993) typology 
of violence is used in this discussion of Zimbabwe's political economy. Salmi (1993) 
contends that there are many different kinds of violence. Violence can be direct or indirect. 
Fast-track land reform constituted direct physical violence by the police (beatings, unlawful 
detainment) and ruling party militias and supporters (kidnapping, torture, murder) (Human 
Rights Watch, 2002:22-25). Less direct forms of violence were committed insofar as the land 
reform programme interfered with the fulfilment of many people's (farm workers and 
farmers) basic needs, including sources of livelihood and homes (Meredith, 2003:167-170; 
Buckle, 2002). The 2005 urban clean-up campaigns are also discussed in this context. 
Chapter 6 concludes by outlining the reaction of the international community to the fast-track 
land reform programme, particularly the apparent contradictions between the land reform 
policy (on paper) and its implementation. 
Chapter 7 outlines the qualitative, case-study research design used in this investigation to 
answer two main questions; 
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• How many farms in the study area were affected by fast-track land reform and illegal 
farm occupations and how many are still operating at full capacity, or otherwise? 
• What are the general responses of farmers and farm workers to the land reform 
programme in the area and why is this so? What exists now in terms of social 
dynamics and how can they be explained? 
A focus group discussion was conducted as a pilot study. This was followed by in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with identified groups of respondents (government officials, white 
farmers and farm workers) to understand (outline and explain) the relationships/dynamics, 
micro-political issues and other influences at work in this locality. The questions posed to 
farmers and farm workers (not government officials) covered similar substantive material in 
order to describe and link events, processes and characteristics (to give an explanatory 
hypothesis) about the struggle for survival in the area studied; within the broader context of 
the sea of despair that has engulfed the majority of Zimbabweans since 2000. 
The report is both descriptive and analytical in the presentation of its findings. A major aim 
of the study, from a phenomenological or interpretivist point of view, was to emphasise the 
social reality of the respondents directly affected by the land reform programme. The study's 
focus on welfare issues is influenced by Moyo's (1995:287) observation that most 
commentary on land reforms emphasises distributional outcomes (the transfer of land from 
the haves to the have-nots) and does not pay sufficient attention to the impact of reform 
efforts on the welfare and social reproduction of ordinary poor people. Moyo (1995 :71) 
impresses the need for change in the scale of analysis of land reforms; from international and 
national levels to local levels (macro to micro) in order to appropriately and adequately 
inform the premises on which land policies evolve. Chitiyo (2003:187) echoes Moyo's 
concerns when he cautions that Zimbabwe' s fast-track land reform programme was short-
sighted because it was preoccupied with "retributive justice." Chitiyo (2003) believes that 
"true social justice" will only be achieved when the plight of poor, landless Zimbabweans, 
Improves. 
Subsequent investigation showed that some landholdings in the study area (twelve out of 
about 127 properties) were invaded between 2000 and 2002, but the invasions were brief in 
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most cases. Where the invaders have stayed (about seven of the twelve mentioned above), 
they pegged out parts of farms for themselves, planted crops and are co-existing with white 
farmers, unlike in Mashonaland East, West and Central provinces which were completely 
over-run when land invasions first broke out (Meredith, 2003: 184; Buckle, 2002; Moyo, 
2000a:90). The enquiry also ' showed that most land in the study area has been listed for 
compulsory acquisition under the fast-track land reform programme, although some farms 
are still officially in the hands of their white owners. The status quo shows some degree of 
compromise by the stakeholders (farmers and farm workers) because they have vested 
interests in the continued existence of the farms. The chapter identifies individual and 
collective survival strategies in the aftermath of this significant chapter in Zimbabwe's land 
reform efforts. An interesting range of localised socio-political and economic responses and 
new patterns of social organisation are highlighted as those directly affected by the land 
reform exercise, particularly former farm workers, try to address everyday issues of survival 
and social reproduction. This focus of the enquiry aims to make policy-makers more aware 
of people's needs at local levels and hopefully influence how these are addressed. 
The conclusions drawn from the study apply strictly to the three farms studied and no claims 
are made to portray the situation on these farms as being the same as that on other farms in 
Vumba and Burma Valley, Manicaland Province or the country as a whole. 
Chapter 8 concludes the study by looking at the lessons that can be drawn by Zimbabwe's 
neighbours from Zimbabwe's experience of land reform from independence to the present 
because the land question continues to have political, economic as well as social relevance in 
most former settler colonies in which indigenous people were forcibly dispossessed of their 
land. An analysis of Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform is important to Zimbabwe's 
neighbours, for instance, South Africa and Namibia, who are currently implementing land 
reform measures. Although agriculture is significantly less important in South Africa because 
it contributes less to the country's GDP, employment and foreign currency eaming than is the 
case in Zimbabwe (these differences mean that the pressure for land reform is weaker in 
South Africa than in Zimbabwe), Zimbabwe's experience of land reform can still be 
instructive for South Africa's own land reform because their economies are closely integrated 
and a repeat of the upheavals caused by fast-track land reform in Zimbabwe is highly 
undesirable (Jenkins and Knight, 2002: 287-293). 
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Despite the differences in the pre-eminence of land as a primary resource in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, Jenkins and Knight (2002:287-293) note that the greatest poverty and 
underdevelopment is experienced in the rural areas of both countries. As such, Zimbabwe's 
experience offers insights regarding what works and can be adopted by countries in the 
region in their own reform efforts; what can be modified to suit the specific needs of each 
country as well as what should be avoided in the implementation of comprehensive land 
reform so that land reform benefits those that need it the most, landless and poor people. 
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The Land Question 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the land question in Southern Africa. It goes on 
to give a historical over view of Zimbabwe's experience of colonial land dispossession 
because this history provides the context for land reform after the attainment of political 
independence in 1980. 
The bulk of this chapter traces the aims and successes of land reform in Zimbabwe from 
1980 to 1998 and is broken down into two main phases. Phase 1 covers the period from 
independence in 1980 to the adoption of the first economic structural adjustment programme 
in 1990. Phase 2 is from 1990 to the inception phase of the fast-track land reform programme 
in 1998. 
2.2 Overview ofthe Land Question in Southern Africa 
Land is a principle source of livelihood, security and status for most people in developing 
countries. In Africa, 61 % of the people make their living from land as a primary means of 
production. Land plays a vital role in sustaining human society because it provides people 
with a place to live, a place to be employed, a place to pasture their livestock and access to 
natural resources (Bush and Szeftel, 2000:173; Christodoulou, 1990:15, El-Ghonemy, 1990). 
It is for these reasons that access to land is a crucial and on-going concern (Hendricks, 
1995b:54; Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987:10). Apart from its economic relevance, land is 
also considered sacred because it often has social cultural and religious significance, for 
example, as tribal burial grounds. 
The land question refers to the unequal distribution of land, mainly as a result of colonialism 
and unequal power relations between the colonisers and the colonised (Warriner, 1969:233). 
The land reforms implemented in Southern Africa are best understood within the broad 
historical context of colonial dispossession and underdevelopment. Settler colonies like 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe experienced extensive land dispossession 
(43%, 89%, 49% and 49% by 1958 respectively) compared to Tanzania and Zambia's 
experience of land alienation (0.9% and 3.0% by 1958 respectively) (Hendricks, 1995b:42-
43). Colonialism instituted dualistic agrarian structures in the settler colonies where white 
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settlers owned most of the high value agricultural land and where engaged in commercial 
export production while indigenous populations lived in overcrowded reserves or homelands 
with infertile soils (Hall, 2003; Palmer, 2000:18). This experience of colonial land 
dispossession motivated anti-colonial struggles in countries like Zimbabwe and Namibia 
(Hendricks, 1995b: 39,40 & 49). The main objective ofland reforms in most former colonies 
has been to change racially biased power structures by reclaiming alienated land rights 
(transfer resource control) by removing discriminatory tenure systems and reducing 
ownership of large estates by people of foreign nationality (Von B1anckenburg, 1994:6; 
Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987; Warriner, 1969:1). 
According to Bush and Szeftel (2000:173) and Warriner (1969:11 & 14), the struggle for 
control over good quality land has political, economic and social aspects. Land reform in 
Africa is meant to achieve social justice and equality by re-aligning political independence 
with economic control over the main means of production, mainly land. The motivation for 
land reform in Africa, therefore, revolves around land distribution, access and ownership to 
enable people without economic assets to have a means of livelihood or to engage in 
productive employment, thus encouraging rural development and alleviating rural poverty 
(Hendricks, 1995b:41; Moyo, 1995:35; Riddell, 1992:82 & 101; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:8; 
EI-Ghonemy, 1990). Palmer's (1997) comparative survey of the land question in Southern 
and Eastern Africa shows how inequalities in the racial and gender allocation ofland relate to 
poverty in Malawi, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which makes the land question a 
priority for the governments of these countries. 
According to Raul Prebisch of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) (cited 
in Warriner, 1969:5, 12 & 262), land reform is a critical social and economic "condition for 
balanced development" in countries whose economies are predominantly agricultural. In 
most developing countries, rural development is predicated on the need to improve human 
socio-economic conditions by reducing land scarcities. It is for this reason that land reform 
and resettlement polices are primarily aimed at alleviating poverty and land pressure (Palmer, 
1997:82; McDowell, 1996:1). 
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2.2.1 Definitions of Land Reform 
I. The narrow definition of land reform refers to the "redistribution of property rights in 
land for the benefit of small farmers and agricultural labourers, thus redistributing 
income by diverting resources to their use." 
2. The broad definition of land reform encompasses "any improvement m the 
institutions of land tenure or agricultural organisation" (Warriner (1969). 
Hendricks (2001 :293) notes that there are no simple solutions to planning and implementing 
land reform because it carries political, economic and social risks. Debates abound over the 
constitutional legality, fairness and equitability of land acquisition and redistribution 
procedures, the efficacy ofland reform administration and the political motivations that drive 
land reform whenever established property rights are at stake (Moyo, 1995:1 & 11). There 
are also no guarantees that the bigger the scale of reform the more benefits will accrue to the 
majority of those who need land (Warriner, 1969). Christodoulou (1990:18 & 158) maintains 
that there is "a variety and complexity of conditions, actors, interactions and dynamic 
influences that affect the genesis, progression and outcome of land reform," more so, because 
different stakeholders have unequal power (social and political clout), which impacts on their 
bargaining positions. Successful land reform, therefore, depends on a government's sustained 
political power and will to resolve the issue in a decisive manner (Prosterman and Riedinger, 
1987:177). 
2.3 Zimbabwe's Land Question in Historical Perspective 
Land is a permanent element of community life in Zimbabwe because approximately 70% of 
the country's population is rural (African Development Bank, 1993 cited in Hendricks, 
1995b:54). Zimbabwe's experience of land apportionment and the existence of a sustained 
and unequal land distribution twenty years after independence provided the backdrop for the 
'fast-track' land reform programme which was implemented in 2000. The history of land 
dispossession in Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) shows why land redistribution is such an 
emotive issue and why land reforn1 is widely regarded as the key to economic independence 
and power. The process of land alienation in Zimbabwe is described below and shows why 
Zimbabwe's ruling Zanu-PF party felt justified in declaring in its May 2000 election 
manifesto that "Land is the economy and the economy is land" (or "Ivhu kuvanhu-Land to 
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the people" and "Our land is our prosperity") (Kibble, 2004:366; Sachikonye, 2002:18; 
Krieger, 2000:445). 
Moyo et al (1991:1) emphasise that the gross inequality in land distribution in Zimbabwe 
was "neither achieved through democratic policy processes nor market-based principles" and 
it is this reality that makes Zimbabwe's land question a major cause of racial and class 
conflict, fragmentation, hostility and antagonism. Land dispossession in Zimbabwe was 
initially effected by right of conquest by the British South Africa Company's Pioneer 
Column. Violence was used to dispossess indigenous black people of their land and force 
them into inhospitable, tsetse-fly infested and dry areas where the land had low agricultural 
value. White settlers acquired more than half of the good quality land in ecologically 
favoured natural regions I, 2 and 3 for their exclusive use (Meredith, 2003:114-115; Utete 
Report, 2003:10-14; Von Blankenburg, 1994:23; Astrow, 1983). Over time, land (and 
mineral/mining rights) was seized through a series of concessions and treaties including the 
1888 Moffat Agreement/Treaty, the 1888 Rudd Concession and the Jameson Agreement 
(Chitiyo, 2003: 162). This created fundamental social and political inequalities, great 
bitterness and resentment towards white colonial settlers. This inequality and resentment 
precipitated the 1893 Anglo-Ndebele war and the first Chimurenga war of 1896/97 in which 
the indigenous people were defeated (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Chitiyo, 2003: 160-161; 
Utete Report, 2003: 10-14; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:23-24; Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 177; Von 
Blanckenburg, 1994:2 &14). 
The recommendations of the 1925 Morris-Carter Land Commission further prohibited 
indigenous people from purchasing land in white areas, effectively alienating the little land 
that blacks had access to at this point. The Morris-Carter Commission's recommendations 
were later codified in the 1930 Land Apportionment Act which legally institutionalised the 
racial division of land. The Act created Native Reserves covering 21 127 040 acres or 22% 
of the total land surface (Utete Report, 2003:11). Approximately 7.5 million acres (7.8% of 
the country's land surface) was set aside as native Purchase Areas for use by black master 
farmers. The black population (1 million in 1931) was allocated 29 million acres and the 
white population (48 000, of whom only 11 000 were settled on the land) were awarded 49 
million acres (51 % of the land surface). A further 18 million acres of state land (forests and 
national parks) was undesignated. Blacks were barred from moving onto designated white 
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land, thereby compounding population pressure and the over-stocking of grazing lands in 
black areas (Bush and Szeftel, 2000:177; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:15-16). The 1930 Land 
Apportionment Act remained in force for nearly forty years (Meredith, 2003:114-1 15; Utete 
Report, 2003:11; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:23-24; Zinyama, 2001:163,167 & 174; Made, 
1998:191 -195; Von Blackenburg, 1994; Astrow, 1983). 
The 1930 Land Apportionment Act was replaced by the Land Tenure Act of 1969 (after the 
Rhodesian Constitution of 1969 was passed) which gave white settlers access to half the 
country's agricultural land. Thousands of black people were evicted from white farming 
areas and this entrenched the unequal division of land. Europeans controlled about 18.1 
million hectares ofland compared to 18.2 million hectares designated as Native Reserves and 
Tribal Trust Lands (Meredith, 2003: 116-118; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:23-24; Zinyama, 
2001:163,167 & 174; Made, 1998:191-195; Von Blackenburg, 1994; Astrow, 1983). This 
pattern of land ownership/distribution was grossly disproportionate because white settlers 
accounted for only 5% of the population. 
White-owned large scale commercial farms (LSCF) eventually covered approximately 11.2 
million hectares (about 28 .7%) of the total land area. These holdings ranged from 
small holdings of 200 hectares to extensive ranches in excess of 10 000 hectares (Chitiyo, 
2003: 161; Zinyama, 2001: 165). The large-scale commercial farming sector was comprised of 
about 4 400 individual farming units held under registered freehold or 99-year leasehold 
tenure. About 1 784 of these farming units were owned by private local and international 
companies whilst Africans had communal tenure on Reserve land with little agricultural 
potential. 
These injustices and grIevances over land ownership fuelled resentment among the 
indigenous people and became a major motivating force behind the second 
Chimurengalliberation war of 1972. The leaders of the liberation struggle promised that 
every African would be given land once the war was won (Ministry of Lands, Land Reform 
and Resettlement, 2004; Meredith, 2003:116-118; Chiremba and Masters, 2003 ; Made, 
1998:203; Hendricks, 1995b:43 & 50; Astrow, 1983). 
The next section is periodised (by decade) to highlight the main arguments and debates that 
moulded the different stages in Zimbabwe's land reform from independence to the present. 
The section also assesses the government's successes (and failures) in acquiring and 
redistributing white-owned land to the black peasant majority. 
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2.4 Land Reform Phase 1 (1980-1990) 
The success of the second Chimurenga war of liberation led Zimbabwe to independence from 
colonial rule in 1980. Independence was partly a result of the liberation war itself, as well as 
the Lancaster House negotiations which led to the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution. Land 
redistribution was central to the post independence government's aim of rectifYing the many 
indefensible and untenable social, economic and racial inequalities and imbalances that 
existed, especially since large tracts of productive land were un-utilised or under-utilised. At 
independence, over-populated, over-tilled and over-grazed Native Reserves were home to 
more than 60% of the population on 16.2 million hectares compared to 15.6 million hectares 
owned by 5 500 white commercial farmers (Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement, 2004; Vtete Report, 2003:12; Riddell, 1992:14). 
Land reform was not only crucial to assuage grievances over forcible colonial land 
dispossession but it was a necessary step that would guarantee political stability by 
improving the standard of living (alleviating rural poverty) of the largest and poorest section 
of the country's historically disadvantaged black people population (Moyo, 1995 :120). The 
aims and achievements of land reform in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1990 are separated 
and discussed below. 
2.4.1 Lancaster House Provisions and the Land Question 
The Lancaster House Constitution sought to strike a balance between the protection of 
private property (mainly in white hands) and the new government's need to distribute land 
ownership (and other assets) more widely. The land question proved the most difficult to 
resolve during the Lancaster House negotiations. Ian Douglas Smith (the former Rhodesian 
Prime minister), for instance, retained his 6 000 acre farm south-west of Harare (Meredith, 
2003:55). The 'willing-seller-willing-buyer' principle and compensation for land in foreign 
currency was an integral part of the Lancaster House agreement that was eventually reached 
and it created problems for the new government (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6). The 
provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution were effective for ten years after 
independence, during which the government could only purchase land against the owner's 
wishes (compulsorily) if such land was under-utilised or if the land was required for public 
purposes. In both instances, the owner had to be given prompt and full compensation in 
foreign currency (preferably British Pounds). The government's ability to undertake land 
reform was restricted and in many cases, the government acquired poor quality land that was 
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reluctantly offered for sale by white land owners (Meredith, 2003 :44-45 & 119; Utete 
Report, 2003:13). 
2.4.2 Donors and Zimbabwe's Land Reform Phase 1 
The clauses of the Lancaster House Agreement regarding land redistribution and the 
protection of white property rights were accepted by Zimbabwe's black government after 
assurances that multinationals would provide funds to assist in land redistribution (Olaleye, 
2005 :6). International donors promised Zimbabwe a total of US$2 billion toward land 
reform. As the former colonial power, Britain was expected to play a pivotal role III 
Zimbabwe's land reform and pledged £44 million which was broken down as follows: 
• £20 million was a specific land resettlement grant 
• £27 million was budgetary support to help meet the Zimbabwean government's own 
contribution to the land reform programme 
• £3million was for miscellaneous expenses 
The United States of America (under Kissinger), the European Community, the World Bank, 
the African Development Bank and the Kuwait government pledged financial and logistical 
support towards Zimbabwe's land reform in the 1980s (Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 7; 
Jenkins and Knight, 2002:25). Britain's Conservative Party government (and the provisions 
of the Lancaster House Agreement) and America offered their assistance on condition that 
the Zimbabwean government would not expropriate privately owned white commercial 
farmland within the first decade of independence, unless land acquisition was based on the 
'willing-seller-willing-buyer principle' (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Hall, 2003:256; Lee, 
2003:1; Utete Report, 2003:13 & 16; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 7; Jenkins and Knight, 
2002:25; Zinyama, 2001:163,167,174; Krieger, 2000:445; Palmer, 2000:39; Made, 
1998:191-195; Palmer, 1997:303; Moyo et aI, 1991:15). 
2.4.3 The Government's Land Reform Plans 
According to Meredith (2003:1 I & 122), white farmers were treated well soon after 
independence because they accounted for three-quarters of Zimbabwe's agricultural output. 
They grew 90% of the cotton, virtually all the tobacco and other export crops like wheat, 
coffee, tea and sugar (accounting for one-third of total exports). White farmers employed 
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about one-third of Zimbabwe's wage earning labour force (271 000 people at independence 
in 1980) and these figures continued to rise steadily until the mid 1990s (Meredith, 2003: III 
& 122). Apart from the restrictions on compulsory land acquisition imposed by the Lancaster 
House Constitution, Meredith (2003:121-122) maintains that the new government could not 
ignore the contribution of white farmers to the economy and was cautious with its land 
reform plans as a result. Despite this consideration, however, Meredith (2003:14) and Moyo 
(2000a:73) note that although the new government was compelled to give reassurances that 
there would be no nationalisation of farms, mines or industries soon after independence, its 
policy dialogue on land redistribution in the 1980s was "ideologically grounded in 
nationalistic, moralistic, patriarchal and statist philosophies." 
The government drafted a land resettlement programme which aimed to resettle 18 000 
families on white-owned commercial farmland over a period of three years (1980-1983). 
Resettlement was the vehicle through which the government sought to even-out population 
densities (decongestion) and resource pressures in the Reserves that were occupied by blacks. 
The initial land resettlement programme was revised to form the Transitional National 
Development Plan of 1982. The new programme aimed to resettle 162 000 poor, landless and 
displaced families on 9 million hectares of commercial farmland (Moyo, 2004:1-2; lenkins 
and Knight, 2002). The government' s long term objective was to transform the racially 
skewed ownership of the country's prime land by Ensuring equitable and socially just access 
to land (transfer of not less than 60% of land from the commercial farming sector to the rest 
of the population using a villagised resettlement model (AI) to decongest overpopulated and 
over-stocked areas (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:7). 
The government wanted to re-structure the country's entire farming system including access 
to markets, credit and training, access to social, developmental and economic amenities as 
well as ensuring land tenure security for all types of landholdings in order to enhance 
agricultural productivity. The government hoped that these changes would eventually lead to 
black industrial and economic empowerment and long-term macro-economic growth and 
aimed to promote investment in agriculture through capital out-lays and infrastructure 
provision (Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5; Moyo, 2004:1-2; 
Vtete Report, 2003: 15). 
The 1985 Land Acquisition Act contained provisions for land redistribution, still with an 
emphasis on resettlement. The 1985 Land Acquisition Act gave the government the 'right of 
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first refusal' on the sale of all private rural land (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:82; Buckle, 
2002:11; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:30). The government hoped to reduce population pressure 
in the communal areas and to improve rural agricultural production and household incomes 
by creating resettlement schemes covering 8.3 million hectares (Moyo, 1995: 120; Riddell, 
1992:82). The government planned to provide supporting economic and social infrastructure 
and technical services (electricity, wide tar all-weather roads and telecommunications) 
(Jenkins and Knight, 2002:23-24; Zinyama, 2001:175; Made, 1998:197; Moyo, 1995:120). 
These investments were targeted to benefit peasant families that had been displaced by the 
war and to provide land and other resources to the landless, unemployed, ex-combatants and 
the destitute. 
2.4.4 Settler Identification and Resettlement Models in Phase 1 
The settler identification and land allocation criteria set during this phase is outlined below. 
The different categories of land reform beneficiaries did not have to possess any knowledge 
of farming or working capital, except what was necessary for subsistence (Jenkins and 
Knight, 2002:82). 
• Landless people or those willing to for-go claims to land in the communal areas 
• Poor or unemployed people with dependents 
• Returning refugees who had been displaced by the liberation war 
Four resettlement models were devised to address the issue of resettlement and infrastructure 
provision. The government hoped to eventually indigenise the large-scale commercial 
farming sector by creating small, medium and large scale conunercial farming resettlement 
schemes. The resettlement models adopted in this period are described below: 
• Model A: each family was allocated a residential stand of 0.25 hectares or I acre in a 
nucleated village with 5-8 hectares of arable land for intensive cultivation and 30-200 
hectares for conununal grazing for a specified number oflivestock, depending on the 
agro-ecological potential of the land. 
• Model B: nucleated settlement with collective-cooperative style farming on 800-2000 
hectares. 
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• Model C: an extension of Model A for intensive individual smallholder production 
around a centralised estate managed communally or supervised by the Agricultural 
Development Authority (state parastatal-ADA, formerly ARDA). 
• Model D: similar to Model A, but primarily for game-ranching and livestock 
production on state land in poorer, drier agro-ecological regions (Jenkins and Knight, 
2002:84; Zinyama, 2001:174). 
2.4.5 Land Reform Successes in Phase 1 
Resettlement Model A was the most common or popular, followed by Models B and C. 
Model D generally did not involve resettlement although about 20 000 families benefited 
from the additional grazing land that it provided (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Scudder, 
2001; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:31; Riddell, 1992:18; Cusworth, 1992). 
Resettlement areas were considered state property and arable, grazing and residential land 
under resettlement Models A, C and D were governed by state permit tenure in terms of the 
Rural Land Act (Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5). Resettlement 
Model B was governed by communal tenure (Made 1998; Palmer, 1997:81-82). 
According to Deininger (2003:144-145), the resettlement programme succeeded in reducing 
rural poverty and inequality by allowing rural households to accumulate assets and gain 
income from crop production. An estimated 40 000 households benefited (3.1 % of rural 
households) with each receiving an average of 59.28 hectares (Deininger, 2003:144-145). 
Before independence, the peasant sector produced only 6% of the country's marketed 
agricultural output but this situation is reported to have improved significantly following land 
resettlement. Following examples of providing the destitute and unemployed with land and 
other resources in Burkina Faso, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Peru (Scudder, 
2001:253), the Zimbabwean government provided inputs (seed, fertilizer, tillage tractors, 
credit, improved road transport, marketing facilities and agricultural extension) through 
parastatals under the Ministry of Lands. The parastatals included the Agricultural Technical 
and Extension Services (Agritex), the District Development Fund (DDF), Agricultural 
Development Authority (ADA), the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and AgriBank. 
Resettled peasants were able to work their land to realise the 'maize and cotton miracle' or 
agricultural boom between 1980 and 1982/3 (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:102, 294). The 
agricultural boom was also assisted by international donors such as the Norwegian Agency 
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for International Development (NORAD), the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Canadian International Development Association (CIDA) 
who provided funding and technical assistance. It is reported that peasant sector production 
accounted for 55% of marketed maize and 20% of total marketed agricultural output in this 
period (Jenkins and Knight, 2002: 102 & 294; Masilela and Weiner, 1996; Hendricks, 
1995b:50-52; Moyo, 1987 cited in Moyo, 2003:34). 
Agricultural collectivisation was implemented (resettlement Model B) alongside resettlement 
for homes and subsistence (Model A). Most co-operatives produced maize and small grains 
like millet, sorghum, rapoko, groundnuts and vegetables and a few produced cotton. Moyo 
(1998:225) notes, however, that most co-operatives operated below capacity because they did 
not have sufficient working capital for essentials such as irrigation infrastructure. In many 
instances, weed, pest and disease control activities were not carried out at the right time and 
entire crops were often destroyed (Moyo, 1998:225). 
According to Moyo (1998), agricultural collectivisation had limited success because of poor 
infrastructure, financing and management. It was a general failure in terms of production 
output and management efficiency because co-operative members lacked the requisite 
skills/training. About 8% of those involved in cooperative farming were illiterate, 53% had 
an education between grade 1-7 and only 5% had a secondary education (Moyo, 1998:223; 
Chiremba and Masters, 2003). The state was criticised for rushing into establishing farming 
co-operatives without putting in place the necessary institutional framework to promote 
investment and production. Technical assistance and other inputs such as credit, marketing, 
infrastructure, agricultural research and improved farm technology were also inadequate 
because of limited state resources (Moyo, 1998:215; Alexander, 2000; Made, 1998:203). 
A small but influential number of black commercial farmers held land under freehold tenure 
in the African Purchase Areas. This rural bourgeoisie class was created through the colonial 
land Acts of the late 1960s and early 1970s mentioned above (Hendricks, 1995b:55). The 
number of these rich landowning peasants increased from 8 500 in 1977 to 9 500 in 1982 
because of the government's agricultural reforms which were aimed at eventually 
indigenising the large-scale commercial farming sector by creating small, medium and large 
scale commercial farming resettlement schemes under the A2 resettlement model 
(Chidzonga, 1993; Good, 1990; Harrison, 1987 cited in Hendricks, 1995b:51). 
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2.4.6 Land Reform ConstraintslFailures in Phase 1 
The implementation of comprehensive land redistribution and resettlement was hindered by 
several factors soon after independence such that it fell far below the government's targets. 
Government statistics show that 71 000 families, instead of the proposed 162 000, were 
settled on 3 498 444 hectares (3.5 million hectares) or 40% out of the projected 9 million 
hectares. Only 19% of the land acquired was classified as prime land and the rest was either 
marginal or unsuitable for cultivation or grazing (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement, 2004:5; Utete Report, 2003:15 ; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Government of 
Zimbabwe, 1998 cited in LandWeb, 2000a). The government's delivery of infrastructure 
(roads, fencing, dip tanks, housing, schools and clinics) lacked adequate technical support 
and it has been argued that the targets that the government has set for land reform were 
unrealistic and beyond its financial and logistical capacity (Meredith, 2003:120). 
Land reform targets were difficult to achieve because of several reasons. The main reason 
was the constraints imposed by the Lancaster House Agreement. The conditions of the 
agreement guaranteed white settler privilege and economic hegemony by protecting their 
property rights to the most productive agricultural lands (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:25 ; 
Astrow, 1983). The government could only acquire under-utilised agricultural land; if and 
when white farmers chose to sell land to the government, on a "willing-seller, willing-buyer" 
basis and white farmers were generally unwilling to sell their land (Deininger, 2003:144-145; 
Utete Report, 2003:15; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:82; Von 
Blanckenburg, 1994:30). In practice, this led to the acquisition of scattered, low quality land, 
which was not ideal for the establishment of large resettlement schemes (Meredith, 
2003:119; Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Hall, 2003 :256; Lee, 2003:1 ; Human Rights Watch, 
2002:3 & 7; Buckle, 2002:11; Zinyama, 2001:163,167,174; Krieger, 2000:445; Palmer, 
2000:39; Made, 1998:191-195; Palmer, 1997:303 ; Moyo et ai, 1991:15). 
Another major constraint on the government's ability to carry out significant land reform in 
this period was the prohibitive cost of acquiring land from white commercial farmers. The 
government struggled to pay for the little land that was made available because white farmers 
were entitled to receive compensation in foreign currency (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:82; 
LandWeb, 2000a; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:30), especially since very little of the assistance 
pledged by Britain and America for land reform ever materialised (Human Rights Watch, 
2002:7; Palmer, 1997:303). In this regard, Deininger (2003:153) notes that chronic under-
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funding and mismanagement reduces the sustainability of land reform programmes and is a 
key reason why governments terminate or postpone land reforms. Palmer and Toulmin 
(2000) also caution that donor assistance in funding land reforms is a welcome gesture but 
the role of donors can be problematic. Zimbabwe's experience illustrates how donors can 
dictate the terms of land reform and literally hold the reforming govemment ransom. Jenkins 
and Knight (2002:81) maintain that the Zimbabwean govemment had abandoned its aims of 
implementing a sustained resettlement programme by 1983. They argue that the 
government's ambivalence on the matter was reflected in the lack of a budget allocation for 
further resettlement in the 1983/84 financial year (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:81). 
2.4.7 Conclusion 
Von Blanckenburg (1994:20) notes that the number of large white-owned commercial 
farmers had decreased from 6 100 to about 4 600 by the mid 1980s. However, land reform 
and resettlement in the 1980s progressed slowly and eventually stalled because it was very 
costly under the conditions outlined above. Land reform during this period saw little land 
transfer (15% of white-owned land transferred to 6% of the peasantry) (GoZ: Ministry of 
Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5; Riddell, 1992:15). Von Blanckenburg 
(1994:29-31) estimates that by 1991, only a third of the resettlement targets set in 1985 had 
been achieved. Von Blanckenburg (1994:32) also argues that apart from the poor 
performance in terms of the number of people resettled, the people resettled were poorly 
selected, often because of their ties to the liberation struggle or other political merits rather 
than need. 
Despite initial improvements in peasant production (the maize miracle above), 
comprehensive land reform remained an illusion (Hall, 2003:261; Palmer, 2000:39; Made, 
1998:191; Palmer, 1997:303; Hendricks, 1995b:50; Riddell, 1992:1). Land redistribution was 
insufficiently addressed, even though it was a central political and economic demand of 
Zimbabwe's two liberation wars (Moyo, 1999:1). Consequently, Zimbabwe's bi-modal 
agricultural-based economic structure; dominated by white large-scale commercial farmers 
(land holding, output, technology and infrastructure) was maintained (Moyo, 2000a:72). It is 
noted, however, that although Zimbabwe's land reform achievements in this period were 
modest, this early land reform attempt achieved one of the highest land acquisition and 
resettlement figures on the continent at the time (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998 cited in 
LandWeb, 2000a; Kinsey, 1999 cited in LandWeb, 2000a). 
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2.5 Land Reform Phase 2 (1990-1998) 
The Lancaster House Agreement lapsed in April 1990 and there was little to show in terms of 
land reform (considering the scale of the problem) after a decade of independence so a more 
radical land policy was drawn up. The World Bank estimated that 3 million hectares of 
commercial farmland in natural regions I, 2 and 3 were under-utilised and could be 
redistributed without depressing crop production or interfering with export targets (World 
Bank, 1991 cited in Von Blanckenburg, 1994:26; Riddell, 1992:82). Apart from addressing 
the problems that had been posed by the provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement, the 
government revisited the land issue to gain support for the 1990 elections. 
2.5.1 Constitutional and Legislative Changes 
In December 1990, parliament passed a constitutional amendment (number 11) that allowed 
the government to compulsorily acquire or confiscate privately owned land, fix compensation 
in local currency (not foreign currency as was previously required) and deny farmers the 
right to appeal the government's decisions in court. Affected land owners could contest the 
acquisition of their landholdings to the Minister of Lands in writing; setting out the reasons 
for their objection (Chitiyo, 2003:163; Utete Report, 2003:15; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:34; 
Riddell, 1992:81). The government planned to acquire 5 million hectares of the remaining 
11.2 million hectares (approximately half the remaining privately owned commercial 
farmland in ecological regions 2 and 3 in the 1990s) to resettle 110000 families . Limits were 
placed on the number of farms that individual farmers could own, on absentee landowners 
and on foreign ownership of land (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 
2002:6; Adams, 1995 cited in LandWeb, 2000a). 
In respect of compensation, the December 1990 constitutional amendments allowed the 
government to use non-market solutions in determining the compensation that farmers would 
receive if their land was compulsorily acquired (Tshuma, 1997). New land valuation 
procedures were instituted, for example, the purchase price of land was based on 'fair 
compensation' for the value of buildings, dams, roads and other infrastructure on the 
property, not the market value of the land itself (Meredith, 2003:195). The new constitutional 
and legislative provisions stipulated that the government would pay at least half the 
compensation total for expropriated land when the land was acquired or within a reasonable 
time thereafter. Half of the outstanding balance would be paid within two years and the last 
instalment would be paid within five years (Von Blanckenburg, 1994:35). The government 
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argued that; "The white colonialists took our land without paying for it. Why should we pay 
them exorbitant prices?" (Meredith, 2003: 122). The government retained the ' right of first 
refusal' in buying land that white farmers sold (Buckle, 2002:11). Numerous objections were 
raised by white farmers who argued that they were not consulted about the new land 
acquisition process and that the exercise disregarded their private property rights. 
In January 1991, productive white farmers (about 4 000 represented by the Commercial 
Farmers Union) were reassured that they had nothing to fear when the new Land Acquisition 
Bill was brought before parliament (Meredith, 2003:121-122). The farmers where told that 
the Bill was mainly targeted at under-utilised land, land belonging to absentee landlords, 
foreign-owned (individual or companies), officially derelict land, land owned for speculative 
purposes (unutilised), over-sized farms and land belonging to individuals with more farms 
than were considered necessary (more than two) (Hall, 2003:269; Meredith, 2003:121-122; 
Krieger, 2000:445-446; Moyo, 1995 :90). These land categories, including land already 
owned by the state, were to be redistributed first before productive land was affected. The 
new National Land Policy and Land Acquisition Act came into force in 1992 and enumerated 
the Zimbabwean government's overarching land reform aims and objectives (Utete Report, 
2003:15; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6). 
A Land Tenure Commission known as the Rukuni Commission was established in 1994 to 
address the problems of duplication of services and jurisdiction in land administration, 
transparency in land administration, as well as to limit farm sizes, introduce a land tax and 
regulate land use (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:274-275; Human 
Rights Watch, 2002:6; Moyo, 2000:84; Made, 1998:211, Mbiba, 1997). The Commission 
was also tasked to look into the issue of equity, including gender equality, in the land reform 
process (Moyo, 2003:4 & 38). The Rukuni Commission reiterated and enumerated the 
country's overarching land reform aims and objectives. Limits were placed on the number of 
farms owned by individual farmers , on farm size (through land taxes), on absentee 
landowners and on foreign ownership of land. Extensive areas (blocks) were designated for 
land acquisition and resettlement (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Adams, 1995 cited in 
LandWeb, 2000a). The Land Tenure Commission known as the Rukuni Commission 
recommended that all statutory land (now under freehold title) should be vested in a National 
Land Commission that would be composed of politicians and technocrats, and charged with 
the responsibility of ensuring both the effective implementation of the Land Acquisition Act 
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in pursuit of a comprehensive land reform programme (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Jenkins 
and Knight, 2002:274-275; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Moyo, 2000:84; Made, 1998:211). 
The status of Village Assemblies was reinforced and all village land was vested in these 
assemblies (now vested in the President) (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Van den Brink, 
2000). 
The constitutional amendments between 1990 and 1992, the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, 
the National Land Policy of 1992 and the Rukuni Commission of 1994 were the 
government's way of addressing the problems encountered in implementing land refonn 
Phase 1. The government gave itself more power to designate and expropriate large blocks of 
land for resettlement than was the case when the Lancaster House Agreement was effective 
(Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Adams, 1995 cited in 
LandWeb, 2000a). Unfortunately, however, the proposed National Land Commission was 
not established until the fast-track land reform of 2000. 
2.5.2 Land Reform and Economic Structural Adjustment 
Zimbabwe began implementing an International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescribed economic 
structural adjustment programme (ESAP) in 1990. The neo-liberal, pro-capitalist 
prescriptions of the programme led the government to abandon its Marxist-Leninist thinking 
(Burkett, 2000:471). In practice, restructuring the state 's fiscal and monetary policies meant 
the gradual reduction of state involvement in the economy by adopting freer labour practices, 
lifting price controls, reducing state subsidies to parastatals and reducing state expenditure on 
social, infrastructural and agricultural services (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:137-159; Moyo, 
2000a:155). The tide of trade liberalisation led to the privatisation of previously state-owned 
marketing boards like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Cotton Marketing Board (CMB), 
Dairy Marketing Board (DMB) and Cold Storage Commission (CSC) from 1994 (Jenkins 
and Knight, 2002:137-159; Moyo, 2000a:56). It is important to note, however, that land 
reform was not integrated into the ESAP framework because commercial farmers made the 
biggest contribution to agricultural exports and the country's foreign currency earnings 
(Meredith, 2003 :111 & 122; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8). 
The largely white-owned commercial agricultural sector contributed 33% of formal 
employment and accounted for 40% of Zimbabwe' s exports. This realisation and re-
evaluation made the government reluctant to radically down-size the white commercial 
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farming sector because it would have serious economic ramifications. The government hoped 
to improve the agricultural sector and eco-tourism's contribution to the country's GDP and 
foreign currency earnings by retaining a core of efficient large-scale commercial agricultural 
producers (Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:1-3; Moyo, 2004:8-11). 
White farmers agreed to cooperate with the government on this basis, as well as the 
reassurances that the government had given them when the 1992 Land Acquisition Act was 
first tabled before parliament. White commercial farmers said they recognised the need for 
land redistribution and suggested that the government should use the 500 000 acres of land 
that it already owned, but had not redistributed, for resettlement. Alternatively, white farmers 
suggested that the government should focus on acquiring unproductive land, including farms 
owned by the black elite (Meredith, 2003:123). 
2.S.3 Land Acquisition in the 1990s 
Contrary to the reassurances that white farmers were given, the government designated 13 
productive white farms (17 000 acres) for acquisition in Mutare district, although seven of 
the 13 designated farms were subsequently un-designated (Meredith, 2003:124). Again in 
1993 the government designated 72 highly productive farms (475000 acres) for acquisition. 
This time 27 farms out of the 72 farms that were designated were subsequently un-
designated. Many white farmers challenged the legality of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act 
because farmers could not sell or lease their property once a farm was designated, except 
with the permission of the Minister of Agriculture. Farmers could not approach the courts or 
appeal to an independent body except the Minister of Agriculture (Meredith, 2003: 124-126). 
White farmers argued that the land designation process was unconstitutional and deprived 
them of their rights to property. 
On 28 November J 997, the government published a list of J 503 farms (about 12 million 
acres or 45% of the land held by commercials farmers at the time) that it planned to 
expropriate. Affected farmers lost their title to the land, their ability to borrow money from 
banks using the land as collateral as well as the right to harvest crops on their farms and this 
fuelled racial tensions in the country (Meredith, 2003). By December 1997, 1 471 white-
owned farms had been designated for compulsory acquisition. Farms owned by blacks, 
church organisations, plantation farms, farms with Zimbabwe Investment Centre permits and 
productive single owner farms where not designated for compulsory acquisition (Utete 
Report, 2003: IS). 
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Britain, the United States of America, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
tried to intervene in defence of the rights of white farmers and threatened to withdraw aid 
packages to Zimbabwe if white property owners were not assured of fair compensation in the 
land reform process (Meredith, 2003; Utete Report, 2003: 15). Approximately 1 393 
objections were lodged in the courts and about 510 of these where upheld. However, the 
courts could not rule against the government, in most cases, because land expropriation was 
seen to be in the public interest (Von Blanckenburg, 1994:35; Moyo et ai, 1991:125). Thirty-
two of the original I 503 farms gazetted in November 1997 were eventually un-designated 
(Moyo, 2000a:15; Moyo, 2000b; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000). 
2.5.4 Land Allocation Criteria and Corruption 
Black small-scale commercial farmers/rural bourgeoisie with freehold land tenure first 
emerged around 1977 when the African Purchase Areas were created. These black farmers 
were initially numerically insignificant but they held considerable social, political and 
economic sway at the national level (Hendricks, 1995b:55). The ESAP period consolidated 
the position of these black commercial farmers and created the opportunity for closer 
interaction between them and state officials. Phase 2 of Zimbabwe's land reform saw the 
revision of land allocation criteria, to reflect a preference for more experienced farmers who 
would be able to make productive use of the land (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:82-83). 
The Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (ZFU) represented small and emerging communal, 
resettlement and commercial farmers but over 50% of ZFU members were poor, had 
inadequate land and about 40% of them rarely broke-even from farming (Moyo, 1999: 16-17). 
The situation was conducive for the growing black bourgeoisie to seek a lose alliance with 
greedy government elites who would support their class ambitions. This situation gradually 
saw the reconstitution of the black agrarian bourgeoisie to include government elites who 
sought to promote land reform at the expense of the poor by accessing large land holdings for 
private gain and participation in lucrative agri-business (as happened in Kenya), thus 
diminishing the possibility of an egalitarian land reform (Moyo, 2000a: 164; Bush and 
Szeftel, 2000: 175; Palmer, 1997:84). 
Zimbabwe's land reform soon became embroiled in scandal. By 1990, Zimbabwe's ruling 
elite had established themselves as a new class of land owners while the majority of black 
people waited for comprehensive land reform. In 1994, an independent newspaper 
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investigated increasing elite ownership of extensive prime lands and the exclusionary nature 
of economic empowerment. The newspaper discovered that one of the farms that the 
government had forcibly acquired from a white farmer in Hwedza (3 000 acres) had not been 
used for resettlement. Instead, it had been leased to Witness Mangwende, the former Minister 
of Agriculture (then serving as Minister of Education) who had aggressively pushed through 
the 1992 Land Acquisition Act (Meredith, 2003: 126). It was also discovered that many 
other government-owned farms (bought from white farmers) that were originally ear-marked 
for resettlement had been leased to senior government officials (governors, High Court 
judges, members of parliament) and ministers for nominal rent or no rent at all. The 
beneficiaries included the head of the President's office (Charles Utete), the Air Force 
Commander (Perence Shiri), the Police Commissioner (Augustine Chihuri) and Harare's then 
Executive Mayor (Solomon Tawengwa) (Meredith, 2003:127; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:45; 
Buckle, 2002:23). 
Zimbabwe's ruling elite managed to acquire about 8% of the country's commercial farmland 
since independence, although most of it was not put to any productive use (Meredith, 
2003:121). Despite these negative revelations, however, rhetoric over the land issue was 
popular around election times, for instance, during the 1995 general election campaign in 
which the government threatened to seize more white-owned farms without compensation 
(Jenkins and Knight, 2002:51). The government was criticised for its corruption and the 
tradition of "predatory elite appropriation" (Chitiyo, 2003: 163), which allowed state officials 
to own several farms; instead of allocating such land to genuinely landless people who 
needed it (Chitiyo, 2003:163 & 164; Hall, 2003:267; United States Department of State, 
2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:7; Moyo, 2000a; 200b; Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 177; 
Chattopadhyay, 2000:314). 
2.5.5 Land Administration and Tenure 
The main land tenure regimes that existed in Zimbabwe before independence and for a long 
time after it included customary/communal tenure, 99-year freehold tenure, license tenure 
and statutory allocation tenure. Customary/Communal Tenure was in terms of the Communal 
Lands Act. Inhabitants of communal land were not conferred land ownership rights to the 
land they occupied. Land use under customary tenure was not a right but was conferred at the 
discretion of the President (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb 2000). 
Rights of occupancy were conferred subject to the approval of a Rural District Councilor 
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with special consent from the Minister of Local Government. Lack of security under this 
tenure regime meant that irrespective of the duration of occupation and investment, a family 
or community could be displaced (without compensation) to make way for infrastructural 
projects such as dams (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb, 2000a). This 
was the fate of communities in Manicaland's Mutasa district when the Osborne Dam was 
constructed in the late 1990s. 
Rural District Councils were central to the process of issuing land-use permits for 
community-related uses, for instance, religious and educational. A variety of other authority 
figures, for instance, kraal heads and village chairpersons were active in land allocation 
procedures, although this resulted in confusion and conflicts between traditional leaders and 
local government structures. This decentralisation also often led to corruption at the different 
levels (Rukuni, 1994; Government of Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb, 2000a). 
Most commercial farms where held under 99-year freehold tenure (Larsson-Liden, 2000: 133; 
Von Blanckenburg, 1994:21 & 29). License Tenure was applicable to state land which was 
put to private use, for instance, for fishing, game parks, logging or safari purposes. This 
tenure regime fell outside the framework of leasehold tenure and was governed by 
contractual arrangements between individuals, companies or institutions and the state 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb, 2000a). Jenkins and Knight (2002:45) 
note that in many instances after independence, land was leased to senior government 
officials and ministers for nominal rent or no rent at all under this tenure regime. 
Statutory Allocation Tenure applied to state land allocated for a specific use by a statutory 
body. This was done in terms of an Act of Parliament that regulated and safeguarded the 
rights of the statutory body over the specified piece(s) ofland. Examples included state lands 
used by the Forestry Commission and the Parks and Wildlife Board (LandWeb, 2000a). 
Resettlement areas were regarded as state property and were governed by state permit tenure 
(Made 1998; Palmer, 1997:81-82). Un-alienated state land was a descriptive term (not a 
tenurial regime) used to refer to all vacant land which had not been allocated to any person or 
body (over which no occupation or use-rights existed). The state enjoyed title over such land 
by virtue of its sovereignty over all un-alienated land within the country 's borders 
(Land Web, 2000a). 
Land reform and resettlement created confusion between civil (District Councils) and 
traditional institutions (chiefs) and disputes arose over who had the power to register land 
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rights, allocate and administer land and resolve land disputes at local levels (Palmer, 
1997:82; Reynolds, 1996). The 1994 Land Tenure CommissionIRukuni Commission was 
established to address the problems of duplication of services and jurisdiction in land 
administration, to promote transparency in land administration, as well as to limit farm sizes, 
introduce a land tax and regulate land use (Chiremba and Masters, 2003; lenkins and Knight, 
2002:274-275; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Moyo, 2000:84; Made, 1998:211, Mbiba, 
1997). The Rukuni Commission was also tasked to look into the issue of equity, including 
gender equality, in the land reform process (Moyo, 2003:4 & 38). 
The Land Tenure Commission consulted with several women's and farmers organisations. 
The Commission found out that beneficiaries of land reform were discontent with annual 
permits of occupancy in resettlement areas. Land reform beneficiaries demanded that 
irrigation and resettlement schemes cease to be state land (Palmer, 1997:81-82). The National 
Farmers Association of Zimbabwe recommended that individual title be given to farmers for 
both arable and grazing land in resettlement areas (Larsson-Liden, 2000: 130). 
The Rukuni Commission recommended that all statutory land should be vested in a National 
Land Commission and the status of Village Assemblies was reinforced so that all village land 
became vested in them (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; van den Brink, 2000). In terms of the 
gender dimension, the Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre and Network sought freehold or 
leasehold titles to land for women (ZWRCN, 1996 cited in Larsson-Liden, 2000:160). 
Several other women's organisations argued that women were a vulnerable part of the 
population (widows, divorcees) because they are discriminated against by customary 
practices and needed protected rights to land in their individual capacities (Metcalfe and 
Vudzijena, 1996; Rudecon Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1996). Some of 
these issues and recommendations were incorporated into the government's land policies, for 
example, the issue of farm sizes and land tax. 
The government passed Statutory Instrument 419 on 24 December 1999 to prescribe 
maximum farm sizes with the view of speeding up land acquisition. Statutory Instrument 419 
was to be complimented by the introduction of a land tax for farms that exceeded the 
recommended maximum farm sizes. The government passed a Land Tax Bill through the 
Cabinet Committee and the Bill was tabled before Cabinet. The government planned that 
once the Land Tax Bill was enacted, individuals owning farms larger than the maximum 
recommended sizes would pay tax (based on land surface alone) on the area above the 
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maximum limit. Individuals could keep over-sized farms and pay taxes if they so wished but 
had to subdivide such land (at their own expense) if they decided to sell or transfer it at a 
later stage. The land subdivision was meant to ensure that landholdings conformed to the 
recommended maximum fann sizes (van den Brink, 2000:12; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000). 
Statutory Instrument 419 defined maximum A2 commercial farm sizes by Natural Region as 
shown by the Table 1 below: 
Table 1: Maximum A2 Commercial Farm Sizes by Natural Region 
Agro-ecological 
ZonelN atural 
(Van den Brink, 2000:2) 
2.5.6 Evaluation of Land Reform in Phase 2 
The 1990s were marked by the govenunent's indecision, ambivalence and inaction over the 
land issue because of the arguments put forward by technocrats within government itself, for 
example, the then Finance Minister Bernard Chidzero, Associations that represented white 
economic interest and economists who supported economic liberalisation under ESAP 
(Jenkins and Knight, 2002:48, 83). According to Meredith (2003: 123) land designation and 
acquisition procedures in the 1990s were inconsistent because the government did not follow 
the criteria set out in the 1992 Land Acquisition Act. Although the government still regarded 
land reform as the main vehicle for indigenising and empowering rural communities, it made 
low fiscal allocations for land acquisition (Jenkins and Knight, 2002). There was a 
misalignment between the government's stated land reform objectives and the mechanisms 
that where used to implement them, for instance, the low budget allocations for land reform 
already mentioned. The net effect of these was the stalling of a reform process which was 
already slow to begin with (Moyo, 2004). Where the government had targeted to resettle 7 
500 families on 500 000 hectares per year from 1990 to 2000, it only managed to resettle 2 
000 families on 50000 hectares per year (Moyo, 1998 cited in LandWeb, 2000a). Less than 
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I million hectares of land were actually acquired for distribution in the 1990s and less than 
20000 families were resettled (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; LandWeb, 2000a). In 1999, 
according to Human Rights Watch (2002:7), nearly 11 million hectares of prime land 
remained in the hands of 4 500 commercial farmers, most of them white. 
Zimbabwe's land reform in the 1990s was criticised for its 'techno-rational goals' because 
policy makers were preoccupied with land management issues instead of land redistribution 
(Chitiyo, 2003:177; Moyo, 2000a; 200b). Economists maintained that the social and political 
gains of land reform would not compensate for consequent reductions in national income 
(economic). Von Blanckenburg (1994:7) supports this view that wholesale land expropriation 
is counter-productive and maintains that "an equal distribution of land is neither possible, 
because not enough land is available to satisfy all the needs of the landless, nor is it 
economically advisable." Arguments against extensive land reform were based on the 
presumption that commercial farming is more efficient and profitable and that extensive 
reform would lower productivity because it implies the division of large landholdings into 
smaller ones (Larsson-Liden, 2000:129 & 133; Alexander, 2000; Warriner, 1969:37 & 45). 
Moyo (1995:278) maintains that dominant economic arguments during the ESAP period 
were flawed in that they over-estimated the productive role of commercial farmers and 
under-played increasing productivity among peasants and resettled farmers. Masilela and 
Weiner (1996) criticise the economic arguments used in this period because they compared 
high input commercial farms on medium-high potential arable land with lower input 
communal and resettlement areas with significantly greater soil and water constraints. 
In spite of these objections, however, economists succeeded in convincing the government 
and stakeholders like the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) and the Zimbabwe Farmers ' 
Union (ZFU) that expropriating large tracts of productive farmland from white commercial 
farmers would ruin the country's economic base and was, therefore, undesirable (Made, 
1998: (97). 
Commercial farms held under 99-year freehold tenure accounted for 11.2 million hectares of 
agricultural land between 1991-1993 and were the largest single employer; employing about 
a quarter of the country's formal sector work force (about 1.9 million people) (Larsson-
Liden, 2000:133; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:21 & 29). Large-scale commercial farms supplied 
a third of the manufacturing sector's raw materials and were essential to the country's 
domestic consumption and export/foreign currency earnings (commercial farms produced 
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tobacco, beef, milk and milk products, cotton, malze, sugarcane, coffee, tea, wheat, 
groundnuts, soya-beans, potatoes). Apart from the established value of commercial farms to 
the country, ESAP promised accelerated export-led economic growth by encouraging the 
conversion of existing land uses to a focus on horticultural production (cut-flowers, 
vegetables and fruits) and game ranching (Moyo, 2000a; 200b). Until 1996, ESAP's neo-
liberal outlook held sway and demanded policy makers to consider the economic rationale of 
maintaining the productive and foreign currency earning capacity of commercial farms over 
the people's political and social aspirations (Von Blanckenburg, 1994:3 & 32; Riddell, 1992: 
2 & 101; Moyo et ai, 1991:125). 
Skalnes (1995 cited in Moyo, 2000a:18 & 74) concludes that ESAP's "contradictory macro-
economic and agrarian policies were intended to curb excessive government intervention in 
land and related markets by using co-optation strategies to marginalise land reform," thus 
validating existing unequal land ownership patterns. The shift towards land reform with an 
emphasis on promoting production efficiency and effective land use by committed, non-
absentee land owners negated the promise and momentum of significant land reform which 
had been heralded by the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 (Moyo, 2000a: IS). 
The government's resolve in addressing the land question was neutralised as the government 
avoided widespread land expropriation from white farmers in order to retain investor 
confidence. Further, to this end, the government committed itself to assisting commercial 
farmers in evicting squatters from their land (Chitiyo, 2003: 176-177; Chiremba and Masters, 
2003). This state of affairs was testimony that markets alone could not facilitate significant 
land reform at the rate required to achieve the political and social/welfare objectives for 
which land reform was intended and this resulted in mounting disgruntlement amongst the 
black majority (Deininger, 2003:11-17,143). 
According to Moyo (2000a: 145), peasant farmers and the landless did not benefit from the 
purported socio-economic benefits ofESAP's macro-economic land policy. Moyo (1999:2, 3 
& 7) also comments that the outcomes of land reform (access to land and related resources) 
in this period were not transparent or equitable. Rural people were disgruntled by land reform 
because most of them desperately needed comprehensive land reform as a means of survival 
in the wake of dire economic hardships induced by ESAP. Moyo (2003:8) concludes that 
ESAP "effected pauperization on one hand and accumulation on the other" between the poor 
and the ruling elite. Urban and rural poverty increased dramatically and began to undermine 
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the government's popularity (Moyo, 2000a:165). This situation was compounded by 
increases in the cost of living (150% between 1998 and 1999) because of high inflation and 
interest rates, severe food, water, fuel and electricity shortages. Real wages deteriorated 
drastically and people experienced widespread job losses, rising unemployment and a sharp 
decline in their standard of living (Larsson-Liden, 2000: 128 & 131 ; Krieger, 2000:445; 
Burkett, 2000:471; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:33; Riddell, 1992:22). The economy's dismal 
performance, partly because of failed structural adjustment and poor agricultural reform, 
fuelled domestic unrest which culminated in a mass stay-way or general strike on 9 
December 1997. The protest was organised by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU, at the time comprised of 27 unions with a membership of 400 000, about a third of 
Zimbabwe's formal labour force) (Meredith, 2003:140-141). 
On top of these problems, government corruption and the general mismanagement of the land 
reform programme compelled Britain to withhold further support for Zimbabwe's land 
reform after having spent £44 million on it since 1980 (Meredith, 2003: 121 & 127). Britain 
offered two main reasons for suspending its financial support of Zimbabwe's land reform. 
The first one, according to Bush and Szeftel (2000: 178) was because "the wrong people were 
benefiting from land reform." Government officials were benefiting from land reform instead 
of the poor and landless. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank also 
refused to continue to bankroll Zimbabwe's land reform and resettlement programme on this 
basis (Meredith, 2003:148-149,157; Chattopadhyay, 2000:310). 
The second reason for Britain's withdrawal of financial support was given by Britain's 
Minister for International Development who wrote to the Zimbabwean government in 1997 
saying; "We do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land 
purchase in Zimbabwe" (Utete Report, 2003:15; Human Rights Watch, 2002:7). The 
Zimbabwean government reacted by saying that the money that it expected Britain to 
contribute towards its land reform was a matter of historic obligation (Human Rights Watch, 
2002:7). It further accused Britain and America of seeking to frustrate its legitimate land 
reform efforts. 
Zimbabwe's experience of financial withdrawal by donors can be juxtaposed with that of 
Kenya, also a former British colony. Immediately after independence the new Kenyan 
government embarked on the 'million acre scheme' which distributed 300 000 hectares of 
formerly white-owned large estates to small farmers. Deininger (2003: 145) attributes the 
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reform' s success (partly) to British funding. The British government's Department for 
International Development (DIFD) continues to support several of Kenya' s land policies and 
projects (livestock, aquatic resources, land tenure, crops, natural resources management), 
mostly through bi-lateral funding arrangements, for example, it has invested £582 846 in 
Kenya's forestry projects, £96 535 in water projects and £99 840 in natural ecosystem 
projects (Natural Resources Information System, accessed 05/05/2005). 
2.S.7 Conclusion 
Although the period 1990-1998 was characterised by comparatively radical land reform 
discourses and accompanied by supportive legislative changes to enable easier land 
redistribution, in practice, little land was transferred from the commercial farming sector to 
the poor (Moyo, 2000a:72, Moyo, 2000b). Land reform was politically unsatisfactory 
because ESAP's neo-liberal economic imperatives contradicted the political objectives of 
accelerating land reform (Moyo, 1999:8). As discussed above, the neo-liberal influence of 
ESAP circumscribed the government's land acquisition and allocation efforts. Instead of the 
government's initial focus on giving land to the unemployed, displaced and destitute; the 
government adopted the Malaysian model of selecting capable or qualified small-scale black 
commercial farmers (represented by the CFU) as reform beneficiaries because it believed that 
they were better able to fully utilise the land (Larsson-Liden, 2000:133 ; Made, 1998:199; 
Moyo, 1995:61,118, 272 & 280; Stiles, 1994). Larsson-Liden (2000:130) quotes President 
Mugabe as having said in January 1993 that "land reform and resettlement is no longer a 
home making exercise." Such pronouncements over the unresolved land issue sowed seeds of 
discontent among the people because as Riddell (1992:14) notes; "the Mugabe government's 
legitimacy and power was based on a nationalist platform as well as an explicit commitment 
to socialism," with the land question firmly embedded at the heart of people's aspirations and 
expectations. The situation was worsened by recurrent droughts as well as ESAP-induced 
cuts in budget allocations to agricultural parastatals that assisted resettled farmers, resulting 
in bad harvests (Moyo, 1998:219). 
Although the government maintained that the land issue was non-negotiable, the results of 
land reform in the 1990s proved otherwise. The land issue remained unresolved at a time 
when the number of people dependent on subsistence agriculture was growing much faster 
than the pace of land reform (Riddell, 1992:101). Widespread public discontentment over 
inadequate land reform and declining standards of living (the general strike and food riots) 
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renewed mobilisation and agitation for comprehensive land reform and eventually forced the 
government to rethink its position on land reform. In 1997, the government vowed to 
vigorously pursue the compulsory land acquisition agenda and to disregard court decisions 
that stood in its way (Meredith, 2003). The government's recornmitment to land reform gave 
birth to the third phase of Zimbabwe's land reform which covers the period 1998 to the 
present. This last phase is discussed in detail in the rest of this paper. 
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3 
The Political and Economic Context for the Fast-Track Land 
Reform Programme 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the context for the fast-track land reform prograuune in terms of 
Zimbabwe's social (the national question and the deteriorating status of white citizenship), 
economic decline, Zimbabwe's ill-timed military intervention in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the 2000 and 2002 elections and the strategic position of war veterans at the time that 
the reform was conceived and implemented (Chan, 2003). War veterans were an important 
link between events that followed the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA) in 1997 to initiate debate on a new constitution and Phase 3 of Zimbabwe's land 
reform which began in 1998. Land reform in this period was still partly a response to the 
country's colonial history of large-scale expropriation of land rights from the indigenous 
people by white settlers, coupled with increased scarcity of productive land because of 
population growth. Zimbabwe's black majority was disgruntled because by 1999, 
predominantly white farmers still owned about 4 500 large-scale commercial farms (about 11 
million hectares of prime land or 28% of the total land surface) (Human Rights Watch, 
2002:2). Apart from the slow rate of land acquisition effected thus far ; the land that had been 
acquired for redistribution had been allocated to government Ministers and senior officials, 
instead of the landless peasantry (Meredith, 2003:121-127; Chitiyo, 2003:163 & 164; Hall, 
2003:267; Human Rights Watch, 2002:2 & 7; Moyo, 2000a; 200b; Bush and Szeftel, 
2000:177; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314). The Zimbabwean government was under extreme 
pressure to urgently address the longstanding, unequal, race-based patterns of land ownership 
that persisted in the country more than two decades after independence. 
The land issue was compounded by a lack of economic opportunities in other sectors of the 
economy (stagnation) in the aftermath of failed structural adjustment prograuunes. By 1996, 
an under-performing economy and rapidly deteriorating economic climate in Zimbabwe 
compelled many people to question the ruling Zanu-PF party's commitment to the ideals and 
principles it had set for itself during the liberation struggle (Buckle, 2002: 12). Fast-track land 
reform was catalysed by growing political instability on two overlapping fronts. The fiscal 
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and economic crisis gave birth to strong political opposition (Movement for Democratic 
Change, MDC) and renewed mass mobilisation for land reform created a legitimacy crisis for 
the Mugabe regime on the eve of the 2000 parliamentary election (Deininger, 2003:133). In 
order to re-affirm its legitimacy and regain the people's support, the government decided to 
pursue a radical course of action to address the land issue. Zimbabwe's land reform from 
2000 onwards was unlike any other attempts that the government had made before and it 
discussed in detail in the remaining chapters because it provides the background for the 
enquiry into the responses to fast-track land reform and the relatively infrequent and less-
violent incidences of illegal land occupations in Vumba and Burma Valley, compared to 
other parts of the country. 
3.2 Reconciliation and the National Question 
The 1969 census showed that 41 % of whites in then Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) had 
been born there; 23% had been born in the United Kingdom and 22% had been born in South 
Africa (Jenkins and Knight, 2002). The Zimbabwean government pursued a national policy 
of reconciliation with the former colonial administration of white British settlers after 
independence in 1980. At independence, President Mugabe embraced Zimbabwe's white 
community saying; 
"If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with 
the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself...The wrongs of the past 
must now stand forgiven and forgotten ... It could never be a correct justification that 
because the white oppressed us yesterday when they had power, the blacks must 
oppress them today because they have power. An evil remains an evil whether 
practiced by white against black or black against white" (cited in Meredith, 2003:15). 
There were more economic continuities than discontinuities at independence because the 
white community still dominated Zimbabwe's agriculture, commerce, industry and banking. 
It controlled bodies like the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), Zimbabwe 
National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) and the 
Employers Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ). The white community also possessed a 
virtual monopoly on high level skills (Chan, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:26, 39-40, 271). 
Despite all this, the government reassured the white community that there would be no 
nationalisation of white-owned farms, mines or industries (Meredith, 2003:14). The new 
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government was reluctant to radically alter the economic status quo in the first decade of 
Zimbabwe's independence (1980-1990) because it appreciated the need to retain the 
confidence of its former adversaries and investors. The govermnent wanted to build a good 
working relationship with the white community to minimise the flight of essential skills that 
were needed to rebuild the country after the two liberation wars (Meredith, 2003 :41; Chan, 
2003; Buckle, 2002). 
In the political arena, twenty of Zimbabwe's hundred members of parliament (MPs) were 
white. The white MPs were selected separately by the white community from the 
Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe and this arrangement was in force for the first five years 
of Zimbabwe's independence in accordance with provisions of the Lancaster House 
Agreement (Olaleye, 2005:6; Utete Report, 2003:15; Chan, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 
2002:25). Von Blanckenburg, (1994:128) notes that white farmers were not really influential 
in post-independence Zimbabwe's ruling party or in parliament but the then prime minister, 
Robert Mugabe, specially appointed two white ministers. One of them was Dennis Norman, a 
former president of the Commercial Farmer's Union. Norman became the Minister of 
Agriculture in a carefully planned strategy to control white farmers (containing their power 
and influence). White farmers numbered about 6 000 at independence in 1980 and owned 
about half the country's land (two-thirds of the most fertile land). They employed about one-
third of Zimbabwe's wage earning labour force (271 000 people in 1980) (Meredith, 
2003:14). White land ownership was protected by the Lancaster House agreement and this 
ensured their continued dominance of the economy (Olaleye, 2005:6; Deininger, 2003: 144-
145; Meredith, 2003:119; Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Hall, 2003:256; Lee, 2003:1; Jenkins 
and Knight, 2002:25 & 82; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 7; Buckle, 2002:11; Zinyama, 
2001:163,167,174; Krieger, 2000:445; Palmer, 2000:39; Made, 1998:191 -195; Palmer, 
1997:3 03; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:30; Moyo et ai, 1991:15; Astrow, 1983). Apart from the 
guarantees given to them by the Lancaster House Agreement, white farmers (and the 
community in general believed that their rights were secure because the new govemment's 
policy of reconciliation further allowed them to retain considerable property and personal 
wealth. White farmers were treated surprisingly well because they accounted for three-
quarters of the Zimbabwe's agricultural output (about one-third of total exports) (Meredith, 
2003:55). According to Meredith (2003:44-45), the reassurances that white farmers received 
from the new government even convinced some of them to support it (Meredith, 2003 :44-
45). Unfortunately, however, this honeymoon did not last long. 
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3.3 The Deteriorating Status of White Citizenship 
Despite the goodwill and reassurances given to the white community through the national 
policy of reconciliation outlined above, significant numbers of the white community (retired 
civil servants, former soldiers and policemen, skilled artisans and professionals like doctors, 
accountants, teachers and nurses) left Zimbabwe at independence, mainly to South Africa. 
The exodus slowly gathered momentum and within three years of independence, about half 
the white population had emigrated. The white population fell from an estimated 300 000 to 
about 100 000 and this flight forced the government to import expensive expatriates to curb 
the skills deficit that was being created (Meredith, 2003:46 & 55; Jenkins and Knight, 
2002:88, 190-19). Racial tensions first became apparent in 1985 when President Mugabe 
wamed the white community that; 
" ... Those whites who have not accepted the reality of a political order in which 
Africans set the pace will have to leave the country. We are working with those whites 
who want to work with us. But the rest will have to find a new home." (cited in 
Meredith, 2003 :56). 
These tensions gradually snowballed in the 1990s. President Mugabe labelled the white 
community "a greedy bunch of racist usurpers" because they numbered no more than 80 000 
by 1995, yet it still controlled most of Zimbabwe's mines, manufacturing industries and 
commercial agriculture (Meredith, 2003:123). President Mugabe denounced the white 
community for seeking to perpetuate economic domination and called for affirmative action 
in the "indigenisation of the economy" (Meredith, 2003:123-129). The Indigenous Business 
Development Centre (IBDC) was launched in 1990 to facilitate black participation in, and 
control of the economy. The IBDC represented 4 000 black-owned businesses and in 1992, 
Z$150 million was set aside by the government to benefit black-owned businesses. The 
Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO) was also established to channel about 
30% of government tenders to black businesses (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:26, 39-40, 271). 
White farmers were the natural targets because of their monopoly on Zimbabwe's 
agricultural sector, although they were periodically given reassurances by the government 
that they had nothing to fear because they contributed greatly to the national economy 
(Meredith, 2003; Chiremba and Masters, 2003; Tshuma, 1997; Adams, 1995 cited in 
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LandWeb, 2000a). Without warning or consultation with the Commercial Farmer's Union, 
the government gazetted thirteen productive white farms (17 000 acres) for compulsory 
acquisition in Mutare district. One of the designated farms was a dairy farm that supplied 
milk to Mutare and another was a leading tobacco producer (Meredith, 2003:124). The 
government designated another 72 highly productive farms (475000 acres) for acquisition in 
1993. The list included several farms that belonged to political opponents, for example, 
James Chikerema and Ndabaningi Sithole. Sithole owned Churu Farm and was the original 
leader of Zanu and long time adversary of President Mugabe. 
White farmers challenged the legality of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act because; once a farm 
was designated, the farmer could not sell or lease the property, except with the permission of 
the Minister of Agriculture. Farmers could not approach the courts or appeal to an 
independent body except the said minister (Meredith, 2003:124-126; Chitiyo, 2003:163; Von 
Blanckenburg, 1994:34; Riddell, 1992:81). The government maintained that the land issue 
was non-negotiable and vowed to disregard court decisions that prevented it from 
compulsorily acquiring white-owned land (Tshuma, 1997). The land issue became 
increasingly bitter. Britain, the United States of America, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund tried to intervene to protect the rights of white farmers and 
threatened to withdraw non-humanitarian aid packages to Zimbabwe if white property 
owners were not assured of fair compensation for land that was expropriated from them 
(Meredith, 2003:123). In September 1993, President Mugabe denounced Western 
governments that were criticising his land policies as the two quotes below show: 
"How can these countries who have stolen land from the Red Indians, the Aborigines 
and Eskimos dare to tell us what to do with our land?" (cited in Meredith, 2003: 126). 
"If white settlers just took the land from us without paying for it, we can in a similar 
way just take it from them, without paying for it, or entertaining any ideas of legality 
and constitutionality." (Meredith, 2003:126). 
The government alienated and demonised Zimbabwe' s white community through racist 
attacks carried by government-controlled newspapers because it resented continued white 
monopoly on economic power and blamed it for the country's economic problems and 
vowed to pursue the land issue more vigorously (Chan, 2003). In October 1997, President 
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Mugabe announced; "We are going to take the land and we are not going to pay a cent to any 
soul...If Britain wants us to compensate its children, it must give us the money ... " 
(Meredith, 2003:138-139). The government said it was only prepared to pay compensation 
for buildings, dams, roads and other infrastructural improvements (at an unspecified date in 
the future), but not the land itself (Meredith, 2003: 195). On 28 November 1997, the 
government published a list of I 503 farms (about 12 million acres or 45% of the land still 
held by white commercials farmers) that it planned to expropriate. Affected farmers lost their 
title to the land, their ability to borrow money from banks using the land as collateral as well 
as the right to harvest crops from their land. These developments fuelled the racial tensions 
that already existed. By the end of 1997, 1 471 white-owned farms had been designated for 
compulsory acquisition. Thirty-two of the original 1 503 farms gazetted in November 1997 
were eventually de-listed because they had not been listed in terms of the set criteria for 
compulsory land acquisition (Meredith, 2003; Moyo, 2000a:15; Moyo, 2000b; Palmer and 
Toulmin, 2000). 
3.4 The Rise of War Veterans as a Formidable Force 
This section discusses Zimbabwe's liberation war veterans because they played, and continue 
to play, a crucial role in Zimbabwe since the inception of the fast-track land reform 
programme. At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had about 60 000 ex-combatants who 
fought the Chimurenga war of liberation. After de-mobilisation, about 20 000 of these ex-
combatants were integrated into Zimbabwe's National Army (Meredith, 2003:83; Human 
Rights Watch, 2002:8). The rest were paid small monthly pensions for two years and then 
left to their own devices. Many of them had left school to join the liberation war and had no 
educational qualifications or vocational skills. About 30 000 of them were unemployed or 
destitute and roamed the towns looking for work (Meredith, 2003:83; Human Rights Watch, 
2002:8). The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association was formed in 1989 
to lobby the government for assistance to improve the plight of ex-combatants. The 
government opened negotiations with this body in 1991 and laws, including the War Victims 
Compensation Act of 1993, were passed in the war veterans' favour. However, tensions 
existed between the government and the war veterans because many of the war veterans 
believed they had been short-changed by the government (neglected and disillusioned) 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002:8). 
The composition of war veterans as a constituency changed significantly during the course of 
the fast-track land reform progranune. In everyday usage, the term war veteran became 
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synonymous with a more dynamic and diverse mix of people including; legitimate/bonafide 
liberation war veterans, lawless gangs composed primarily of Zanu-PF supporters, youth 
militias (too young to have fought in Zimbabwe's liberation war) and land hungry peasants 
(Buckle, 2002:29). 
Zimbabwe's growing economic crisis and the government's own legitimacy crisis worsened 
when the government capitulated to liberation war veterans' demands for pensions and 
disability compensations in 1997, following the defrauding of the War Victims 
Compensation Fund. The government was forced to suspend disbursements from the War 
Victims Compensation Fund in 1996 because between Z$450 and $500 million was looted 
from the fund by those who administered it (Meredith, 2003:133-134). Those implicated in 
defrauding the War Victims Compensation Fund included senior politicians, officials and 
their relatives. War veterans responded by demanding compensation from as far back as 
1992. They also demanded that those responsible for looting the War Victims Compensation 
Fund be investigated but the government tried to ignore these demands. President Mugabe 
initially refused to meet with them but the war veterans were up for the challenge. Later, 
President Mugabe tried to appease the war veterans by appointing a commission of inquiry 
led by Judge Godfrey Chidyausiku to investigate the issue of the missing funds (Meredith, 
2003). 
The Chidyausiku Commission found that numerous government officials and their relatives 
had made claims for various questionable chronic illnesses and disabilities, and had been 
compensated, for example; Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri had been awarded 
Z$138 645 for "toe dermatitis"; Air Force Commander Perence Shiri had been awarded Z$90 
249 for "polyarthritis and mental stress disorder"; Commander of the Defence Forces Vitalis 
Zvinavashe had been awarded Z$224 395 for "skin allergy and chest injuries"; Minister 
Joyce Mujuru had been awarded Z$389 472 for "poor vision and mental stress disorder" 
(Meredith, 2003:137; Buckle, 2002:238). The chairman of the War Veterans Association, 
Chenjerai 'Hitler' HUllZvi, had also been awarded Z$517 536 (US$43 300) for injuries which 
included "impaired hearing and sciatic pains of the thigh." According to his claims, Hunzvi 
had a disability rating of 118% (Meredith, 2003:137; Buckle, 2002:238). 
The Chidyausiku Commission also found evidence that the War Victims Compensation Fund 
corruption scam involved President Mugabe's own relatives. His brother-in-law, Reward 
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Marufu, had been awarded Z$822 668 (about US$70 000) for "a scar on his left knee and 
ulcers." In total Marufu was classified as having a 95% disability (Meredith, 2003:137). 
Reeling from the embarrassment of this scandal, President Mugabe promised to resume 
compensation and pension payments to the war veterans but this was little consolation to the 
war veterans who proceeded to hold protest marches in Harare for three consecutive days in 
July 1997. They hailed insults at the government and denounced President Mugabe for 
neglecting them after independence. President Mugabe eventually agreed to meet with the 
war veterans on 21 August 1997 but by then, the war veterans had become more aggressive. 
Their demands then included the resumption of payments from the War Victims 
Compensation Fund, plus Z$50 000 once-off gratuities and monthly pensions of Z$20 000 
(for life) for each of the 50 000 war veterans that were registered with the Zimbabwe 
National Liberation War Veterans Association (Meredith, 2003:133-136). 
Apart from monetary compensation, the war veterans also demanded that half the ex-
combatants be given resettlement land by December 1997. The other half had to be allocated 
resettlement land by July 1998. The war veterans threatened to occupy white-owned farms if 
the government did not respond promptly to their demands (Olaleye, 2005:7; Meredith, 
2003: 133-136). 
President Mugabe reluctantly gave-in to war veteran demands in September 1997 after the 
findings of the Chidyausiku Commission became public. Apart from the unbudgeted Z$50 
000 once-off gratuities, Z$2 000 monthly pensions and land, President Mugabe (patron of the 
War Veterans Association) promised war veterans free health care and free education at an 
estimated cost of at least $4 billion, which the government did not have because of the fiscal 
crisis it was already in (Meredith, 2003:137). Donors, for example, the World Bank, 
suspended lending arrangements with Zimbabwe when President Mugabe announced in 
November 1997 that the war veterans would be paid their gratuities and pensions by 
Christmas 1997. The donors suspected that the money was being diverted to pay war 
veterans' pensions and gratuities. These developments forced the value of the Zimbabwean 
dollar to plunge even further. Not only was the government's decision ill-timed; it was not 
sustainable in the medium-long term and thus put tremendous strain on Zimbabwe's finances 
(Meredith, 2003:148-149, 157; Jenkins and Knight, 2002; Chattopadhyay, 2000:310). The 
government tried to impose new taxes and levies to pay for the president's pledges to the war 
veterans but this move was highly unpopular (Meredith, 2003:139). 
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3.5 Military Intervention in the Congo 
Apart from the extra taxes introduced to pay war veterans, the Zimbabwean government 
decided to spend more money by intervening in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). President Mugabe became chairman of SADC's defence arm in 1996 and 
decided, without consulting parliament or the cabinet, to intervene militarily in the civil war 
in the DRC. Zimbabwe initially deployed 3 000 troops, together with combat aircraft and 
armoured vehicles to the DRC. The number of Zimbabwean troops in the DRC eventually 
rose to about 12 000 and special allowances were paid to all the soldiers serving in the DRC. 
The intervention is reported to have cost Zimbabwe US$1 million per day (Chitiyo, 
2003:177; Mlambo, 2003:195; Meredith, 2003:148-157; Chan, 2003; Sachikonye, 2002:14; 
Chattopadhyay, 2000:310; Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 177-178; Krieger, 2000:443-444; Burkett, 
2000:471). The DRC president Laurent Kabila offered mining and timber concessions, 
preferential trade in diamonds, cobalt and other minerals so that Zimbabwe could recoup the 
costs of the intervention. Unfortunately, however, the main beneficiaries turned out to be a 
select group of Zimbabwe' s defence officials and other businessmen from amongst the ruling 
elite. These included Zanu-PF's business controller Emmerson Mnangagwa, millionaire 
arms-dealer John Bredenkamp and Armed Forces Commander General Vitalis Zvinavashe. 
These individuals capitalised on the DRC crisis by transporting food and other consumer 
goods (hauling contracts) and supplying arms and ammunition (Meredith, 2003:148-149; 
Chan, 2003). 
Opinion polls in Zimbabwe showed that the unbudgeted payments to war veterans and 
Zimbabwe's military involvement in the DRC were very unpopular decisions at a time when 
the country was already facing a severe financial crisis. Western governments and other 
donors queried the rationale of providing Zimbabwe with financial assistance for land reform 
and other economic initiatives when its leaders were prepared to squander obscene amounts 
of money on foreign adventures in which Zimbabwe had no real stake, and which did not 
benefit ordinary poor Zimbabweans (Meredith, 2003:148-149; Chan, 2003; Jenkins and 
Knight, 2002). Zimbabwe's creditworthiness proved questionable because of the 
government's apparent economic recklessness at a time when Zimbabwe's economic, social 
and political circumstances were deteriorating rapidly. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank and Britain withheld loans from Zimbabwe in November 1997, 
despite the crippling balance of payments crisis it was already experiencing because offailed 
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structural adjustment (Meredith, 2003: 148-149 & 157; Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 178; 
Chattopadhyay, 2000:310). 
The deteriorating economIc situation provoked mass resistance, led by the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and led to a general strike on 9 December 1997 
(Meredith, 2003: 139). President Mugabe responded by issuing a decree under the 
Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act banning national strikes for six months. He 
also threatened to suspend the registration of any trade union found to be defying the decree 
and to imprison trade union organisers. Further, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) 
was mandated to investigate the ZCTU's source of funding (Meredith, 2003:162; 
Raftopoulos, 1996: 17). The worsening economic situation in Zimbabwe erupted in food riots 
across the country in January 1998 after a series of food price increases, where in many cases 
the prices of maize-meal, cooking oil and rice had doubled or trebled. The riots were reported 
as the worst outbreak of urban violence since independence and the army deployed troops on 
the streets to contain crowds of angry protestors for the first time since 1980 (Meredith, 
2003: 141; Sachikonye, 2002: 14; Chattopadhyay, 2000:310; Larsson-Liden, 2000: 131). 
3.6 The National Constitutional Assembly and the Movement for Democratic Change 
Zimbabwe's worsening economic crisis undermined the government's popularity and 
threatened its legitimacy even more such that strong political opposition forces began to 
emerge. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) formed an alliance with civic 
organisations (church organisations, human rights groups, lawyers and journalists) and 
launched the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998 to initiate debate on a new 
constitution and to seek public support for it. The Secretary-General of the ZCTU, Morgan 
Tsvangirai, was the president of the NCA (Olaleye, 2005:8; Karume, 2005:37-39; Meredith, 
2003: 162). The government countered this move by appointing its own Constitutional 
Commission in April 1999. Most of the Commission's 400 members were Mugabe's 
nominees from Zanu-PF and included 147 members of parliament. The Commission was 
mandated to draft a new constitution which would be put to the electorate in a national 
referendum (Olaleye, 2005:8). 
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed in September 1999 amidst these 
constitutional revisions and Morgan Tsvangirai was chosen as its leader (Olaleye, 2005:8 ; 
Meredith, 2003:163). The MDC was Zimbabwe's first serious opposition political party. 
White Zimbabweans in general, and white commercial farmers and businesses in particular, 
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were among the most prominent MDC supporters and this gave Zimbabwe's ruling Zanu-PF 
party an opportunity to castigate the MDC as a front for "white imperialist interests" 
(Karume, 2005:39). The MDC was also widely popular amongst the black urban electorate 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002:9; Raftopoulos, 2002) and there were other smaller parties like 
the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD) that demanded an accountable and open 
government. 
The government's Constitutional Commission released its draft constitution in November 
1999 but the draft constitution was reportedly full of loopholes, including provisions that 
would greatly strengthen the government and the President (by giving him sweeping powers) 
at the expense of parliament (Meredith, 2003:163). The proposed amendments did not 
provide sufficient oversight powers for parliament and the judiciary and would allow the 
president to, inter alia, serve an additional twelve years and to retain powers to appoint 30 of 
the 150 members of parliament (patronage). Without consulting the Constitutional 
Commission, President Mugabe inserted an amendment allowing the compulsory acquisition 
of white-owned land without compensation (Meredith, 2003:163-165 ; Jenkins and Knight, 
2002:83; Buckle, 2002:13 & 41; Human Rights Watch, 2002:9; La Guardia and Blair, 2000; 
Centre for Democracy and Development Observer Mission, 2000). The Commercial 
Farmers' Union was strongly opposed to this particular amendment and mobilised the white 
farming community against endorsing the revised draft constitution (Meredith, 2003 : 164). 
The revised constitution was submitted to a national referendum in February 2000 and was 
rejected by between 53% and 60% of the votes cast, even though voter turnout was low 
(Olaleye, 2005:8; Utete Report, 2003:16 & 30; Chan, 2003; Buckle, 2002:13). Meredith 
(2003:165) reports that only a quarter of the electorate voted (1312738 out ofa potential 5 
million voters). Buckle (2002:105) notes that Mashonaland East province registered the 
highest "No" votes in the February 2000 constitutional referendum. Meredith (2003: 165) also 
notes that most "No" votes came from urban blacks and that 60% of the votes were cast in 
the main centres of Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and six other provincial towns. This defeat 
came amidst allegations that the government cunningly influenced the constitution drafting 
process by interfering with the appointment of members of the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA) and the Constitutional Commission, as well as their work. The Centre for 
Democracy and Development Observer Mission (2000) reports that the "government's 
partisan behaviour" created acrimony between the N CA and the Constitutional Commission 
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and discredited the revised constitution in the eyes of the public. It is also noted that some 
constitutional amendments were inserted into the revised draft constitution against protests 
from members of the government's own Constitutional Commission (Human Rights Watch, 
2002:9; La Guardia and Blair, 2000; Centre for Democracy and Development Observer 
Mission, 2000). 
As outlined above, the revision of the constitution and the referendum coincided with the rise 
of the MDC as a serious political opposition party that was challenging the government's 
economic policies and governance (power-sharing, transparency and corruption scandals, 
mass unemployment and the DRC intervention) (Meredith, 2003:164). The ruling Zanu-PF's 
defeat in the February 2000 referendum was historic in that it was the first time that the party 
had lost a popular vote since independence in 1980 (Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Chan, 2003; La 
Guardia and Blair, 2000). This "humiliating defeat", however, did not deter the government 
from pushing through the provision that would allow it to compulsorily acquire white-owned 
land without compensation (La Guardia and Blair, 2000). The government recommitted itself 
to land reform in order to maintain its legitimacy in the face of growing discontent and 
political opposition. The government announced that the constitutional amendment regarding 
land acquisition without compensation would come into effect within a month of the 
amendment being passed (Utete Report, 2003:16; Buckle, 2002:13). President Mugabe gave 
new impetus to the land question because, if manipulated well, it would boost the ruling 
party's dwindling support base, especially in the rural areas (its traditional support base) 
where the land issue was still strongly associated with the liberation war (Meredith, 
2003:164-165; United States Department of State, 2003; Krieger, 2000:443-444; Bush and 
Szeftel, 2000:179; Chattopadhyay, 2000:315; Sachikonye, 2002: 17; La Guardia and Blair, 
2000). 
3.7 The Original Plans for Zimbabwe's Land Reform Phase 3 
As Zimbabwe's economic crisis worsened following the implementation of economIc 
structural adjustment programmes, the role of donors became more central and two Donors' 
Conferences where convened in Harare in 1998 to discuss Zimbabwe's on-going land reform 
issues, particularly the financing of land acquisition/compensation of white farmers; bearing 
in mind the scandals and corruption that had derailed the process in the past. The 
Zimbabwean government met with Western donors in March 1998 and the Agriculture 
Minister, Kumbirai Kangai, signed undertakings to postpone the wholesale expropriation of 
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white-owned farms. Minister Kangai reassured donors that productive white farms would not 
be seized and that the few white farmers who would be affected by land reform would be 
compensated the full value of their land. The government also reassured donors that land 
reform would be conducted in accordance with the law and in a transparent manner 
(Meredith, 2003: 142). 
Another Donors' Conference was held in Harare from 9-11 September 1998. Its aim was to 
build consensus among the various stakeholders and to devise a new, comprehensive land 
reform plan for Zimbabwe. Representatives from 48 countries and international organisations 
(including Britain, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden (European Union) the United States of 
America, China, Cuba, South Africa, the World Bank, the IMF, the United Nations 
Development Programme) and local delegates from the Commercial Farmers Union, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector and civic organisations attended the 
conferences. The Zimbabwean government presented its case for land reform as one of basic 
human rights and political necessity. The delegates unanimously agreed on the political 
imperatives and urgent need to address persistent, race-based imbalances in Zimbabwe's land 
ownership patterns (Meredith, 2003:143; Utete Report, 2003:16; Human Rights Watch, 
2002:8). They also agreed on the economic need for comprehensive land reform and 
resettlement in Zimbabwe because they believed that land reform could playa pivotal role in 
poverty reduction, political stability and economic growth (Meredith, 2003:143; Utete 
Report, 2003: 16; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8). 
The Zimbabwean government and donors agreed that the new land reform programme would 
begin with a 2-year Inception Phase (learning/trial period) from October 1998 to June 2000 
to ascertain its viability. The target for the Inception Phase was to acquire 841 farms covering 
2.1 million hectares for resettlement. These farms had previously been designated for 
compulsory acquisition but, for various reasons had not been acquired. The govermnent also 
wanted to redistribute the 118 farms/200 000 hectares (700 000 acres) which had already 
been offered by white farmers, particularly those that owned more than one farm (Meredith, 
2003:144; Utete Report, 2003:16). It must be noted, however, that this seemingly voluntary, 
noble, goodwill gesture by white farmers was the result of increasing political and social 
pressures as the country's economic fortunes ebbed away and the masses became 
increasingly agitated (Meredith, 2003: 140-141; Sachikonye, 2002: 14; Chattopadhyay, 
2000:310; Larsson-Liden, 2000:131; Raftopoulos, 1996:17). The plan was for I million 
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hectares of the 2.1 million hectare target for the Inception Phase to be acquired based on 
market-value compulsory acquisition. However, in order to reduce the cost of compulsory 
acquisition, the government had to acquire the rest of the land from alternative sources. The 
government had the option to sub-divide large farms such as cooperatives under the Model B 
resettlement scheme which was implemented in the 1980s. It also had the option to sub-
divide state-owned farms and to introduce a land tax to limit farm sizes (Vanden Brink, 
2000:4 & 11). It was projected that the Inception Phase would be implemented at a cost of 
US$189 million, which was broken down as follows: 
• Land acquisition (33%) 
• Land policy (4%) 
• Infrastructure and support services (61 %) 
• Program management and contingencies (2%) 
It was hoped that the Inception Phase would benefit 33 800 farm households, 75 000 non-
farm households in Rural Service Centres (Growth Points) and 10 000 communal area 
households (Human Rights Watch, 2002:9; Van den Brink, 2000:11). 
The 2-year Inception Phase was to be followed by an accelerated or 'fast-track' land reform 
programme from July 2000 to December 2001. The fast-track land reform programme was 
intended to speed up the pace of land acquisition and resettlement (Moyo, 2004:22-25; Utete 
Report, 2003: 16). It was envisaged that the fast-track land reform programme would identify 
and acquire 5 million hectares of land from various sources for acquisition and redistribution 
to the landless masses in 3-5 years. Apart from land acquisition, the land reform plan was 
meant to accelerate land planning and demarcation once acquired, settler emplacement and 
infrastructure provision in all provinces (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement, 2004:8; Utete Report, 2003:16-18). 
The government initially wanted to resettle 30 000 families in each of the country's 10 
provinces and considered purchasing an equal number of farms in each province but these 
targets were subsequently revised. The new targets were to resettle 48 000 families in 200 I ; 
42 000 in 2002 and 30 000 in 2003 countrywide and budgeted government resources and aid 
from the Donor Community would be used to provide infrastructure and support services for 
resettled families (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:8; The 
Financial Gazette cited in Buckle, 2002:160). 
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3.8 Elections as a Catalyst for Land Reform 
Warriner (1969:4) comments that the motives behind any land reform can be inferred from 
the political situation of a government at the time when the reform is implemented. In 
Zimbabwe' s case, it should be noted that, apart from monetary compensation, war veterans 
also demanded meaningful land reform. However, despite the slow rate of land reform from 
independence in 1980 until 2000, the government was opposed to illegal land occupations 
and actually assisted farmers in evicting squatters (through the law and court system, local 
authorities and the police) from private land. A squatter policy circumscribed land "self 
provisioning" because the government was under pressure from investors and stakeholders 
such as the CFU to maintain high agricultural output for the domestic market and for export 
(Moyo, 2000a:81). However, these provisions soon became irrelevant as renewed agitation 
for land reform grew from 1998 and came to a head in 2000. 
Deininger (2003:146-147) also comments that the primary motivation behind why many 
governments in Africa and Latin America undertake land reforms is political, rather than 
economic. Such reforms are aimed at calming social unrest and allaying political pressures 
rather than increasing productivity or improving people's general welfare. Phase 3 of 
Zimbabwe's land reform can be viewed as one such attempt by a government to divert 
attention from other problems (political and economic) rather than as part of a long-term 
development strategy. The fast-track land reform programme was planned at the same time 
as the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The debacle with the war 
veterans over the looted War Victims Compensation Fund proved that the war veterans were 
a formidable force. The incident reasserted the importance of the unresolved land issue and 
the Zanu-PF government realised that the war veterans' mob mentality could be useful in 
winning or coercing support for land reform, and to boost support for itself. Despite people's 
widespread feelings of discontentment and disillusionment with the country's progress since 
independence in 1980, President Mugabe desperately wanted his ruling Zanu-PF party to win 
the June 2000 parliamentary election. He also wanted to hold on to power by winning the 
presidential election that was scheduled for 2002. The government' s capitulation to war 
veterans' demands renewed this constituency's support for the government/ruling Zanu-PF 
party (Human Rights Watch, 2002:8). The government adopted a decidedly aggressive and 
openly racist (read nationalist and anti-imperialist) campaign through which it sought to 
exonerate itself in the eyes of the masses through a land reform crusade. White farmers were 
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portrayed as hindering equitable land redistribution in Zimbabwe and were repeatedly 
attacked in President Mugabe' s speeches (Chan, 2003; Buckle, 2002:101; Raftopoulos, 
2002:418; Ncube, 2001 in Buckle, 2002). The ruling Zanu-PF party had acquired a 
reputation for its "customary pre-election sabre-rattling" on the land issue; even though it had 
repeatedly failed to deliver on its promises for comprehensive land reform that would benefit 
the poor (Palmer, 1997:302). Krieger (2000:226) believes that the fast-track land reform 
programme was yet another opportunity for the government to use the land question as an 
election trump card to quell people's discontentment over the economy' s poor performance. 
The government formed what Chitiyo (2003:278) calls a "survivalist alliance" with war 
veterans and promised them 20% of the land that would be acquired and redistributed under 
the revamped, revolutionary fast-track land reform programme (Moyo, 2004:26). The 
alliance was formed primarily to defend the ruling party's hegemony and to accelerate land 
reform based on forceful notions of social justice (Buckle, 2002:178). The government's 
attitude was that it did not need the approval of white farmers to implement radical land 
reform measures (Krieger, 2000:226). Fast-track land reform was conveniently dubbed the 
'Third Chimurenga' (liberation war). The government passionately implored and reinforced 
nationalist ideologies in its rhetoric and in Zanu-PF's May 2000 election manifesto which 
declared; "Land is the economy. The economy is the land" (Human Rights Watch, 2002:10; 
Krieger, 2000:445; Kibble, 2004:366; Sachikonye, 2002:18; Buckle, 2002:49). The 
government incited racial hatred by using the emotive issues of land and race to win support 
for the impending elections and in the process, the war veterans (the government's ally) 
became a law unto themselves (Buckle, 2002:178). The chairman of the War Veterans 
Association, Chenjerai Hunzvi, said the land invasions that began in February 2000 happened 
for two reasons. One was to get land back to the black people and the other was to keep 
Zanu-PF in power. He added that there would be no peace in Zimbabwe if these two things 
did not happen (Buckle, 2002:76). 
3.9 The 2000 Parliamentary Election 
The government became increasingly intolerant of dissent in the run-up to the June 2000 
parliamentary election and is believed to have given war veterans and party militias covert 
support to attack and terrorise white commercial farmers and farm workers in a military-
backed reign of terror which was dubbed "Operation Tsuro" (Kibble, 2004:365; Chitiyo, 
2003:180; Chan, 2003; Sachikonye, 2002:17). The Ministry of Defence announced that war 
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veterans were going to be re-trained and would become a reserve force attached to the 
Zimbabwe National Army. War veterans were also incorporated into the police-force and 
were deployed, together with the para-military police and Zanu-PF youths, from militia bases 
across the country to victimise opposition strongholds (Buckle, 2002:226). A war veteran 
leader, Andrew Ndlovu, threatened civil war saying that the war veterans constituted a 
"reserve army" that could be called into active duty when needed. Ndlovu also threatened 
that the war veterans would declare a military government if the MDC won the 2000 
parliamentary election (Meredith, 2003: 170; Buckle, 2002: 17). 
White farmers, farm workers and teachers in the rural areas were accused of supporting the 
MDC. White farmers were accused of having arms of war and forming militant rogue armies 
(Buckle, 2002:41 & 153). About 400000 farm workers were employed by white farmers and 
constituted a significant part of the rural electorate, together with their families (about 15%). 
President Mugabe regarded them as enemies of his government, together with white farmers. 
War veterans set up ore-education centres' on several farms that had been deserted because of 
illegal farm invasions. The war veterans rounded up farm workers for indoctrination and 
chastisement and forcing them to chant Zanu-PF slogans and to sing liberation songs. 
Primary and secondary schools were invaded and teachers were harassed in front of pupils. 
Some were beaten and others were taken to ore-education camps.' It is reported that about 6 
000 rural people had fled from the countryside to Harare and other cities by the last week of 
May 2000 because of the violence that swept across most farming communities (Meredith, 
2003:177-178; Buckle, 2002: 107). The Standard reported that war veterans and Zanu-PF 
supporters warned hospital personnel not to treat victims of commercial farm invasions, or 
risk being victims themselves (Buckle, 2002: 131). Indiscriminate violence in the rural areas 
forced almost 9 000 teachers, particularly in Mashonaland Central and East provinces, to 
abandon schools and flee to nearby towns by mid-June 2000. An estimated 2 096 teachers 
had been assaulted and 12 cases of rape, mainly of teachers' spouses were documented. 
Twenty-five school pupils had also been abducted or raped. The Progressive Teacher's 
Union of Zimbabwe reported that about 250 rural schools had been forced to close down 
because of the violence (Meredith, 2003: 178; Buckle, 2002: 107 & 133). 
The campaign of intimidation was not confined to the rural areas for long. It also targeted 
MDC officials and supporters and the independent media in the urban areas (Meredith, 
2003:180,204; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:51). These groups were raided on a regular basis by 
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para-military police, soldiers and Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) agents. MDC 
officials and supporters were beaten with rifle butts, chains and clubs and some received 
death threats. Some were raped, kidnapped and tortured and many were charged under the 
Law and Order Maintenance Act for inciting the violence. The mobs destroyed or looted 
property belonging to white commercial farmers, MDC members and suspected MDC 
supporters (Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Kibble, 2004:366; Bush, 2003:536; Chitiyo, 2003; Hall, 
2003:260; Makumbe, 2003; Mlambo, 2003; Chan, 2003; United States Department of State, 
2003 ; Human Rights Watch, 2002:10; McGregor, 2002:10; Raftopoulos, 2002; Buckle, 2002; 
Krieger, 2000:446-447). The terror spread to white-owned factories, offices and businesses 
(shops, restaurants, hotels) and subsidiaries of South African, British, American, Australian, 
Danish and other foreign companies. War veteran gangs interrupted management meetings 
and ordered the reinstatement of dismissed workers, they set up kangaroo courts, assaulted 
and abducted managers and staff and seized equipment. These atrocities extended to aid 
agencies and foreign embassies which President Mugabe regularly accused of assisting and 
funding the MDC (Karume, 2005:30-36; Meredith, 2003: 18, 211-214). The secretary for 
foreign affairs in Zimbabwe' s Foreign Ministry (Willard Chiwewe) announced that the 
government could not guarantee the security of foreign embassies and donor agencies if they 
became agents or sympathisers of political parties (Meredith, 2003:213). 
It is alleged that the police were instructed not to intervene in all these crimes and are 
reported to have watched opposition supporters being assaulted by war veterans. The police 
also unlawfully detained thousands of people (Meredith, 2003 :211; Buckle, 2002). When it 
tried to intervene, the judiciary was accused of being pro-white by President Mugabe, his 
ministers and war veteran leaders. The government deliberately undermined the judiciary by 
ignoring court orders, including the one that was issued on 17 March 2000 by Justice 
Paddington Garwe. The order ruled in favour of white farmers declaring the on-going farm 
invasions illegal and ordered the police to evict invaders from occupied farms within twenty-
four hours of the granting of the order (Meredith, 2003:170-172,199-207; Buckle, 2002:17 
& 25). The Deputy Police Commissioner is reported to have applied to the High Court for a 
variance or exemption on the High Court's ruling. The Deputy Police Commissioner argued 
that the solution to the land issue lay in the political domain, not with the courts (Meredith, 
2003: 172; Buckle, 2002:43 -45). The application was unsuccessful and the original order was 
upheld, although it was still ignored. Buckle (2002:235) reports that Messengers of Court 
were given death threats when they served eviction notices on squatters and war veterans. 
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Regarding the court orders, in April 2000, President Mugabe said that the country' s political 
problems overrode 
" ... the little matter oftrespass .. .I know there is an expectation that I will say to the war 
veterans 'Get off the land.' I will not say or do that. There is no policeman who is going 
there. We have said 'No.' If the British have their own police they must send them 
there ... We cannot be expected to buy back our land that was never bought from us, 
never bought from our ancestors." (cited in Meredith, 2003: 172; Buckle, 2002:43-45). 
In June 2000, a Danish-based organisation, the International Rehabilitation Council for 
Torture Victims, reported that there was widespread evidence of mass psychological torture 
and community disruption in Zimbabwe because of intimidation and violence (Buckle, 
2002: 133). Many people, especially whites, are reported to have left Zimbabwe just before 
the June 2000 elections because they feared that the level of political violence would escalate 
into a civil war (Buckle, 2000:143). The MDC is also reported to have considered boycotting 
the elections because of the level of violence in the country (Buckle, 2002:91). On I June 
2000, the MDC reported that its campaign for the June 2000 parliamentary election was free 
and safe in just 25 of the 120 constituencies (Meredith, 2003:182). By the time the June 24 
and 25 parliamentary election were held, nearly 1 500 farms had been invaded and about 1 
000 of these remained occupied (Krieger, 2000:446; Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 179). On the 
voting days, some Zanu-PF youths and war veterans prevented people from reaching polling 
stations by setting up roadblocks or confiscating their identity cards and passports because 
people without proof of identity could not vote (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002: 143). 
Instead of a landslide victory, the ruling Zanu-PF party narrowly won the June 2000 
parliamentary election. Zanu-PF won 62 seats (48% of votes cast, plus the 30 non-
constituency seats appointed by the President from among his supporters), the MDC won 57 
seats (47% of the votes) and the last contested seat went to an independent candidate 
(Olaleye, 2005:8). The MDC won all the seats in Harare and Bulawayo and ten of the twelve 
contested seats in Matebeleland. It also performed strongly in the Midlands and Manicaland 
provinces. To show how unpopular the Mugabe regime had become in the urban areas, Zanu-
PF retained only one urban constituency in the whole country (Meredith, 2003: 188). Zanu-
PF's unconvincing victory in the June 2000 parliamentary election made the Mugabe regime 
even more determined to intensify the onslaught on commercial farmers and urban dwellers 
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who voted against it. The situation became more desperate after the Amani Trust (a human 
rights group) published a summary of violence in the run up to the 2000 election as follows: 
19 deaths and 5 070 incidences of political violence (86% of the perpetrators were Zanu-PF 
supporters and only 4% were MDC supporters) (Meredith, 2003:183). The Daily News 
Online (cited in Buckle, 2002:160) reported the number of deaths in the run-up to the 
parliamentary election to be as high as 33. Mashonaland East province was affected the most 
by political violence and Buckle (2002: 1 05) believes that this is because the province 
registered the highest "No" votes in the February 2000 constitutional referendum. 
The international community was outraged by the human rights abuses that marked the 
election campaign and declared them neither free, nor fair (Kabernba 2005; Olaleye, 2005; 
Sidiropoulos, 2004:110-111; Meredith, 2003:229). The MDC challenged the results of the 
election in 38 constituencies, arguing that violence, intimidation, fraud and other 
irregularities rendered them invalid (Kabemba 2005; Olaleye, 2005; Meredith, 2003:216-
217). 
3.10 The 2002 Presidential Election 
The ruling Zanu-PF party's systematic use of provocation, intimidation and violence in the 
2000 parliamentary election laid the foundation for the 2002 presidential election. Violence 
was not confined to the parliamentary and presidential elections. It was also used to influence 
the outcome of parliamentary by-elections and mayoral elections, in which threats were used 
against headmen, chiefs, civil servants, teachers and nurses to ensure that they did not vote 
for the MDC (Meredith, 2003: 179, 214, 215 ; Buckle 2002:5, 107 & 133). 
The constitutional amendments passed in 2000 gave the state president unchecked executive 
powers, which effectively allowed the government to disregard the rule of law and the courts, 
and to unilaterally change laws under the guise ofland reform (Buckle, 2002:35). 
A series of repressive and highly unpopular laws that were meant to silence criticism by the 
local media and civic organisations, were passed in the run-up to the 2002 presidential 
election. These laws included the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPP A) and the General Laws Amendment Act, 
which was subsequently revoked after being declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
The new security laws made it a criminal offence to criticise the president (Karume, 2005:41; 
Meredith, 2003: 150-156, 180 & 204; Hall, 2003:275; Lahiff and Cousins, 2001:654-655; 
Chan, 2003; United States Department of State, 2003 ; Kibble, 2004:365 & 369; Bush and 
61 
Szeftel, 2002:7-9; Sachikonye, 2002:18-19). The Public Order and Security Act dates back to 
the 1960s when it was enacted by the Smith government to repress black nationalists. The 
Zanu-PF government used the Act to empower the police to restrict movement to and from 
political meetings and banned political rallies at will, unless the head of the party was 
personally present (Buckle, 2002:83). The courts were barred from granting bail to suspects 
in politically motivated crimes (effectively detention without trial). The security laws also 
created loopholes that allowed the government to interfere with the independence of the 
Electoral Cornmission and voter registration (Kabemba 2005; Olaleye, 2005; Sidiropoulos, 
2004:110-111). 
The new laws allowed the government to exerCIse tighter control over independent 
journalists and foreign correspondents (controlling their reporting) (Karume, 2005 :41; 
Meredith, 2003:226; Chan, 2003). Journalists (Ray Choto, Mark Chavunduka and Clive 
Wilson of The Standard) were charged with treason and detained unlawfully in January 1999 
over a report that was carried by The Standard about Zimbabwe's military involvement in the 
DRC (Meredith, 2003: 150-156, 180 & 204). On 9 April 2000, Geoff Nyarota, the editor of 
the Daily News received death threats in a letter that accused him of a "lack of respect for our 
dear President" (Meredith, 2003:180, Buckle, 2002:69-70). The newspaper' s offices were 
attacked three days later when a powerful petrol bomb exploded in an art gallery below 
Nyarota's office in central Harare but Nyarota survived the attack. Foreign journalists were 
accused of misrepresenting the different parties' interests, exaggeration and biased reporting. 
Foreign journalists had their cars stoned on a regular basis and two foreign journalists were 
deported in February 2001 (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002:99). 
The government gazetted new broadcasting regulations (using Presidential Powers) to ensure 
that 75% of all programming on radio and television was Zimbabwean content, however, the 
state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) was exempted from the new 
regulations (Buckle, 2002:235). Independent newspapers (The Daily News, The Standard) 
were harassed at will. The Daily News was banned in rural areas like Murehwa and Shurugwi 
and vendors who tried to sell it there were threatened. The paper was confiscated from the 
few individuals who were seen reading it. To ensure the loyalty of civil servants, they were 
banned from taking the Daily News into government offices, especially since they had just 
been awarded a 65% pay increment (Meredith, 2003: 180; Buckle, 2002:69, 106 & 108). In 
January 2001, Zanu-PF supporters seized and burnt copies of the Daily News in several 
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towns. On January 23 , Chenjerai Hunzvi led a mob of 500 Zanu-PF supporters to the offices 
of the Daily News demanding that the paper be banned. Zimbabwe's then Information 
Minister, Jonathan Moyo, threatened to 'silence' (on television) the editors of the Daily 
News, the weekly Independent and the Sunday Standard for being "unpatriotic." The printing 
presses of the Daily News were bombed a few hours later (Kibble, 2004:365 & 369; 
Meredith, 2003: 150-156, 180 & 204; Hall, 2003:275; United States Department of State, 
2003; Bush and Szeftel, 2002:7-9; Buckle, 2002:72; Sachikonye, 2002:18-19; Lahiff and 
Cousins, 2001:654-655). 
A sustained and systematic form of violence was used as a strategy to convince the electorate 
to vote for President Mugabe in 2002, even though the electorate no longer had confidence in 
his government because of decades of economic mismanagement, corruption and cronyism 
(foreword by Ncube, 2001 in Buckle, 2002). President Mugabe tried to discredit the MDC by 
claiming that it was counter-revolutionary and that it was created and controlled by Britain, 
the United States and the old Rhodesian network. The government described the MDC and 
farm workers as puppets of white commercial farmers and Britain (opposed to land reform) 
(Karurne, 2005: 30-36; Moyo, 2004:27; Mlambo, 2003:196-1 97; Meredith, 2003:193 & 194; 
Raftopoulos, 2002; Krieger, 2000:447). President Mugabe refused to accept election 
observers from Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark and expelled the 
Swedish head of the European Union observer mission (Karume, 2005: 30-36). The 
Commander of the Defence Forces unambiguously expressed the government' s position by 
declaring that the military would not recognise the result of the election if President Mugabe 
lost the 2002 presidential election (Meredith, 2003:227-228). 
The 2002 presidential campaign led to an upsurge of land invasions in 2001 and harassment 
of the opposition by war veterans because of the enactment of the Rural Land Occupiers 
(Protection from Eviction) Act which came into force in June 200 I and inflammatory 
statements made by several government officials. The Rural Land Occupiers Act protected 
land invaders who had occupied land from the start of land invasions in early 2000 until 
February 2001. The Act protected land occupiers for a period of one year and nullified all 
court orders that had been issued to evict illegal land occupiers from farms (Human Rights 
Watch, 2002:13). President Mugabe also chose this crucial moment to grant amnesty to 
perpetrators of politically motivated crimes committed between January and July 2000 (from 
the onset of land invasions in February 2000 to the June 2000 parliamentary election). The 
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main beneficiaries of this pardon were war veterans and Zanu-PF supporters who were 
involved in incidents of assault, abduction, torture and arson. Other crimes like murder, rape, 
theft and possession of anns were excluded from the amnesty although it is alleged that the 
police did not pursue such cases when Zanu-PF supporters were known to be the perpetrators 
(Meredith, 2003:194; Human Rights Watch, 2002:22). 
Meredith (2003:18) notes that the worst outbreak of violence occurred in August 2001 in the 
Chinhoyi fanning district (60 miles south-west of Harare). Liston Shields Farm was invaded 
after war veterans were encouraged to do so by Zanu-PF government ministers and MPs. 
One MP, Phillip Chiyangwa, was filmed (without his knowledge) instructing war veterans 
and Zanu-PF mobs to invade more fanns. Chiyangwa said; 
"If you get hold of MOC supporters, beat them till they are dead. Burn their farms and 
their workers' houses, then run away fast and we will blame the burning of the 
workers' houses on the whites. Report to the police, because they are ours" (cited in 
Meredith, 2003 :221). 
Mobs of party supporters went on the rampage across Chinhoyi district and many white 
farmers and farm workers were forced to flee for their lives. The violence spread to 
Mhangura and Ooma (north of Chinhoyi) and to Hwedza (east of Chinhoyi) (Meredith, 
2003 :220). The invaders destroyed crops and equipment, cut off water supplies and set fire to 
grazing land. The owner of Liston Shields Farm and about twenty-one neighbours who 
responded to distress calls from the farm were arrested and assaulted. They were held in 
custody for two weeks before bail was granted and the Minister of Home Affairs claimed that 
the farmers had provoked the attack. The land grab became more frantic as soldiers, air force 
officers, war veterans, government officials, party officials and peasants descended on 
commercial farms in retaliation (Meredith, 2003: 197). It is reported that government and 
Zanu-PF officials claimed many of the prized properties for themselves. Meredith (2003 :230) 
notes, for example, that the Anny Commander appropriated a farm that produced flowers and 
vegetables and seized assets worth US$20 million. The Staunton family had owned the fann 
for more than a hundred years but they were given just five days to leave their farm to make 
way for the new owner (Meredith (2003 :230). 
Victims of this surge in land invasions included black commercial farmers who were known 
supporters of the MOC. A Chegutu farmer, Philemon Matibe, had stood for the 2000 
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parliamentary election and had challenged the results when he lost. Matibe's 1 100 acre farm 
was seized and divided among Zanu-PF supporters. These actions compelled Matibe to 
comment that the land reform programme was not about correcting colonial imbalances. He 
said; "It [land reform 1 is about punishing your enemies and rewarding your friends. This is 
about staying in power no matter what the damage is to your country or democracy" (citied 
in Meredith, 2003 :221). 
MDC officials and supporters continued to be abducted, beaten, tortured and sometimes 
murdered. MDC campaign rallies were disrupted and their party offices were raided. The 
para-military police, soldiers, war veterans and youth militias hWlted down opposition 
supporters (raided shops, destroyed homes, set up roadblocks and demanded to see people's 
Zanu-PF membership cards) and victims of political violence risked further assaults at the 
hands of the police (Human Rights Watch, 2002:22-25; Buckle, 2002). Human Rights groups 
(Amani Trust, Zimbabwe Human Rights Association/Zim Rights) reported that the police 
selectively enforced the law and that this was most notable when opposition party supporters 
were accused of instigating violence. In such cases, the police took swift action, in contrast to 
their inaction when Zanu-PF supporters where implicated in disturbances. The government 
repeatedly denied allegations that the police were becoming increasingly partisan or that the 
police failed to act when called upon to do so (Meredith, 2003: 193 & 194; Human Rights 
Watch, 2002:22-25). 
President Mugabe won 56% of the votes, to Morgan Tsvangirai's 42% (Meredith, 2003:225-
228). Tsvangirai, Britain, the United States and the Commonwealth Observer Mission did not 
accept the election results and issued scathing reports which said the election results did not 
adequately reflect the free will of Zimbabweans (Kabemba 2005; Sidiropoulos, 2004:110-
III; Meredith, 2003 :229; Makumbe, 2003). 
3.11 Conclusion 
The ruling party' s campaIgn of terror, aided by war veterans and Zanu-PF supporters, 
ensured that the Zanu-PF won both the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 Presidential elections, 
although both results have been disputed (Chitiyo, 2003: 179; Meredith, 2003; McGregor, 
2002:11; Krieger, 2000:448). These victories have been described as 'stolen elections' 
because they were won through a reign of terror that tried to obliterate political opposition, 
emasculate the independent media and Wldermine the judiciary (Makumbe, 2003; Meredith, 
2003; Sachikonye, 2002: 17 & 19; Buckle, 2002; Krieger, 2000:448). These elections and the 
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fast-track land reform programme brought with them a disturbing and enduring by-product, 
which Kibble (2004 :365) describes as a "holistic strategy of repression." The fact that the 
perpetrators of grave injustices enjoyed impunity makes the situation even more disturbing 
(Chitiyo, 2003: 198; Meredith, 2003, Buckle, 2002). 
Hall (2003 :276 & 280) and Kabemba (2005:26) describe Zimbabwe's land issue as a pawn in 
broader political struggles, used in this instance for electioneering. The Zimbabwean 
government had periodically manipulated the land question before major elections and this 
time was no different (Meredith, 2003). Although the land question was fundamentally 
political, Skalnes (1994 cited in Moyo, 1999:14) criticises the Zimbabwean government for 
using "racial electioneering tactics" and "hiding behind populist rhetoric and nationalist 
ideology whilst serving the narrow and monopolistic interests of the ruling clique" (1996 
cited in Moyo, 2000a:18-19). The government's unprecedented partisan behaviour; strategy 
of violence in the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections left the entire 
popUlation alarmed and panicked and led some commentators to question if the fast -track 
land reform programme was genuine. Ncube (2001 in Buckle, 2002) and Raftopoulos 
(2002:418) maintain that the 2000 and 2002 election campaigns were not about land at all, 
but about President Mugabe's fear of losing power. Bush and Szeftel (2000:179) also 
conclude that the ruling Zanu-PF party hijacked and exploited the people's legitimate need 
for land reform and used it as the backbone for its election campaign because it feared losing 
political power; not because of a genuine commitment to land redistribution, development or 
poverty alleviation. 
Chapter 4 discusses the fast-track land reform policy in detail because it provides the basis on 
which the programme's implementation is evaluation in Chapter 5. 
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4 
The Fast-Track Land Reform Policy 
4.1 Introduction 
Zimbabwe's chequered land reform history is a reflection of the political and economic 
constraining variables discussed in the previous chapter. Chapter 2 showed that the 
government's land reform plans were plausible soon after independence. There was no doubt 
that gross injustices had occurred in Zimbabwe's colonial past and no one could deny that 
some white farmers owned more than one farm (imbalances in landholding patterns between 
the black majority and white minority). Most stakeholders, including Zimbabwe's white 
commercial farmers, accepted the need for land reform in order to make more land available 
to landless blacks (Buckle, 2002:30; Moyo et ai, 1991:124). Unfortunately, however, the 
government's land reform efforts were undermined by an apparent lack of sustained political 
will by the government, as well as the greed and corruption of politicians and other 
opportunists who exploited successive land reform attempts to their own advantage 
(Kabemba, 2005:26; Riddell, 1992:17). Consequently, land reform failed to achieve results 
on the scale envisaged at independence (Utete Report, 2003:10-14). 
Ncube (200 I in Buckle, 2002) also comments that white farmers were not entirely without 
blame in Zimbabwe's land reform failures and subsequent political meltdown. Ncube (2001 
in Buckle, 2002) maintains that many white farmers were content with the status quo in 
which the white minority owned most of the country's productive land. White farmers were 
reluctant or unwilling to radically alter their access and control of the excess productive land 
that they owned. It has been argued that white farmers' failure to cooperate with the 
government by selling excess land or their failure to be proactive in supporting the 
government's land reform efforts (lack of commitment or passive resistance that) eventually 
led President Mugabe to portray land reform as a "war between blacks and recalcitrant 
whites" (Deininger, 2003:144-145; Buckle, 2002:11; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Ncube, 
200 I in Buckle, 2002; Raftopoulos, 2002). 
Fast-track land reform was still mainly a response to Zimbabwe's colonial history of large-
scale expropriation of land rights, compounded by an increased scarcity of productive land 
due to population growth. This chapter begins with a brief summary of Zimbabwe's land 
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reform impediments and achievements from independence in 1980 until 1998 because they 
give the contextual background for the fast-track land reform programme. It also briefly 
outlines the land reform guidelines set at the 1998 Donors' Conference as well as the 
financial and technical role of donors. The bulk of the chapter discusses how the 
Zimbabwean government's land reform policy for Phase 3 appeared on paper/in theory, 
including the institutional framework; the phased approach to the programme's 
implementation; budgetary and resource allocation aspects; land identification criteria and 
procedures for land acquisition. 
4.2 Justification for Fast-Track Land Reform 
The Zimbabwean government's efforts to change the country's racially unequal colonial land 
distribution had modest results up until 1998. The Zimbabwean government pursued a 
national policy of reconciliation with the former colonial administration of white British 
settlers after independence in 1980 and this policy, together with the express provisions of 
the Lancaster House Agreement, significantly limited the rate and extent of land reform in 
the first decade of Zimbabwe's independence (Utete Report, 2003:10-14; Human Rights 
Watch, 2002; Raftopoulos, 2002; Astrow, 1983). The number of white-owned large-scale 
commercial farms decreased from 6 100 to about 4 600 in the mid 1980s. This represented a 
transfer of 15% of white-owned land to 6% of the black peasantry (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, 
Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:20; Riddell, 1992:15). 
Government statistics show that 71 000 families, instead of the proposed 162 000, were 
settled on 3 498 444 hectares (3.5 million hectares) or 40% of the 9 million hectares that the 
government had hoped to acquire for resettlement in the 1980s. Only 19% of the land 
acquired dW'ing this period was classified as prime land (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land 
Reform and Resettlement, 2004:5; Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Government of Zimbabwe, 
1998 cited in LandWeb, 2000a). Von Blanckenburg (1994:29-31) estimates that by 1991 , 
only a third of the revised resettlement targets set in 1985 had been achieved. Less than 1 
million hectares of land were acquired for distribution in the 1990s and less than 20 000 
families were resettled (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; LandWeb, 2000a). 
In 1999, 70% of Zimbabwe's most productive land was still owned by 4 500 predominantly 
white large-scale commercial farmers. These farms covered about 11 million hectares of 
prime land or 28% of the total land surface (Human Rights Watch, 2002:2; Bush and Szeftel, 
2000: 177; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314). To the politicians, the persistence of significant 
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imbalances in land ownership, access to land and the benefits derived from land proved that 
market forces (the willing-seller-willing-buyer approach) could not overhaul deep-rooted 
colonial/racial inequalities in Zimbabwe's land ownership pattern (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, 
Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004; Hall, 2003:278; Chitiyo, 2003:161 & 162; Chiremba 
and Masters, 2003; Zinyarna, 2001:163,165,167 & 174; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:177; Made, 
1998:191-195, 203; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:15-16; Astrow, 1983). 
Apart from the slow rate of land acquisition to change the country's untenable, grossly 
disproportionate landholding patterns; land reform was marred by government 
corruption/cronyism in the 1990s. The land which the government had bought from white 
farmers and ear-marked for resettlement had been allocated or leased to government 
ministers and senior government officials (governors, High Court judges, members of 
parliament) for nominal rent or no rent at all, instead of the landless peasantry. Beneficiaries 
included the head of the President's office (Charles Utete), the Air Force Commander, the 
Police Commissioner and Harare's then Executive Mayor (Meredith, 2003:127; Jenkins and 
Knight, 2002:45; Buckle, 2002:23). The Zimbabwean government was under extreme 
pressure to urgently address the longstanding, unequal, race-based patterns ofland ownership 
that had managed to remain intact in two decades of independence. 
The land question was compounded by a lack of economic opportunities in other sectors of 
the economy (stagnation) in the aftermath of failed structural adjustment programmes. The 
country's general economic decline was exacerbated by the government's unbudgeted 
gratuities and pension payments to liberation war veterans and Zimbabwe's military 
involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The government was faced with a fiscal 
as well as a legitimacy crisis (political) because of these problems and was, therefore, 
compelled to address the land question with a heightened sense of urgency than before 
(Deininger, 2003:133; Buckle, 2002:12; Meredith, 2003:83, 133-139, 164-165,148-149; 
Chan, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8; Jenkins and Knight, 2002). 
Zimbabwe's racially unequal land distribution was politically and economically indefensible, 
especially since large tracts of productive land were un-utilised or under-utilised in a country 
were the majority of the population is rural-based and derives its livelihood from agriculture 
and related activities. Land redistribution was seen as a necessary step towards alleviating 
rural poverty and improving the general welfare of historically disadvantaged black people 
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(Government of Zimbabwe: Ministry of Lands, Land Refonn and Resettlement, 2004:5; 
Moyo, 2004:1-2; Utete Report, 2003:16). The government tried to amend the country's 
constitution when it established the Constitutional Commission in April 1999 but the 
constitutional revisions were rejected in the February 2000 referendum (Meredith, 2003:165 ; 
Chan, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:9; Buckle, 2002:13; La Guardia and Blair, 2000; 
Centre for Democracy and Development Observer Mission, 2000). In order to reaffinn its 
legitimacy and regain the people 's support on the eve of the June 2000 parliamentary 
election, the government decided to pursue a radical course of action to address the 
fundamental land question (Deininger, 2003:133). The government's main objective with the 
fast-track land refonn approach was to compulsorily acquire and redistribute II million 
hectares of land and to resettle 71 000 families between the programme's inception in 1998 
and 2005 (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:20-22; Meredith, 
2003:121-127; Chitiyo, 2003 :163- 164; Hall, 2003:267; Human Rights Watch, 2002:2 & 7; 
Moyo, 2000a; 200b; Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 177; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314). 
4.3 The Blueprint for Fast-Track Land Reform 
The Zimbabwean government had an elaborate, if not impressive, blueprint for its latest land 
refonn programme (Meredith, 2003:143; Utete Report, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:4). 
The rest of this chapter outlines the land refonn programme's institutional framework for 
land refonn policy formulation and implementation (including various stakeholders and 
government ministries); the phased approach to its implementation over ten years; budgetary 
and resource allocation aspects; land identification criteria for compulsory acquisition; the 
land acquisition procedure; beneficiary selection and emplacement and the monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms. 
4.3.1 The Institutional Framework for Land Reform Policy Formulation and 
Implementation 
A participatory or consultative approach was used to produce the blueprint for this land 
refonn programme. Key contributors included the Government of Zimbabwe, farmers 
organisations (Commercial Fanners' Union and Zimbabwe Farmers' Union), various 
industrial and financial organisations, the land taskforce of the National Economic 
Consultative Forum and several civic organisations (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform 
and Resettlement, 2004:6). The main bodies that dealt with land refonn policy fonnulation 
and implementation are outlined below: 
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The National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF) was comprised of the 
private/industrial sector, financial institutions and civic organisations. The Forum, through its 
land taskforce, contributed towards the reform programme by consulting (formal meetings) 
with the government's Working Party of the Cabinet Committee on Resettlement and Rural 
Development (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:19). 
The Cabinet Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development (CRD) formulated 
policy and coordinated rural resettlement and development in conjunction with the Working 
Party of the CRD and the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Resettlement and Rural 
Development (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004: 17; Utete 
Report, 2003 :20). 
The Working party of the CRD was composed of the Permanent Secretaries of the 
Ministries involved in the CRD. The Working Party of the CRD was chaired by the Principal 
Director in the Office of the Vice President. The Working Party of the CRD assisted the 
CRD with recommendations regarding policy formulation (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land 
Reform and Resettlement, 2004: 17; Utete Report, 2003:20). 
The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development (IMCRRD) 
served both the CRD and the Working party of the CRD. The Director in the Office of the 
Vice President chaired the IMCRRD. This body made recommendations on policy matters 
but was primarily concerned with programme implementation, refinement and the appraisal 
of programme projects (technical aspects, including programme monitoring and evaluation) 
(GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004: 17; Utete Report, 2003:20). 
The National Land Acquisition Committee identified land for compulsory acquisition and 
coordinated the acquisition process. A three tier (decentralised) system was used to 
coordinate the Committee 's functions. The Committee was chaired by the Vice President's 
Office at the national level; by Provincial Governors/Administrators at provincial level 
through Provincial Land Identification Committees and by District Administrators, through 
District Land Identification Committees (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement, 2004:18; Utete Report, 2003 :20). Representatives of Rural District Councils, 
traditional leaders and the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans' Association were 
also members of these committees. Zanu-PF party chairmen were represented at both local 
and national levels (Human Rights Watch, 2002:11-12). 
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The Land Taskforce of Ministers was a sub-committee of the National Land Identification 
Committee. The Land Taskforce had a mandate to coordinate and integrate the land 
acquisition process by ensuring that (through meetings of relevant command centres) line 
ministries mobilised and shared resources (allocation) effectively and efficiently in order to 
speed up land delivery and settler emplacement. The Land Taskforce of Ministers met 
weekly and was chaired by the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National 
Housing (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004: 18 & 19; Utete 
Report, 2003 :20). 
The National and Provincial Command Centres Committee served the Land Taskforce of 
Ministers. National and provincial command centres were mandated with data gathering and 
dissemination and the Secretary for Local Government, Public Works and National Housing 
chaired the National Command Centre Committee (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform 
and Resettlement, 2004:18-19; Utete Report, 2003:20). 
The following Ministries were represented in the institutional framework outlined above. 
This framework also included stakeholders from the private sector and farming community 
(through the NECF). 
• Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement 
• Ministry of LocaI Government, Public Works and National Housing 
• Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Development 
• Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
• Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
• Ministry of Environment and Tourism 
• Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation 
• Ministry of Mines and Energy 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• Ministry of Transport and Communications 
• Ministry of Health and Child Welfare 
• Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 
• The Department of War Veteran Affairs 
• The Department ofInformation and Publicity 
• Security Ministries (defence etc) 
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4.3.2 The Land Reform Implementation Schednle (2000-2010) 
Fast-track land reform (excluding the Inception Phase) was to be implemented over a period 
of ten years (from July 200 to December 20 I 0). The table below shows the time frame which 
was proposed for each stage of the land reform programme's 10-year implementation. 
Table 2: Land RefOilli Implementation Schedule 
Activity Period 
Identification of land to be acquired 2000-2001 
Suitability assessment of farms to be acquired 2000-2001 
Gazetting of properties to be acquired 2000-2001 
Serving of preliminary notices and acquisition orders 2000-2002 
Filing of court applications for confirmation of acquisition orders 2000-2002 
Land valuation and assessment of compensation 2000-2004 
Preliminary planning and demarcation 2000-2004 
Settler selection and emplacement 2000-2005 
Provision of access roads, water points and dip tanks 2000-2006/20 I 0 
Detailed land-use planning 2000-2006/20 I 0 
Provision of secondary infrastructure 2000-2006120 I 0 
.. (GoZ: Mlrustry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:20-22) 
Elected officials in the civil servICe (Rural District Councils, District Administrators) 
constituted the official land allocation structure and individuals had to complete the 
prescribed application forms which would be available from these structures. The selection 
of beneficiaries was also deliberately targeted at landless peasants and special groups 
(affirmative action) such as women because they account for a significant part of the poor 
rural popUlation (Meredith, 2003:195). 
The fast-Track land reform programme adopted variations of Model A resettlement (0.25 
hectares or I acre residential stand per family in a nucleated village with 5-8 hectares of 
arable land for intensive cultivation and 30-200 hectares for communal grazing) which was 
implemented soon after independence (Chiremba and Masters, 2003). Model Al was planned 
for village resettlement and subsistence farming and Model A2 was planned for commercial 
farming. The two resettlement models adopted for the fast-track land reform programme are 
outlined below. 
Model Al was planned as an intensive decongestion model aimed at relieving land pressure 
in over-populated communal areas and to benefit landless peasants. The model was aimed at 
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eliminating squatting and disorderly settlements in both urban and rural areas as well as 
extending and improving the agricultural capacity/output of the peasant farming sector (GoZ: 
Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:11-13; Utete Report, 2003:20). 
Beneficiaries would be allocated individual residential plots in nucleated settlements some 
distance from their relatively small (3 hectares of arable land) enough for crops that can 
sustain a family and produce a small surplus. Individuals were to be given communal 
grazing for their livestock together with shared woodlots and water points. It was expected 
that the model would benefit 160 000 poor people selected from Rural District Council 
waiting lists or from other farms (Human Rights Watch, 2002:12). The government officially 
reserved 20% of all resettlement plots (crop or livestock options) under model Al for bona 
fide liberation war veterans; in accordance with the promise that the government made to this 
constituency before the programme's implementation (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform 
and Resettlement, 2004:11-13; Moyo, 2004:26). 
It was planned that resettlement Al beneficiaries would have 99-year leasehold tenure with 
the option to purchase the land at a later stage. The leases were to be part of the Permit 
Tenure system that applied to resettlement land since the 1980s and married couples would 
be given leases or title deeds in the names of both spouses (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land 
Reform and Resettlement, 2004:11-13; Utete Report, 2003:20 & 84-85). However, the permit 
tenure system is precarious and insecure because the rights of permit holders depend on the 
discretion of the Minister of Lands and Agriculture (rights are not enforceable). Under the 
resettlement programme, the Minister would purchase land for resettlement under the 
provisions of the Rural Land Act and all resettlement land would remain the property of the 
state. Beneficiaries would have occupation and use-rights that are transferred to them through 
resettlement permits (Chenaux-Repond, 1993 and Government of Zimbabwe, 1998 cited in 
LandWeb,2000a). 
Model A2 was set aside for intensive small-medium scale commercial farming (average 134 
hectares) and was to be administered by the Minister of Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement in terms of the Agricultural Land Settlement Act Chapter 20:01. The A2 model 
was aimed at increasing the participation of black fanmers in commercial farming (to 
promote the indigenisation of the commercial farming sector) by giving them easier access to 
land and infrastructure. The model was targeted at individuals older than 25 years of age and 
with experience, preferably those trained to be master farmers (demonstrated 
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ability/competence in farming). Beneficiaries had to have the resources/capital necessary to 
undertake commercial farming with little government assistance because the model was 
based on a full-cost recovery system for any assistance rendered to resettled farmers by the 
government. The principle of one farm per individual was adopted for land held under the A2 
resettlement scheme and some A2 beneficiaries received irrigated land (Moyo, 2004:25; 
Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004; Utete Report, 2003 :20). 
Resettlement A2 beneficiaries had to be prepared to permanently reside on their allocated 
farm. Alternatively, they had to hire a technically competent resident farm manager (Moyo, 
2004:26; Utete Report, 2003:20; Van den Brink, 2000:14). Model A2 beneficiaries could 
engage in either crop or livestock farming or a combination of both, depending on ecological 
regions. Peri-urban farmers were expected to engage in horticulture, market gardening or 
crop farming (Moyo, 2004; Utete Report, 2003 :20). 
The land reform policy stipulated that applications for Model A2 land had to be processed in 
the province where applicants wished to be allocated land. Applicants would be short-listed 
and evaluated by a technical sub-committee of the relevant Provincial Land Identification 
and Resettlement Committee. The technical sub-committee would submit its 
recommendations to the Provincial Land Identification and Resettlement Committee which in 
tum would send its recommendations to the Agricultural Land Settlement Board. The 
Agricultural Land Settlement Board would consider all applications and make 
recommendations to the Minister of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement for their 
approval. The Minister's approval would be endorsed by the National Land Allocation and 
Redistribution Committee before land was allocated to individuals. Successful applicants had 
to pay a deposit fee before a lease was issued (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement, 2004:13-16, Utete Report, 2003:20). As was the case with the Al resettlement 
model, the government officially reserved 20% of land allocated under Model A2 for war 
veterans (Moyo, 2004:26-27). 
Model A2 resettlement land would be considered state land and its leasing would be 
regulated by the Agricultural Land Settlement Act and the Rural Land Act which were 
enacted before independence and have remained virtually unchanged (Government of 
Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb, 2000a). Although freehold tenure was legally highly 
regarded as a secure and coherent tenure system, it was discredited for the fast-track land 
reform programme's model A2 because of its colonial legacy of acquisition by conquest. It 
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was argued that freehold tenure lacked political and moral legitimacy because it represented 
ownership and control of land by a white minority (LandWeb, 2000a). Instead of the more 
traditional freehold tenure regime, the 99-year leasehold tenure system, with the option to 
buy the land after five years, was adopted for model A2 land (Van den Brink, 2000:14). The 
purchase price of the farm would be equal to the market value of the farm, minus the rent 
already paid. Rentals would be based on an open market rental evaluation, which would be 
adjusted every year according to an escalation factor (and reviewed after the first five years 
when the lessee can exercise the option to buy the land). As with Model Al resettlement 
land, Model A2 leases or title deeds for married couples would be in the names of both 
spouses (Utete Report, 2003:20 & 84-85; Van den Brink, 2000:14-15). 
4.3.3 Criteria for Land Identification and Compulsory Acquisition 
Land identification for compulsory acquisition was to be based on the following main 
criteria: 
• Derelict land: Land that has been abandoned or not used for an indefinite period of 
time. 
• Under-utilised land: Land that is not being used to its full potential. 
• Land registered to individuals with multiple ownership of land: Land owned by 
individuals who own more than one farm. 
• Foreign owned land: Land owned by foreign nationals or companies and 
organisations. 
• Land contiguous to communal areas: Land that is adjacent to communal areas so that 
the land can be used de-congest neighbouring communal areas without up-rooting 
entire communities to other locations. 
• Lands with low infrastructural developments: Land with little investment or 
improvements of a permanent or semi-permanent nature (boreholes, irrigation pipes, 
dams, tobacco barns). 
• Land under litigious ownership: Land which is the subject of court proceedings to 
establish its rightful owner and the rights of different parties that are claiming 
ownership of the land. 
• Land under absentee landownership: Land usually held for speculative purposes (real 
estate whose value appreciates over time) without much agricultural activity carried 
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out or land that is leased to others because the owner is not engaged in farming (GoZ: 
Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:19; 
Human Rights Watch, 2002:12). 
Statutory Instrument 288 of 2000 prescribed similar farm sizes according to Natural Regions 
as Statutory Instrument 419 of 1999, except that it prohibited the sale ofland unless the piece 
ofland in question conformed to stipulated maximum farm sizes shown by Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Maximum Farm Sizes Prescribed by Statutory Instrument 288 of 2000 
Natural Region Maximum Land Sizes 
I 250 
IIa 350 
IIb 400 
III 500 
IV 1500 
V 2000 
(Utete Report, 2003: 19) 
There where several categories of land that were exempted from compulsory acquisition and 
these included farms belonging to church and mission organisations, as well as farms under 
Bi-lateral Investment Promotion Agreements. Also included where properties with Export 
Processing Zone permits and those with Zimbabwe Investment Centre certificates. Plantation 
farms engaged in large-scale production of tea, coffee, timber, citrus fruit and sugar cane 
were also excluded together with agro-industrial properties involved in the integrated 
production, processing andlor marketing of poultry, beef and dairy products (Utete, 2003: 19). 
4.3.4 The Land Acquisition Process 
In theory, the National Land Identification Committee would identifY land for compulsory 
acquisition. Four Ministries were officially involved in the process: Lands, Agriculture and 
Rural Resettlement; Local Government Public Works and National Housing; Rural 
Resources and Water Development; and Environment and Tourism. The Ministry of Local 
Government, Public Works and National Housing would play the critical role in land 
identification, and Provincial Land Identification Cornmittees coordinated the 
implementation process (Human Rights Watch, 2002:11-12). Three main land acquisition 
notices would be published in all state-owned national newspapers (The Herald, The Sunday 
Mail) and provincial newspapers (The Manica Post) by the Minister of Special Affairs in the 
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office of the President and Cabinet (Dr. J. 1. Nkomo) in charge of Land, Land Reform and 
Resettlement. The notices would gazette the name of the designated landholding that was 
being acquired, the district in which the title deed was registered, the name of the title holder 
as well as the size of the landholding. The three main land acquisition notices read as 
follows: 
I. Preliminary notice to compulsorily acquire land (in terms of sub-section (I) of section 
5 and paragraph (iii) of sub-section 91 of section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act 
Chapter 20: I 0). 
2. Vesting of land, taking of materials and exercise of rights over land (in terms of 
paragraph (iii) of subsection (I) of section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 
20: 1 0). 
3. Confirmation of Section 8 Order in the event that compulsory land acquisition is 
contested in the courts (notice in terms of Section 7(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 
Chapter 20: 1 0). 
If the first notice was unopposed, the government would deploy evaluation officers to assess 
the amount of compensation payable for each landholding. Valuation reports would be 
submitted to the Compensation Committee which would be appointed by the Minister of 
Land, Land Reform and Resettlement in terms of the Land Acquisition Act. The Land 
Acquisition Act Section 19(5) specifies that 'fair compensation' (different from 'fair-market 
value') must be paid to the owner within 5 years of land acquisition. Compensation payment 
is spread over five years from the date of effective acquisition. At least half the compensation 
payable would be paid at the time the land was acquired (or within a reasonable time 
thereafter) and the remainder would be paid within two years of the acquisition (Utete 
Report, 2003; Van den Brink, 2000:5-6). 
The second notice (vesting of lands) would be published after the land valuation team 
submitted a report to the Compensation Committee. In terms of the Land Acquisition Act, the 
effect of an acquisition order is that ownership of the land in question immediately vests in 
the acquiring authority (government). Title deeds would be transferred at a later stage but the 
land owner could be ordered to cease to use, occupy or to hold the land with immediate effect 
(Utete Report, 2003; Van den Brink, 2000:5). 
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Due legal process followed in the Administrative Court or Supreme Court of Appeal if the 
compulsory acquisition of gazetted lands was contested. Confirmation orders (third notice) 
would only be issued once legal matters had been concluded. If the Administrative Court did 
not confirm the acquisition of a particular piece of land, the law expressly provided for the 
return of such land to the owner. The Land Acquisition Act envisaged compensation claims 
by land owners (for losses/expenses incurred) if, in the end, the government did not acquire a 
particular piece of land or the Administrative Court did not grant a confirmation order for the 
acquisition of that land (Mushonawari, 2005:1; Utete Report, 2003; Van den Brink, 2000:5). 
4.3.5 The Budget Outline for Land Reform 
Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:203) suggest that a successful land reform programme 
requires meticulous planning and financial considerations should be central to this planning. 
A successful land reform programme requires a budget which outlines the main stages that 
will be implemented (land acquisition and compensation, land demarcation and infrastructure 
provision). Table 4 below shows a breakdown of the government's official land reform 
budget. 
Table 4: The Fast-Track Land Reform Budget 
Activity US$ 
Land Assessment 1 329257 
Farm Acquisition 184032993 
Land Distribution 12087378 
Farmer Support 26244321 
Monitoring and Evaluation 709937 
Demarcation 7798309 
Credit Support 177 234 386 
Infrastructure 932284245 
Surveys 94574923 
Capacity Building in the Division of Land Affairs 17935352 
Contingency (5%) 90573526 
Total Cost 1 902044044 
. . (GoZ: Mmlstry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:24) 
The Zimbabwean government committed itself to bearing the full cost of land acquisition for 
the A 1 resettlement model. It was expected that the model would account for three quarters 
of total land reform beneficiaries and consume about 80% of the land reform budget (about 
US$1.5 billion) because beneficiaries under this model (the poor and landless) would require 
more external support from the government (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and 
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Resettlement, 2004:6-7; Vtete Report, 2003:87). The government planned to immediately 
provide new farmers with pegging for their plots, a housing unit per household through the 
Rural Housing Programme Loan Fund, a blair/pit toilet per household, a borehole per village 
of20-25 families to provide clean drinking water, access roads and a dip tank for every I 400 
cattle, land preparation/tillage and crop packs (tillage, seeds and chemicals). Other 
infrastructure, such as clinics (for every 500 families) , schools and rural service centres 
would be provided at a later stage or when resources became available (GoZ: Ministry of 
Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:11-13 ; Vtete Report, 2003:18). It was projected 
that this massive undertaking in infrastructure provision would take up the bulk of the 
VS$1.9 billion that was budgeted for the fast-track land reform programme and a phased-
approach was adopted for the provision of limited basic infrastructure. 
It was expected that the A2 resettlement model would require significantly less from the 
budget (VS$387 million) because it was planned as a full-cost recovery model where 
resettled farmers would pay the government for the improvements made to the land by the 
former owner (housing, irrigation facilities, tobacco barns, green houses and 
standing/unharvested crops at the time ofland allocation). The government planned to recoup 
costs through lease rentals and the payment of an agricultural land tax as well as the purchase 
price from resettled farmers who chose to exercise the option to buy their farms. In such 
instances, the farmer in question would pay an initial deposit to the government and pay the 
balance over five years (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:2; 
Vtete Report, 2003 :87). 
4.3.6 Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms 
There is a need for governments to assess what and how much (successes and failures) has 
been accomplished through the land reform programmes that they implement. This data is 
used by government agencies, together with donors financing the reform, to remedy 
problems in the land reform process. Donors are involved in the monitoring and evaluation 
process because they often pledge financial and technical assistance on condition that 
periodic progress reports are produced (Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987:192-194). 
Mechanisms to evaluate whether or not there is an actual shift in land ownership to 
previously landless people are an integral part ofland reform planning. Monitoring is usually 
in the form of tabulations and quarterly reports that show how many hectares of land have 
been valued; how many land transfers have been effected through the issuing of land title 
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documents to previously landless people; how many landholdings are subject to contentions 
or conflicting claims; the incidence of problems encountered by beneficiaries; and plans for 
land improvement and related resource needs (Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987:192-194). 
Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform policy stipulated that Land Inspectors had to produce 
annual agricultural census reports and quarterly status reports on resettled families under 
model AI. The reports had to enumerate the take-up rate of allocated plots by settlers and the 
status of government infrastructure and service provision. These periodic reports would assist 
in evaluating productivity and would act as a checking mechanism to determine settlers' 
compliance with lease agreements or permit conditions and settlers who failed to comply 
with their lease conditions under model Al would forfeit their leases (OoZ: Ministry of 
Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:23; Utete Report, 2003 :73-80). 
The Ministry of Lands and Agriculture had to compile annual and quarterly status reports on 
the performance of model A2 beneficiaries for the first five years after resettlement. It would 
be the duty of ministry officials to evaluate new farmers' productivity, check their 
compliance with lease agreements and to identify problem areas and evaluation reports for 
different farms would be classified as: successful, average or unsuccessful (Vanden Brink, 
2000). If there were problems, remedial action would, and in most instances, entail the 
provision of extension services or agricultural inputs. The Minister of Lands and Agriculture 
reserved the right to terminate lease arrangements with unsuccessful A2 farmers after the 
first five year period (OoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:23; 
Utete Report, 2003 :73-80). 
4.4 Donors' Pledges for Zimbabwe's Land Reform (1998 onwards) 
Potential donors insisted that the land reform programme be closely supervised by the donor 
community to ensure that land reform benefited the intended beneficiaries. It was also 
stipulated that land had to be bought at market-related prices on a willing-seller-willing-
buyer basis (Meredith, 2003:142 & 143; Human Rights Watch, 2002:9; Van den Brink, 
2000:4). Donors supported and endorsed Zimbabwe's land reform policy blueprint on the 
understanding that it would be governed by the following principles which were discussed at 
the 1998 Donors Conferences: 
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• A poverty reduction orientation consistent with Zimbabwe's wider economic 
interests. 
• Affordability. 
• Transparency: Beneficiary participation and consultation with farmers' organizations 
and donors. 
• Respect for the rule of law. 
The Zimbabwean government reassured potential donors and other stakeholders that land 
reform would be conducted in accordance with these principles and as a show of support, 
several countries and organisations pledged financial and technical assistance for 
Zimbabwe's land reform programme (Van den Brink, 2000; LandWeb, 2000c). It was also 
agreed that a Technical Support Unit (TSU) would be constituted by the UNDP, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, the United States and Norway which would act as the clearing-office for the 
programme. It was agreed that the Technical Support Unit would be financed by the UNDP 
and would assist in the preparation/planning and implementation of the land reform 
programme. 
A consultative committee of twelve donors including the World Bank, the UNDP, the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organisation, the European Union, Britain, the United States, 
Australia, Denmark, Gem1any, Japan, Norway and Sweden met with Zimbabwe's 
government representatives in Harare two weeks after the September 1998 Donors' 
Conference (Meredith, 2003:144). The twelve donors were prepared to contribute funds for 
Zimbabwe's the land reform programme and the World Bank began negotiating a US$5 
million Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL). The Zimbabwean government was expected to 
budget US$350 000 towards a Land Acquisition Fund and to appoint a coordinator for the 
Technical Support Unit (Vanden Brink, 2000:2 & 11). The donors emphasised that their 
continued financial and technical support was on condition that the Zimbabwean government 
implemented the land reform plan as it was presented at the September 1998 Donors' 
Conference (in terms of the guidelines above). 
The next chapter shows how the land reform plan differed significantly from its 
implementation from 2000 onwards. 
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5 
Land Reform Phase 3 in Practice 
5.1 Introduction 
Land grievances were the root-cause of the two Chimurenga wars of liberation which led to 
Zimbabwe's independence from British colonial rule, however, for various reasons, this 
fundamental issue remained unresolved in two decades of independence (Utete Report, 
2003:10-14; Raftopoulos, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Rafiopoulos, 1996; Astrow, 
1983). The preceding chapter dealt with the Zimbabwean governrnent's plans (policy) for 
fast-track land reform. This chapter discusses in detail how the land reform programme 
unfolded in practice. The chapter begins with a focus on the constitutional and legislative 
amendments and presidential decrees that where passed to facilitate the radical fast-track land 
reform and how these enactments led to the deteriorating status of white citizenship and 
white property rights. The governrnent's desire to win the June 2000 parliamentary elections 
has been discussed in Chapter 3 and explains the urgency with which constitutional and 
legislative amendments were passed as the Zimbabwean governrnent's relationship with the 
international community, particularly the former colonial power, Britain, deteriorated. The 
rest of the chapter is a detailed account of land acquisition (and illegal land invasions) and 
redistribution (allocation and settler emplacement) during fast-track land reform. The chapter 
ends with an evaluation of the fast-track land reform programme' s successes and failures, for 
instance, its controversial settler identification process. This evaluation also enumerates some 
of the recommendations that were made by the Presidential Land Review Committee on the 
implementation of the fast-track land reform programme. 
5.2 Constitutional and Legal Amendments to Facilitate Fast-Track Land Reform 
The Zimbabwean government significantly revised the constitutional and legal framework in 
order to expedite the land acquisition process. This section outlines the legal changes that 
made Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform so controversial. As already mentioned above, 
Zimbabwe's white farmers had been reluctant to give up the excess land that they owned 
because of the Lancaster House provision which expressly stated that any land transfers from 
white farmers had to be on a willing-seller willing-buyer basis. The governrnent justified the 
drastic, forceful measures that it took to effect fast -track land reform by blaming white 
farmers' failure to support or cooperate adequately with its previous land reform efforts 
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(Deininger, 2003:144-145; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Rafiopoulos, 2002; Buckle, 2002:11 
& 57; Ncube, 2001 in Buckle, 2002). At independence celebrations in April 2000, President 
Mugabe lamented the fact that he had extended the hand of reconciliation to white 
Zimbabweans and they had rejected it. President Mugabe said that Zimbabweans "rejected 
the persistence of vestigial attitudes from the Rhodesian yesteryears, attitudes of a master 
class, master colour, master owner and master employer" (Buckle, 2002:56). 
Constitutional amendment number 16 of 2000 gave President Mugabe unchecked executive 
powers which allowed the government (through presidential decrees) to disregard for the rule 
of law and the courts, thereby unilaterally changing any laws it wanted under the guise of 
land reform (Buckle, 2002:35). Although the revised draft constitution had been rejected in 
February 2000, the government went ahead and tabled a motion in parliament to amend the 
constitution. The Amendment Bill sought to pass the constitutional amendment which would 
enable the government to compulsorily expropriate white-owned land without paying 
compensation to the legal owners. The government also added a new section (section 16a) to 
the existing constitution. The added section provides inter alia that: 
(I)(c)-the people of Zimbabwe must be enabled to reassert their rights and gain 
ownership of their land; and accordingly-
(i)-the former colonial power has an obligation to pay compensation for 
agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement, through an adequate 
fund established for the purpose; and 
(ii)-if the former colonial power fails to pay compensation through such a fund, 
the Government of Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation for 
agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement. 
This amendment became law in April 2000 and it significantly extended the grounds on 
which land could be compulsorily acquired. The amendment absolved the Zimbabwean 
government of the duty to provide compensation for acquired land, except for tangible 
improvements. The wording of the amendment sparked a war of words between Britain and 
Zimbabwe and caused more tension with Zimbabwe's white community (Meredith, 
2003 :171; Utete Report, 2003:19; Buckle, 2002:13 & 41-42; Human Rights Watch, 2002:2 & 
10). The British government (Peter Hain and Robin Cook from Britain's Foreign Office) 
categorically refused to be forced to pay for Zimbabwe' s land reform unless the criteria set at 
84 
the 1998 Donors' Conference (a poverty reduction orientation, affordability, transparency, 
beneficiary participation and consultation with farmers' organizations and donors and respect 
for the rule of law) were met (Buckle, 2002:42). 
President Mugabe signed a decree under the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act 
of 1986 on 24 May 2000 amend the 1992 Land Acquisition Act and to enact temporary 
legislation (for a period of 6 months). The government's aim was to streamline various 
procedural aspects of the land acquisition process and to prescribe new compensations rules 
in terms of the constitutional amendment above (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement, 2004:8-9; Utete Report, 2003:20; Human Rights Watch, 2002:10). The decree 
removed all legal obstacles to the government's land reform plans by empowering the 
government to seize white-owned farms without paying compensation. About 804 white-
owned farms and other properties were gazetted for compulsory acquisition in the state-
controlled Herald newspaper on 2 June 2000. The properties included cattle ranches, flower 
farms, dairy estates, tobacco farms, a mission farm, a potatoe farm, game ranches, safari 
properties, abattoirs, a mine and other smallholdings. Landowners, occupiers and any person 
with an interest or rights in the gazetted properties and who wished to object to their 
compulsory acquisition had to lodge the objection, in writing, with the Minister of Lands and 
Agriculture by 2 July 2000 (Meredith, 2003:195 & 197; Human Rights Watch, 2002:12-13; 
Buckle, 2002: 129-130; Krieger, 2000:446; Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 179). 
The one-man-one-farm policy was instituted together with 'swap and subdivision' options 
which would allow farmers to offer one piece of land as a substitute for a farm or farms 
gazetted for compulsory acquisition. Farmers also had the option to offer the government a 
sub-division or portion of a gazetted farm (Utete Report, 2003 :20). Farmers were issued with 
eviction notices which gave them just thirty-five days to leave their farms (Meredith, 
2003:195; Buckle, 2002:100). In August 2000, another 2 237 farms were added to the June 
list of 804 farms to give a total of 3 041 farms, covering just over 5 million hectares or 19 
000 square miles (67% of Zimbabwe's cornmercial farms). The additional farms were to be 
gazetted in batches/lots after being processed for acquisition and resettlement (Buckle, 
2002: 172-173). On top of all this, in September 2000, the government ordered farmers to 
increase farm workers' wages by 46%, forcing some of the remaining farmers to downsize 
their operations (lay-off some workers) in order to remain financially viable (Buckle, 
2002:212). 
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On 6 October 2000, President Mugabe granted amnesty (Clemency Order No. 1 of 2000) to 
perpetrators of politically motivated crimes committed between I January and 31 July 2000 
(period covering the first wave of illegal land invasions and the June 2000 parliamentary 
election). Ninety-seven prisoners were released on 30 October 2000 and 89 of these had been 
convicted and were already serving prison sentences. The main beneficiaries were war 
veterans and Zanu-PF supporters who had been involved in incidents of assault, abduction, 
torture and arson. Other crimes like murder, rape, theft and possession of arms were excluded 
from the amnesty (Meredith, 2003:194; Human Rights Watch, 2002:22; Buckle, 2002:235 & 
237). On 26 October 2000, President Mugabe threatened to revoke the government's policy 
of reconciliation and prosecute whites for war crimes cornmitted during the 1970s liberation 
war (Buckle, 2002:237). The Land Acquisition Act was amended again in November 2000 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002: 1 0) and the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) 
Act came into force in June 2001. The latter Act was meant to protect land invaders who had 
illegally occupied farms from the start of land invasions in early 2000 until February 2001. 
The Act protected land occupiers for a period of one year and suspended/nullified all court 
orders that had been issued to evict illegal land occupiers from occupied farms (Human 
Rights Watch, 2002: 13). In essence, this amendment legalised land occupations that had been 
carried out in clear violation of the law/legal procedures that existed at the time of the 
occupations. 
In November 2001 , the government again revised the country's legal framework to suit its 
aims. President Mugabe used his 'presidential powers' to amend the Land Acquisition Act, 
with retroactive effect from May 2000 and ordered the expropriation of a further 2 000 
white-owned farms (without compensation) in November 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 
2002:2 & 10). The amendment altered the land acquisition procedure in that the ownership of 
designated land would now be transferred immediately to the acquiring authority 
(government), regardless of pending court actions against such acquisition. The immediate 
transfer of ownership served as a 90-day eviction notice for the previous farm owners. 
Failure to comply with these provisions or hindering the land acquisition process in any way 
attracted steep penalties, including imprisonment for up to two years. The amendment also 
gave the goverrunent the right to halt farming operations on designated farms at any time 
after the serving of a section 8 notice in terms of the Land Acquisition Act (Meredith, 
2003:223; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). In November 2001 , the Minister of Lands, 
86 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (in terms of Statutory Instrument 419 of 1999) gazetted 
regulations limiting maximum farm sizes in both the main arable areas and the drier grazing 
areas (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). 
Each week from November 2001 onwards, new lists of designated farms were published in 
the government press. All land became eligible for redistribution, even though many white 
farmers had bought their farms with government approval (with certificates of 'no interest' ) 
after independence (Meredith, 2003:195; Human Rights Watch, 2002:12-13 ; Buckle, 2002; 
Krieger, 2000:446; Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 179). The 2001 amendments to the Land 
Acquisition Act compelled the Supreme Court to overrule the December 2000 interdict 
which had been awarded to the CFU to prevent the government from acquiring more land. 
The earlier Supreme Court ruling was overturned because the fast-track land reform 
programme was suddenly ' lawful ' because of the retroactive effect of the latest amendment 
to the Land Acquisition Act. 
By May 2002, a total of 3 000 white farmers (about two-thirds of the total covering 12 
million acres) had been given notice (reduced to 45 days) to vacate their properties without 
compensation or risk imprisonment. This number represented about 95% of the members of 
the Commercial Farmers Union (Meredith, 2003: 195, 197 & 230; Buckle, 2002:129; Human 
Rights Watch, 2002:12-13; Krieger, 2000:446; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:179). 
The government also amended the Labour Relations Act in early 2002 with the effect that the 
owner of a farm that was compulsorily acquired had to pay benefits due to his/her employees 
when they were laid off. These severance packages would be paid through a Restitution Fund 
and the government would not pay compensation for infrastructural improvements on 
acquired farms if the concerned farmer did not produce proof of payment of severance 
packages for his/her former farm workers (Utete Report, 2003:29 & 36). Previously, the law 
required that the acquiring authority (government) would take responsibility for the previous 
land owner's legal obligations towards workers on an acquired farm, on conditions no less 
favourable than those which existed before the acquisition (Human Rights Watch, 2002:33). 
5.3 Racial Tensions and the Issue of White Property Rights 
Moyo (1999:2, 3 & 7) comments on the Zimbabwean government' s neglect of several 
applicable principles of democracy and governance in addressing land rights during fast-
track land reform. Moyo's (1999) analysis is informed by a concern for the citizenship rights 
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and entitlements of Zimbabwe's white citizens (an nationals) as well as regional labour 
migrants who have lived in the country for generations. 
Zimbabwe is party to a range of international instruments which include the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and 
People's Rights. Under these treaties, the government must guarantee equal protection of the 
law to all persons, and must prosecute serious violations of enumerated rights (Human Rights 
Watch, 2002:36). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, Article 17) states that 
everyone has the right to property, alone or in association with others, and no one may be 
arbitrarily deprived of his/her property. Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and 
People' s Rights provides that "the right to property shall be guaranteed and may only be 
encroached upon in the public interest, in accordance with the provisions of appropriate 
laws" (Human Rights Watch, 2002:36). Judicial independence is a cornerstone of these 
international provisions because the judiciary acts to protect people 's rights. 
Property rights are part of the conventions and treaties mentioned above. Formal rights imply 
an ability to draw on the state's enforcement institutions to defend and uphold such rights 
under a system that is legitimate, legal and accountable. Property rights to land are social 
conventions concerned with the distribution of benefits derived from land use. They also 
provide a basis for the level of tenure security enjoyed by individual landowners, and land 
owners ' willingness to exchange these rights with others (Deininger, 2003 :32). 
The right of governments to acquire land in the public interest is commonly recognised 
(Utete Report, 2003) because "the evolution of property rights is not automatic, neither is it 
independent of political factors" (Deininger, 2003:32). Property rights to land are not static 
and governments determine how they are defined, enforced and how they evolve in line with 
changing economic and social conditions, for instance, population growth and land pressure 
due to increased demand (Deininger, 2003:22 & 157-8). 
Deininger (2003: 126) notes that many countries, including industrialised countries, either 
prohibit foreigners from owning land (Bulgaria, Indonesia, the Philippines, Romania 
Switzerland and Tanzania) or permit land ownership by foreigners under very strict 
conditions. Deininger (2003) argues that the complete protection of existing property rights 
can only be justified if everyone has the basic minimum to maintain a decent standard of 
living. This, however, was not the case in Zimbabwe. The issue of white (read foreign) land 
ownership had been the source of much political friction in Zimbabwe from the colonial era 
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and international donors and Zimbabwe's white commercial farmers accepted that the issue 
needed to be resolved, even though they could not agree on how to do this (Buckle, 2002:30; 
Moyo etal, 1991:124). 
The constitutional and legislative amendments outlined above raised questions about the 
citizenship status of white Zimbabweans (not just farmers). The measures taken by the 
government to facilitate land reform infringed on the property rights of Zimbabwe's white 
commercial farmers and created much controversy, locally and internationally (Raftopoulos, 
2002). Although section 18(1) of Zimbabwe's Constitution stipulates that every person is 
entitled to the protection of the law, white farmers felt like they were being victimised. 
Heated, divisive political debates and legal battles ensued over compulsory land acquisition 
without compensation. Although the government was justified in pursuing a comprehensive 
land reform programme, the president's racially charged rhetoric gave the impression of a 
conspiracy to drive whites out of the country (Van den Brink, 2000). The government 
unambiguously regarded whites as foreigners, not citizens or nationals, and many of 
President Mugabe' s speeches ordered them to leave the country because white land 
ownership and monopoly over the economy was regarded as an insult to Zimbabwe's black 
population (Buckle, 2002; Commercial Farmers' Union Information Centre, 2000; Palmer 
and Toulmin, 2000; LandWeb, 2000c; Raftopoulos, 1996). The government's statements and 
actions concerning land reform essentially created an ' us and them' mentality along racial 
lines (xenophobia). 
The constitutional and legislative amendments to the 1992 Land Acquisition Act were 
opposed by the Commercial Farmers' Union, and the white community, because they 
disregarded their citizenship and property rights. White farmers and other observers were 
outraged because they did not think that these provisions were fair or just. White farmers 
objected to the constitutional amendments because they allowed the government to disregard 
due legal processes. White farmers also did not believe that the government would 
compensate them the market value of their landholdings, including capital investments, if 
their farms were compulsorily acquired for redistribution. The Zimbabwean government 
responded by saying that white colonial land expropriation was neither fair nor just and that 
the fact that a white minority still own II million hectares of Zimbabwe's land was an insult 
to the country's independence (Raftopoulos, 2002). The government interpreted objections 
from white farmers and outsiders (donors) as attempts to derail land reform, thus protecting 
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vested interests and benefits derived from the status quo of racially unequal land ownership 
(Van den Brink, 2000; Raftopoulos, 1996). The Zimbabwean government portrayed white 
farmers and the world at large as undermining its legitimacy, authority, autonomy and 
sovereignty. In early 2000, President Mugabe claimed that the [his] "revolution" was under 
attack from the whites, the British and the West who were "trying to sabotage the economy 
in their fight against the government" (Meredith, 2003: 17). The battle lines between Britain 
and Zimbabwe were drawn when Zanu-PF launched its election manifesto for the June 2000 
parliamentary elections. Part of President Mugabe's speech read as follows: 
"We will determine it [our destiny] ourselves, the people of Zimbabwe, not from 
Downing Street, not from the British parliament. And let those who are 
pretending that they can determine our future , realise that we have fought for it; 
we can still fight for it" (cited in Buckle, 2002:83). 
Britain revoked all arms export licences to Zimbabwe following this statement. Zimbabwe's 
fast-track land reform programme intensified racial hostilities in the country and the 
worsening economic crisis led to the mass exodus of white Zimbabweans as refugees or 
asylum seekers to Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, 
Botswana, Mozambique and Uganda (Buckle, 2002:89). In mid-June 2000, President 
Mugabe stated that compulsory land acquisition was not going to be restricted to gazetted 
properties only. He announced that: "If we allow others to own portions of it [land], it must 
be out of our own will, our own desire, our own charity ... " (cited in Meredith, 2003:184; 
Buckle, 2002: 135). 
Section 79b of Zimbabwe's Constitution guarantees judicial independence but the 
government deliberately and systematically undermined the judicial system by disregarding 
court rulings/orders issued against it (to uphold the rights/claims of disgruntled white farmers 
and to remove invaders from white farms). The Deputy Police Commissioner applied to the 
High Court for an exemption on the High Court's ruling. The Deputy Police Commissioner 
argued that the solution to the land issue lay in the political domain, not with the courts 
(Meredith, 2003: 172; Buckle, 2002:43-45). The application was unsuccessful and the 
original order for the police to remove invaders from occupied farms was upheld, although it 
was still ignored. The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) launched two actions in the 
Supreme Court against the implementation of the fast-track land reform programme. The first 
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action challenged the legality of the fast-track land reform programme. The CFU argued that 
the laws under which the government was acting were unconstitutional (the use of 
Presidential Powers to acquire land) and that the programme was being carried out 
unlawfully (without compensation). The CFU challenged the police' failure to comply with 
High Court orders to remove invaders from occupied farms and also argued that the land 
reform was being conducted in a politically and racially discriminatory manner (Meredith, 
2003:197-198 ; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13; Buckle, 2002:184 & 208). 
On 10 November 2000, Zimbabwe's Supreme Court ruled in favour of the CFU and granted 
an interdict to stop further land acquisitions on the grounds that the fast-track land reform 
process was unconstitutional (Buckle, 2002:238). The fast-track land reform programme was 
declared illegal because the government was not complying with its own laws, for instance, 
land seizures were occurring when just the preliminary steps in the compulsory seizure 
process had been taken. The Supreme Court added that farmers had not been given enough 
time to appeal against the government's acquisition orders. The court described the 
resettlement programme as "entirely haphazard and unlawful" because the government was 
allowing war veterans, villagers and unemployed urban dwellers to move onto farms with no 
regard for the law (Meredith, 2003:198; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13; Buckle, 2002:241). 
Further, the Court said that land reform was being conducted unlawfully and unfairly because 
white farmers were not being adequately compensated (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002). 
The second action by the CFU argued that the government was failing to comply with legally 
prescribed procedural requirements in implementing the fast-track land reform programme, 
for example, giving farmers thirty-five days notice to leave their farms, instead of the three 
months' notice stipulated in the land reform programme's guidelines (Meredith, 2003:197). 
On 21 December 2000, Zimbabwe's Supreme Court ruled in favour of the CFU. The Court 
ruled that the reform was being conducted in politically discriminatory manner because 
several government ministers had announced that only Zanu-PF supporters would receive 
resettlement land under the programme, especially since Zanu-PF officials were involved in 
settler selection and land allocation. The Supreme Court also ruled that farmers and fann 
workers had been deliberately deprived of the protection of the law when common law 
crimes were being committed against them with impunity because the police had been 
instructed not to intervene because land reform was considered a political matter (Meredith, 
2003:198; Buckle, 2002:241). The Supreme Court ordered the police and the Minister of 
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Home Affairs to restore the rule of law in commercial farming areas by removing war 
veterans, squatters and other occupiers from occupied farms. The government was instructed 
to devise a lawful resettlement programme within six months (by I July 2001) (Meredith, 
2003: 198-199; Buckle, 2002:241). 
The government was unperturbed when the legality and constitutionality of the constitutional 
amendments regarding land redistribution was queried. Following the Supreme Court rulings 
above, the government's attitude and actions became more and more racially discriminatory, 
in contrast to the policy of reconciliation and nation building that it had adopted at 
independence (Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Chitiyo, 2003; Hall, 
2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002: 133; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 , 13 & 36; Raftopoulos, 
2002; Commercial Farmers ' Union Information Centre, 2000; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000; 
LandWeb, 2000c; Moyo, 1999:2, 3 & 7; Raftopoulos, 1996). President Mugabe trivialised 
the concerns and panic of white farmers by stating that the country's political problems 
overrode "the little matter of trespass" and that Zimbabwe's black people could not be 
expected to buy back land that was never bought from them or their ancestors (Meredith, 
2003:172; Buckle, 2002:43-45). White farmers expected the state to uphold and enforce their 
property rights but this did not happen in many cases, even when the courts intervened. 
President Mugabe, his ministers and war veteran leaders repeatedly criticised the courts and 
accused the judiciary of being pro-white and obstructing the government's legitimate land 
reform efforts. Court officials that ruled against the government were weeded out and their 
court orders were ignored (Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Meredith, 
2003: 170-172, 199-207; Chitiyo, 2003; Hall, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 13; 
Buckle, 2002: 17 & 25). 
5.4 Land Reform and the Emasculation of the JUdiciary 
The Supreme Court was accused of being biased in favour of white landowners at the 
expense of the landless majority when it ruled that the land seizures that began in February 
2000 where illegal. The Supreme Court was comprised of five judges; two white, two black 
and one of Asian origin. Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay was a British born, highly respected 
former Rhodesian Judge and he was singled out for attack even though he had been 
appointed by President Mugabe in 1990. The Information Minister called for the removal of 
Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay on I November 2000. The head of the High Court, Godfrey 
Chidyausiku (a former minister and head of the Chidyausiku Commission that investigated 
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the corruption involved in the War Victims Compensation Fund) also publicly accused Chief 
Justice Gubbay of bias in favour of white commercial farmers. Zanu-PF MPs tabled a motion 
in parliament urging President Mugabe to set up a tribunal to investigate Gubbay's conduct 
(Meredith, 2003:199-201; Buckle, 2002:237). Zanu-PF's parliamentary caucus passed a vote 
of "no confidence" in the Supreme Court and demanded the removal of all white judges. The 
Justice Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, described white judges as "vestiges of the colonial era" 
and accused them of stifling the government's land redistribution exercise by making racist 
judgments that favoured whites (Meredith, 2003 :201). Minister Chinamasa said that the 
reform of the judiciary was overdue: 
We must begin to exorcise the ghost of Ian Smith ... by phasing out his 
disciples ... The elements on the present bench associated with the Smith regime 
must know and be told that their continued stay on the bench is no longer at our 
invitation ... (cited in Meredith, 2003:201). 
A Zanu-PF MP, Christopher Mushohwe, claimed that Chief Justice Gubbay had been 
"infiltrated into Zimbabwe by British Intelligence to overthrow the government" and 
described him as "a Manchester man with links to very powerful Jewish fmancial interests" 
(Meredith, 2003:206). Supreme Court judges Gubbay, McNally and Ebrahim were given 
two-week ultimatums to resign or risk being removed from office in December 2000. War 
veterans threatened to attack the judges in their homes and Joseph Chinotimba (a war veteran 
leader) warned that there would be a blood bath if the land issue was not resolved in their 
favour (Meredith, 2003:202; Buckle, 2002:240; Human Rights Watch, 2002: 13). Zanu-PF 
officials also took turns to harass the judiciary. At the armual Zanu-PF congress in December 
2000, President Mugabe denounced white land owners as "white devils" (Meredith, 
2003:203). President Mugabe urged delegates to support the land reform programme saying: 
" ... no judicial decision will stand in our way ... we should not be defending our 
position in the courts .... they think because they are white they have a divine 
right to our resources ... The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for 
Africans, Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans ... our party must continue to strike fear 
in the hearts of the white man, our real enemy. They must tremble . .. " (cited in 
Meredith, 2003:17-18 & 203; Buckle, 2002:240). 
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On 22 January 2001, Chief Justice Gubbay and Chief Justice Sandura met with Vice-
president Simon Muzenda to discuss the on-going battles between the judiciary, the 
goverrunent and war veterans. The Vice President reprimanded the judges and Gubbay 
threatened to resign. Later that day, the Justice Minister called Gubbay and told him that the 
goverrunent accepted his resignation and that the goverrunent could not guarantee his safety 
(Meredith, 2003 :205). Gubbay was forced to take early retirement and to stand down as chief 
justice by June 2001. The Justice Minister also called on two other Supreme Court judges 
(McNally and Ebrahim) suggesting that they too should take early retirement but both 
refused to comply with the minister's demands. The two black judges (Wilson Sandura and 
Simbarashe Muchechetere) refused to see the Justice Minster when they were summoned 
(Meredith, 2003:205). The speaker of parliament, Emmerson Mnangagwa, stated that; "We 
should guard against the judiciary developing into an omnipotent entity devoid of any 
accountability" (Meredith, 2003:205). Minister Chinamasa summed up the goverrunent's 
position as follows : 
Judges should represent our interests because if they don't, we will criticise them. 
They are part of the three arms of goverrunent and if they behave like unguided 
missiles, I wish to emphatically state that we will push them out (cited in 
Meredith, 2003 :205). 
On 27 February 2001, Minister Chinamasa announced in the goverrunent's Herald 
newspaper that Chief Justice Gubbay' s position would be terminated on 28 February 2001, 
not June 200 I as previously agreed. The goverrunent also said that it would not recognise any 
court rulings over which Gubbay presided from 1 March 2001 onwards. Gubbay was 
instructed to vacate his office and official residence the next day but he refused to do so. The 
Justice Minister and Gubbay's lawyers eventually resolved, inter alia, that Gubbay would 
retain his position until I July 2001 but that he would take immediate leave and an acting 
Chief Justice would be appointed. The parties also agreed that no further steps would be 
taken by the goverrunent to remove other Supreme Court judges from the bench (Meredith, 
2003:206). Judge Godfrey Chidyausiku (a more pliable candidate perceived to be loyal to 
the ruling Zanu-PF party) was chosen to become the acting Chief Justice in Gubbay's place 
and was subsequently confirmed as the new Chief Justice and one of his first tasks was to 
reverse the December 2000 Supreme Court ruling which declared the goverrunent's fast-
track land reform illegal (Meredith, 2003:206-207; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13; Buckle, 
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2002:239). President Mugabe also took this opportunity to expand the number of Supreme 
Court judges from five to eight. Again, the three new appointees were known to be loyal to 
Zanu-PF (Meredith, 2003:206-207; Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). 
This animosity and witch-hunting took place because the Zanu-PF government blamed 
continued white control of Zimbabwe's economy for the deepening poverty that was being 
experienced in the country. The intimidation and victimisation of the judiciary successfully 
undermined its independence in deciding the issues raised by the controversial fast-track land 
reform programme but despite the general lack of optimism, many white farmers legally 
challenged issues regarding equity, property rights, citizenship and transparency in the land 
reform process (Olaleye, 2005; Makumbe, 2003b; Chan, 2003; Van den Brink, 2000). 
However, many other white farmers eventually lost hope in the judicial system because of 
the political wrangles (Buckle, 2002). 
The overall effect of these problems, according to Mushonawari (2005), is that the number of 
legal proceedings brought before the courts extended the land acquisition period. 
Mushonawari (2005) reports that the acquisition of some landholdings was still being 
finalised and confirmation acquisition orders were still being issued by January 2005, instead 
of the 2000-2002 timeline projected for land acquisition. 
5.5 The 2000 Farm Invasions 
This section gives a detailed account of events that occurred in the Inception Phase of 
Zimbabwe's land reform phase 3 (October 1998-June 2000). The land question had been 
used successfully to gain mass support for Zimbabwe's liberation war and proved to be a 
useful political weapon in 2000 when it was manipulated by President Mugabe' s ruling 
Zanu-PF party to retain power in the face of serious opposition. 
On 12 November 1998, the Minister of Lands Agriculture signed acquisition (designation) 
orders for 841 white-owned farms covering approximately 2 million hectares, instead of the I 
million hectare limit set for the Inception phase at the Donors Conference two months earlier 
(Palmer and Toulmin, 2000). The seizure of the farms was announced without prior notice or 
consultation with the affected farmers. By 28 November 1998, I 471 farms had been gazetted 
for compulsory acquisition. However, I 436 farms were eventually acquired out of the I 471 
because the acquisition of the original 841 farms had been contested in the courts by 27 
November 1998. Only 85 farms were un-contested and of these, 59 were acquired (about 90 
000 ha) at fair market value between September 1998 and 2 March 2000. Thirty-five of the 
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farms were erroneously earmarked for acquisition (in terms of the official land identification 
criteria) and were de-listed as a result. The acquisition of the other 721 farms was 
successfully challenged in court (Meredith, 2003:144; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8; Van 
den Brink, 2000:7). A further 45 farms were released through the sub-division of large state-
owned farms and farming cooperatives under the old Model B resettlement scheme (Van den 
Brink, 2000: 11). 
The land question was used as a rallying cry for the June 2000 parliamentary and 2002 
presidential elections in which it was used to instil fear within the white community and the 
political opposition (Meredith, 2003:144; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:83). The illegal farm 
occupations that characterised this period began on 26 February 2000 (after the unsuccessful 
2000 constitutional referendum) and lasted until the 2002 presidential election and it is 
alleged that President Mugabe and the Zanu-PF government encouraged lawless gangs 
comprised of liberation war veterans, ruling party militias, unemployed youths (too young to 
have fought in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle in the 1970s) and landless peasants to carry 
out the violent invasions of 4 500 white-owned farms (Bond and Manyanya, 2003 :76-82; 
Chan, 2003; United States Department of State, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:30; 
Jenkins and Knight, 2002:51; Buckle, 2002: 29; Lineback, 2001; Krieger, 2000:446; 
Chattopadhyay, 2000:314). On 28 February 2000 Zimbabwe's Minister of Home Affairs 
issued a statement instructing land occupiers to leave occupied farms but President Mugabe 
retracted the statement (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 13). 
The first farms to be invaded were those that had been gazetted for compulsory acquisition in 
November 1997 but had not been successfully acquired (Bond and Manyanya, 2003:76-82; 
United States Department of State, 2003; Buckle, 2002:17; Lineback, 2001; Krieger, 
2000:446; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314). Farmers who were known to have supported the MDC 
in the February 2000 constitutional referendum were also singled out for attack. The invaders 
were armed with axes, iron bars, electric cables, chains, bricks, knobkerries, rubber 
truncheons and machetes descended on white farms and laid siege on them whistling, 
shouting and singing war songs. The invaders destroyed crops and equipment, stole tractors, 
vehicles and fertiliser, slaughtered cattle and often drove off entire herds of livestock. They 
prevented farmers from planting crops, looted farmhouses and farm workers' dwellings 
before setting them on fire. They also set tobacco barns and grazing land on fire. The 
invaders allocated plots of land for themselves on invaded farms. They cut timber, cut off 
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water supplies or polluted water sources (Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Kibble, 2004:366; 
Meredith, 2003:18; Bush, 2003:536; Chitiyo, 2003; Hall, 2003:260; Makumbe, 2003; 
Mlambo, 2003; United States Department of State, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:10 & 
17; McGregor, 2002: 10; Rafiopoulos, 2002; Buckle, 2002:37 & 50; Krieger, 2000:446-447). 
As time went on and winter set in, the invaders began demanding fuel/petrol, transport, 
firewood and food (mealie-meal and beef) for the numerous political rallies that were taking 
place on occupied farms (Buckle, 2002:84, 113-118). 
One of the most callous acts during this period was the poaching that took place at the Save 
Valley Conservancy. The conservancy was made up of several former cattle ranches and 
covered 850 000 acres (340 000 hectares). It was a thriving tourist destination with 600 
elephants and several endangered species, including black rhinoceros. The conservancy was 
invaded in early 2000 and invaders pulled down fencing, disarmed, intimidated and assaulted 
ranch scouts before hunting and killing more than I 600 animals worth an estimated $23 
million by September 2000 (impalas, kudus, bush buck, warthog, leopards, elephants, wild 
dogs, buffalo, cheetahs, zebra and even lions). They also burnt grass and chopped down trees 
in the conservancy, leaving very little vegetation for the animals (Meredith, 2003:167 & 196; 
Buckle, 2002:154, 208-209). 
White farmers were issued with false eviction orders, kicked, punched, whipped and tortured 
in the Karoi, Hwedza, Acturus, Bindura, Mvurwi, Mutepatepa and Marondera areas before 
they were ordered off their farms or forced to sign away half their farms (Meredith, 
2003:184; Moyo, 2000a:90). About 70 unofficial eviction notices were given to farmers in 
the Glendale area in one week in July 2000 (CFU cited in Buckle, 2002:161). According to 
the Commercial Farmers' Union, extortion of money from white commercial farmers by war 
veterans and youth militias became commonplace and the practice was accompanied by 
threats of violence iffarmers did not pay up (cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:19; Buckle, 
2002:5, 113-118). War veterans swooped down on Zimbabwe' s main tobacco growing 
region and forced tobacco farmers to take their crop to the auction floors, even though the 
selling prices were severely depressed. Buckle (2002:97) maintains that this was done in 
order to guarantee inflows of foreign currency into the country's coffers so that the 
government could service some of its external debts and payoff some of its fuel bills. 
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The Commercial Farmers' Union reported that nearly 400 farms out of 4 500 had been 
invaded by 8 March 2000 (Buckle, 2002). Towards the end of March 2000, the government 
announced a 21 % increase in the pensions of war veterans. The increase was reported as an 
incentive, ostensibly for war veterans' part in returning land to its rightful owners. Village 
heads were awarded similar packages to those of the war veterans, a privilege they did not 
have before. These incentives caused a public outcry because they meant that more tax 
payers' money was being used to support a programme that many people had reservations 
about (Buckle, 2002:28-29). By 4 April 2000, 922 farms had been invaded and 504 of these 
remained occupied (Buckle, 2002:33). By 14 April 2000, 1 065 farms had been affected by 
the illegal farm occupations. This time Acting President, Joseph Msika, called on war 
veterans to vacate occupied farms but again President Mugabe countered the order on his 
return from an official trip overseas (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). President Mugabe 
dismissed the farm invasions as spontaneous, peaceful and lawful demonstrations by land-
hungry peasants (Buckle, 2002:14). President Mugabe blamed the invasions on white 
farmers' reluctance to surrender enough land for resettlement since independence (Meredith, 
2003:170; Buckle, 2002:14 & 57). War veteran leaders also defended the invasions as a 
revolution that would liberate and return land to its rightful black owners (Meredith, 
2003: 169). Table 5 below shows the spatial distribution of illegal land occupations by 
province as of3 0 April 2000. 
Spatial Distribution of Illegal Land Occupations by province as of30 April 2000 
Region Total affected since February 2000 Currently Occupied 
Mash Central 207 80 
Mash West (South) 84 36 
Mash West (l'I orth) 141 119 
Mash East 210 123 
Manicaland 152 85 
Midlands 84 36 
Masvingo 83 53 
Matabeleland 95 83 
TOTAL 1056 645 
(Table 5: Source: CommercIal Farmers' Umon InformatIon Centre, 2000) 
The government is believed to have co-ordinated the farm invasions and given "key logistical 
and coercive support" to war veterans and other groups (Raftopoulos, 2002:414). It is 
reported that prominent Zanu-PF officials, the army (the notoriously brutal Support Unit and 
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the Air Force Commander, Perence Shiri) police officers and the Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO) were given time off work to direct the farm occupations disguised as war 
veterans (in plain clothes). These officials ensured that the invaders had food and other 
essential supplies. Government vehicles were also reportedly used to transport invaders and 
AK-47 assault rifles and other automatic weapons were used in the invasions (Buckle, 
2002:59; Amnesty International cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:2, 3 & 26). Further, the 
invaders were paid a daily allowance for their services (Meredith, 2003:167; Buckle, 2002:5 
& 16). The chairman of the War Veterans' Association, Chenjerai Hunzvi, unambiguously 
spelt out the government's objectives at Zanu-PF head-quarters in Harare on 15 March 2000 
when he disclosed that he had been given Z$20 million by Zanu-PF at the end of February to 
organise the farm invasions and to campaign for Zanu-PF in the 2000 parliamentary election 
(Meredith, 2003:169; Buckle, 2002:84). A senior government official, Didymus Mutasa, 
openly admitted that the invasions were well orchestrated when he said "The whites have 
themselves to blame because they shot themselves in the foot by mobilising people to throw 
away the draft constitution" (cited in Meredith, 2003: 169). 
Farm workers were not spared the severe beatings and general harassment that white farmers 
were subjected to. About 400 000 farm workers were employed by white farmers and, 
together with their families, constituted a significant part of the rural electorate (about 15%). 
The Zimbabwean government and war veterans branded farm workers as traitors, sell-outs or 
enemies of the state who supported or allied themselves with the MDC and its white sponsors 
in rejecting the revised draft constitution in the February 2000 referendum (Karume, 2005; 
Meredith, 2003: 177-178; Buckle, 2002:58, 71, 77 & 125; Raftopoulos, 2002. The perceived 
alliance between white farmers, the MDC and farm workers led to vicious attacks on farm 
workers by war veterans and youth militias. War veterans set up "re-education centres" on 
several deserted or "liberated" farms and rounded up farm workers for indoctrination and 
chastisement. Some farm workers had petrol poured over them and were set alight. Many 
were maimed because of the abuse they were subjected to by the invaders. Farm workers 
were forced to swear allegiance to the ruling Zanu-PF party and denounce the opposition 
(Meredith, 2003: 177-178; Buckle, 2002:58, 71, 77 & 125; Raftopoulos, 2002). 
Government officials and the police turned a blind eye to the violence in the farming 
communities and human rights groups reported that the police failed to apprehend 
perpetrators of violence. The police defied orders issued by the High Court instructing them 
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to remove illegal occupiers from white farms claiming that it was too dangerous for them to 
enforce the orders. When repeatedly asked to intervene, the Police Commissioner said there 
was nothing the police could do to stop the invasions. The Police Commissioner absolved the 
police of any responsibility by saying; " It is a political issue ... What do you expect the police 
to do? ... Talk to the politicians about it" ( cited in Meredith, 2003:169; Buckle, 2002:13). 
Human Rights Watch (2002) reports that in the few instances were the police arrested 
suspects in politically motivated violence; they released them a few hours later without 
charging them. Buckle (2002:57) also notes that the few policemen who tried to help white 
farmers were victimised, for instance, Constable Chikwenya who was shot dead by war 
veterans in the Marondera area. 
The outspoken war veteran leader, Chenjerai Hunzvi, was summoned before the High Court 
for his repeated defiance of High Court Orders (contempt of court) and he responded by 
saying; " It is President Mugabe' s prerogative to end the invasions ... He said they [invaders] 
could remain on the farms and ordered the police not to evict them. I cannot challenge him" 
(cited in Meredith, 2003183-184; Buckle, 2002:75). 
The first fatality since the land invasions broke-out was reported on 15 April 2000 when the 
47-year old owner of Arizona Farm in Macheke (David Stevens) was murdered by war 
veterans and five other farmers were abducted together with Stevens' foreman. Mr Stevens 
was shot at point blank range after his farm workers forced invaders off the farm. One man 
was arrested for the Stevens murder but the prosecution'S case was withdrawn because of 
insufficient evidence (Meredith, 2003: 172-175, 177, 194; Buckle, 2002:50 & 240). 
Stevens' murder was followed by the pre-meditated murder of 42-year old Martin Olds who 
owned a ranch (Compensation Farm) in Matebeleland's Nyamandlovu area outside 
Bulawayo. Olds was known to be sympathetic to the MDC and was attacked and murdered 
by war veterans on his ranch on 18 April 2000. Olds was shot in both legs, his house was set 
on fire and he was shot in the head in broad daylight. It is alleged that the police colluded 
with war veterans by setting up roadblocks to prevent people from responding to Olds' 
distress calls (Meredith, 2003:172-175, 194; Buckle, 2002:54-55). These two murders were 
followed by assaults on Allan Dunn and John Weeks in Beatrice on 8 May 2000. Dunn was 
assaulted by war veterans on his farm at night and left for dead. Weeks was shot in the 
abdomen in an alleged robbery attempt at his farm. Both farmers died in hospital from 
injuries sustained in the attacks (Meredith, 2003:172-177 & 194; Buckle, 2002:50-55, 89 & 
93). When these four white farmers had been killed, Chenjerai Hunzvi commented that: 
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"Like in any revolution, the path is always bloody, that is to be expected ... no one should 
raise eyebrows over the death of four white farmers" (cited in Meredith, 2003:177). Tony 
Oates was the next victim. Oates was shot in the arm and through a lung on his farm 
(SkeltoniUitzight Farm) in Trelawney, and like the last two farmers before him, later died 
from his wounds (Buckle, 2002: 115-116). 
On 20 April 2000, the CFU received reports that more war veterans were moving into 
Matebeleland North and ordered the immediate evacuation of all commercial farmers. 
Similar instructions were given to farmers in the Headlands, Hwedza, Virginia, Macheke, 
Enterprise and Midlands areas (Meredith, 2003: 176). The land grab was condemned locally 
and internationally but the government remained defiant. President Mugabe thanked the war 
veterans for "standing up where others would not stand up to acquire their vital resources 
(Buckle, 2002:135). The Justice Minister also condoned the violent nature of the land reform 
programme saying that "violence is a necessary tool for a successful land reform 
programme" (Meredith, 2003:218). By the time the June 2000 parliamentary election was 
held, 1 500 farms had been invaded and about 1 000 of these remained occupied (Krieger, 
2000:446; Bush and Szeftel, 2000:179). More than 1 500 farms had been invaded by mid-
June 2000 and a total of just over 1 600 commercial farms were occupied by December 2000, 
although some farms were occupied for short periods (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 11 & 30; 
Buckle, 2002:135). The Commercial Farmers Union estimates that a total of 1 948 farms had 
been occupied by the end of2001 (Buckle, 2002). 
The incidence and severity of the farm invasions was highest in Mashonaland East and 
Mashonaland Central Provinces and the northern sector of Mashonaland West province, 
regardless of whether the farms were designated for compulsory acquisition or not (Karoi, 
Hwedza, Acturus, Bindura, Mvurwi, Mutepatepa, Marondera areas) (Meredith, 2003:184; 
Moyo, 2000a:90). Moyo (2000a:90) suggests that this was because the least land 
redistribution had occurred in these areas before 2000. The area has some of the best soils in 
the country and 70% of the land there was still in the hands of white commercial farmers 
involved in tobacco, wheat, horticulture and grain production (Moyo, 2000a:90). Although 
not all farm occupations were accompanied by violence, human rights organisations like 
Amnesty International, ZimRights and Amani Trust estimate that 5 078 violent incidences 
(arson, kidnapping, intimidation) had been documented, on and off the farms. These 
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incidences included I 012 assaults, 8 rapes, 19 murders and 417 cases of property 
destruction, mostly arson (Meredith, 2003:183; Buckle, 2002:71). 
Sidiropoulos (2004: 110) and Human Rights Watch (2002) estimate that 90% of Zimbabwe's 
white commercial farming popUlation (CFU's membership of 3 500) was forcibly evicted or 
forced to abandon their farms because of the violent and illegal land invasions and the 
inaction of the police. The trail of destruction that characterised the fast-track land reform 
programme compelled Britain's junior Foreign Office minister, Peter Hain to announce that 
Britain was prepared to accept 20 000 white Zimbabweans seeking asylum from the 
upheavals in Zimbabwe. President Mugabe launched a verbal attack on Britain saying it was 
acting to protect the interests of Zimbabwe's white community and plotting to overthrow him 
(Meredith, 2003: 171; Buckle, 2002:27). Many whites are reported to have left Zimbabwe just 
before the June 2000 elections because they feared that the level of political violence would 
escalate (Buckle, 2000). 
5.6 Land Acquisition in the Inception Phase of Fast-Track Land Reform 
Government statistics show that 168 263.808 hectares ofland were acquired in the Inception 
Phase of the fast-track land reform programme between October 1998 and June 2000 (GoZ: 
Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:6). Table 6 below shows the 
number of farms, per province, that were acquired during this period. 
Table 6: Farms Acquired in the Inception Phase 
Province Number of Farms Extent (ha) 
Masvingo 5 5487.7533 
Manicaland 20 I 16449.9434 
Midlands 7 14449.3840 
Matebeleland North 2 33749.1669 
Matebeleland South 9 27 655.4582 
Mashonaland East 14 18480.7100 
Mashonaland West 21 52216.3934 
Mashonaland Central 7 9908.445 
Total 85 168263.808 
.. (GoZ: Mmlstry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:28) 
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5.7 Fast-Track Land Acquisition 
The Accelerated Land Reform and Resettlement (Fast-Track) programme was officially 
launched on 15 July 2000 with a budget of $1.3 million. According to the Utete Commission 
(2003), instead of being implemented until December 2001 , in practice, the fast-track land 
reform programme was carried out until August 2002. It is worth mentioning that instead of 
the 5 million hectares target set at the Donors ' Conference in 1998, the govemment later 
planned to acquire between 8.3 million and 8.8 million hectares from the large commercial 
farming sector (Moyo, 2004:22-25; Buckle, 2002:159; Human Rights Watch, 2002). 
Government figures indicate that between June 2000 and February 2001 , a national total of 2 
706 farms covering 6 086 605.1317 hectares was gazetted for compulsory acquisition under 
the fast-track land reform programme as shown on Table 7 below (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, 
Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:8). As more social and political pressure was brought 
to bear on Zimbabwe' s white commercial farmers, attempts were made to resolve the Britain-
Zimbabwe land dispute through the September 2001 Abuja Agreement (Raftopoulos, 
2002:415; Bush, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Lineback, 2001). 
Table 7: Fast-Track Land Acquisition between June 2001 and February 2001 
Province Number of Farms Extent (ha) 
Manicaland 159 153997.5109 
Mashonaland Central 286 362 920.6439 
Mashonaland East 735 700062.6638 
MashonalandWest 505 648902.7115 
Masvingo 249 1 806249.7880 
Matebeleland North 187 818 306.0313 
Matebeleland South 208 861 197.8368 
Midlands 377 734967.9455 
Total 2706 6086605.1317 
(GoZ: MIIDStry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:30) 
In November 2001, the Commercial Farmers ' Union (CFU) offered the government 562 
farms (approximately I million hectares) of commercial farmland contiguous to communal 
areas under the auspices of the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZJRI), which was 
brokered by the Commonwealth in Abuja, Nigeria (Raftopoulos, 2002:415; Bush, 2003; 
Human Rights Watch, 2002; Lineback, 2001). Apart from land, commercial farmers pledged 
to assist resettled farmers with technical know-how and heavy-duty farm equipment such as 
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combine harvesters and planters (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13-14). Despite this 
intervention, President Mugabe announced the expropriation of a further 2 000 white-owned 
farms in November 2001 and the number of commercial farms to be expropriated was 
extended every week from November 2001 onwards. President Mugabe continued to alienate 
Zimbabwe's white community through racist attacks in his speeches and through what was 
generally perceived as state-sanctioned harassment, provocation, intimidation and 
humiliation by war veterans and Zanu-PF youth militias (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002). 
Human Rights Watch (2002:12) and Buckle (2002:130) note that, with time, the land 
identification criteria in the government's land reform policy documents were abandoned and 
categories of landholdings that had been exempted from compulsory acquisition were 
designated (farms protected by Bi-lateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements 
and state-land that was leased for private use under Export Processing Zone and Zimbabwe 
Investment Centre permits). By June 2000, there seemed to be no distinguishable pattern to 
how land acquisition was being carried out. In practice, any piece of land could be 
compulsorily acquired and the sizes of the properties ranged between 33 000 hectares and 
less that 50 hectares. In addition to the official land identification criteria in the goverrunent's 
land reform policy documents, more and more land was acquired on one or more of the 
criteria below: 
• Farms were neighbouring communities/communal area had a historical claim. 
• Conservancies and plantation farms engaged in large-scale production of coffee, tea, 
timber, citrus fruits and sugar cane. 
• Agro-industrial properties involved in processing or marketing of poultry, beef and 
dairy products. 
• State-land that was leased for private use to individuals, companies or institutions 
under Export Processing Zone and Zimbabwe Investment Centre permits/license 
tenure/contractual arrangements with the state for fishing, game parks, logging or 
safari purposes (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998a cited in LandWeb, 2000a). 
• Farms belonging to church organisations. 
• Farms belonging to foreign nationals protected by Bi-lateral Investment Promotion 
and Protection Agreements (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 
2004). 
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• Farms belonging to MDC officials or known MDC supporters (Meredith, 2003; 
Buckle, 2002). 
• Farms on which the owner had a reputation for ill-treating his workers. 
• Farms were the owner had regular conflicts with villagers in the neighbouring 
communal area. 
By January 2002, 6 481 farms had been listed for compulsory acquisition. However, 918 of 
these farms were de-listed because they had been counted twice. Another 689 farms were de-
listed after litigation or negotiation; leaving a total of 4 874 listed farms covering 9.23 
million hectares (Human Rights Watch, 2002:11). In May 2002, about 3 000 white farmers 
(farms covering approximately 12 million acres) were given forty-five days notice to vacate 
their properties without compensation or risk imprisomnent (Meredith, 2003: 195, 197 & 
230; Buckle, 2002:129; Human Rights Watch, 2002:12-13; Krieger, 2000:446; Bush and 
Szeftel, 2000: 179). 
5.8 Land Allocation: Settler Identification and Emplacement 
This section is a summary of land allocation during the fast-track land reform programme. 
According to an interview conducted by Amnesty International on 28 November 2001, the 
Agritex (govermnent's agricultural extension services division) identified land for 
resettlement and sub-divided it. Although elected officials in the civil service (Rural District 
Councils, District Administrators, Chiefs) constituted the official land allocation structure, in 
practice, official channels were often superseded by informal processes governed by Zanu-PF 
committees, the army, war veterans and youth militias (Meredith, 2003:195 ; Amnesty 
International 2001 cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:26). Buckle (2002) notes that many 
land applications were made through war veteran commanders or Zanu-PF militias operating 
in a particular area or leading the occupation of a particular farm. War veterans influenced 
the beneficiary selection criteria by selectively issuing application forms and allocating land 
along party-political lines. People registered for land allocation with war veterans after 
showing national identity cards and Zanu-PF membership cards as proof of support for the 
government, thus excluding opposition MDC supporters from the land allocation process. It 
is reported that people who applied for land in this way also had to pay between Z$20 and 
Z$350 for 2-10 hectares of land which they were told would be allocated at a later stage 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 12; Buckle, 2002:27 & 85). These processes were 
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illIfegulated and constituted discrimination because beneficiary selection was highly 
politicised. Land allocation was not always transparent and no provisions were made for 
appeals if applications were unsuccessful (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 26-29). 
Land allocation according to political affiliation raised questions about the extent to which 
the real need for land was a criterion for land allocation, especially since the main 
beneficiaries turned out to be Zanu-PF officials, war veterans, card carrying Zanu-PF 
members, senior police officers and other security force personnel, civil servants and 
journalists affiliated with state-owned newspapers; many of whom have no farming 
experience (Meredith, 2003:195; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 12). Meredith (2003:197) 
notes that the ruling elite (President Mugabe' s wife (Grace) and brother-in-law, ministers and 
senior officials) took the prized, most valuable properties for themselves, a repeat of the land 
corruption of the 1990s. Kibble (2004:367) suspected too that this trend would continue into 
the campaign for the 2005 parliamentary elections, where Zanu-PF supporters would be 
allocated peri-urban land as a way of buying votes. 
According to government statements, 51 543 landless peasant families were identified for 
resettlement on 2.1 million hectares during Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform. Government 
figures show that 4 697 families were resettled during the Inception Phase of the fast-track 
land reform programme between October 1998 and June 2000 (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, 
Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:6). Table 8 below shows a breakdown of resettlement 
figures for the fast-track land reform programme according to provinces. 
Table 8: Resettlement Statistics for the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme 
Province Land Area (ha) Resettled Families 
Manicaland 56721 3974 
Mashonaland East 189991.3457 8945 
Mashonaland Central 107613.82 4211 
Mashonaland West 182651.782 6184 
Midlands 309245.2011 10227 
Masvingo 381 355 8908 
Matebeleland South 587 179.2054 5 339 
Matebeleland North 270539.8113 3 755 
Total 2 083 301.166 51543 
.. (GoZ: MlDlstry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:7 & 29) 
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Van den Brink's (2000: 11) figures, however, note that significantly less families (about 1 
700) were resettled in the same period at a cost of Z$200 million. 
5.9 Resettlement Models and Tenure Regimes 
According to Deininger (2003), secure land tenure can improve the welfare of the poor by 
enhancing their asset base. It also acts as an incentive that increases people's willingness to 
invest in agricultural production. Secure land tenure gives landowners better credit access 
because title deeds can be used as collateral for bank loans. Deininger (2003) notes, however, 
that there is no ideal tenure system. Instead, tenure systems vary according to agrarian 
experience and the social and political environment of each country. This section discusses 
how the tenure regimes and resettlement models adopted for Zimbabwe's fast-track land 
reform operate in practice. 
Model At: The government had planned to resettle 160 000 poor people selected from Rural 
District Council waiting lists under the Al resettlement model (Human Rights Watch, 
2002: 12). In practice, approximately 2 652 farms with a combined hectarage of between 4 
231 080 hectares and 6.5 million hectares were allocated to between 127 192 and 130 641 
households nationally under Model Al between July and November 2003. The beneficiary 
take-up rate of allocated land under Model Al was 97% (Moyo, 2004:25; Southern African 
Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:5). However, it has been noted that 
women and other disadvantaged groups (including opposition supporters) lost out in the 
beneficiary selection process (Human Rights Watch, 2002:3; LandWeb, 2000c). It is also 
interesting to note that although war veterans were a major force in supporting and driving 
the fast-track land reform programme, they did not receive the 20% of redistributed Al land 
which they had been promised by the government. Instead, they received between 2% and 
22% ofland under the Al resettlement scheme (below 15% nationally) (Moyo, 2004:26-27). 
Although, in terms of the land reform blueprint, beneficiaries are supposed to have 99-year 
leasehold tenure with the option to purchase the land at a later stage (GoZ: Ministry of 
Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004: 11-13), in practice, legal lease contracts, 
permits or titles for redistributed land/new land owners have not been officially provided 
because of delays in the legal transfer of commercial farmland. Model A 1 settlers are being 
issued temporary occupation licenses which will be converted into proper leases at a later 
stage. Inefficiencies also exist in other areas of land administration, namely, boundary 
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demarcation, registration and record keeping, thereby leaving the reform process incomplete. 
These delays also apply to titles for the few remaining large commercial farmers since there 
are numerous land cases still pending in the Administrative and Supreme Courts 
(Mushonawari, 2005:1; Moyo, 2004:27; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; 
Hall, 2003:262-264; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3,12-13). 
Model A2: Approximately I 672 farms covering between 2 198 814 hectares and 2.5 million 
hectares were allocated to 7 260 beneficiaries by 31 July 2003. The number of model A2 
beneficiaries rose to 20 400 by November 2003. The take-up rate for allocated model A2 
resettlement land ranged from 42% in Manicaland and 100% in Matabeleland South 
provinces. The national average take-up rate under model A2 was 66% by mid 2003 and 
some beneficiaries received irrigated land (Moyo, 2004:25; Southern African Regional 
Poverty Network, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:5). According to the Utete Report (2003), the 
failure by 34% of applicants to take up their land allocations means that a considerable 
amount of land is lying fallow or unused while thousands of would-be A2 beneficiaries have 
no land. In terms of the land reform policy, Model A2 beneficiaries had to be competent 
farmers but this criterion was not followed strictly in practice. According to press reports, 
model A2 beneficiaries included Zanu-PF officials, senior police officers and other security 
force personnel, civil servants and journalists affiliated with the state-owned newspapers and 
prominent Zanu-PF supporters; many of whom have no farming experience (Meredith, 
2003:195; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 12). As with Model Al above, the 20% of model 
A2 land that war veterans were promised did not materialise. War veterans received between 
7% and 17% of Model A2land, depending on agro-ecological regions (Moyo, 2004:26-27). 
As with model Al above, in practice, legal lease contracts, permits or titles for most 
redistributed land/new land owners have not been officially provided because of delays in the 
legal transfer of commercial farmland and inefficiencies in other areas of land administration, 
namely, boundary demarcation, registration and record keeping, thereby leaving the reform 
process incomplete (Mushonawari, 2005:1 ; Moyo, 2004:27; Southern African Regional 
Poverty Network, 2004; Hall, 2003:262-264; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3, 12-13). 
According to the Administrative Court in Manicaland, about 219 land acquisition dispute 
cases countrywide had been confirmed in favour of the government by January 2005 since 
2002. As of January 2005, an estimated 5 099 cases were still pending and the number of 
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such cases continued to rise (Mushonawari, 2005:1). Table 9 below shows a breakdown of 
pending land cases by province as of January 2005. 
Table 9: Unresolved Land Cases by Province as of January 2005 
Province Number of Cases 
Mashonaland East 940 
Mashonaland Central 756 
Mashonaland West 1364 
Masvingo 452 
Matebeleand North 373 
Matebeleland South 476 
Manicaland 352 
Midlands ---
(Mushonawan,2005:1) 
The Utete Report (2003:33) recommended that these issues be addressed as soon as possible. 
It is worth noting too that in practice, the Ministry of Local Governrnent (responsible for 
rental evaluation) has been unable to strictly implement the policy regarding the purchasing 
of A2 farms by resettled farmers (LandWeb, 2000a). 
In November 2001, the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (in terms of 
Statutory Instrument 419 of 1999 above) gazetted regulations further limiting maximum farm 
sizes in the main arable areas, and the drier grazing areas (Human Rights Watch, 2002:13). 
All village land is now vested in the President (Human Rights Watch, 2002:6; Van den 
Brink, 2000). Statutory land (state-land allocated for an identified, specific use by a statutory 
body in terms of an Act of Parliament, for example, state-lands leased to the Forestry 
Commission and the Parks and Wildlife Board) is now held under freehold title (Human 
Rights Watch, 2002:6; Van den Brink, 2000; LandWeb, 2000a). 
5.10 Evaluation of Fast-Track Land Reform 
Human Rights Watch (2002:4) concedes that Zimbabwe had well-developed plans to 
implement a comprehensive land reform programme but the governrnent side-stepped them 
by condoning political violence and general lawlessness. The land reform programme's 
methodology/execution became a major source of friction between Zimbabwe and the donor 
community. Chitiyo (2003:166) and Bush and Szeftel (2000:178) criticise the Zimbabwean 
government for failing to adhere to the guidelines (deliberately ignoring procedures) set at 
the September 1998 Donors' Conference. The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (2003) describes 
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the land reform as "chaotic", "opaque" and "problematic." The Coalition (2003) contends 
that the reform programme was a short-sighted and "unsustainable political gimmick" that 
was carried out too rapidly. The Zimbabwean government began losing the confidence and 
goodwill of its donors at an early stage because of contradictory statements and actions by 
various government ministries and officials involved in the land reform process (Buckle, 
2002:35-36, 167). The acrimony caused by the programme is evidenced by the court actions 
instituted by white commercial farmers (through the CFU) towards the end of 2000 
mentioned above (Meredith, 2003:197). Many white farmers fled the country and bought 
farms in Malawi and Mozambique but some have stayed despite the violence, fear, 
insecurity, tension and uncertainty. 
Other problems arose from pronouncements by some government ministers that only Zanu-
PF supporters would receive resettlement land under the land reform programme. Such 
statements were compounded by the fact that war veterans, and youth militias under their 
tutelage, seemed to have carte blanche in land allocation and overrode, undermined and 
made a mockery of official land allocation structures such as Beneficiary Selection 
Committees (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002). Instead of improving the welfare of the poor 
and landless, and the country as a whole through increased agricultural output, the fast-track 
land reform programme reduced Zimbabwe to a pariah state that is despised, ridiculed, 
isolated and beset by violence, lawlessness, famine and a growing welfare crisis (Jenkins and 
Knight, 2002). 
The fast-track land reform progranune can be analysed in a number of different ways; the 
most obvious, and perhaps important one, being the transfer of land from whites to blacks. 
Despite the controversies and problems created by fast-track land reform; government 
ministers and other government officials in the army, police and the Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO) heralded the programme as a "successful revolution about agrarian 
empowerment" (Chitiyo, 2003:166; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004). The 
programme was the most successful (compared to its predecessors) in terms of distributional 
outcomes or transferring white-owned land to black people. The land reform programme's 
radical and forceful nature was defended by the Zimbabwean government because extensive 
land redistribution occurred and the land reform programme increased smallholder control of 
land from 56% to 70% under the resettlement models described above (Moyo, 2004:25-26; 
Utete Report, 2003). The Presidential Land Review Committee on the implementation of the 
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fast -track land reform programme was chaired by Dr Charles Utete. The Utete Commission, 
and subsequent Utete Report (2003), also hailed the successes of the fast-track land reform 
programme in the face of "formidable odds", although it highlighted several problems in the 
programme's implementation (Utete Report, 2003; Chitiyo, 2003:166). However, although 
the fast-track land reform programme was highly successful in terms of distributional 
outcomes, the Utete Report (2003) the and Manica Post Farming Reporter (2005: 18) note 
that more land is still needed to cope with demand, particularly for Model A2 resettlement 
land. The Utete Report (2003) notes that there demand for land is still high in Mashonaland 
Central, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West and parts of Matabeleland North and South 
provinces. It is also noted that not much de-congestion had taken place in Mberengwa and 
Zvishavane districts at the time the report was compiled (Utete Report, 2003:7). The Utete 
Report (2003 :7) notes that the fast-track reform programme was often implemented in a 
haphazard manner in terms of the criteria for land identification for compulsory acquisition, 
the acquisition process and settler emplacement, for example, in parts of Mashonaland West 
adjacent to Harare and the western and north-western parts of Mashonaland province where 
land invasions were most prevalent. 
Regarding the "formidable odds" encountered during the land reform's implementation, the 
Utete Report (2003:6 & 30) enumerates factors such as a hostile external political 
environment (including sanctions by the Commonwealth, America, Australia and the 
European Union), national macro-economic instability, legal and constitutional objections to 
compulsory land acquisition by white farmers and the exploitation of the land reform 
programme by opportunists pretending to be war veterans. According to the Utete Report 
(2003 :31), certain people who did not have official status or authority interfered with the land 
reform programme, particularly land allocation in districts adjacent to main towns and cities 
(Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Gwanda being the most affected). The Utete Commission 
states that the government regrets the unwelcome intervention by such individuals or groups 
(2003). Statements about "regrettable violent incidences", ostensibly by misguided, 
criminally inclined elements pretending to be war veterans, were also mentioned in May 
2000 when the Commonwealth's head of security, Don McKinnon, visited Zimbabwe to 
assess the situation in the country before the June 2000 parliamentary elections (Buckle, 
2002:99). Again in August 2000, Zimbabwe's Minister of Home Affairs told the Financial 
Gazette that the police were ready to deal forcefully with "rogue elements within the war 
veterans' fraternity" for violent actions and ignoring court orders (Buckle, 2002: 174). 
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Despite these pronouncements, however, some commentators are convinced that these so-
called misguided elements were acting on the orders of the ruling party and government. 
Buckle (2002: 5, 16,84 & 178), Chitiyo (2003:278) and Meredith (2003: 167-169) speak of a 
deliberate alliance (and payment) between the government and 'war veterans' which cannot 
be ignored. However, to prove its point, the government (Vice President Joseph Msika, 
successive Home Affairs Ministers Dumiso Dabengwa and John Nkomo, senior Zanu-PF 
spokesman Nathan Shamuyarira) deployed riot police a few times to evict some invaders 
(knocking down and burning the structures they had erected on occupied farms) from farms 
around Harare, for example, Stoneridge Estate and Blackfordby Farm. Other illegal land 
occupiers were removed from Kambuzuma Extension and parts of Chitungwiza, but each 
time this happened, other government officials (President Mugabe, Vice President Muzenda, 
the Information Minister Jonathan Moyo) would override the order to have the squatters 
removed, for instance, the Information Minister announced on 30 November 2000 that the 
government would not be removing squatters and war veterans from occupied farms (Buckle, 
2002:191-192, 216 & 239). 
Chitiyo (2003:160) points out that the fast-track land reform programme was froth with 
problems (legal, logistical) and describes the programme as a "revolutionary experiment in 
socio-agrarian engineering." The Utete Commission (2003) and government officials 
variously admitted that several obstacles interfered with the land reform's implementation, 
for example, resource constraints, disagreements over the legal framework, bureaucratic and 
related operational/procedural irregularities and inconsistencies In acquiring and 
redistributing land. The United Nations' Development Programme (UNDP) was part of the 
land reform audit/evaluation structure. A UNDP report on land acquisition structures and 
procedures noted in 2002 that, in practice, the elaborate decentralisation of functions within 
the land reform programme's institutional framework created serious implementation 
problems. The report stated that "weak capacity and poor coordination" compromised the 
reform programme's effectiveness and efficiency (UNDP Interim Mission Report 2002 cited 
in Human Rights Watch, 2002: 12). The report expressed concern over the numerous links 
between the different ministries and between national, provincial and local/district levels 
because, in practice, these links created a lot of confusion and duplication. The UNDP noted 
that "complex, cumbersome consultations and decision-making processes involving 
numerous district, provincial and central government actors" made the land reform process 
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tedious to execute and led to "nwnerous errors" (UNDP Interim Mission Report 2002 cited in 
Human Rights Watch, 2002: 12). 
The complexities and inconsistencies in the land reform process resulted in a variety of legal 
issues that remain unresolved in respect of compulsory land acquisition, for example, land 
allocation to beneficiaries, especially under the A2 model; the assessment of the value of 
improvements on farms for compensation; as well as ownership and access to moveable 
assets on acquired farms (Utete Report, 2003). Some of these problems arose because the 
Technical Support Unit that was supposed to be set up before the start of the Inception Phase 
was never formed. The Administrative Court in Manicaland revealed that a significant 
number of white commercial farmers are seeking to reverse the government' s decision to 
compulsorily acquire their farms for resettlement, and the number of such cases continues to 
rise (Mushonawari, 2005:1). According to Mushonawari (2005 :1), in most instances the 
Administrative Court has ruled in the government's favour. 
In spite of the radical nature of fast-track land reform, Von Blanckenburg's (1994:33) 
rationalisation that, in any land reform, a portion of productive commercial farmland should 
be left intact and be devoted to the production of high value export crops is still relevant. It is 
noted, for example, with a view to restore viability in some crucial industries, the 
government de-listed some dairy farms in Mashonaland East province that had been 
designated for compulsory acquisition (Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004). 
The Utete Commission (2003:5) established that 1 323 white farmers still held 1 377 agro-
industrial farms covering 1 175 607 hectares by 31 July 2003. The total landholding under 
this category constitutes about 3% of land in the country, excluding land held by corporate 
entities. This is a huge decline from about 50% at independence in 1980. Zinyama 
(2001: 175) notes that some of these farms have been down-sized or sub-divided into smaller 
units (averaging 854 hectares) to allow for resettlement around them. Another 960 large 
farms are owned by the state or by multinationals and continue to operate relatively normally 
although investment in infrastructure; and the total planted area has been reduced 
significantly (Moyo, 2004:28; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Hwnan 
Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 14). 
On the other hand, Human Rights Watch (2002: 14) estimates that about I 000 commercial 
farms had shut-down operations because their owners had been evicted (or allowed to stay 
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but not engage in farming activities by militias occupymg the land) by 2002. The 
Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) believes the number of white-owned farms that are still 
operational (without being de-listed) is less than 650 and that several such farms are around 
the Midlands Province and Bindura area (Commercial Farmers' Union Information Centre, 
2000; Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Chitiyo, 2003 : 183). 
Moyo (2004:28) notes too that I 440 black-owned (government officials and other influential 
people) large-scale commercial farms were never gazetted for acquisition; neither were they 
sub-divided into smaller units. Moyo (2004:26-27) reports that about 142 black and white 
farmers still own multiple fanns which they bought on the open market before the reform and 
that other influential individuals were allocated more than one model A2 farm under the fast-
track land reform programme. 
LandWeb (2000c) criticises the government for treating fast-track land refonn as an event 
and not as a process. LandWeb (2000c) contends that the government limited the land reform 
programme to land acquisition and redistribution without paying enough attention to other 
issues that would flow from the reform, for instance, the environmental damage that would 
be caused by resettlement. LandWeb (2000c) notes that by September 2000, the fast-track 
land reform programme did not have clear plans for Environmental Impact Assessment 
studies or the enhancement of environmental sustainability. Zimbabwe has a total land 
surface area of 390.757 sq. krn (150.872 sq. miles) and had a population of 11.6 million 
according to the 2002 census. LandWeb (2000c) contends that land pressure (population 
densities and land carrying capacities) should have been an integral part of the reform 
process. Mr. Tengendu of the Farmers Development Trust, an organization that trains 
farmers, pointed out in 2000 that contrary to government claims, a survey of new 
resettlement areas showed that resettlement was disorderly; mainly because farm and village 
aerial surveys were not being carried out. He also noted that the analytical work necessary for 
prudent farming practices was not being undertaken, for instance, there was no analysis of 
soil structure and capability before people were resettled (LandWeb, 2000c). 
The Utete Report (2003) attributes some of these oversights to the fact that the government 
had limited financial resources and faced administrative difficulties because the bureaucratic 
apparatus was over-stretched in coping with the haste in which land reform was carried out 
(Utete Report, 2003; Meredith, 2003:195; Human Rights Watch, 2002:15-16; Bush and 
Szeftel, 2000:173 ; LandWeb, 2000b; LandWeb, 2000c). 
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Hall (2003:262-264) observes that apart from its immediate focus on land redistribution; fast-
track land reform did not adopt a comprehensive restitution or tenure strategy. The most 
striking thing about the fast-track land reform programme, apart from the violence, is that 
concrete provisions were not made for about 300 000 former farm workers who lost their 
jobs and security of residential tenure on white-owned farms (Moyo, 2004:26-27; Human 
Rights Watch, 2002:3). On the other hand, Chitiyo (2003:164) notes that "blitzkrieg style 
land invasions" during the land reform allowed the occupiers to assume automatic land 
ownership during the invasions. This ownership by conquest, however, proved to be 
problematic and untenable as early as mid-2000 and the government has been taking some 
steps to remedy the situation by evicting or shifting illegal land occupiers from illegally 
occupied farms and re-locating them elsewhere, provided alternative land is available 
(Mungoshi, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:33; Buckle, 2002158). President Mugabe told a press 
conference with South African President Thabo Mbeki in mid-2000 that the government 
would remove war veterans from occupied farms but many believe that this was just window 
dressing as President Mugabe contradicted himself when he announced a few days later that 
war veterans would not be removed from occupied farms: "r didn't say war veterans should 
be removed ... The donors can stay with their money. We will not give up our land because of 
what the donors say." (President Mugabe cited in the Daily News in Buckle, 2002: 174 & 
175). 
The government did not have an efficient system of issuing land permits or leases to 
guarantee the tenure of resettled people. Consequently, some pieces of land were allocated 
multiple times to different people since new settlers did not have written proof that the land 
in question was allocated to them (Utete Report, 2003:37; Human Rights Watch, 2002:12-
13). These problems have resulted in a high tum-over of new settlers as many leave 
resettlement areas after a short while. Human Rights Watch (2002:12) attributes this turn-
over to conflicts between different groups of settlers over the allocation of some pieces of 
land. This situation, in turn, is disrupting agricultural production in new resettlement areas. 
The uncertainty over tenure security is exacerbated by the general rule that people forfeit 
land in the cornmunal areas if they take up allocated land under the fast-track programme. 
Land in the communal areas is allocated for cultivation and housing by traditional leaders 
and villagers do not have absolute ownership of such land. The problem with this rule is that 
if a person is absent for an extended period of time, they forfeit their right to hold communal 
land and their land is re-allocated to someone else. Some newly resettled people are in a 
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dilemma where they have insecure tenure (no legal security) in the new resettlement areas 
and can easily be displaced with no access to communal land (Human Rights Watch, 
2002: 14-15). 
5.11 Some Recommendations by the Utete Commission 
The period between the lodging of appeals and the final determination or confirmation of 
acquisition orders by the Administrative or Supreme Courts is filled with uncertainty. This 
uncertainty negatively impacts farmers' investmentlbusiness decisions, especially since 
landless peasants, former farm workers and newly resettled people moved onto disputed 
fanns and started working the land before the courts gave a final ruling (Mushonawari, 
2005:1). Representations were made by some white commercial fanners to the Utete 
Commission regarding their status after the land reform programme. The fanners included 
those that had been served with Section 8 orders yet they owned only one fann; fanners who 
fell under the agro-industrial category or those that had surrendered their other fann(s) to 
government and had been allowed to choose to keep one farm or sub-division thereof. 
The Utete Commission (2003 :7) recommended that the government should conclusively and 
expeditiously address problems arising from the allocation of land sub-divisions to allow for 
productive land-use and a sense of certainty for the white farmers concerned, provided the 
farmers were in compliance with all criteria set by the government in this regard (review and 
rectification where deemed necessary). The Commission (Utete Report, 2003 :7) also 
recommended that action be taken as soon as possible to regularise the situation regarding 
land which is held under Bi-Iateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements. 
Although such fanns were officially exempted from the compulsory acquisition process, 
some were acquired despite the exemption (Human Rights Watch, 2002). 
The Utete Commission recommended that the government make speedy efforts to de-list 
dairy fanns in Mashonaland East province that had been gazetted for compulsory acquisition 
and about 185 such farms have since been de-listed in Mashonaland East (the highest number 
per province) (Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:37). 
The Utete Commission (2003) also noted that several fanns had been left intact, even though 
they exceeded the recommended maximum fann sizes, for instance, around the Midlands 
Province and Bindura area. The Utete Commission (2003) suggested that a review of this 
situation should take into account land use patterns in the relevant areas. 
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The Vtete Commission recommended that land administration (land registration, resolution 
of boundary disputes, tenure, compensation, maximum farm sizes, multiple ownership, 
inheritance systems, farm swaps and sub-divisions, land tax and new settler allocations) be 
undertaken by the Ministry of Lands and Rural Development in conjunction with the 
Department of Lands and the Surveyor General. The Vtete Commission suggested that these 
institutions be supported by the District Development Fund and the agricultural extension 
parastatal, ARDA (Vtete Report, 2003:80). The Vtete Commission recommended that speedy 
action be taken by the government to resolve land allocation issues arising out of, or 
outstanding from the land reform programme's implementation, together with the issue of 
leases or other forms of legal title for land reform beneficiaries because tenure security is 
vital for assured, productive land-use. Particular reference was made to the case of applicants 
for A2 plots whose names were published in newspapers as confirmation that they met the 
criteria for land allocation. The Commission noted that despite satisfying the set criteria, 
many such applicants were still waiting to be allocated land by their local leaders (District 
Administrators, chiefs) (Vtete Report, 2003). Some model A2 applicants were still waiting to 
be informed whether their applications were successful or not. Others were waiting to hear 
whether their plots, which were irregularly taken over by others, would be given back to 
them or if replacement allocations would be made, provided the land in question had not 
been de-listed (Vtete Report, 2003:88). 
The Vtete Commission also recommended the establishment of a semi-autonomous National 
Land Board to facilitate the effective functioning of the Ministry of Land Affairs. The 
National Land Board would exercise both executive and advisory functions in conjunction 
with the Ministry of Land Affairs. Further, the Commission recommended that the National 
Land Board be empowered to ensure that land allocated/redistributed under the land reform 
programme be fully utilised (Vtete Report, 2003 :80). The Commission recommended a 
countrywide review of plots sizes allocated under the Al and A2 models to ensure 
consistency and compliance with policy guidelines. With regards to statutory maximum farm 
sizes, the Vtete Commission, while noting the rationale for these, recommended flexibility in 
their enforcement, taking into account land-use patterns in different ecological zones and the 
infrastructure already on the land (Vtete Report, 2003 :86). 
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5.12 Concluding Remarks 
The Zimbabwean government initially committed itself to following a process of 
consultation, gender sensitivity and equity in its land reform programme because the 
programme was meant to reduce the marginalisation of vulnerable groups (Vtete Report, 
2003). LandWeb (2000c) notes, however, that the government abandoned these plans and 
excluded civil society participation (did not conSUlt) during the fast-track land reform 
programme; resulting in controversial policy positions. Legal mechanisms for negotiating 
and resolving grievances were deliberately subverted in favour of authoritarian and violent 
means and the assessment of civic organisations in this regard is that political expediency 
took precedence over social and economic considerations (Hall, 2003:276 & 280; Chitiyo, 
2003:179, 183 & 198; Meredith, 2003; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; Bush and 
Szeftel, 2002; Sachikonye, 2002: 13; McGregor, 2002: 11; Buckle, 2002: 1 01; Raftopoulos, 
2002:418; Ncube, 2001 in Buckle, 2002; Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 179; Krieger, 2000:448). 
According to Deininger (2003: 149), the main challenge for land reform in Africa is to 
provide an agricultural base for a vibrant and productive rural sector but achievements thus 
far lag significantly behind expectations and Zimbabwe's experience of fast-track land 
reform demonstrates why this is so. An account of the fast-track land reform programme's 
catastrophic economic and social consequences shows that although the programme finally 
changed Zimbabwe's racially skewed land ownership patterns, it has not improved 
agricultural output or the general well-being of the society. 
This chapter has shown that the fast-track land reform programme did not go as smoothly as 
had been hoped (Moyo, 2004:20-22). The programme sparked debates over whether the 
means used to implement it justified the ends achieved, regardless of the political necessity. 
Chitiyo (2003:183) questions whether Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform was a "grand 
emancipatory" or "grand totalitarian" project. The reactionary nature of the goverrunent's 
actions in the face of opposition leads one to conclude that the latter masqueraded as the 
former. Whilst one cannot deny that some degree of compUlsion was necessary for the 
government to acquire land from white farmers for redistribution to landless peasants, it is 
debatable how much force would have sufficed. The political or diplomatic meltdown 
between Zimbabwe and the international community (mainly donors) over the land reform 
programme had dire economic ramifications. The consequences of land reform phase 3 are 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
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6 
The Consequences of Fast-Track Land Reform 
6.1 Introduction 
It was established In the previous chapter that numerous constitutional, legal and 
administrative changes (amendments, enactments) were made by the Zimbabwean 
government in order to implement the fast-track land reform programme. However, 
according to Olaleye (2005), Makumbe (2003b), Chan (2003), Buckle (2002) and Moyo 
(1999:2, 3 & 7), these decisions or changes undermined democratic governance in 
Zimbabwe, instead of consolidating it. The government's intolerance of political opposition 
parties and the independent media, its handling of white citizenship and property rights and 
the erosion of the separation of powers between the three tiers of government (executive, 
parliament and the judiciary) are examples that illustrate this point. These were 
systematically undermined even though political freedom and other civil liberties are 
enshrined in Zimbabwe' s constitution. The implementation of the land reform programme 
led to wanton disregard for the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of fear, both of 
which have had serious political, economic and social ramifications. Von Blanckenburg 
(1994) and Warriner (1969) express reservations about the implementation of radical land 
reforms and Zimbabwe's experience of fast-track land reform proves that radical approaches 
to land reform can indeed be counter-productive. This chapter discusses the consequences of 
the land reform programme and evaluates its impact on peasants, farm workers, white 
farmers, opposition political parties, the media, the economy as well as the Zimbabwean 
government's diplomatic relationships with the international community (donor and non-
donor). 
Apart from an evaluation of the fast-track land reform programme in terms of the amount of 
land transferred from white commercial farmers to blacks (previous chapter), this study 
sought to identify individual and collective survival strategies in the aftermath of this 
significant chapter in Zimbabwe's land reform efforts. This chapter is divided into two broad 
sections. The first one discusses fast-track land reform as it relates to development (Coetzee, 
2001:119; Thomas, 2000:34; Pearson, 2000:393; SwanepoeI1997a:48; Preston, 1996:245 & 
246; Seers, 1979) and McDowell's (1996) theory of displacement and impoverishment. The 
land reform is analysed within a developmental framework because one of the main 
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motivations for its implementation was the government's desire to distribute the country' s 
main means of production (land) more evenly, thereby giving ordinary Zimbabweans the 
means to earn a decent living. The Utete Report (2003: 15-20) cites, among others, the 
following reasons for the fast-track land reform programme: 
• To positively transform people's social and economic circumstances. 
• To transform the rural economy by increasing agricultural production to enhance 
national food security and industrial development. 
According to LandWeb (2000c), to meet these aims, the government initially committed 
itself to following a process of consultation, gender sensitivity and equity to reduce the 
marginalisation of vulnerable groups (1998 Donors Conference). However, instead of 
alleviating poverty by increasing the people's income base, the fast-track land reform 
programme has had devastating social and economic costs, such that many ordinary people 
believe that they are economically worse-off than they were before the land reform 
(LandWeb, 2000c). The government's pronouncements on the successes of the programme 
have been overshadowed by the programme's negative impacts on the economy. Jenkins and 
Knight (2002: I 02) are equally sceptical and contend that the way in which fast-track land 
reform erupted in violence and caused so much destruction from 2000 onwards drastically 
reduced its chances of enhancing people's socio-economic circumstances. The plight of 
Zimbabwe's farm workers and their dependents illustrates this point well. This constituency 
represented 20% of the country's population and more than half of them became destitute 
because of this particular land reform exercise (Mlambo, 2003:201). McDowell's (1996:6) 
observation that forced displacement, whether due to war, political upheaval or natural 
disaster has far-reaching consequences that ingrain the "multidimensionality of 
impoverishment and social disintegration" accurately describes Zimbabwe's farm workers' 
struggle to survive after fast-track land reform. 
This situation is a major concern in light of Warriner's (1969: 13, 28-29, 234) contention that 
the primary test of the efficacy ofland reform is measured by, inter alia, whether or not the 
social conditions or living standards of land recipients, and the society as a whole, improve 
because of the reform. Many would argue that Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform fails this 
test (Sidiropoulos, 2004: 11 0; Meredith, 2003 :231; Mlambo, 2003; Crisis in Zimbabwe 
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Coalition, 2003; Buckle, 2002:48, 109 & 142; Human Rights Watch, 2002:17-18; 
Sachikonye, 2002: 18; Jenkins and Knight, 2002; Buckle, 2002; LandWeb, 2000c). 
Development issues are dealt with in relation to people's dwindling socio-economic 
prospects, partly a result of the unrealistic targets that the governrnent set for itself 
immediately after independence. These unrealistic targets were compounded by failed 
economic structural adjustment in the 1990s (Chan, 2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002). 
Zimbabwe's economic crisis deteriorated further with the implementation of fast-track land 
reform and this situation has implications for the immediate needs or socio-economic 
prospects, not just of newly resettled people (high levels of poverty, agricultural support and 
infrastructure provision), but the entire population. 
The second part of this chapter analyses Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform as it relates to 
Salmi' s (1993) typology of violence. Salmi (1993) contends that there are many different 
kinds of violence. Violence can be direct or indirect and one would argue that both forms 
were a characteristic of fast-track land reform and have adversely affected Zimbabwe's 
political arena (voter apathy). The section on violence traces the birth of the first significant 
political opposition to the ruling Zanu-PF party, mainly as a result of widespread feelings of 
disillusionment with the governrnent's policies since independence in 1980. The chapter 
shows how the government became increasingly reactionary and authoritarian when it was 
threatened by a fermenting legitimacy crisis, before the June 2000 parliamentary election and 
after it (Olaleye, 2005; Meredith, 2003; Chan, 2003; Buckle, 2002). Land reform constituted 
direct physical violence by the police (beatings, unlawful detainment) and ruling party 
militias and supporters (kidnapping, torture, murder) (Olaleye, 2005; Sidiropoulos, 2004; 
Meredith, 2003; Raftopoulos, 2002; Buckle, 2002; Makumbe, 2003b; Human Rights Watch, 
2002:22-25). Less direct forms of violence were committed insofar as the land reform 
progranune interfered with the fulfilment of many people's (farm workers, farmers , the poor 
and vulnerable) basic needs, including sources of livelihood and homes (BBC News, July 
2005; Meredith, 2003: 167-170; Buckle, 2002). 
6.2 People-Centred Development Theories 
The word development is a normative concept that has the connotation of 'favourable or 
good social change,' 'improvement' and 'transformation.' Development is synonymous with 
"progress", through which individuals and groups participate in making decisions that affect 
their lives (economically, socially and politically) (Swanepoel 1997a:48; Chambers, 1997 
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cited in Thomas, 2000:23; Seers, 1979). According to Coetzee (2001:119), the word 
development implies the "right to live a meaningful life" or "human well-being" (livelihood, 
security, equity and sustainability). Although the process of development can disrupt 
established patterns of living, people aspire towards this state of being because development 
implies "improved living standards, improved health and well-being and the achievement of 
whatever is regarded as a general good for society" in the long term (Thomas, 2000:23). It is 
expected, therefore, that development interventions should offer people the opportunity to 
become more than they already are (Coetzee, 2001: 119). 
Dudley Seers (! 969 cited in Thomas: 2000:33) challenges the economic basis of 
development that emphasises productivity and economic growth without reducing poverty or 
meeting basic human needs. Seers (! 979) poses the question; "What constitutes true 
development?" He argues that development should be much more than just economic growth 
(reflected in GDPs). His contention is that economic growth does not automatically translate 
to poverty reduction or the reduction of unemployment and inequality because development 
is social, political and economic (multi-dimensional). 
Alternative approaches to development or discourses about 'egalitarian development' date 
back to the United Nations sponsored symposium on development in Mexico in 1974 and the 
International Labour Organisation's World Employment Conference in 1976, both of which 
affirmed the importance of basic human needs. The UN symposium of 1974 led to the 
Cocoyoc Declaration which called attention to the needs of the poorest of the poor. The 
Cocoyoc Declaration insisted that any process of growth that does not address the most basic 
needs of the poorest people makes a mockery of the process of development. 
The Basic Needs debate was a move away from narrow economic discussions and drew an 
important distinction between economic growth and the provision of the basic necessities; 
requirements or the minimum physiological needs of human beings for social existence. The 
Basic Needs Approach emphasised the importance of addressing people's basic needs such as 
food, water, shelter, health, clothing, education, work and political participation (Coetzee, 
2001; Preston, 1996:245 & 246). The Cocoyoc Declaration also included issues like choice, 
self-reliance, the right to vote and the right to an opinion because, ultimately, proponents of 
Alternative or People-Centred development understand poverty and underdevelopment as 
being synonymous with a "lack of choice or capability" (Kotze, 1988:43 cited in Treurnicht, 
1997:27). 
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According to Eyben (1998 cited in Green, 2002:53), "a socially aware approach to 
development is one that recognises that all policies and programmes have social dimensions 
and implications across all sectors." The role of governments in such an approach is to ensure 
that "poor and vulnerable groups either benefit directly from development interventions 
or ... that the poor are not disadvantaged and made poorer as a result of their engagement with 
development processes" (Green, 2002:53). Proponents of Basic Needs or Human-Centred 
Approaches take development to mean progress in tenns of combating or alleviating poverty 
(evidenced by low levels of material poverty, unemployment, maternal and child mortality as 
well as relative equality, better education), whilst restoring or enhancing basic human 
capabilities and freedoms because "human welfare and progress should be the ultimate goal 
of all development policies" (Thomas, 2000:34; Pearson, 2000:393). People-Centred 
development emphasises "people as agents of development; solving their own problems 
individually or through local organisations and networks" (Thomas, 2000:48; Coetzee, 
2001). David Korten (1995 cited in Thomas, 2000:32-33) is one of the leading proponents of 
Alternative or People-Centred development and he believes that 'authentic development' is 
guided by three basic principles that support people's aspirations for improved quality oflife: 
• Justice: priority must be given to assuring a decent human existence for all people. 
• Sustainability: The earth's resources must be used in ways that assure the well-being 
of future generations. 
• Inclusiveness: Every person must have an opportunity to be a recognised and 
respected contributor to family, community and society. 
Alternative approaches to development are criticised for being idealistic and ignoring the 
limits posed by historical and political contexts. Green (2000 cited in Green 2002:62) 
maintains that development is a concept infonned by subjective or moralistic value 
judgements and "effective social analysis of any local situation must take into account the 
effect of policy contexts and macro-level influences" (social, political and economic 
constraints and motivations). Wisner (1988:49 cited in Swanepoel, 1997a:48) states that 
"development is part of local politics because the process of need definition and 
identification is political" and gaining access to available resources is also a political act 
which can cause tension and conflict. Swanepoel (l997b:56) cautions that the state's role in 
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development is "infonned by an attitude or a commitment demonstrated through national 
economic, social, technical and fiscal policy in support of development goals." Swanepoel 
(l997b:58) notes further that whilst development policies ought to reflect the needs of 
intended beneficiaries, it is only "a relatively strong government with a strong legitimacy 
base that can really involve people in policy matters." One can argue that this is where many 
third world governments fall short. Zimbabwe's attempts to achieve and maintain a decent 
level of development have had mixed success as the next section demonstrates. 
6.2.1 The Birth of Zimbabwe's Economic Crisis 
Many people believed that Zimbabwe had a bright future at independence. The then president 
of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, advised President Mugabe: "You have inherited a jewel. Keep it 
that way" (cited in Meredith, 2003: 14). Jenkins and Knight (2002) maintain that the seeds of 
Zimbabwe's economic decline were sown soon after independence because of the ambitious 
and unsustainable policy initiatives undertaken by the government. The government had to 
satisfy certain domestic expectations in order to sustain its political legitimacy and adopted a 
strategy of balancing reconciliation (to retain the skills of white settlers in order to ensure 
economic stability) with black advancement. The new government's economic policy was 
market-oriented but with a 'growth with redistribution' orientation to address the resource 
imbalances inherited from the colonial era (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:2). This strategy was 
the backbone of the Transitional National Development Plan of 1982/83-1984/85. The 
' growth with equity' policy or economic growth and redistribution of resources to the 
previously disenfranchised black majority entailed reducing urban bias in the provision of 
public services by extending people's access to schools, clinics, water, electricity, 
agricultural extension, research and credit, particularly in the rural areas. Also central to this 
policy was the question of land reform (Meredith, 2003:47; Jenkins and Knight, 2002). 
The government's plans were ambitious and required excessive government spending against 
available resources. The government funded these initiatives using aid money pledged by 
Western countries that admired the spirit of reconciliation and good-will that was adopted by 
the new government. According to Jenkins and Knight (2002:133), President Kissinger of 
America promised Zimbabwe US$I billion in 1976 but in 1980, America's official pledge 
was only US$25 million. The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development 
(ZIMCORD) was held in March 1981. Zimbabwe was promised £636 million in 
development aid at this conference, bringing the total aid pledged close to £900 million 
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(US$1.9 billion). The World Bank was the largest single donor and offered Zimbabwe Z$287 
500 million in soft loans, followed by the United States of America which provided 
Zimbabwe with a three year package of US$225 million and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:133). A wave of aid workers and expatriate 
workers arrived in Zimbabwe after this conference to help rebuild the new state but the 
period of optimism and grand plans was short-lived as some pledges of assistance by the 
donor community were never honoured (Meredith, 2003:47; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:47). 
According to Jenkins and Knight (2002), the government's post-independence policies 
necessitated pervasive government intervention in the economy to the point where, within a 
decade of independence, the government was losing political and economic direction. In 
terms of government intervention in education and health; enrolment increased in secondary 
education and there was a reduction in infant mortality because people who earned less than 
Z$150 per annum (US$238) were allowed free health from 1980 (Jenkins and Knight, 
2002:87-88). By the mid 1990s, the government was struggling to satisfy and sustain the 
people' s expectations in education and health provision, land reform and employment 
creation. The cost of living increased by 150% between 1998 and 1999 because of high 
inflation and interest rates. Real wages deteriorated drastically and people experienced 
widespread job losses. At least a third of the country's labour force was unemployed and 
there was a sharp decline in people's standard of living. Severe food, water, fuel and 
electricity shortages were experienced and these were accompanied by a deteriorating quality 
of social services (Larsson-Liden, 2000:128 & 131; Krieger, 2000:445; Burkett, 2000:471; 
Mwanza, 1999; Von Blanckenburg, 1994:33; Riddell, 1992:22). The needs of the poor were 
side-lined because of a lack of sustained political will by the country's leadership to commit 
to the socio-economic objectives set at independence. Despite the government's Marxist-
Leninist (socialist) outlook and rhetoric, the living standard of the ordinary man had not 
improved significantly and the electorate became disillusioned (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:2 
& 4). Voter apathy and the incidence of protests (rioting) increased notably. 
Increased access to wealth by the ruling elite by the mid-1990s proved to be counter 
productive (crippling corruption and plundering of limited resources and gross 
mismanagement) when viewed against the government's stated poverty alleviation objectives 
(Jenkins and Knight, 2002:5; Manza, 1999). Zimbabwe's economy began under-performing 
because of failed economic structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s, yet the ruling 
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elite found ways to enrich itself. Fraud, forgery, embezzlement and theft became endemic in 
government departments and parastatals such as Air Zimbabwe, the National Railways of 
Zimbabwe (NRZ), the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), the Posts and 
Telecommunications Corporation (PTC), the National Social Security Authority (NSSA), the 
Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), the 
Cold Storage Commission (CSC) and the District Development Fund (DDF) (Meredith, 
2003; Jenkins and Knight, 2002; Buckle, 2002). 
The Willowvale Mazda Motor Industries scandal led to the Sandura Commission in 1988 in 
which several government ministers where implicated. Geoffrey Nyarota, Fredrick Shava 
and Maurice Nyagurnbo were convicted in the Willowvale debacle (Meredith, 2003). Buckle 
(2002:56) reports that there was a $28 million scandal in which the Minister of Agriculture 
was implicated and the GMB was under investigation for fraud involving in excess of $320 
million and about $4 million was looted from the DDF by senior government officials. The 
War Victims Compensation Fund (chapter 3) was defrauded of an estimated $Z450-$500 
during this period (Meredith, 2003133-134; Buckle, 2002:56 & 236) and land reform became 
embroiled in corruption as Zimbabwe's elite established themselves as a new class of land 
owners, while the majority of black people waited for comprehensive land reform (chapter 2) 
(Hall, 2003:267; Meredith, 2003:121-127; Chitiyo, 2003:163 & 164; Jenkins and Knight, 
2002:45; Buckle, 2002:23; Human Rights Watch, 2002:7; Moyo, 2000a; 200b; Bush and 
Szeftel, 2000:177 &178; Chattopadhyay, 2000:314). 
President Mugabe 's second wife (Grace) was also involved in the rampant corruption. She 
acquired 10 acres of land in Harare's affluent Borrowdale suburb to build a mansion. It is 
alleged that she only paid Z$78 206 for it even though it was valued at Z$570 000. Grace 
also took advantage of an illegal housing scheme that was hatched by government officials in 
the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing to build houses for VIP 
beneficiaries (cabinet ministers, senior civil servants, defence and police chiefs). This scheme 
was later declared corrupt and illegal by the High Court (Meredith, 2003: I 09; Buckle, 
2002:56). On top of all this corruption, the government made huge unbudgeted payments 
(gratuities, disability compensation and pensions) to Zimbabwe's liberation war veterans 
(Meredith, 2003:83 & 133-139; Human Rights Watch, 2002:8) and intervened militarily in 
the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a decision which is reported to have cost 
Zimbabwe US$l million per day (Meredith, 2003:139,1 48-157; Chitiyo, 2003:177; Mlambo, 
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2003:195; Chan, 2003; Sachikonye, 2002:14; Jenkins and Knight, 2002; Chattopadhyay, 
2000:310; Bush and Szefte1, 2000:177-178; Krieger, 2000:443-444; Burkett, 2000:471). 
From the 1990s, President Mugabe was no longer required to attend parliament and answer 
questions regarding government policies and he turned a blind eye to these problems and 
their cover-ups (Meredith, 2003 :81-82, 95-102). Instead, following the 1995 elections, the 
president, all the cabinet ministers and members of parliament gave themselves lavish pay 
increases of 133%, yet health spending was cut by 43% and civil servants only received 20% 
pay increases (and no bonuses), forcing doctors, nurses and students to go on strike against 
declining standards of living in 1995 (Meredith, 2003: 127-131; Mwanza, 1999). High level 
corruption allowed the governing elite to drive expensive cars, own multiple farms, business 
concerns, real estate/houses and travel overseas while the ordinary people suffered. Over all, 
the government took little or no action against the people involved in these scandals and 
corruption. A High Court Judge pointed out that nearly four years later, no action had been 
taken to recover the Z$450-500 million that was looted from the War Victims Compensation 
Fund. On war veteran leader, Chenjerai Hunzvi, had been charged (as a sacrificial lamb for 
fabricating medical records and claiming a 118% disability from the fund) by June 1998 but 
he was acquitted in November 2000 (Meredith, 2003:144-145; Buckle, 2002:238). Financial 
mismanagement was so rife that NOCZIM owed its suppliers Z$ 11 billion in debt by 12 
October 2000, even though some of its top managers were arrested on corruption charges in 
June 2000 (Buckle, 2002: 132). 
Land reform's modest results from 1980 to 2000 added to the government's poor delivery 
record and it tried to assuage people's feelings of disappointment by pursuing a radical land 
reform policy. Economists, bankers and businessmen warned that the government's hasty 
plans to compulsorily acquire white-owned commercial farms would send the country into 
further economic crisis. The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange plummeted soon after 1 471 farms 
were gazetted for compulsory acquisition in November 1997 because more than a third of the 
companies listed on the Stock Exchange were heavily dependent on agriculture and the 
acquisitions destroyed investor confidence. The shock-waves created by the land designation 
and the acute land shortages that were experienced in the rural areas meant that the 
unemployed had no safety-net in agriculture. The country's economic problems fuelled 
domestic unrest which culminated in countrywide food riots in January 1998. The food riots 
had such an adverse effect on businesses that the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange went into 
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another slump (Meredith, 2003: 141; Chattopadhyay, 2000:310; Sachikonye, 2002: 14; 
Larsson-Liden, 2000: 131; Raftopoulos, 1996: 17). 
In the same week as the food riots, the government spent more than US$2 million on fifty 
new ministerial Mercedes-Benz vehicles (Meredith, 2003:141; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:50). 
Ten days later, the Presidential Pension and Retirement Benefits Amendment Bill was tabled 
in parliament to substantially increase the pensions, number of free vehicles, air travel, 
bodyguards, medical attention and staff that the president and his fami ly and the country's 
two vice presidents could enjoy for the rest of their lives. This extravagance amidst poverty 
(government's priorities left a lot to be desired) induced another ZCTU-led nationwide mass 
stay-away in March 1998 (Meredith, 2003: 141) but by then, most Zimbabweans were 
generally worse-off than they had been at independence because average wages were lower, 
unemployment had trebled, public services were crumbling and life expectancy was falling 
(Meredith, 2003: 17). 
6.2.2 Fast-Track Land Reform and Development 
Zimbabwe was once a relatively prosperous country and was regarded as the breadbasket of 
Southern Africa (once held SADCC/SADC's Food Security portfolio) but it now faces 
starvation. Fast-Track and reform devastated Zimbabwe's agricultural sector and induced the 
collapse of the economy because most other industries in the country are linked to 
agriculture. The disruptions caused by land reform and illegal land occupations by those 
claiming to be war veterans drastically reduced the volume and value of marketed 
agricultural produce. Many farmers were forced to shut-down operations on their farms, for 
example, according to the Daily Telegraph (cited in Buckle, 2002: 162), about forty farms 
that employed an estimated 10 000 people closed down in the Glendale area outside Harare. 
The Zimbabwe Standard reported that a maize shortage was imminent because maize 
planting was down by between 40%-60% in October 2000 (quoted in Buckle, 2002:236). The 
planting figures for winter wheat fell by a third in 2001 while maize and export crops like 
tobacco fell by about 70%. By December 2001, commercial maize planting declined to 45 
000 hectares from 150 000 hectares in the 1999/2000 season. This general decline in 
production forced the price of vegetables to increase by 200% because of shortages (Kibble, 
2004:367; Chitiyo, 2003 :214; Meredith, 2003 :231; United States Department of State, 2003; 
Sachikonye, 2002:13; Human Rights Watch, 2002:17-18; Buckle, 2002:48,109 & 142; Bush 
and Szeftel, 2002:7; Chattopadhyay, 2000:307; LandWeb, 2000c). 
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The Commercial Farmers' Union estimates that close to 250 000 (about 20%) of Zimbabwe' s 
national herd (beef and dairy cattle) had been forcibly de-stocked by late 2001 because of the 
looting associated with illegal farm occupations. Zimbabwe's beef exports were 
compromised because of mob interference with fencing and quarantine arrangements and the 
illegal movement of cattle from communal areas to commercial areas; which increased the 
risk of disease communication (anthrax, foot-and-mouth). Outbreaks of anthrax were 
reported in Makoni North and Makonde in November 2000 and had spread to Chihota in 
Mashonaland East by December 2000. Further, over 1.6 million hectares of grazing land had 
been destroyed/burnt, creating milk and other shortages (Borland and Moyo, 2004; Human 
Rights Watch, 2002:17-18; Meredith, 2003:231; Buckle, 2002:48, 109,142, 238 & 241; 
LandWeb, 2000c). The country's banks, for example, Standard Chartered Bank, repeatedly 
warned the government about the impending economic collapse and food shortages but their 
alarm was ignored. Despite the growing crises (political, economic and social), President 
Mugabe went on the campaign trail for both the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential 
elections saying; "Zimbabwe is able to go it alone .. .If whites want to go [leave Zimbabwe], 
we will offer them an escort. Do you think we cannot farm tobacco, tea, sugar or oranges?" 
(cited in Buckle, 2002:48-49). Rousing nationalist sentiment and circumscribing white 
citizenship seemed to be the only thing that held sway at this point. 
The fast-track land reform programme's shock-waves in the agricultural sector had a severe, 
negative knock-on effect on Zimbabwe's motor, clothing, textiles, timber, mining and 
tourism industries. Factory closures in these industries led to unprecedented job losses as 
more than 200000 jobs have been lost since the beginning of2000 (Mlambo, 2003:200-203; 
United States Department of State, 2003). Political instability and a severe lack of foreign 
currency forced many companies into liquidation. Foreign investment in Zimbabwe's 
economy has dropped by 90% since 2000; resulting in the closure of many companies and 
massive unemployment estimated to be higher than 70% (Makumbe, 2003b; Buckle, 2002:89 
& 142; Jenkins and Knight, 2002). During the fast-track land reform programme, President 
Mugabe announced that the government planned to indigenise Zimbabwe's mining sector 
once land reform was complete. This announcement compelled private businesses to 
accelerate their exodus (Buckle, 2002: 142). The property market (real estate) was also under 
serious threat and experienced a rapid decline (Buckle, 2002:142). The government's 
reputation for condoning on-going incidences of politically motivated violence (lawlessness), 
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repression and anti-white hostility added to waning investor confidence. On 19 October 
2000, the Matebeleland Chamber of Industries announced that half of its members would 
close down at the end of the year because of the harsh economic climate and analysts 
estimated that 200 000 jobs would be lost (Buckle, 2002:236). In November 2000, a leading 
pharmaceutical company, Johnson and Johnson, announced that it was relocating to South 
Africa because of continuing economic instability in Zimbabwe. On 30 November 2000, the 
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) announced that 23% of local manufacturing 
companies were planning to disinvest from Zimbabwe owing to economic decline (Buckle, 
2002:239). 
Zimbabwe's main holiday resorts, such as the Victoria Falls Hotel , reported increased 
cancellations and a significant reduction in bookings (by about 25%) in 2000. Kariba also 
experienced a sharp decline of about 80% of its normal number of visitors (Buckle, 2002:48, 
105 & 142-143). Similar reports were made about tourism (a decline of 70%) in the 
Nyanga/Juliasdale area of Manicaland's Eastern Highlands (Buckle, 2002:142-143). The 
decline in bookings meant reduced revenue in foreign currency. The Zimbabwe Electricity 
Supply Authority (ZESA) resorted to emergency power rationing or load shedding because 
of the critical foreign currency shortage. Zimbabwe also experienced a crippling fuel 
shortage (petrol, diesel and paraffin) that brought surviving industries to their knees because 
the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) owed its suppliers Z$1 1 billion by 
October 2000 (Sidiropoulos, 2004: 11 0; Mlambo, 2003; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; 
Makumbe, 2003b; Sachikonye, 2002:18; Jenkins and Knight, 2002; Buckle, 2002:48, 56, 89, 
132 & 236). Without a steady in-flow of foreign currency from the agricultural sector, 
hospitals ran out of essential drugs including medicine for diarrhoea and vomiting, 
contraceptive pills and condoms, as well as bandages and disposable gloves. The Ministry of 
Health reported that at least 2000 people were dying of AIDS per week in Zimbabwe yet 
most hospitals and clinics just had Aspirin, Chloroquin and Paracetemol to offer them 
(Buckle, 2002:234). These problems compelled the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) to call a general strike in July 2000 (Buckle, 2002:166-167). 
Kibble (2004:369) comments on the brain-drain currently being experienced by Zimbabwe as 
15% of its popUlation is living outside the country, mostly as economic and political 
refugees . Skilled black middle class professionals (nurses, pharmacists, doctors, teachers, 
accountants and engineers) have fled the country to overseas destinations (Britain, Ireland, 
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Scotland, America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) or to neighbouring countries like 
South Africa, Namibia and Botswana in search of better wages and conditions of 
employment (Meredith, 2003:210; Bijlmakers et ai, 1996; Bijlmakers et ai, 1998; 
Gaidzanwa, 1999). The flight of hwnan capital, and the withdrawal of official development 
assistance by international donors, has inadvertently added to the general collapse of most 
delivery systems in the country (health, education). 
Ordinary, poor Zimbabweans were affected the most by the debilitating welfare crisis that 
was created by fast-track land reform. Between 60%-80% of the population is classified as 
living below the poverty line and as many as 6 million (half the population) have to contend 
with acute food shortages, especially in the rural areas (Kabemba, 2005: 11; Karume, 
2005:41; Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Meredith, 2003:231; Makumbe, 2003b; United States 
Department of State, 2003; Bookstein and Lawson, 2002:635; Buckle, 2002:56; Jenkins and 
Knight, 2002). Bread riots broke out in Harare on 17 October 2000 following a 30% price 
rise. Food riots also broke out in Mutare on 24 October 2000 (Buckle, 2002:236-237). People 
in the urban areas also experienced critical food shortages and sharp increases in the prices of 
basic food stuffs (mealie-meal, sugar, cooking oil, bread) as the inflation rate rose to 103.8% 
in November 2001, forcing Zimbabwe's Real GDP to contract by 7.5% in 2001. As 
Zimbabwe's food situation continued to deteriorate because of reduced cereal production, the 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) urged the government to intervene in December 
2001 (Buckle, 2002). The inflation rate kept rising and reached 175% by the end of 2002. 
Zimbabwe's inflation rate was over 400% in the third-quarter of 2003 and reached 600% by 
the end of 2003/beginning of 2004. The cost of Zimbabwe's political and economic crises 
amounted to a 25% decline in GDP between 2001 and 2004 (Kibble, 2004:368; Sidiropoulos, 
2004:110; Utete Report, 2003:30; Mlambo, 2003 ; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; 
Sachikonye, 2002:14; Bush and Szeftel, 2002; Buckle, 2002:28 & 109; Human Rights 
Watch, 2002: 17-18; Bush and Szeftel, 2000). 
Zimbabwe has been unable to produce or import (was importing from South Africa, Zambia) 
enough food to feed its people for the past three years. About half of Zimbabwe's popUlation 
became dependent on food relief from January-February 2002 (basics like mealie-meal, 
cooking oil, soya, sugar-beans). Zimbabwe's starving masses are at the mercy of 
international hwnanitarian relief organisations such as the Red Cross, Plan International, 
Care International and the United Nations' World Food Programme which have been 
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distributing food aid since the upheavals began (Karume, 2005:41; Kibble, 2004:367; 
Chitiyo, 2003:214; United States Department of State, 2003; Bush and Szeftel, 2002:7; 
Chattopadhyay, 2000:307; Sachikonye, 2002:13). It should be noted, however, that the fast-
track land reform's disruption of agricultural production aggravated an already bad food 
deficit. Zimbabwe's food desperate situation was initially a result of recurrent devastating 
droughts (1982-84, 1986-87, 1991-92, 1994-95) and the introduction of economic structural 
adjustment programmes in the 1990s (Bookstein and Lawson, 2002:635; Saunders, 1996; 
Bijlmakers el ai, 1998; Bijlmakers el ai, 1996). 
6.2.3 Development: Prospects for Resettled Communities in Agriculture 
Land is probably the most valuable economic asset in countries whose economies rely 
mainly on agriculture, like Zimbabwe, therefore, adequate training and capacity building 
(improved infrastructure) is a necessary step towards rural development (Deininger, 
2003:154-155; Ghai and Radwan, 1983:12-15, 27-28). According to Warriner (1969:59), 
integrated land reform can be broken into two main phases. Phase 1 is concerned with land 
expropriation and redistribution. Phase 2 is concerned with the provision of the necessary 
support (credit, technical know-how/extension services, inputs like seeds, pesticides, 
herbicides and fertilizer, stock-feed) to create better farmers who can sustain reasonably high 
agricultural production (Warriner, 1969:26,44,47 & 267). Larsson-Liden (2000:130) and 
Moyo (1999: 17) agree that for small-scale farmers to do well, they need access to better 
knowledge and skills, quality inputs and efficient marketing services. Christodoulou 
(1990: 140) highlights this point by stating that technical and operational effectiveness are 
part (and outcome) of being able to/having the competence to make informed decisions. 
Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:203-226) distinguish between two types of support for 
resettled farmers and communities. The first one is geared towards realising the full 
agricultural potential of the land ('core support'). It is agreed (Prosterman and Riedinger, 
1987:203-226; Scudder, 2001 :256; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003) that agricultural 
production is enhanced or facilitated by direct measures, such as, access to credit, appropriate 
agricultural extension services, dip tanks, minimum all-weather roads for improved 
transportation, reasonable marketing networks, improved seeds, fertiliser, pesticides, storage 
and milling facilities; all of which help to boost production. The 'core support' defined above 
enables land reform beneficiaries to make productive use of the land they receive, thereby 
enhancing the productive capacity and commercial possibilities of the rural poor. Failure to 
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pay sufficient attention to capacity building and training before beneficiaries gain access to 
land can limit a government's efforts to improve the plight of poor rural people. Most 
advanced countries (USA, Britain, France) subsidise their agricultural sectors and provide 
farmers with this kind of support (Warriner, 1969:34, 39, 60). In this regard, one notes that 
the Zimbabwean government offered this kind of support to resettled farmers/communities 
soon after independence and gradually withdrew it following the country's 'maize miracle' in 
the 1980s. After the withdrawal, small farmers were unable to sustain high output levels and 
the situation was compounded by recurrent droughts from the mid 1980s (1982-84,1986-87, 
1991-92,1994-95) and the adoption ofneo-liberal structural adjustment programmes. 
The Utete Report (2003) acknowledges that land reform cannot begin and end with land 
redistribution. The report reiterates the government's position that fast-track land reform was 
aimed at positively transforming people's socio and economic circumstances by transforming 
the rural economy in order to increase agricultural production, thereby enhancing national 
food security and industrial development. However, in terms of these outcomes, Jenkins and 
Knight (2002: 1 02) are sceptical and contend that the land reform prograrmne caused 
unprecedented destruction and it is unlikely that it can enhance people's socio-economic 
circumstances in the short-medium term. Mlambo (2003:199-206), Jenkins and Knight 
(2002:102), Human Rights Watch (2002:3 & 14), Raftopoulos (2002:426), Bush and Szeftel 
(2000: 173) and LandWeb (2000b) maintain that the fast-track land reform programme lacked 
a comprehensive plan for Warriner's (1969) Phase 2 (provision of the necessary support). 
Even the Utete Commission which was appointed by President Mugabe to evaluate the 
programme admits that it lacked adequate infrastructure provision to allow resettled 
communities and farmers to make productive use of the land and meet the aims outlined 
above (Utete Report, 2003 :25). 
So far, this chapter has outlined the extent of Zimbabwe's economic crisis in terms of the 
sharp decline in agricultural production and its effect on other sectors of the economy 
namely; foreign currency shortages, fuel shortages, three-digit inflation, company closures, 
job losses and food shortages. In real or practical terms, the crisis means that the government 
and others cannot import farm machinery and other inputs because of the lack of foreign 
currency, for instance. From the onset, Mr Makumbe, a Political Science lecturer at the 
University of Zimbabwe, was sceptical of the government's ability (financial and 
administrative) to offer newly resettled communities the level of support they need to 
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become self-reliant. Mr Makumbe commented that; "The people will not get adequate 
infrastructure, financial support or training to cultivate the land productively ... will damage 
the environment and the economy ... " (quoted by the United States Department of State, 
2003). The escalating cost of agricultural inputs (because of high inflation rates) is 
compounded by the prohibitive interest rates (and insufficient funds) offered by the state-
owned Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) which provides loans to small-scale farmers. 
Other problems include the high cost of electricity (needed for irrigation, dairy farming and 
some horticultural processes) and crippling fuel shortages which interfere with the 
transportation of goods from the source to other industries or to the market. Bush and Szeftel 
(2000: 173) note that to date, insufficient funds have been made available for basic 
infrastructure provision for fast-track land reform beneficiaries. Bush and Szeftel (2000) 
allege that peasant farmers have received little or no support in terms of credit, roads or 
technical know-how for them to be productive. In terms of the development 
theories/approaches above, it is this chronic "lack of choice and capability" that represents 
under-development and poverty (Kotze, 1988:43 cited in Treumicht, 1997:27). 
The lack of comprehensive agricultural support is a predicament faced by many of 
Zimbabwe's newly resettled peasant farmers (Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 173) because of 
delayed or inadequate 'core support' and physical infrastructure provision. The Ministry of 
Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and 
Urban Development, which funds the District Development Fund (DDF) and District 
Councils (for projects such as road, bridge and dam construction) in rural areas, are failing to 
cope with demand for agricultural inputs, extension services and physical infrastructure. The 
capacity of the Agritex (the government's agricultural extension service wing) and the DDF 
(a development aid institution) to assist resettled farmers is reportedly far lower than was 
expected at the beginning of the land reform exercise and this has negatively impacted 
agricultural development and extension work (Mlambo, 2003:199-206; Jenkins and Knight, 
2002:102; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 14; Raftopou10s, 2002:426; Bush and Szeftel, 
2000:173; LandWeb, 2000b; LandWeb, 2000c). The Agricultural Development Authority 
(ADA, formerly the Agricultural Rural Development Authority/ ARDA) is responsible for 
"planning, coordinating, implementing, promoting and assisting agricultural and rural 
development" (Moyo et ai, 1991: I 02) and is also failing to deliver these services to resettled 
communities, even with the assistance of the Farmers Development Trust (FDT). 
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The lack of empowerment evident in newly resettled areas, in tum, negatively impacts 
agricultural production. LandWeb (2000b) reports that some newly resettled farmers are 
abandoning their land or under-utilising it because they do not have the resources (basic 
inputs like fertiliser and seeds) to make productive use of it. In Matabeleland South Province, 
for example, LandWeb (2000b) reports that villagers are abandoning the small plots that they 
were allocated. Provincial officials in Matabeleland South revealed that only 1 000 out of the 
9 000 people allocated land in the province have taken it (LandWeb, 2000b). The remainder 
have abandoned their plots because they are frustrated at the government's failure to provide 
basic infrastructure (Utete Report, 2003:25; LandWeb, 2000b). Human Rights Watch 
(2002:3 & 14) also report that some potential settlers turned down the opportunity to own 
land because they do not have the means to work the land without government assistance. 
Many resettled people do not have farming equipment of their own to use, for example, 
tractors, ploughing disks, combine harvesters and irrigation pumps, pipes and sprinklers for 
crops and livestock in drought prone areas (Buckle, 2002). They also do not have assets to 
use as collateral when applying for bank loans which could help them procure the necessary 
farming inputs and equipment. 
The situation described above shows that the overall capacity of land reform to increase 
production on resettled land is compromised because government support for resettled 
families (especially ordinary peasant Al resettlement beneficiaries) is insufficient. These 
deficiencies make for a bleak future for small, recently resettled commercial and peasant 
farmers who are struggling to sustain viable operations (with high quality and consistently 
high yields) as a result. One is inclined to agree with the critics (Mlambo,2003:199-206; 
Raftopoulos, 2002:426; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 173; Land Web 
2000c) that the government's promises of support (administrative, financial, infrastructural 
and extension requirements-Chapter 4) were unrealistic because of the government's limited 
resources and Zimbabwe's dire economic circumstances. 
6.2.4 Recommendations made by the Utete Commission 
In spite of the above criticism, the Utete Report notes (although results were not computed 
statistically by the commission itself) that production in newly resettled areas shows 
appreciable performance especially under the Al resettlement model. The Utete Commission 
reports that land reform beneficiaries are making full use of the land allocated to them (Utete 
Report, 2003 :28). The Utete Commission notes further that in some areas, yields realised in 
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crops such as maize and tobacco were quite significant, considering the poor rainfall patterns 
in the seasons covered by the land reform programme (Utete Report, 2003 :28). However, the 
Commission noted the need for timeous provision of adequate tillage services and inputs of 
all types as a recurring concern raised in most of these areas. Unfortunately, the government 
does not have enough resources to provide such inputs and infrastructure on that scale (Utete 
Report, 2003 :31). In a bid to alleviate the problems outlined above and raise production 
levels on resettlement land, the Utete Commission made recommendations to government 
and some of them are outlined below. 
The Utete Commission recommended a major overhaul/rationalisation of government 
departments involved in land and agricultural affairs so that all aspects of the land reform 
programme can be handled by two separate Ministries; a Ministry of Agriculture and a 
Ministry of Land Affairs. The Utete Commission suggested that the Ministry of Agriculture 
should deal with all agricultural matters, including water development and irrigation. It also 
proposed that the Ministry of Agriculture should house most, if not all, the parastatals 
currently engaged in agricultural activities of one kind or another (Utete Report, 2003:73-80). 
The Commission also recommended a comprehensive policy and approach for corporate-type 
models of land administration to allow local community participation in plantations, 
conservancies, safaris and forest areas in Matabeleland North and South, Masvingo and 
Manicaland provinces (Utete Report, 2003:94-95). This initiative is intended to enhance 
agricultural production to guarantee local food security and the development of the economy 
as a whole. It is also meant to ensure that returns to the country in export (foreign currency) 
multiply, for example, through value addition to raw materials (processing). 
The Utete Commission emphasised the need for comprehensive and systematic planning of 
future agricultural development with particular focus on, among others; Human 
Capacity/Skills Development, Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer (Utete Report, 
2003:73-80). In order to achieve the government's goals for agrarian transformation, the 
Utete Commission encouraged the collaborative and coordinated participation of the local 
private sector, donor countries and other development partners to complement national 
initiatives through research and development, financing, irrigation development, 
environmental protection, skills development/capacity building, processing of produce and 
marketing (Utete Report, 2003 :96-1 00). The Utete Commission emphasised that the need for 
a water resource development strategy because Zimbabwe is drought prone. The Utete 
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Commission proposed that irrigation must be viewed as a national priority and recommended 
that governmental institutions involved in water resource development should be harmonised 
and streamlined to enhance the effectiveness of their overall impact. 
With regards to inputs and infrastructure provision, the Vtete Commission said it is 
imperative that practical steps be taken to address input shortages (and the issue of exorbitant 
input prices) by carefully targeting agricultural assistance using the needs-based criteria 
(Utete Report, 2003 :73-80). 
6.2.5 The Government's Inputs Credit Scheme 
Fast-track land reform disrupted farming activities, which in tum led to a severe shortage of 
foreign currency and agricultural inputs. This section enumerates some measures that are 
being taken by the Zimbabwean government (and others) to rectify this situation (address the 
decline in the agricultural sector) in an attempt to resuscitate Zimbabwe's economy. The 
Utete Report (2003) notes that most newly resettled farms are engaging in the production of 
tobacco, paprika, soya-beans and cotton. Some farmers in Manicaland and Mashonaland East 
provinces are also engaging in horticulture. The main problem, however, is that inputs are 
either inadequate or belatedly distributed, or both, for instance tillage services (Utete Report, 
2003:38). In order to alleviate this situation, the government budgeted Z$77.64 billion for 
crops and livestock inputs in the 2002-2003 season, and a further Z$18.96 billion for 
irrigation schemes. The Department of Meteorological Services also contracted a local 
company, Agricair, to run "cloud-seeding" programmes for part of the 2004/2005 rainy 
season at a cost of ZW$2.7 million an hour. This move was necessitated by erratic rains and 
recurrent droughts in some parts of the country. Additional funds for these projects were 
made available through supplementary budgets to give a total of Z$96.6 billion that was set 
aside for inputs provision (Utete Report, 2003:38). 
According to Manicaland's Provincial Administrator (Interview, January 2005), newly 
resettled farmers are benefiting from the government's agricultural input supply scheme 
which is meant to alleviate the critical shortage of tillage equipment, thereby increasing crop 
hectarage and improving yields per unit. Manicaland Province was given a maize target of 
590 000 hectares for the 2004/2005 maize season. Maize targets for Manicaland 's Makoni, 
Chipinge and Mutare districts for the 2004/2005 maize season were 190 105 hectares, 64 390 
hectares and 140 454 hectares respectively. Individual farmers were given planting targets ; 
for example, 10 hectares had to be under maize crop for model A2 farmers (Interview with 
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Manicaland's Provincial Administrator, January 2005). The Agricultural Development 
Authority (currently has a fleet of25 tractors) managed to till I 500 hectares in Manicaland 
province during the 2004/2005 planting season. The Mutare Rural District Council, in 
conjunction with the District Development Fund (DDF), also assisted farmers by ploughing 
just over 2 500 hectares in the province (Interview with Manicaland's Provincial 
Administrator, January 2005). 
About II 000 tonnes of maize-seed was distributed to farmers in Manicaland Province 
during the 2004/2005 maize season. It was expected that 290 000 tonnes of Compound D 
planting fertiliser and 170 000 tonnes of Ammonium Nitrate top-dressing fertiliser would be 
distributed in the province's eleven districts by the beginning of the planting season. 
However, Zimbabwe was hit by a severe shortage of Ammonium Nitrate fertiliser and maize 
and soya-beans were the worst affected (yellowing) because of the nitrate deficiency 
(Interview with Manicaland' s Provincial Administrator, January 2005). Farmers in the 
province were urged to grow sunflowers for oil extraction, sugar beans and soya-beans by the 
Agriculture, Research and Extension Services (AREX) in case the maize crop was ruined by 
the fertiliser shortage (Manica Post Farming Correspondent, 2005: 12). The Grain Marketing 
Board (GMB) managed to source a consignment of Ammonium Nitrate fertiliser from South 
Africa and Manicaland Province was allocated 2 520 tonnes, which was distributed through 
various GMB depots in the province (Manica Post Correspondent, 2005:3). 
Premier Banking Corporation's (Zimbabwe) Agri-Finance Manager revealed that the 
institution disbursed $Z42 billion to farmers in the 18 months from the beginning of 2004 to 
June 2005. Premier Banking Corporation supports the government's land reform efforts and 
is assisting both large and small-scale commercial farmers (mostly through loans at 
concessionary interest rates) because the government does not have enough resources to 
support the land reform programme on its own (Sunday Mail Chief Reporter, 2005 :6). The 
money is being used to buy inputs (seed and chemicals) and land preparation (tillage). One 
requirement for this loan facility is that beneficiaries must produce letters-of-proof that they 
were lawfully allocated land by the government. Farmers involved in crocodile farming, 
ostrich rearing and wheat production have so far benefited from this facility (Sunday Mail 
Chief Reporter, 2005 :6). 
138 
The government has set up a $50 billion livestock purchasing scheme. The scheme is meant 
to re-stock the dwindling national herd which was depleted by recurrent droughts, outbreaks 
offoot-and mouth disease, anthrax and the looting that became characteristic ofthe fast-track 
land reform programme. The Manica Post reports that about 780 farmers have so far 
benefited from the $11.2 billion that has been disbursed through AgriBank (Post Farming 
Correspondent, 2005:12). Communal and Model Al resettlement farmers are entitled to $10 
million for beef cattle and $15 million for dairy cows. A maximum of $50 million for beef 
cattle and $80 million for dairy cows per farmer has been budgeted for Model A2 
resettlement farmers. Small livestock producers are also entitled to a maximum of $20 
million for piggery and $3.5 million for poultry projects from the livestock purchasing 
scheme (Post Farming Correspondent, 2005: 12). 
Tobacco is a major foreign currency earner for Zimbabwe and it was affected by recent 
droughts, erratic rains and disruptions caused by land reform. The Zimbabwe Allied Banking 
Group (ZABG), in conjunction with ABSA Bank of South Africa, has set-up a US$25 
million input facility for the 200516 tobacco season through the Tobacco Development 
Cooperation. This initiative is part of the government's 'economic turnaround plan' and was 
brokered by the Reserve Bank of ZimbabwelRBZ to increase output from the tobacco sector 
(Mabwe, 2005:B 1). Targeted beneficiaries include both small and large-scale tobacco 
growers from Zimbabwe's main tobacco growing areas; namely Mashonaland East, Central 
and West Provinces and parts of Manicaland. The money is disbursed through farmers' 
organisations and committees under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(Mabwe,2005:BI). 
There have been similar developments in Zimbabwe's horticultural sector. New Ziana 
(2005:10) reports that Zimbabwe's floriculture production declined to below 20 000 tonnes 
from 24 000 tonnes of flowers worth US$86 million produced in the 2002 marketing season. 
Zimbabwe's central bank considers horticulture a high growth sector worth investing in 
because it is strategic in terms of employment creation and foreign currency generation. The 
Netherlands is Zimbabwe's biggest flower market and absorbs 60% of Zimbabwe's 
floriculture produce. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and the Export Processing Zone 
Authority (EPZA) joined forces to finance and rehabilitate the flower growing sector (New 
Ziana, 2005: 1 0). The RBZ has set aside Z$750 billion for the revival of horticultural estates 
and projects. It is expected that the money will be used for greenhouse construction and 
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irrigation, Rose propagation and Rose-stem supply, flower marketing and the construction 
and repair of cold rooms (New Ziana, 2005: 1 0). Through this arrangement, experienced 
horticultural farmers have been given a special dispensation which guarantees them 
uninterrupted productive land tenure for 5-10 years (New Ziana, 2005:10). 
Chattopadhyay (2000:314) contends that to redistribute land without correct and adequate 
extension of technical and financial support invariably undermines meaningful agricultural 
production. The seemingly unsystematic manner in which fast-track land reform was 
conducted (in practice) gives the impression that no concrete plans had been made to provide 
land reform beneficiaries with agricultural extension services and other support/inputs 
(Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Buckle, 2002). It is credible, however, 
that the government has recently taken measures to address deficiencies in 'core support' 
delivery to encourage higher agricultural output from both the peasant and commercial 
farming sectors but many would argue (Mlambo, 2003:199-206; Raftopoulos, 2002:426; 
Human Rights Watch, 2002; Bush and Szeftel, 2000: 173; Land Web 2000c) that the support 
that is currently available is still inadequate when compared to the demand that exists (a case 
of too little, too late because of insufficient planning), but at least it is available to new 
farmers who fit the criteria set for farmers to access the inputs outlined above. 
6.2.6 Resettled Communities and Consumption Credit 
At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had a diversified economy and was classified as a 
middle-income country with significant developments in health and education (Sachikonye, 
2002: 13). Fast-Track land reform had catastrophic economic and social consequences which 
led to the rapid deterioration of living standards for most Zimbabweans. The dire socio-
economic situation outlined above demands what Prosterman and Riedinger (1987:203-226) 
call 'complimentary support.' Complimentary support refers to non-agricultural, subsistence 
or 'consumption credit', with capacity building as its long term goal. Consumption credit or 
social infrastructure is beneficial to resettled communities because it is primarily concerned 
with the provision of food aid, water and sanitation. The provision of these basic services is a 
form of preventative intervention aimed at improving nutrition, thus boosting people' s 
immunity to diseases as well as reducing health hazards. In some cases complimentary 
support extends to the provision of basic health and education services (schools, clinics). 
Education provision is meant to benefit both children and adults (primary schools for 
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functional literacy and numeracy) (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; Scudder, 2001 :256; 
Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987:203-226). 
One of the perceived roles of governments is that of a benefactor whose function is to 
provide, rectify and finance people's basic needs, however, Zimbabwe's experience 
demonstrates that this is not always feasible. Commentators and stakeholders like Mr. 
Hungwe (President of the Zimbabwe National Farmer's Union), Mr. Tengengu (from the 
Farmers Development Trust) and Ms Chari (a gender lobbyist) are aware of the 
government's chronic lack of resources and its poor delivery record as far as infrastructure 
provision is concerned (cited in LandWeb, 2000c). With regards to fast-track land reform, a 
UNDP technical team noted in late 2001 that "the provision of roads, schools, clinics and 
boreholes was lagging far behind settler emplacement" and that the "provision of essential 
public infrastructure within a reasonable time would be impossible, given the government's 
past record and its current implementation capacity" (UNDP Interim Mission Report 
2002:21-23 cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:15). Human Rights Watch (2002:16) notes, 
for example, that some resettlement schemes that where established in the 1980s remained 
without schools within walking distance or adequate clean water supplies because the 
government did not have the resources to provide such infrastructure. To date, insufficient 
funds have been made available for basic infrastructure provision for fast-track land reform 
beneficiaries (Bush and Szeftel, 2000:173). Buckle (2002:230) comments too that the 
Zimbabwean government promised the electorate health, housing and education for all by the 
year 2000 but none of these promises have materialised. The critics are sceptical about the 
government's ability to provide basic services to families resettled under the fast-track land 
reform programme, thereby achieving real development in terms of the definitions above 
(Mlambo, 2003: 199-206; Raftopoulos, 2002:426; LandWeb, 2000c). LandWeb (2000c), 
Preston (1996:311-312) and Pearson (2000) note, for example, that insufficient infrastructure 
provision impacts women more because they are primary caregivers to children (nutrition 
and education) and they are a support network for sick family members and others (clinics) 
in their cornmunities. 
The main function of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) is to complement and assist 
in the development process ( as partners) when governments are unable to provide particular 
services. One would expect a government in Zimbabwe's predicament to seek and welcome 
the help of NGOs but this has not been the case. The activities of NGOs in Zimbabwe are 
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closely monitored by the government because politicians are suspicious of their motives, 
which have been construed as interfering with, and undermining the country's political 
system (Karume, 2005 :30-36). The Zimbabwean government issued a notice that required all 
civil society groups in the country to register with the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and 
Social Welfare under the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (PVO Act) of 1995 (Karume, 
2005:35). The campaign of intimidation already mentioned was mainly directed at civil 
society organisations, the media and political opposition parties from the beginning of 2000 
(in preparation for the June 2000 and March 2002 presidential elections) but it was not 
confined to these groups. The campaign extended to aid agencies and foreign embassies 
(United Kingdom, Oermany, Denmark, USAID, the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy) which the government regularly accused of furthering Western agendas in 
Zimbabwe through their assistance and funding of the MDC (Karume, 2005:30-36). The 
harassment of NOOs was mainly in the rural areas, for instance, in Chimanimani where war 
veterans led mobs of villagers in looting food aid that was donated by the European Union to 
benefit cyclone victims. The project was run by a Oerman NOO (HELP), which war veterans 
claimed was a front for the MDC. Other NOOs subjected to this treatment included Care 
International which was involved in poverty alleviation, health, nutrition and emergency 
relief. The Oerman-Austrian NOO SOS Children's Villages that looked after 5 000 orphans 
was also invaded and forced to close temporarily (Meredith, 2003: 18, 211-214). Meredith 
(2003:211-214) reports too that the offices of the Oerman NOO (the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation) which is involved in civic education programmes were ransacked in Harare. 
The mistrust and hostilities between the Zimbabwean government and NOOs has led to the 
introduction of repressive laws and NOOs have been discredited because of alleged political 
bias. Several NOOs have been ordered to leave the country for various reasons, including 
criticising the fast-track land reform programme and the human rights abuses synonymous 
with it (Karume, 2005:30-36). The secretary for foreign affairs at the Foreign Ministry 
announced that the government could not guarantee the security of foreign embassies and 
donor agencies if they became agents or sympathisers of political parties (Meredith, 
2003:213). This hostile reaction by the government is compounding the country's already 
bad infrastructure and service delivery situation because it has rendered NOOs 
ineffective/useless. It is unfortunate, however, that the brunt of this fall-out is felt by 
ordinary, poor Zimbabweans who do not have a choice in the matter; or the means to cope 
without the assistance of NOOs. In contrast, white commercial farmers used to provide their 
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workers and communities with subsidised basic social services like clean water, healthcare 
(clinics), schools and food stuffs (rations of maize, beans) but the practice has since stopped 
because of the upheavals caused by the land reform programme; to the detriment of these 
communities (Buckle, 2002). Development should ideally be a bottom-up process of 
empowerment (from grassroots level) and the role of the state, and NGOs, should be that of 
enabling and supporting community participation, capacity building and ownership of 
development. The next section shows a situation of growing economic disempowerment and 
desperation for many ordinary, poor Zimbabweans who were displaced or impoverished as a 
result of fast-track land reform. 
6.2.7 Displacement and Social Disarticulation: The Plight of Zimbabwe's Farm Workers 
The United Nations (1999, cited in Vincent, 2001 :6-7) defines internal displacement as 
" ... persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence ... and who have not crossed an internationally 
recognised state border." Forced displacement, whether due to war, political upheavals or 
natural disaster has far-reaching consequences. McDowell (1996:6) argues that such 
consequences produce a "multidimensionality of impoverishment and social disintegration." 
Cernea (1996:\3, 21-22) explains ' multifaceted impoverishment' in terms of variables like 
"landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, increased morbidity, food 
insecurity and the disruption or destruction of formal and informal networks and social 
organisation" (impoverishment and social disarticulation). There is growing worldwide 
concern over such crises created by socio-political violence and resultant internal 
displacement of people in places like Burma, Angola, Burundi, Dafur in Sudan and the 
former Yugoslavia. Zimbabwe's situation is no different. Cernea (2001:241; 1996:21) 
cautions that "the expropriation of land removes the main foundation upon which people's 
productive systems, commercial activities and livelihoods are constructed." This has been the 
experience of both farmers and farm workers in Zimbabwe. Farm workers, who were in most 
instances landless labourers, lost their jobs and access to small gardens on their employers 
farms. 
Zimbabwe experienced unprecedented internal displacement of thousands of people from its 
rural areas in the run-up to the 2000 parliamentary elections, as well as during and after the 
2002 presidential election (including the urban clean-up campaign in 2005) (Meredith, 2003; 
Makumbe, 2003b; Buckle, 2002). The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) 
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reports that at least 200 000 people were internally displaced in Zimbabwe because of land 
invasions and fast-track land reform (cited in Kabemba, 2005:23). The fast-track land reform 
was envisioned as part of a broader developmental agenda (Utete Report, 2003) but the 
current plight of former farm workers and recently evicted illegal land occupiers illustrates 
how ill-planned and ill-timed development efforts can further marginalise vulnerable people. 
Zimbabwe had between 300 000 and 400 000 wage earning farm workers in the commercial 
farming sector (about a quarter of the formal sector labour force), who together with their 
families constituted about a sixth (about 17%) of the country's population before the land 
reform (Meredith, 2003:196). According to Krieger (2000:447), Zimbabwe's farm workers 
have always been one of the country's most vulnerable groups and have traditionally been an 
"invisible," marginalised class, earning low wages (the government's stipulated minimum 
wage for farm workers is Z$47 000), poor housing and involved in paternalistic relationships 
with white land owners. According to Amanor-Wilks (2000 cited in Mlarnbo, 2003 :202; 
Loewenson, 1990) Zimbabwe's farm workers experience some of the highest morbidity, 
malnutrition, mortality and illiteracy rates in the country. Zimbabwe's farm workers were the 
victims of violent crimes and political injustice during the fast-track land reform exercise 
because they have always been politically inarticulate and therefore powerless and 
insignificant (Bush and Szeftel, 2000:174 & 179). 
Fast-track land reform further marginalised Zimbabwe' s farm workers, many of whom did 
not own land in the communal areas (no alternative source of livelihood). The Commercial 
Farmers' Union and the United Nations estimate that about 30 000 farm worker families had 
been forced off commercial farmland or laid-off work because of the shut-down of farming 
operations on farms by January 2002 (cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:32). Only an 
estimated 80 000 farm workers out of the original 175 000 full-time farm workers that 
existed before fast-track land reform retained their employment on commercial farms (black 
and white owned), state-owned farms, estates and plantations by the beginning of 2003. A 
few others managed to secure employment with newly resettled farmers (Moyo, 2004:26-27; 
Chaumba et ai, 2003). IRIN News (2003a; 2003b) reports that only a quarter of the farm 
workers who lost their jobs had received severance packages by the end of2002. 
According to Buckle (2002), more people were forcibly displaced (about 300 000 farm 
workers and 90% of Zimbabwe's white farmers) in farming communities than have been 
resettled during fast-track land reform. Farm workers were not given any rights in the 
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commercial farming sector were they had been employed and lived. Although farm workers 
were not precluded from applying for land, one of the most striking things about fast-track 
land reform is that very little attention or concrete provisions were made to cater for the 
needs of the more than 245 000 former farm workers (about 70%) who lost their jobs and 
security of residential tenure on white-owned farms (compounds) (Moyo, 2004:26-27; 
Sidiropoulos, 2004:110; Deininger, 2003:149; Chitiyo, 2003:166-167; Human Rights Watch, 
2002:3). The social and economic disruption caused by the land reform programme 
devastated, not just farm workers, but their dependents too (an estimated 2 million people). 
As already noted, land allocation and resettlement under the fast-track land reform 
programme tended to be clandestine and former farm workers were neglected because of 
their perceived alliance with white farmers and the MDC (Meredith, 2003:195; Human 
Rights Watch, 2002:3,12,26-29; Buckle, 2002: 27, 85 & 108). 
The Secretary-General of the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of 
Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ) said that farm workers were sidelined in land resettlement because of 
the vetting done by war veterans (asking for Zanu-PF party cards) (cited in the Daily News in 
Buckle, 2002: 194). Although about 90% (11 million hectares) of white-owned commercial 
farms were compulsorily acquired for redistribution, farm workers as a constituency received 
only 5% of redistributed land under the decongestion Al resettlement model. This very small 
percentage means that, individually, most farm workers did not get any land (Moyo, 2004; 
Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; IRIN News, 2003a; 2003b; 2003c). By October 2001 , 
only 2 122 of the 123 979 households resettled (1.7%) were farm worker households (Human 
Rights Watch, 2002:33). About 25% of Zimbabwe's farm workers were of foreign descent 
(Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia). They came to the country as indentured labour between 
1953 and 1963 and are precluded from owning land in Zimbabwe (have no claim to land in 
the communal or resettlement areas). The disproportionate land allocation created a dire 
situation for displaced families, particularly foreigners who had not acquired Zimbabwean 
citizenship, forcing some elderly, unemployed former farm workers of foreign descent to 
return to their countries of origin (Moyo, 2004:26-27; Utete Report, 2003:29 & 36; Meredith, 
2003 :231; Chaumba et ai, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 32; Mbiba, 1995:147). This 
state of affairs has also forced many former farm workers to remain on acquired, designated, 
abandoned or occupied white commercial farms because they have nowhere else to go. 
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The Southern African Regional Poverty Network (2004) and Utete Report (2003:29 & 36) 
note that the continued presence of significant numbers of former farm workers on some 
farms (in conditions of destitution) is creating problems arising from the sprouting up of 
squatter camps all over the country, illegal gold panning, misuse of existing farm 
infrastructure and general criminal activity. These people are living in make-shift pole and 
dagga huts with no clean water (Mungoshi, 2004:6; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003). 
Buckle (2002:234-235) reports that about 40 000 former farm workers are squatting at 
Chikwiti in the Makonde communal area were they are living in abject poverty; forced to 
cope with sudden unemployment, severe food shortages and chronic under-nourishment. 
Mungoshi (2004:6) notes too that scores of recently evicted illegal land occupiers and their 
families are setting-up over-crowded make-shift squatter shelters under similar inhospitable 
conditions. 
Cernea (2001 :245) warns that displacement increases morbidity and mortality rates due to 
outbreaks of relocation-related diseases (parasitic and vector born diseases). Unsafe water 
supplies and poor sanitation also increase health risks and people's vulnerability to epidemics 
like diarrhoea, dysentery and cholera which mostly attack infants, children and the elderly. 
From the plight of these communities, one can conclude that farm workers' interests were not 
an integral part of the fast-track land reform agenda. Farm workers were not consulted to 
participate in the reform process and they were not empowered by it (Hall, 2003 :279; 
Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 2004; IRIN 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; Bush and 
Szeftel, 2000: 175). The plight of Zimbabwe's farm workers and other poor landless people 
compels Chitiyo (2003: 187) to conclude that fast-track land reform did not bring true social 
justice to ordinary people. In the light of the revelations above, the Utete Commission 
(2003 :7) recommended that the government should urgently address the welfare needs of 
former farm workers. 
6.2.8 Land Reform, Development and the Gender Dimension 
Land is considered important for economic and social security in most societies but some 
customs, for instance, inheritance laws, in many African societies preclude women from 
owning land as individuals (independent of men). Customary gender discrimination 
undermines women's access to land despite the fact that women often account for more than 
half the population, for example, in Uganda, Cameroon and Senegal (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 
2003). Women are disempowered because they do not own or control land but have usufruct 
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rights and other nominal rights which depend on their relationships to men (fathers, 
husbands, brothers, uncles and sons) (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:1-28; Deininger, 2003:57-60; 
Moyo, 2003:32; Pearson, 2000:386; Cousins, 1993). Marriage is the primary means through 
which women (wives/daughters-in-Iaw) gain access to land in sub-Saharan countries like 
Ethiopia, Cameroon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Uganda and these rights 
differ depending on whether the marriage is recognised by the law (civil/Christian, Islamic or 
traditional) (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:2). Women in polygamous marriages, divorced and 
widowed women are vulnerable to land dispossession. Widowed women do not have 
automatic access to their husband 's land because access to the land depends on the duration 
of the marriage, whether the couple had children, the sex of the children and whether the 
widow plans to remarry (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:1-28). Women also have little or no 
control over benefits that accrue from the sale of produce from the land they have access to 
(Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003: 1-28). 
Preston (1996) observes that the present situation of women in the Third World is that of 
"relative disadvantage" and that much of the burden of poverty falls on women. Preston 
(1996:311-312) contends that this is because "women experience multiple deprivation and 
have poor or no prospects for regular employment." Pearson (2000) discusses this 
phenomenon in what she terms the "feminisation of poverty." The World Bank (1989 cited in 
Pearson, 2000:398-399) makes a similar observation and comments that "women tend to be 
disproportionately represented among the lowest income groups of whatever economy or 
society." Women's work is often not considered as proper work because it is done in the 
home (child-care, nursing and feeding the sick and disabled, household cleaning chores) but 
domestic work is not the only kind of work that women do. Rural women spend the majority 
of their time contributing towards their local agrarian economies and household incomes by 
weeding, harvesting, collecting animal fodder, water and wood fuel, processing foodstuffs 
and marketing surplus agricultural produce (Pearson, 2000:386) yet the majority of women 
do not own land. Hendricks (2001:301) observes that, despite these constraints on women's 
land rights, men continue to benefit more from land restitution, redistribution and reform 
measures than women. 
Although fast-track land reform revolutionised Zimbabwe's agricultural landscape, it has 
been criticised for not being adequately gender-sensitive. Cousins (1993) notes that the 
extent to which women in Southern Africa have claim to land in their own right has varied 
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over time and remains inconsistent. This situation is compounded by land shortages in many 
countries, which perpetuate the customary, gender-based constraints on women's land rights 
outlined above (Muthoni-Wanyeki, 2003:27-28). Hendricks (2001:301) observes further that, 
despite the constraints on women's land rights, men benefit more from land restitution, 
redistribution and reform measures than women. Zimbabwe' s experience of fast-track land 
reform illustrates this point. 
Women account for 52% of Zimbabwe's population and over 60% of them depend on land as 
a source of livelihood (Kabemba, 2005 :26). Before fast-track land reform, women accounted 
for 70% of Zimbabwe's farming sector labour force. Unfortunately, many female farm 
workers were employed seasonally and were not entitled to severance packages when they 
lost their jobs as a result ofland reform (Meredith, 2003 :231; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 
2003; IRIN News, 2003a; 2003b). On paper, Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform programme 
was meant to benefit the landless masses and other specified groups, for example, women. 
The gender dimension of the agrarian reform was meant to economically empower women in 
light of the growing phenomenon of what Preston (1996) and Pearson (2000) refer to as the 
'feminisation of poverty' among women-headed households. In October 2001, the 
government pledged to set aside a 20% quota of land acquired under the fast-track land 
reform for single women as well as married women, through j oint ownership with their 
spouses. However, in practice, this commitment was not implemented as there was no legal 
or administrative framework in place to guarantee gender equality in land allocation (Human 
Rights Watch, 2002:30-31). 
In practice, land allocation and resettlement was largely unregulated and beneficiary 
selection was politicised; to the extent that some targeted beneficiaries, for instance, women, 
did not benefit from land redistribution (Human Rights Watch, 2002:3 & 12). Women 
received just 20% of the 5% of land allocated to former farm workers (Kabemba, 2005:26; 
Moyo, 2004:27; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003 ; IRIN News, 2003a; 2003b; 2003c). 
Women (individually) received between 12% and 24% of land allocated under Model Al and 
between 5% and 21 % of A2 land across the provinces (Moyo, 2004:26). Ms. Chari, a Gender 
Lobbyist, criticises the government for failing to implement a gender-responsive land reform 
programme that would empower women by entitling them to land (in more or less the same 
ratio as women in the total population) and safeguarding their rights to land in the same way 
as men (cited in LandWeb, 2000c). In this regard, the Utete Cornmission (2003:6, 84-85) 
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recommended that given the historically diverse and pivotal role of women in all aspects of 
agriculture in the communal lands and the need to strike an overall gender balance in this 
crucial sector of the economy; a 40% quota of land allocation and funding be reserved for 
women to ensure equity in, and the effectiveness of, the agrarian reform in the country. In 
reaching this decision, the Commission took into account the growing number of rural 
families headed by women (and children) as a result of the devastation wreaked on society by 
the AIDS pandemic and thought it prudent to seek to ensure the survival and stability of such 
households (Vtete Report, 2003). The Vtete Commission (2003) noted that women often 
have inadequate resources to take care of the sick, elderly, orphaned and indigent and that 
land ownership would go some way towards alleviating this situation. 
6.3 Land Reform, Elections and Violence 
It is important to define violence from the onset of this discussion. Salmi (1993: 17) discusses 
the multiple dimensions of violence (direct, indirect, repressive) and defines it as "any 
avoidable action that constitutes a violation of a human right, in its widest meaning, or which 
prevents the fulfilment of a basic human need .... including accidental outbreaks of violence, 
as well as patterns of structural violence ... " Salmi (1993: 17) defines direct violence as 
deliberate action which constitutes a direct attack on a person's physical or psychological 
integrity. This type of violence includes genocide, war crimes and murder as well as coercive 
actions such as forced removals and kidnapping. This section is an overview of Zimbabwe's 
political arena before, during and after fast-track land reform. Zimbabwe's political life 
during this landmark land reform exercise was marked by violence and repression in which 
the ruling Zanu-PF government criminalised opposition politics (Olaleye, 2005:7). 
President Mugabe and the ruling Zanu-PF party carefully consolidated their position in 
Zimbabwean politics from the mid 1980s. President Mugabe became the leader of the ruling 
Zanu-PF party in 1984 and automatically became head of the IS-member Zanu-PF politburo 
which controls government policy. The president also had the right to appoint all the 
members of the politburo from amongst those most loyal to him (Meredith, 2003 :80). 
One cannot speak of violence in Zimbabwe without mentioning the victirnisation of Ndebele 
and Karanga people in Matebeleland in the 1980s. Joshua Nkomo had led the Ndebeles in the 
liberation struggle under the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Mugabe and 
others had led the Shonas under the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), both of 
which had military wings supported by the USSR and China respectively. The two parties 
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had some ideological differences and tribal mistrust existed between them, especially after 
the signing of the negotiated Lancaster House Constitution. ZANU's Zimbabwe African 
National Liberation Army (ZANLA) dominated the liberation struggle and expected to have 
more say in its outcome because the Ndebeles are a minority in Zimbabwe. ZANU had 
preferred a military victory and had been reluctant to compromise in the Lancaster House 
negotiations and this created friction between the two parties (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:21). 
The Zanu-PF government (under Mugabe' s leadership) sanctioned a campaign of terror and 
indiscriminate violence (including women and children) in Matebeleland between 1983 and 
the signing of the Unity Accord (between ZANU and ZAPU) in December 1987 to form 
Zanu-PF (Patriotic Front). The Northern Korean trained 5 Brigade and Zanu-PF youth 
brigades (modelled on China' s Red Guards and trained for special combat duties) were 
responsible for the Gukurahundi atrocities which the government claimed were necessary 
measures to deal with counter-insurgency in Matebeleland. These Special Forces were 
comprised of Shona-speaking ex-ZANLA forces (ZANU's military wing) and were 
answerable directly to President Mugabe and his chosen army commanders. These forces 
also had different equipment, transport and weapons from the regular army and operated with 
impunity (Meredith, 2003 :62-76). 
The 5 Brigade's reign of terror deliberately targeted Matebeleland' s civilian population and 
ex-ZIPRA soldiers and officials (ZAPU's military wing, the Zimbabwe People's 
Revolutionary Army) which the government referred to as dissidents. The violence included 
forced rallies were the Ndebele people were made to sing Shona-praise songs, curfews, 
abductions, interrogations, beatings, torture, public executions, mass murder and arson. 
Shops were forced to close and drought relief supplies were prevented from reaching villages 
that were faced with starvation and at least 10 000 civilians had been murdered by the end of 
the campaign (Olaleye, 2005:7). According to Meredith (2003), the scale of violence during 
the Gukurahundi campaign was worse than that experienced during Zimbabwe's liberation 
struggle. Analysts, including Meredith (2003 :62-76, 231) have concluded that this tragedy 
was a form of ethnic cleansing in which violence was systematically used to achieve one 
objective; to coerce support for Zanu-PF by crushing political opposition from ZAPU, 
thereby establishing a one-party state. 
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During the Matebeleland reign of terror, Zimbabwe's constitution was amended in 1986 to 
give the president powers to legislate unilaterally. The president could wield power 
arbitrarily (rule by decree) by using the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act 
which gave him legislative powers in lieu of parliament, thus parliament became more and 
more irrelevant (Meredith, 2003 :79-80). The Electoral Act gave the president the sole right to 
appoint the Registrar-General and all the members of the Electoral Supervisory Commission, 
the Election Directorate and the Delimitation Commission responsible for determining 
constituency boundaries. In practice, this meant that there was no independent body to 
monitor elections and the president (and Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary 
Affairs) could change electoral laws by proclamation, issue statutory instruments and 
regulations (section 2(1) of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act of 1986) 
regarding the conduct of elections; with the potential to substantially affect electoral 
competition and participation (Kabemba, 2005:20; Meredith, 2003:106). The Political Parties 
(Finance) Act was passed in 1986 and it entitled political parties that had more than 15 
parliamentary seats to financial support from the govemment. In practice, because Zanu-PF 
had a clear majority in parliament, the state financed its election campaigns (advantage and 
systematic exclusion of the opposition) and opposition parties had to fend for themselves 
(Meredith, 2003 :90). 
One-Party rule was institutionalised through a policy of violence, patronage and co-optation 
epitomised by the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU in the aftermath of the 
Matebeleland massacre. In 1987, the positions of the Prime Minister and President were 
combined into an Executive Presidency through the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment 
(No.6 and 7) Act of 1987. President Mugabe became the first Executive President and 
effectively held the posts of Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of 
the Defence Forces. The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1987 gave the Executive 
President the power to dissolve parliament and declare martial law (states of emergencies) by 
using the old colonial Law and Order (Maintenance) Act which remained on the statute 
books (Meredith, 2003 :79-80). The Executive President could run for a maximum of five 6-
year terms of office. The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1987 abolished the 20 reserved 
white seats in the House of Assembly (Lancaster House Agreement). It also introduced 
provisions for 8 provincial governors, 10 customary chiefs elected by the council of chiefs, 
which the president controlled and 12 presidential nominees to the Assembly. The Executive 
President controlled the appointment of all senior posts in the civil service, defence forces, 
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the police and parastatals (Olaleye, 2005:7; lenkins and Knight, 2002:37). President Mugabe 
gave himself more powers over parliament just before the 1990 elections. He increased the 
number of parliamentary seats to 150 but only 120 were to be directly contested on the 
common voters' roll. The remaining 20 seats were reserved for direct presidential 
appointments (after the abolition of the 20 reserved white seats). All these changes meant 
that even if opposition parties gained the majority of seats in a parliamentary election, they 
would not have enough seats to constitute a clear majority to form a government (Kabemba, 
2005:9; Meredith, 2003 89-90). 
The 1990 elections were marked by suppression of political opposition (Edgar Tekere's 
Zimbabwe Unity Movement-ZUM) as gangs of Zanu-PF youths terrorised suspected 
opposition supporters in Harare's high density areas. Public sector employees were 
threatened that they would be fired if they voted for Tekere's party. President Mugabe also 
threatened the white community saying: 'That Tekere nonsense should stop. If the whites in 
Zimbabwe want to rear their ugly terrorist and racist head by collaborating with ZUM, we 
will chop that head off' (cited in Meredith, 2003 :91). The state-owned press was used as a 
propaganda instrument and the independent press was harassed and discredited (Meredith, 
2003:81). Leaders of the University of Zimbabwe's Student Representative Council were 
arrested and the police threw tear-gas canisters into the university's residence halls, assaulted 
students and set up a detention camp opposite the university's main gate, forcing the 
university to close (Meredith, 2003:88). Tekere was denied permission to hold a single rally, 
ZUM officials were detained and the party' s supporters were held on suspicion of subversion 
(Meredith, 2003:88). This same fate was to be meted on Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for 
Democratic Change almost a decade later. The hallmarks of Zanu-PF's rule became police 
violence and intimidation, assaults, arbitrary arrests, contempt for the courts and wholesale 
presidential pardons for Zanu-PF supporters convicted of political violence. 
President Mugabe consolidated his power through a policy of patronage. He bestowed 
favours on those loyal to him within the ruling party and government. The system of 
patronage became a source of upward mobility, status, power and wealth for Zimbabwe's 
ruling elite (Jenkins and Knight, 2002:37). The president refused to discuss the issue of his 
retirement and government ministers and officials (the inner circle) that showed signs of 
dissent were publicly humiliated in speeches, demoted or fired (Makamure, 1991: 1 09 cited in 
lenkins and Knight, 2002:43). From then on, the white community, opposition political 
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parties and the press were vilified for being critical of the government and its policies. The 
ZCTU organised a mass stay-way (general strike) on 9 December 1997 in protest against the 
unbudgeted payments to war veterans and the involvement of the army in the DRC. Despite a 
High Court order permitting the peaceful demonstration, riot police was despatched to 
disperse protesters with tear gas and baton sticks. The secretary general of the ZCTU, 
Morgan Tsvangirai, was ambushed two days after the strike and was beaten unconscious 
(Meredith, 2003: 140-141). Soon after that, President Mugabe issued a decree under the 
Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act banning national strikes for six months 
(Meredith, 2003: 162; Tshuma, 1997). 
The independent press, particularly The Standard, was vilified after reporting on Zimbabwe's 
involvement in the DRC. The editor of The Standard (Mark Chavunduka) was unlawful 
detained and tortured by military intelligence officers and Central Intelligence Organisation 
agents at an anny barracks in Harare for ten days in January 1999. The agents wanted to 
know the sources of the story. Chavunduka was allowed to contact his lawyer on the eighth 
day of his detention. A reporter for The Standard (Ray Choto) was also unlawfully detained 
(without being charged) and tortured in connection with this story (Meredith, 2003: ISO). 
Attempts to contact the two men were thwarted repeatedly until the High Court threatened to 
issue a warrant to arrest the Defence Minister. The two journalists were eventually charged 
under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. The European Union and seven donor 
governments issued protests and about 150 lawyers and human rights activists demonstrated 
outside parliament demanding an end to state-torture and the use of the Law and Order 
(Maintenance) Act. The police, armed with baton sticks, dogs and tear-gas were deployed to 
disperse the protestors (Meredith, 2003: 151). President Mugabe ignored a petition signed by 
five judges of the Supreme Court and one High Court judge against the torture of the two 
journalists (Meredith, 2003: 152). When the president eventually responded, he implied that 
the journalists had gotten what they deserved; 
"If The Standard had not behaved in a blatantly dishonest and unethical manner, 
the army would not have acted the way it did. Any media organisation which 
wilfully suspends truth necessarily forfeits its right to inform and must not cry 
foul when extraordinary reaction visits them ... They had through their own 
deliberate treasonable actions invited that reaction ... " (cited in Meredith, 
2003 :153). 
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President Mugabe said he construed the judges' behaviour as "an outrageous and deliberate 
act of impudence" (Meredith, 2003: 153). He expressed a vote of no confidence in the twenty-
five judges of the Supreme and High Court (seventeen of them black) and threatened to fire 
those that signed the petition over the torture of the journalists (including Chief Justice 
Anthony Gubbay). Despite this, however, the Supreme Court dismissed the charges brought 
against Chavunduka and Choto in a case brought by The Standard challenging the 
constitutionality of the section of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act under which the 
journalists had been charged. The Supreme Court ruled that the section in question 
contravened freedom of expression guaranteed by the constitution (Meredith, 2003: 155-156). 
Zimbabwe' s constitution was revised in 1999-2000 and was submitted to a national 
referendum in February 2000. The constitutional revisions included provisions that would 
greatly strengthen the government and the Executive/President (by giving him sweeping 
powers) at the expense of parliament. The proposed amendments would also allow the 
president to, inter alia, serve an additional twelve years and to retain powers to appoint 30 of 
the 150 members of parliament (20% ofMPs), without providing sufficient oversight powers. 
The proposed constitutional amendments were rejected by between 53%-60% of the votes 
cast, demonstrating the electorate 's lack of confidence in the government (Olaleye, 2005:8; 
Vtete Report, 2003:16 & 30; Chan, 2003; Buckle, 2002:13). After this result, the government 
felt like it was under siege from the political opposition (MDC which had been formed in 
1999) and adopted drastic, reactionary measures to quell the tide of dissent. 
The government resolved to use the emotive (and effective) land question to revive 
nationalist sentiment, thereby averting the focus of criticism from itself and onto white land 
owners. Salmi (1993:20) defines repressive violence as the "deprivation of human rights 
other than the right to life and protection from injury." This form of violence entails the 
infringement of human rights such as freedom, dignity and equality (civil, political and social 
rights). Although "land reform is political in terms of who sets the agenda" and what is put 
on that agenda (Bush and Szeftel, 2000:173) there have been numerous reports concerning 
the state' s infringement on people 's freedom of movement, association, assembly, expression 
and rights to fair trials (the MDC and its supporters and the independent media). The 
government ignored most democratic channels such as consulting different stakeholders in 
addressing the land issue. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, Public 
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Order and Security Act and the General Laws Amendment Act were passed to silence 
criticism from the independent media and civic organisations (Karurne, 2005:40-41; Kibble, 
2004:365 & 369; Hall, 2003:275; Bush and Szeftel, 2002:7-9; Sachikonye, 2002:18-19; 
Lahiff and Cousins, 2001:654-655) and many people questioned the ruling party's sudden 
sense of urgency in addressing the land question when it had failed to do so in twenty years. 
The Catholic Archbishop of Bulawayo, Pius Ncube, is one such person who questioned the 
government's motives and criticised it for the economic decline, high unemployment and 
corruption that was being experienced and the country. Pius Ncube received several death 
threats for his trouble, along with many others (Meredith, 2003: 185-186; Buckle, 2002:99). 
The government (and president's) legitimacy was under threat and violence was the medium 
chosen to bolster its waning popularity and to retain political control under the guise of 
overdue land reform (Tshuma, 1997). President Mugabe lashed out at the white community 
saying that the peace and stability of the country was being "undermined by the acts of some 
white persons of British extraction ... planted in our midst to undertake acts of 
sabotage ... against the legitimate government of this country" (cited in Meredith, 2003:154). 
President Mugabe claimed that whites had pushed the government's sense of racial tolerance 
to the limit and he singled out prominent figures including Clive Wilson of The Standard, 
Clive Murphy also from a newspaper, a lawyer (David Coltart) and chairman of the Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace (Mike Auret). He accused them of seeking to ruin national 
unity and loyalty and vowed to take stem action against them and their MDC ally. President 
Mugabe also accused Westerns embassies in Harare of acting as agents for subverting the 
government by assisting the increasingly influential labour movement (ZCTU under 
Tsvangirai's leadership) (Karume, 2005: 30-36; Meredith, 2003:155). 
In terms of Salmi's definition of direct violence (1993), Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform 
constituted direct violence because gangs of party activists and liberation war veterans were 
deployed to rural areas to seize control of hundreds of white-owned farms. These groups 
(including the army) attacked and terrorised opposition supporters at will and with impunity 
because the police claimed that land reform was a political matter and refused to intervene 
(Meredith, 2003 :211; Jenkins and Knight, 2002:51; Buckle, 2002). Farmers and farm 
workers were killed, abducted and tortured; resulting in widespread internal displacement in 
the rural areas. This sustained campaign of intimidation and violence began toward to end of 
February 2000 (the start of illegal farm occupations), through the June 2000 parliamentary 
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election and lasted until after the 2002 presidential election, during which President 
Mugabe 's speeches regularly denounced political opposition as puppets of the West, 
particularly Britain. Violence was not confined to presidential or general elections but spread 
to parliamentary by-elections and mayoral elections in which headmen, chiefs, civil servants, 
teachers and nurses were cowed into voting for the ruling party (Meredith, 2003:215). 
Violence was not confined to the rural areas only as war veterans and Zanu-PF supporters 
invaded factories, offices, businesses, aid agencies and foreign embassies in the cities too 
(Karume, 2005:30-36; Meredith, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Buckle, 2002). 
As the June 2000 parliamentary election drew near, people in rural Matebeleland were forced 
to buy Zanu-PF party cards and they were threatened with the return of the 5 Brigade which 
committed the Gukurahundi atrocities. War veteran leaders also threatened civil war if the 
MDC won the election (Meredith, 2003: 170). In Harare, MDC supporters and officials in 
strongholds like Budiriro, Chitungwiza and Mabvuku were raided on a regular basis 
(abducted, beaten, tortured and sometimes murdered) by paramilitary police, soldiers and 
operatives of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). The MOC candidate for 
Chitungwiza and his wife were seized in the middle of the night by soldiers. They were 
beaten with rifle butts, chains and clubs. The same happened to the MOC's Mabvuku and 
Kambuzurna candidates (Meredith, 2003:179; Buckle, 2002:63). Chimanimani ' s MOC 
candidate, Roy Bennet, was summoned to a meeting by CIO operatives, a police commander, 
war vets and Zanu-PF officials were he was ordered to withdraw from the 2000 general 
election. Bennet refused to comply and received death threats before his farm was invaded 
and his wife and workers were forced to chant Zanu-PF slogans. Kwekwe MOC candidate, 
Blessing Chebundo, also endured several murder attempts (Meredith, 2003: 179). Kariba's 
Zanu-PF candidate threatened the white community in May 2000 saying: 
"Let me assure you whites here, that once you support MOC, Zanu-PF is not 
going to treat you as business people, but as politicians. Then if you are treated as 
politicians, it is like signing your own death warrant. The political storm will not 
spare you ... (cited in Buckle, 2002: 1 05). 
War veterans, led by Chenjerai Hunzvi, disrupted a "Peace, Justice and Reconciliation" 
march by civic groups on 1 April 2000. Although the demonstrators had permission for the 
march (and a court injunction ordering the police to protect them), they were attacked by 
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gangs that were armed with clubs, bricks, sticks, barbed wire and bottles whilst the police 
made no effort to intervene, except to throw tear-gas canisters at them (Meredith, 2003 : 172; 
Buckle, 2002:31). On 10 April 2000, President Mugabe vowed that "The MDC will never 
form the government of this country, never ever, not in my lifetime or even when I die ... " 
(cited in Meredith, 2003: 177). He also boasted that he had a "degree in violence" (Meredith, 
2003:233). A government minister (Nathan Shamuyarira) also boasted about Zanu-PF' s 
legacy of violence and intimidation saying; "The area of violence is an area where Zanu-PF 
has a very strong, long and successful history" (cited in Meredith, 2003:233). The MDC 
leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, was charged under the Law and Order Maintenance Act for 
allegedly inciting the violent overthrow of President Mugabe' s government (Meredith, 
2003:214). 
The chairman ofthe War Veteran Association, Chenjerai Hunzvi, is believed to have used his 
Budiriro surgery as a base for sporadic violence, a torture centre for those suspected of 
supporting the MDC yet no action was ever taken against him (Meredith, 2003: 179; Buckle, 
2002: 11 0). The international community criticised the government for the lawlessness 
(condoning the violence and illegal farm occupations) and President Mugabe responded by 
saying; " .. .In this country there was no democracy, the British never brought the rule oflaw. 
Now they think they can teach Mugabe the rule of law .. . moral lessons .. . (cited in Meredith, 
2003:180). Zimbabweans went to the polls on June 24 and 25 2000. Zanu-PF won 61 seats 
(48% of votes cast) , plus the 30 non-constituency seats appointed by the president) but seven 
Zanu-PF cabinet ministers lost their seats. The MDC won 57 seats (47% of the votes) and the 
last contested seat went to another party, Zanu Ndonga (Olaleye, 2005 :8; Meredith, 
2003:188). The MDC won all the seats in Harare and Bulawayo and ten of the twelve 
contested seats in Matebeleland. It also performed strongly in the Midlands and Manicaland 
provinces. Zanu-PF retained just one urban constituency in the whole country (Meredith, 
2003:188; Buckle, 2002:151). 
The government's battles with the courts continued in September 2000 over a case brought 
by an independent radio operator, Capital Radio. The Supreme Court ruled that the state' s 
monopoly on broadcasting was illegal and ruled that Capital Radio be allowed to operate. 
President Mugabe responded by issuing a decree imposing new broadcasting laws which 
made it illegal for radio stations to operate without a licence. Capital Radio obtained a High 
Court injunction barring the police from searching its premises and seizing its equipment but 
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the police ignored the injunction and raided Capital Radio and the homes of two of its 
directors. The police confiscated Capital Radio's equipment and dismantled aerials (Buckle, 
2002:235). The Minister of Home Affairs remarked afterwards that; "The days of going to 
court will soon be past. We won't accept any resistance" (cited in Meredith, 2003: 199). 
The MDC tabled a motion to impeach President Mugabe on 26 October 2000 (Buckle, 
2002:237). Acrimony between the government and the judiciary was fuelled by the MOC's 
legal petitions challenging the results of the June 2000 parliamentary election in thirty-eight 
constituencies (almost a third of the total) and the implementation of the fast-track land 
refonn programme (Meredith, 2003:199-201). The MDC maintained that widespread 
political violence, intimidation, fraud and other irregularities rendered the results invalid. It 
also cited blatant abuses of the electoral system (allegedly rigged in favour of the ruling 
Zanu-PF) and questioned the credibility and transparency of the entire electoral process 
(Kabemba, 2005: 19). The MDC argued that the government, through the Registrar General, 
banned independent voter education programmes conducted by civic organisations and 
deliberately obstructed voter registration and voting in urban centres. It is alleged that the 
Registrar General also interfered with the registration of election monitors and the 
independence of the Electoral Supervisory Commission, the Delimitation Commission and 
the Election Directorate; which are supposed to be independent, impartial and non-partisan 
(Kabemba, 2005: 15). Several pieces of legislation were enacted to govern the electoral 
process and prevent the opposition from campaigning. The voters' rolls were not available 
for inspection and constituency boundaries were not defined on time (Kabemba, 2005:10-11; 
Sidiropoulos, 2004:110-111; Meredith, 2003:229; Makumbe, 2003; Buckle, 2002:99). The 
MDC candidate for Kariba eventually withdrew his petition against the June 2000 election 
result after receiving death threats. The chainnan of the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human 
Rights was severely beaten by Zanu-PF party militias and the police when he travelled to 
Sadza in Chikomba constituency to investigate the MDC's case (Meredith, 2003). 
President Mugabe nullified the MOC's petitions by promulgating the Electoral 
(Modification) Act on 8 December 2000, a month before the High Court was due to begin 
hearings regarding the MDC's petitions. The Act stated that, in a democracy, election results 
must be decided by voters themselves and not the courts. The MDC filed an urgent 
application with the Supreme Court challenging the Electoral (Modification) Act and the 
Supreme Court declared President Mugabe's actions unconstitutional (Olaleye, 2005; 
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Meredith, 2003:199-201; Buckle, 2002:240). In April 2001, Judge James Devitte nullified 
the results of the 2000 parliamentary election in three constituencies which had been won by 
Zanu-PF (including Buhera North where Morgan Tsvangirai had stood unsuccessfully) . 
Judge Devitte was denounced by a war veteran leader, Joseph Chinotimba, as "a judge for 
opposition political parties" (Meredith, 2003 :216). Soon afterwards, Judge Devitte received 
death threats and resigned from the bench (Meredith, 2003:216-217). 
President Mugabe claimed that the MDC was counter-revolutionary because it was created 
and controlled by Britain, the United States and the old Rhodesian network and that all of 
them were seeking to re-colonise Zimbabwe by controlling its economy and politics 
(Karurne, 2005:30-36; Meredith, 2003:226-227). The president also attacked church 
organisations for siding with these forces against his government (Meredith, 2003:192) and 
vowed that "There will never come a day when the MDC will rule this country ... Never ever" 
(cited in Meredith, 2003:210). The president's need for power is summed up in a statement 
that he made in 200 I; "No matter what force you have, this is my territory and that which is 
mine I cling to unto death" (cited in Meredith, 2003:236). The Commander of the Defence 
Forces declared his allegiance to the ruling party by saying that the military would not 
recognise the result of the 2002 presidential election if President Mugabe lost (Meredith, 
2003:227-228). 
The 2002 presidential elections were also not considered free or fair by the MDC and most 
international observers (Britain and the United States) for the same reasons as the 2000 
parliamentary elections. It is reported, for example, that the Registrar General secretly 
printed a supplementary voters' roll and extended the period for voter registration by five 
weeks without informing the general public or the MDC. It is also alleged that the Registrar-
General did not reveal how many people had registered to vote during this period. The 
Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of July 2001 and the Electoral (Modification) 
Notice 2002 compelled millions of Zimbabweans to reapply for citizenship or lose it. The 
Electoral (Modification) Notice dealt with, among others, voters who had changed 
citizenship. As a result, thousands of names did not appear on the voters' roll because many 
could not produce proof of citizenship or residence. Further, an estimated I million 
Zimbabweans living abroad were not allowed to vote (massive disenfranchisement) because 
postal votes were restricted to military personnel and diplomats (Kabemba, 2005:14 & 21-23; 
Sidiropoulos, 2004:110-111; Meredith, 2003:229; Makumbe, 2003). President Mugabe won 
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56% of the votes to Morgan Tsvangirai's 42% (Meredith, 2003:225-228) and the 
Commonwealth Observer Mission issued a scathing report saying that the election results did 
not adequately reflect the free will of Zimbabweans (Meredith, 2003 :229). Soon after the 
election victory, President Mugabe denounced the British government saying Zimbabwe had 
"dealt a stunning blow to imperialism .. .In Africa, the black skin is the most important skin, 
not the white skin. In Africa, the African is supreme" (cited in Meredith, 2003 :229). 
Tsvangirai was later charged with treason. 
Salmi's typology of violence (1993) includes various forms of indirect violence. Indirect 
violence was committed during the fast-track land reform exercise insofar as the reform 
programme interfered with the fulfilment of thousands of people's (poor landless peasants, 
farm workers and farmers) basic needs, including sources of livelihood and homes. Salmi 
(1993:18) considers famine to be a form of indirect violence by "omission, indifference or 
neglect in a situation of latent danger or non-assistance with vital material needs." Salmi 
(1993: 18) argues that people starve or are severely under-nourished, not because of an 
absolute lack of food, but because food is not available for social or political reasons for 
which specific people or institutions can be held accountable. 
Fast-track land reform exposed almost half of Zimbabwe's population to famine 
(Sidiropoulos, 2004:110) and there have been allegations that relief food is being withheld 
from rural constituencies that are known to be opposition strongholds. Amin (1992:147 cited 
in Jenkins and Knight, 2002:43) notes that the politicisation (along party lines) of relief aid 
has always been a reality for Zimbabwe's rural poor during drought years. The situation was 
no different when fast-track land reform disrupted food production and many people were 
forced to rely on food aid. Meredith (2003 :231) reports that the state-controlled Grain 
Marketing Board was given the sole right to import and distribute maize, enabling Zanu-PF 
and party officials to give priority to Zanu-PF supporters. A government minister told 
villagers that; "You have to vote for Zanu-PF candidates ... before government starts 
rethinking your entitlement to this food aid" (cited in Meredith, 2003:231). According to 
Salmi's definition of famine, indirect violence is being committed by Zimbabwe's ruling 
Zanu-PF because insufficient delivery channels exist for relief food to reach the areas that 
need it the most. The government has an obligation to the affected populations, irrespective 
of their political affiliations but chooses to distribute food aid along party-lines. 
Zimbabwe's recent Operation MurambatsvinalRestore Order is another example of indirect 
violence, which some analysts, including the United Nations (BBC NEWS, July 2005), have 
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condemned as retaliation by the government aimed at alienating and frustrating the political 
opposition and its supporters under the guise of an urban renewal exercise. 
6.4 The World's Response to Zimbabwe's Fast-Track Land Reform 
The World Bank, IMF and first world governments, particularly Britain and the United 
States, were willing to support the land reform programme financially and technically; on 
condition that the Zimbabwean government eliminated corruption amongst its top officials so 
that land reform would benefit the poor, landless people who needed it the most. Another 
condition was that the Zimbabwean government had to significantly improve its human 
rights record (Human Rights Watch, 2002:4). Regrettably, however, the Zimbabwean 
government failed to adhere to the guidelines (transparency, consultation, poverty alleviation 
orientation) set at the September 1998 Donors' Conference, thus forfeiting the various loans 
and other assistance that had been pledged for the fast-track land reform programme (Buckle, 
2002:167). Zimbabwe's unIawfulland grab attracted negative local (within Zimbabwe) and 
international attention. Locally, numerous civic organisations spoke out against the abuses of 
power and the violence in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Council of Churches is one such 
organisation which criticised the government's trail of destruction: 
Land reform ... has been twisted into a fast-track to further the self aggrandisement 
of the chefs and misery for the masses. What should have improved the lot of 
every Zimbabwean is now viewed as irrevocably partisan, and is associated with 
disorder, violence and displacement ... this has left the average Zimbabwean on 
the verge of utter destitution and hopelessness . . . obvious deficiencies in our 
leadership and governance... (cited in Meredith, 2003 :221). 
Zimbabwe' s Evangelical Fellowship followed suit and condemned the on-going violence in 
the country (Buckle, 2002:99). The most vocal condemnation of Zimbabwe' s worsening 
political violence and economic decay (human rights crisis) came from the United Kingdom, 
the European Union, the United States and Australia (Karume, 2005:41 -44; Sidiropoulos, 
2004:109). The donor community imposed more conditions for the financial and technical 
assistance which they were offering the Zimbabwean government and sanctions were 
introduced later when negotiations and conditionalities failed to achieve their objective. The 
sanctions were aimed at promoting democracy and democratic behaviour by the Zimbabwean 
government as opposed to oppressing its people (the white community, political opposition 
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and its supporters). It is interesting to note, however, that in a show of solidarity, or 
something akin to it, most African countries did not openly condemn Zimbabwe's 
controversial land reform. 
The United Nations defines sanctions (in general terms) as a complete or partial interruption 
of economic relations; sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, 
the severance of diplomatic relations, exclusion from, or suspension of, cultural and sports 
interactions as well as trade and technology embargoes by the imposing country or countries 
(or organisation/body) against a country, government or organisation (Sidiropoulos, 2004). 
The conditions and sanctions that were imposed on Zimbabwe's government and ruling elite 
because of the human rights violations associated with fast-track land reform are enumerated 
below. This section also discusses responses by Zimbabwe's neighbours to the sanctions 
imposed on Zimbabwe by the international community in the context of ongoing debates 
about the efficacy of sanctions regimes imposed to pressure, persuade, or encourage 
accountability and responsible government (to manage and contain conflict) in accordance 
with international norms to protect citizens from repressive leadership (military dictatorships, 
oligarchies and widespread and sustained human rights abuses) (Sidiropoulos, 2004). 
The main argument against the imposition of sanctions concerns the unequal power relations 
between countries. Because sanctions seek to punish, sanctions are resented by weaker 
countries when they are imposed by politically and economically stronger countries of the 
West like the United States (Sidiropoulos, 2004:118). Another problem with sanctions is that 
the population of targeted countries, not the offending ruling elites, suffers more from the 
impact of sanctions (collateral damage). Because of this realisation, there have been attempts 
to redefine and apply sanctions in a limited, more focused manner which is typified by 
references to targeted and smart sanctions (Sidiropoulos, 2004). 
Targeted sanctions are narrowly defined and have targeted effects (specific), for instance, 
aviation and travel bans on individuals or arms embargoes. 
Smart sanctions target ruling elites' (and their families) travel abroad as well as their foreign 
assets, instead of a country' s entire population, thereby minimising the suffering of innocent 
civilians. 
Secondary sanctions are different from targeted and smart sanctions. They are punitive 
measures (deterrents) against third party defaulters who help targeted governments to 
circumvent sanctions (Sidiropoulos, 2004). 
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Contradictions between the land reform policy as it was presented at the September 1998 
Donors' Conference and its implementation were first noticed when 841 white-owned farms 
were designated for compulsory acquisition in November 1998 (the Inception Phase). The 
Zimbabwean government and donors had agreed that the compulsory acquisition route was 
reserved for the fast-track phase only. Furthermore, donors expected to be consulted on 
major decisions before they were implemented and this had not been the case with the 
issuing of these particular acquisition orders (Van den Brink, 2000:9-10). From the donors' 
perspective, this violation marred the spirit of goodwill that had been established amongst the 
stakeholders who attended the Donors Conference. The issuing of these land acquisition 
orders made donors apprehensive, which in tum led to delays in the disbursement of funds by 
Britain, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Word Bank in January 1999. The 
discrepancies between the agreed form ofland reform and its implementation made the donor 
community suspicious of the Zimbabwean government's intentions and motives m 
implementing this kind of forceful land redistribution (Vanden Brink, 2000:9-10). 
Loans were also withheld because the IMF and World Bank were concerned about 
Zimbabwe's military spending in the DRC following the unlawful detention and torture of 
journalists (Ray Choto, Mark Chavunduka and Clive Wilson of The Standard) who had 
reported on the issue in January 1999 (Meredith, 2003: 150-157, 180 & 204). A 
spokesperson for Britain's foreign ministry, Peter Hain, said; "We [Britain] will not fund 
repression or bankroll dictatorship" (cited in Meredith, 2003: 157). The IMF asked the 
Zimbabwean government, jointly with the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF), 
to re-affirm its commitment to implementing an integrated land reform policy and action plan 
based on agreements reached at the September 1998 Donors' Conference (expanding 
stakeholder participation in programme planning and implementation) (Van den Brink, 
2000:9-10). 
On 5 February 1999, Minister Msika gave a Press Conference and issued a Press Release to 
clarify the Zimbabwean government's position regarding the land reform programme. 
Minister Msika reaffirmed that the government was still committed to agreements reached at 
the September 1998 Donors' Conference and that this commitment had been ratified by 
Cabinet. Minister Msika said that the Cabinet Committee on Resettlement and Development 
(CRD) had invited the Land Task Force of the NECF to contribute to the preparation of the 
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Inception Phase Plan. Minister Msika added that the Minister of Lands and Agriculture was 
going to table the new Land Tax Bill (to establish maximum farm sizes for each of the 
country's five main agro-climatic zones and to introduce a land tax on land area above the 
recommended maximum sizes) to Cabinet. The Minister reassured donors that the draft for 
the new National Land Policy was going to be adopted by Cabinet by January 2000 (Van den 
Brink, 2000 :9-10; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000). Following these reassurances, donors 
emphasised that their continued support for the land reform depended on the government's 
compliance (in actions) with the principles agreed to at the September 1998 Donors' 
Conference, among others, continuous consultation, transparency and adherence to the law 
(Van den Brink, 2000:14). The donors agreed to further policy dialogue between the 
Zimbabwean government, the IMF and the World Bank. 
The World Bank negotiated and signed a US$5 million Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) 
for the land reform' s Inception Phase on 7 May 1999, although the loan only become 
effective in January 2000. The United States, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway moved 
forward with the UNDP-coordinated Technical Support Unit project by signing the project 
document on 19 May 1999. Britain and the European Union sent a fact-finding field survey 
mission to Zimbabwe in May 1999 to assist with policy development. France provided 
technical assistance in re-planning the old Model B farms (cooperative-type resettlement 
schemes) which had been established in the 1980s (Van den Brink, 2000 :9-10, 13-14). 
The Zimbabwean government's alleged support of the war veteran-led reign of terror during 
the 2000 farm invasions and its acquiescence (partiality to the rule of law) also brought its 
motives under scrutiny. President Mugabe's defiance further soured the country's 
deteriorating relations with the donor community. In May 1999, President Mugabe declared 
his dislike for the IMF; 
"I do not like the IMF. It is a tool being used by the Western imperialists to 
subject us to their will. The IMF is being political and we will be political in our 
attitude towards it. It is a monster we do not deserve. We are better off without it. 
We will not die as a country. Never ever" (cited in Meredith, 2003:156). 
In the same month, President Mugabe praised China for pledging to provide Zimbabwe with 
' soft loans ' (the birth of Zimbabwe's 'Look East' foreign policy). He said; "If we get funds 
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from China the way we expect, as per their promises, there will not be any need for us to 
look for balance of payments support elsewhere" (cited in Meredith, 2003:157). When called 
upon to restore order and the rule oflaw, President Mugabe said: 
Despite what they say about human rights, the Europeans are the most racist 
people, racist to the core ... For all their appearances of being democratic, you just 
have to go to the United States to see how blacks live" (cited in Meredith, 
2003:157). 
The donor community began to see the fast-track land reform programme as part of an 
elaborate plan for short-term political expediency. It became apparent that the refonn 
exercise was a desperate bid by the Mugabe regime to stay in power by appeasing agitated 
land-hungry masses before the 2000 general election (Buckle, 2002:101; Raftopoulos, 
2002:418; Ncube, 2001 in Buckle, 2002). As the former colonial power, the Zimbabwean 
government expected Britain to unconditionally give £36 million for the land reform 
programme, which it refused to do (Utete Report, 2003: 16; Buckle, 2002:81). In March 2000, 
Britain announced that it was "not convinced that the Zimbabwe government had a serious 
poverty eradication strategy" (Britain's Department for International Development cited in 
Human Rights Watch, 2002:38). Britain did not believe that the Zimbabwean government 
was giving priority to land reform to help the country' s poor and landless people. It also 
voiced concerns about the lack of transparency in the settler identification process. 
Fast-track land reform became synonymous with a strong anti-British and anti-white 
campaign as the Zimbabwean government defended its "autonomy and sovereignty from 
British interference" (BBC News, 2002a). 
The donor community felt that the Zimbabwean government was pursuing a different agenda 
from the one presented at the 1998 Donors' Conference. Donors were not convinced that the 
Zimbabwean government was committed to implementing a planned, sustainable and 
effective land reform programme and the Word Bank froze more than $200 million worth of 
aid for Zimbabwe' s land reform programme in 2000 (Buckle, 2002:35-36). The Zimbabwean 
government maintained that donors' preference for a redistribution process based on market 
values hindered rapid reform, not just with this particular phase of the country's reform 
history, but since independence (Human Rights Watch, 2002:41). 
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Regional heads of state from Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa met at the Victoria 
Falls to discuss the situation in Zimbabwe. The heads of state reiterated the Zimbabwean 
government's position that international donors, particularly Britain, had an obligation to 
deliver on their pledges of support for Zimbabwe's land reform (Buckle, 2002:81). Britain 
said it would help finance Zimbabwe's land reform if the programme was taken seriously by 
the Zimbabwean government; provided the programme was implemented within the rule of 
law with the aim of improving the plight of the rural poor. Britain said it would not help if 
violence, intimidation and defiance of the law persisted. Britain wanted illegal land occupiers 
to be removed from farms and land to be transferred at free and fair prices, conditions which 
the Zimbabwean government refused to meet (Buckle, 2002:82). Palmer and Toulmin (2000) 
use the Zimbabwean government's attitude and behaviour as an example of how 
governments can adopt narrow conceptions of the appropriate roles for donors and host 
governments in land reform. 
Britain said it would indirectly make available £5 million towards land redistribution over 3-
5 years from 2000. Britain said that this money would be made available only through non-
governmental channels and Britain would make "a significant financial commitment" to 
support Zimbabwe's land reform and lobby support from other international donors on the 
condition that a concrete plan for land reform was implemented in accordance the 
agreements made at the 1998 Donors Conference (Human Rights Watch, 2002:38; Buckle, 
2002:81). Zimbabwe's government continued to blame the international donor community 
and Britain for problems in the implementation of the land reform programme (because of 
conditions imposed on financial support). 
By April 2000, SADC was voicing concerns about the effect that Zimbabwe' s deteriorating 
economic and political situation was having on the region (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). 
According to Chitiyo (2003: 184 & 185), Mozambique and Zambia did not endorse 
Zimbabwe's "agricultural Africanisation" or "mono-racial coercive agricultural 
development" and quietly encouraged Zimbabwe's displaced farmers to buy land in their 
countries. 
The Commonwealth' s head of security, Don McKinnon, visited Zimbabwe for a meeting 
with President Mugabe in May 2000. After a 40-minute meeting, Mckinnon announced he 
believed that everything was being done to restore the rule of law in Zimbabwe (Buckle, 
2002:98). This statement disturbed many people because it was becoming quite apparent that 
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the Zimbabwean government had lost control over the war veterans and its supporters, even 
though it made half-hearted statements about "regrettable violent incidences" (Buckle, 
2002:99). The country was descending further into anarchy and this was compounded by the 
fact that the role of the police had been compromised because land reform was seen as a 
political issue (Meredith, 2003: 172; Buckle, 2002:43-45, 96). The on-going human rights 
abuses forced the War Veterans Association to split in June 2000. A group calling 
themselves the Liberators' Platform dissociated themselves from the rest of the rampaging 
war veterans and condemned the lawlessness in the country. The chairman of the Liberators' 
Platform warned that the illegal farm occupations would have dire economic consequences. 
He also criticised the indifference shown by some Zimbabweans and Zimbabwe's neighbours 
to the unfolding catastrophe as "incomprehensible and irresponsible" (Buckle, 2002: 134). 
The European Union imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe on 5 October 2000 (Buckle, 
2002:235) and on 6 October 2000, President Mugabe invoked his Presidential Powers to 
issue an amnesty for politically motivated crimes committed between I January 2000 and 31 
July 2000 (Clemency Order No.1 of 2000), although the amnesty did not extend to crimes 
like murder, rape and robbery (Meredith, 2003:194; Human Rights Watch, 2002:22; Buckle, 
2002:235). The Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act came into force in June 
2001 to protect illegal land occupiers who had invaded farms from the start ofland invasions 
in early 2000 until February 2001. The Act protected land occupiers for a period of one year. 
It also nullified all court orders that had been issued to evict illegal land occupiers from farms 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002: 13). From these actions, it became obvious to donors and other 
observers that the Zimbabwean government was actively, rather than accidentally, subverting 
good governance for personal and political gain (Commercial Farmers' Union Information 
Centre, 2000; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000; LandWeb, 2000c). 
South African President, Thabo Mbeki, publicly condemned Zimbabwe's land grab for the 
first time on 26 October 2000 (Buckle, 2002:237). The United States condemned political 
violence, the collapse of the rule of law, abuse of power and the erosion of the separation of 
powers between the executive, parliament and the judiciary in Zimbabwe. It also objected to 
the blatant abuse of the electoral system (Sidiropoulos, 2004:110-111 , 113). The United 
States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and 
Economic Recovery Bill in January 2001. The Bill ordered U.S. representatives to oppose 
extensions of loans, bi-Iateral assistance and debt-forgiveness to Zimbabwe by international 
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financial institutions and authorised the U.S. President (in consultation with foreign 
governments) to take action against individuals responsible for politically motivated violence 
and the breakdown of the rule of law in Zimbabwe (Karume, 2005:42 & 43; Human Rights 
Watch, 2002:38). The Bill set out conditions under which these measures would be lifted 
(restoration of the rule of law, respect of property rights, commitment to equitable, legal and 
transparent land reform in terms of agreements reached at the 1998 Donors' Conference). 
The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Bill was signed into law in December 
200 I (Karume, 2005). 
Again, Britain voiced its objections to wanton human rights violations as well as the 
subversion of democratic imperatives apparent in the Zimbabwean government's draconian 
press censorship measures and smear campaigns against political opposition (the MDC), 
Britain and America. The United Nations (Secretary General Koffi Annan on behalf of the 
UN) also expressed concern over the scope and scale of the fast-track land reform 
programme because it was being implemented with total disregard for the original objectives 
stated by the Zimbabwean government at the 1998 Donors' Conference, and far beyond the 
targets set for land acquisition in both the Inception and Fast-Track phases (Human Rights 
Watch, 2002:40). On 15 December 2000, the French Ambassador to Zimbabwe announced 
that France would not be funding Zimbabwe's land reform programme because it was not 
being implemented within the law (Buckle, 2002:240). Soon after that, on 21 December 
2000, a UNDP administrator, Mark Mallock Brown, submitted a report on Zimbabwe' s land 
reform programme. The report recommended that the fast-track land reform programme be 
stopped and be revised significantly (Buckle, 2002:241). 
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) held a meeting of Heads of State and Government 
in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001 at which they expressed the view that Britain should honour 
its obligation to fund Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform, despite the contradictions between 
the policy documents and the programme's implementation (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). 
Upon his arrival in Blantyre, Malawi for a SADC summit in August 200 I, President Mugabe 
said; "Britain has a war with us. Blair wants his own version of colonialism in Zimbabwe and 
we will resist that ... Sanctions or no sanctions, Zimbabwe will survive" (cited in BBC News, 
2002a). The IMF and the World Bank refused to extend further loans to the Zimbabwean 
government. Zimbabwe was removed from the list of countries eligible to use resources 
under the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth facility in September 2001. The IMF also 
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resolved to withhold all teclmical assistance to Zimbabwe (Sidiropoulos, 2004:113; British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website-accessed 0110612005). 
Events in Zimbabwe continued to attract negative attention and attempts were made to 
resolve the Britain-Zimbabwe land dispute through the September 200 I Abuja Agreement 
(Raftopoulos, 2002:415; Bush, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Lineback, 2001). A 
committee of nine Commonwealth Foreign Ministers met to discuss the 'Zimbabwean 
situation' from 6-7 September 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria. The Ministers maintained that 
Zimbabwe's land ownership and redistribution issue had to be addressed in a "transparent 
and equitable manner" which entailed the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
democratic principles (Meredith, 2003:222; Utete Report, 2003:18; Human Rights Watch, 
2002:39). The ministers also agreed that Zimbabwe's land reform had to be implemented in a 
fair, just and sustainable manner, which would take into consideration the interests of all 
parties concerned. This intervention was crucial because the volatile situation that existed in 
Zimbabwe at the time was becoming more divisive and threatened socio-economic stability 
in Southern Africa and the continent as a whole. 
Following these deliberations, the Zimbabwean delegation accepted the terms of the Abuja 
Agreement and assured the world that there would be no further fann occupations and related 
violence (Utete Report, 2003:18). Unfortunately, however, the Abuja Agreement was a 
temporary reprieve. Representatives of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans 
Association declared that they were not bound by a truce with the Commonwealth and fann 
invasions continued, almost unabated. This defiance and antagonism was followed by an 
escalation of violent farm occupations between August and October 200 I (Commercial 
Farmers Union cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:39). 
The European Union (EU) formally began consultations with the Zimbabwean government 
in October 200 I under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement which regulates EU relations 
with African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries. The Article incorporates human rights and 
good governance criteria into EU-ACP relations and states that "if there is no progress on 
human rights issues within 75-days of opening formal consultations, appropriate measures, 
including sanctions may be undertaken" (Human Rights Watch, 2002:38). 
In the same month, Britain's Minister of State announced Britain was still willing to 
contribute £35 million to Zimbabwe's land reform, provided that the reform was carried out 
without violence and according to the rule of law; with the aim of empowering the rural 
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landless poor, as opposed to the cronyism experienced in the past (Peter Hain cited in Human 
Rights Watch 2002:38). 
In December 2001, SADC Heads of State met to assess the progress on the 'Zimbabwe 
situation.' They concluded that violence had reduced significantly and stated that they were, 
therefore, opposed to sanctions proposed by the United States (in the Zimbabwe Democracy 
and Economic Recovery Act of December 2001) and the European Union (Human Rights 
Watch, 2002:40). Also in the same month, the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group 
(CMAG) which was established to assess compliance by Commonwealth members with the 
Commonwealth Harare Declaration of 1991, expressed concern over continued violence, 
illegal farm occupations, political intimidation and infringements on the freedom and 
independence of the media. The CMAG's report on the Zimbabwean situation contradicted 
the assessment made by SADC Heads of State and attested to "serious and persistent 
violations of the Commonwealth' s fundamental political values and the rule of law as 
enshrined in the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991" (CMAG cited in Human 
Rights Watch, 2002:39). 
President Mugabe's defiance and inflammatory statements about Britain are well known and 
bad reviews (by the U.S., Britain, the CMAG) concerning his government's implementation 
of the fast-track land reform programme created more animosity between Zimbabwe and the 
rest of the world. The European Union, the Commonwealth and the United States put more 
pressure on the Zimbabwean government to reverse its draconic media and security laws and 
to guarantee free and fair elections before E.U. foreign ministers met in Brussels in late 
January 2002 to review the progress on Zimbabwe's socio-political and economic situation. 
Again in January 2002, the UN Secretary General, Koffi Anan, encouraged the Zimbabwean 
government "to implement fully and faithfully" the actions it promised to take with regard to 
land reform and to allow freedom of speech and assembly, investigate political violence and 
respect the rule oflaw (cited in Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). 
Another SADC Heads of State summit was held in January 2002 at which the Heads of State 
welcomed assurances by Zimbabwe's President that the independent media would be 
allowed to function; judicial independence would be respected; political violence would be 
investigated; and people would have freedom of assembly (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). 
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After all the negotiations (above) to convince the Zimbabwean government to reconsider its 
implementation of the fast-track land reform programme, the E.U. still cited continued 
political violence, infringements on media freedom and judicial independence and the illegal 
occupation of farms as key concerns that where not being addressed by the Zimbabwean 
government (Human Rights Watch, 2002:40). The E.U. introduced targeted sanctions in 
February 2002 against 79 of Zimbabwe's senior government officials (Britain was strongly in 
favour of sanctions and countries like France and Italy were somewhat reluctant). The 
sanctions included: 
• Provisions for the freezing of personal assets belonging to key politicians (about 95) 
believed to be responsible for Zimbabwe's human rights crisis. 
• Prohibition of travel to E.U. countries by such persons (visa restrictions) . 
• The suspension or re-orientation of financial development cooperation programmes 
with the Zimbabwean government. 
• An embargo on the sale of arms by E.U. member states to Zimbabwe (Karume, 
2005:42; Sidiropoulos, 2004:111; Meredith, 2003:227). 
The United States followed suit by imposing similar sanctions on the Zimbabwean 
government on 22 February 2002, in terms of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic 
Recovery Act (Human Rights Watch, 2002:4 & 38). United States sanctions included; the 
freezing of financial and personal assets of Zimbabwe's political elite believed to be 
responsible for the country's human rights crisis, a travel ban on such persons and the barring 
of U.S. citizens from having financial dealings with the listed people (Sidiropoulos, 
2004:111; Meredith, 2003:227). 
The Commonwealth Chairpersons Committee on Zimbabwe (comprising South Africa, 
Nigeria and Australia) instituted sanctions on Zimbabwe in March 2002. In a bit to compel 
the Zimbabwean government to address the on-going political violence and human rights 
abuses, Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth for a year (Karume, 2005 :42; 
Zenit, 2003). The measure was imposed mainly because Zimbabwe's 2002 presidential 
election was marred by politically motivated violence and conditions in the country had not 
been conducive for the free expression of the will of the electorate (Sidiropoulos, 2004:111-
112). The Commonwealth wanted the Zimbabwean government to: 
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• Constructively engage the opposition MDC. 
• Stop the harassment of the opposition. 
• Repeal repressive laws against the media. 
• Address issues raised by the Commonwealth Observer Group after the 2000 
parliamentary and 2002 presidential election regarding electoral malpractice. 
• Government engagement with the UNDP and the Commonwealth regarding lawful 
and transparent land reform (Karume, 2005:42; Sidiropoulos, 2004:112). 
On 13 June 2002, the IMF suspended Zimbabwe's voting and other rights, as well as the 
provision of technical assistance to Zimbabwe (Karume, 2005:43; Sidiropoulos, 2004:113; 
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website-accessed 01106/2005). 
In September 2002 (at the World Summit in Johannesburg) President Mugabe defended 
Zimbabwe's controversial land reform by launching a scathing attack on British Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, and Britain's colonial past. President Mugabe told the British leader; 
"Keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe ... We have fought for our land, we have 
fought for our sovereignty, small as we are, we have won our independence and we are 
prepared to shed our blood" (cited by BBC News, 2002b). Following this statement, the 
Australian government imposed bi-lateral smart sanctions on Zimbabwe in October 2002. 
Australian sanctions included: 
• A travel ban to Australia on Zimbabwe's ministers and certain senior officials 
believed to be responsible for the country's human rights crisis. 
• A freeze on Australian assets held by such ministers and officials. 
• Suspension of non-humanitarian aid to Zimbabwe. 
• Prohibition of defence sales and suspension of all defence links between the two 
countries. 
• The down-grading of cultural links between Zimbabwe and Australia. 
• Suspension of bi-lateral ministerial contact between the two countries (Karume, 
2005 :42; Sidiropoulos, 2004: 112). 
Apart from the sanctions outlined above, several other countries withdrew aid to Zimbabwe, 
except for humanitarian assistance to combat famine. 
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There was no real improvement on the issues raised by the Commonwealth Chairpersons 
Committee when the year of suspension lapsed. The Zimbabwean government pre-empted 
threats by the Commonwealth to further suspend its membership by resigning/withdrawing 
from the Commonwealth on 7 December 2003, ahead of a Commonwealth summit that was 
meant to decide whether or not Zimbabwe would remain suspended from the body (Zenit, 
2003). The recalcitrant stance of the Zimbabwean government over the issue of embracing 
democratic values forced African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to vote for the continued 
and indefinite suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. Zimbabwe's March 2002 
suspension was renewed in December 2003 at the Abuja Commonwealth Heads of 
Govemment Meeting (CHOGM) (Sidiropoulos, 2004:111-112). 
The lack of positive progress on the Zimbabwean situation led the Board of the IMF to 
institute proceedings to expel Zimbabwe from its ranks in December 2003 (Sidiropoulos, 
2004:113; British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website-accessed 01106/2005). 
President Mugabe blamed external forces for Zimbabwe's problems. He demonised the 
sanctioning powers for causing deprivation and untold suffering to Zimbabweans, thus 
deflecting some of the blame from his government's bad policies. President Mugabe 
maintained that the imposition of sanctions was not objective and that the imposing states 
had hidden agendas and double standards; a ploy by Western powers to undermine 
Zimbabwe's autonomy and sovereignty. President Mugabe singled out Britain' s alleged 
pernicious involvement, through the E.U., to derail comprehensive land reform in Zimbabwe. 
He also criticised Britain for its conditional funding of Zimbabwe's land reform efforts 
(Sidiropoulos, 2004). 
Sanctions were imposed on the Zimbabwean government because of its increasingly bad 
governance record from the late 1990s. The sanctions were meant to encourage the 
Zimbabwean government to introduce political and economic reforms (Karume, 2005 :41-44; 
Bush, 2003:535; Kibble, 2004:366). However, it is worth noting that while Britain (and other 
donors) felt strongly about transparency, the upholding of human rights and pluralism as 
preconditions for financial support towards Zimbabwe's land reform; multi-party democracy 
was not instituted in Kenya until 1991, yet it was not a condition for British assistance in 
Kenya's 'million acre scheme' already mentioned. These same conditions have not been met 
by countries like Bangladesh, Croatia, Guyana, Mozambique and Rwanda (which do not 
have the most impressive human rights records) yet Britain and other donors continue to 
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fmancially support their land policy projects (Natural Resources Information System, 
accessed 05/05/2005). When the donor cornmunity refused to commit themselves to 
supporting the controversial fast-track land reform programme, the Zimbabwean government 
resolved to go ahead with the programme despite the lack of support (Buckle, 2002: 158; 
Commercial Farmers' Union Information Centre, 2000; Palmer and Toulmin, 2000; 
LandWeb, 2000c). President Mugabe campaigned for the elections saying; "Zimbabwe is 
able to go it alone .. .If whites want to go [leave Zimbabwe], we will offer them an escort" 
(cited in Buckle, 2002:48-49). 
Several African countries objected to European Union and United States sanctions against 
the Mugabe government. According to Sidiropoulos (2004:114), the fact that "whites owned 
a disproportionate share of land in Zimbabwe had substantial resonance in the region", 
especially in former settler colonies like South Africa, Namibia and Swaziland that 
experienced extensive colonial land expropriation (ranging from 45%-87%). African 
countries generally supported Zimbabwe's land reform plans in principle because of their 
shared history but they disagreed over the way the reform was conducted (Human Rights 
Watch, 2002:4). South Africa rejected the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe, preferring 
instead to focus on 'quiet diplomacy' (to work towards a negotiated settlement amongst the 
main stakeholders). Sidiropoulos (2004:114-115) and Hall (2003:260) believe that this 
cautious position was informed by a consideration of what radical action would have on 
South Africa's own land reform efforts. 
Sidiropoulos (2004) also explains the solidarity shown to the Zimbabwean government, 
(alternatively, the ambiguous support for sanctions) by Zimbabwe's neighbours and SADC, 
firstly as a result of their trade and diplomatic interconnectedness (balance of power). 
Secondly, and more importantly, it is a commonly held belief that even when sanctions are 
imposed multi-laterally, such sanctions are initiated at the behest of dominant powers like the 
United States and its allies in the European Union. Sidiropoulos (2004: 118) contends that 
Zimbabwe's neighbours saw the Zimbabwean government as having the courage to stand up 
to the "double standards" of the West, particularly Britain and the U.S. when they failed to 
agree on the root cause of Zimbabwe's crisis (Karume, 2005:45). Consequently, the 
Zimbabwean government's position was admired by some because sanctions were seen as an 
instrument of control imposed by the strong on the weak (Karume, 2005:45; Sidiropoulos, 
2004). Following the initial criticism of the motives behind the imposition of sanctions on 
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Zimbabwe, however, some African countries eventually agreed with their imposition as the 
Zimbabwean government repeatedly broke all the promises and reassurances that it 
made/gave to the donor community and SADC (Human Rights Watch, 2002:3-4, 37 & 41). 
As recently as June-July 2005, the E.U. increased to 120 from 95 the number of senior Zanu-
PF officials barred from travelling to Europe. Interestingly, the updated list now includes a 
High Court judge (Sunday Mail Reporter, 19 June 2005:3). The Zimbabwean government 
believes that these additional sanctions are retaliation by Britain for the Zimbabwean 
government's much criticised urban clean-up campaign, Operation MurambatsvinalRestore 
Order. Operation Murambatsvina was characterised by mass evictions and the demolition of 
illegal housing structures and umegistered or unlicensed trading areas where black market 
dealing in fuel, foreign currency and other commodities in short supply (criminal activities) 
were believed to be rife. Foreigners who were illegally in the country were also caught in the 
clean-up net. Hundreds of thousands of homes in Zimbabwe's towns were torched or 
bulldozed between April and July 2005 and more than 700 000 people lost their homes or 
livelihoods. The clean-up campaign worsened the humanitarian crisis that was already 
existed in the country because of fast-track land refonn. The United Nations condemned 
Operation Murambatsvina as a "disastrous", "catastrophic injustice" carried out in an 
"indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering ... " (cited in 
BBC News, July 2005). 
The Zimbabwean government has said that the latest sanctions imposed on the country 's 
ruling elite were instigated by Britain (to strategically position itself) before taking over the 
presidency of the E.U. in July 2005 (Sunday Mail Reporter, 19 June 2005:3). Zimbabwe's 
Minister of Infonnation and Publicity, Mr Bright Matonga, said that the government is not 
bothered by this new development because it is just one in a long chain of measures put in 
place by the West to discredit the Mugabe regime following the March 2005 parliamentary 
election. Zimbabwe's ruling elite is convinced that it is managing to circumvent the effect of 
these sanctions through its 'Look East' foreign policy. The Zimbabwean government has 
stated that its goal, and preference, is to cement relations with Asian countries, particularly 
China, since China is keen to access metals such as chrome and platinum from Zimbabwe 
(Sunday Mail Reporter, 19 June 2005 :3). 
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6.5 The Urban Clean-Up Campaigns 
The ruling Zanu-PF won the March 31 2005 parliamentary elections by a wider margin 
against the MDC than it did in June 2000, although just over 50% of the country's 5.4 
million registered voters went to the polls (Post Reporter, 8-14 April 2005: 1-2). The 
government dubbed the March 2005 parliamentary election the "anti Blair elections" because 
they allowed the ruling party to reassert its dominance and authority in the country' s political 
arena by reversing the MDC's 2000 victories (Post Reporter, 8-14 April 2005:1-2). At the 
opening of the 6th parliament, Zimbabwe's newly elected speaker of parliament and Zanu-PF 
national chairman, Dr John Landa Nkomo, commented that Zimbabweans rejected servitude 
to Britain and foreign control in its domestic affairs, thus asserting its sovereignty (The 
Voice, 2005:5). The ruling Zanu-PF won 78 of the 120 contested seats and the MDC won 41 
ofthe 120 seats in the March 2005 election. The last seat went to an independent candidate 
and former Minister of Information and Publicity, Professor Jonathan Moyo. Interestingly, 
out of Harare' s 18 constituencies, Harare South constituency was the only seat won by a 
Zanu-PF candidate (Herald Reporters, 13 April 2005 :1-2); highlighting the ruling party's 
continuing loss of urban support. Despite the lack of popularity in the country's capital (and 
other major cities like Bulawayo), the March 2005 election result gave the ruling party a two-
thirds m'!iority in the country's 6th parliament (including the 30 MPs appointed by the 
president). The opposition MDC is challenging the results of the March 2005 election in 
court and has filed 14 petitions citing electoral irregularities and intimidation by the ruling 
party (Post Reporter, 8-14 April 2005: 1-2). 
The Zimbabwean government embarked on Operation MurambatsvinalRestore Order 
between April and July 2005. Hundreds of thousands of homes were torched and bulldozed 
and more than 700 000 people were left homeless in Zimbabwe's cities and towns (BBC 
News, July, 2005). David Coltart (Zimbabwe's shadow Minister of Justice) maintains that 
Operation MurambatsvinaiRestore Order was politically motivated and directed mainly at 
urban constituencies (chastisement) that supported the opposition in recent elections, 
including the February 2000 constitutional referendum (on BBC News, July, 2005). Coltart 
draws attention to the fact that what might have begun as an urban clean-up campaign 
(ostensibly to crack down on black-market trading and other criminal activities in slum areas) 
curiously spread to and affected certain (targeted) villages in rural opposition strongholds 
(BBC News, July, 2005). Meredith (2003: 165) and Raftopoulos (2002:420-21) also note that 
Zimbabwe's main political opposition, the MOC, has a strong support-base in the urban areas 
176 
and that the Zanu-PF government considers the urban electorate to be against the state. 
Operation Murambatsvina added to the existing poverty and alienation of the country's poor, 
many of whom were shipped off to Caledonia Farm (a transit camp outside Harare). 
Operation Murambatsvina constitutes both direct and indirect forms of violence defined by 
Salmi (1993) and was condemned in a report by the United Nations' Special Envoy Mrs 
Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka who visited Zimbabwe from 28 June to 8 July 2005 to assess the 
impact of the operation. The UN report concluded that the operation was carried out with 
little warning and directly affected 700 000 people, whilst indirectly affecting a further 2.4 
million people (Herald Reporter, 2005:1 & 5). Part of the report reads as follows: 
"The scale of suffering is immense ... about 700 000 people have lost their 
homes or livelihoods and another 2.4 million people have been 
affected ... Operation MurambatsvinalRestore Order was a disastrous 
venture ... carried out in an indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with 
indifference to human suffering ... The scale of suffering is immense, particularly 
among widows, single mothers, children, orphans, the elderly and disabled 
persons" (BBC NEWS, July 2005). 
The UN report strongly encouraged the Zimbabwean government to stop further demolitions 
and to provide people with secure tenure; affordable housing, water and sanitation as 
opposed to the "wanton destruction of homes, business premises and vending sites" (Herald 
Reporter, 2005: I & 5). UN Secretary General, Koffi Anan, also expressed shock at the 
"catastrophic injustice" done to Zimbabwe's poorest people (BBC News, July 2005). 
Zimbabwe's government officials (including Minister of Local Government, Public Works 
and National Housing, Dr Ignatius Chombo and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr S. 
Mumbengegwi) heavily criticised the UN report on Operation MurambatsvinaiRestore Order. 
The Zimbabwean government described the report as being deliberately biased against the 
government with the aim of tarnishing Zimbabwe' s image. Government officials alleged that 
the report was the work of British Prime Minister Tony Blair's vendetta against Zimbabwe 
(through the UN). They also claimed that the figures cited in the report were exaggerated 
(Sunday Mail Reporter, 24 July 2005:4; Herald Reporter, 23 July 2005: 1 & 5). In the 
government's defence, Minister Mumbengegwi insisted that Operation Murambatsvina was 
legal in terms of Zimbabwean law and was consistent with international provisions. 
According to the government, the operation targeted illegal building structures (housing and 
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business), informal trading areas (unregistered or unlicensed) and other places where 
criminal activities such as black market dealing in fuel and foreign currency and other 
commodities was rife. Minister Mumbengegwi said Operation Murambatsvina was 
conceived not as an end in itself but as a precursor to Operation GarikailHlalani Kuhle which 
the governrnent began implementing in July 2005 "to provide decent, affordable 
accommodation and to create an enabling and conducive environment that promotes small to 
medium enterprises (SMEs) .. .in line with the ruling party's manifesto and policy objectives 
for the March 2005 parliamentary elections" (Herald Reporter, 23 July 2005: I & 5). 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Local Governrnent, Public Works and 
National Housing emphasised that Operation Murambatsvina was being succeeded by a 
reconstruction exercise dubbed Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle which is intended to benefit 
people affected by Operation Murambatsvina. The two ministers said Operation 
Garikai/Hialani Kuhle was already underway and was supported by a governrnent budget of 
$Z3 trillion (Herald Reporter, 23 July 2005:1 & 5; Mambondiyani, 2005:1-2). Minister 
Chombo said Operation GarikailHlalani Kuhle is part of the governrnent's efforts to provide 
homeless people with decent accommodation and about 3 100 people have already been 
allocate stands in Harare's Hatcliffe Housing Scheme. Minister Chombo added that 2 260 
houses are at various stages of construction, for example, at Whitecliff in Harare 
(Mambondiyani, 2005: 1-2). Beneficiaries of Operation GarikailHlalani Kuhle in Harare's 
Hatcliffe housing scheme received building materials from the governrnent to help them 
construct temporary out-buildings in which to live whilst building proper residential 
structures. It is reported that each family was given four asbestos roofing sheets in July 2005 
as a contribution towards the rebuilding exercise (Municipal Reporter, 23 July 2005 :8). The 
government also pledged to assist displaced people by deploying 'building brigades' through 
the Local Governrnent, Public Works and National Housing Ministry to help affected people 
with the construction of 2-roomed core houses. The people in these housing schemes were 
assured that they can stay in these temporary structures for a year, without being evicted 
(Mambondiyani, 2005: 1-2). 
According to governrnent figures, Manicaland Province had utilised $Z87 253 billion of the 
$Z3 trillion reconstruction budget on 480 houses in Mutare, Rusape, Nyanga and 
Chimanimani by the end of July 2005 (Mambondiyani, 2005:1-2). The government reported 
that 14 houses were at roof level and 1 000 stands had been serviced in Mutare alone and that 
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300 families had been identified to occupy these houses. It is also reported that some of the 
reconstruction funds have gone towards building factories and vendors' markets in the 
province (Mambondiyani, 2005:1 -2). Minister Chombo announced that more farms would be 
acquired (from the few remaining white-owned farms) for Operation GarikailHlalani Kuhle. 
The Zimbabwean government maintains that Operation Murambatsvina and Operation 
GarikailHlalani Kuhle are meant to uplift the lives of ordinary Zimbabweans in the long 
term, in spite of "sanctions and unwarranted vilification by Britain and its allies" (Herald 
Reporter, 2005: 1 & 5). However, one cannot help but wonder what the affected people are 
meant to be grateful for because as the UN' s July 2005 report highlighted and criticised, it 
appears as though Operation GarikailHlalani Kuhle was an after-thought, a plan hastily 
drawn up in reaction to public outcry over Operation MurambatsvinalRestore Order; when 
hundreds of thousands of people were already homeless and destitute. The UN report also 
points out that regardless of whatever plans the Zimbabwean government might have had, it 
simply does not have the capacity to "fully address the needs of the affected population 
without assistance from the international community" (BBC News, July 2005). 
6.6 Conclusion 
This section on the relationship between fast-track land reform and development highlights 
the everyday reality of ordinary Zimbabweans after land reform, Operation Murambatsvina 
and the current Operation GarikailHlalani Kuhle compares or fits into the government' s 
development objectives. From a humanitarian standpoint, one can debate whether the 
wholesale destruction of livelihoods experienced by the poorest and vulnerable people could 
have been avoided and whether more measures could have been taken to minimise the 
severity of the collateral damage involved. Fast-track land reform deepened the welfare crisis 
that already existed in Zimbabwe because of the degree of displacement and 
disempowerment experienced by the most vulnerable people. 
In terms of politics and democratic governance, most Zimbabweans are disenchanted by the 
government's conduct in carrying out its grand plan for land reform and urban renewal at the 
expense of the country's poorest people. The horrific realities of this period will be 
entrenched in people's minds for a long time to come and the situation is worsened by the 
fact that the government does not acknowledge that its policies (arguably well intended but 
ill-executed) are responsible for the suffering of hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans. The 
land reform programme criminalised and thwarted hopes for free and fair political 
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participation because of the extent of political repression orchestrated and sustained by the 
government during its implementation. 
Zimbabwe celebrated its silver jubilee or twenty-five years of independence in April 2005, 
but sadly, there is not much to show for it in terms of development and good governance. 
Through successive ill-advised and ill-executed policies and reactionary tendencies, the 
Zimbabwean government finds itself in the same position it was in at independence in 1980, 
except there is no war to blame for the camage this time. It will take many years to rebuild 
Zimbabwe's devastated economy (livelihoods and infrastructure) and social fabric after the 
wholesale displacement of both rural and urban populations. This mammoth task is even 
more daunting for everyone involved because the government has limited resources and is 
reeling under the burden of sanctions that could have been avoided, had the government 
heeded the warnings and advice of other parties that had a stake in the land reform process. 
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7 
Case Study of Three Farms in Vumba and Burma Valley 
7.1 Introduction 
This section provides a detailed account of how fast-track land reform was experienced in the 
study area. The tentative proposition for the study was that Vumba and Burma Valley's 
experience of the fast-track land reform programme was somewhat different to the way in 
which the programme was calTied out (in practice) in the rest of the country. This proposition 
was investigated and proven to be true insofar as differences were noted in the extent (scale 
or incidence) of illegal farm occupations, their duration and their intensity (Meredith, 
2003: 184; Buckle, 2002; Moyo, 2000a:90). This study by no means suggests that illegal farm 
occupations or compulsory land acquisition did not take place in Manicaland or the study 
area. Illegal land invasions broke out countrywide at the end of February 2000 and according 
to the Commercial Farmers' Union Inforrnation Centre (2000), by 30 April 2000, Manicaland 
province had 152 farms that had been affected by illegal farm invasions out of a national total 
of 1 056 that had been invaded at the time. About 85 of the 152 affected farms in Manicaland 
were still effectively occupied by 30 April 2000 (Commercial Farmers' Union Inforrnation 
Centre, 2000). 
Illegal farm occupations in Manicaland province were concentrated in the Headlands, 
Chimanimani and Chipinge areas (Buckle, 2002; Commercial Farmers' Union Information 
Centre, 2000). Border Timbers Limited is one of Zimbabwe' s big timber exporters and 
employed 3 500 workers in Zimbabwe's Eastern Border Districts (Manicaland), along the 
border with Mozambique. Border Timbers was covered by a Bi-lateral Investment Protection 
Agreement, and was therefore, officially exempted from the compulsory land acquisition 
process. However, Border Timbers was forced to close down most of its plants, except where 
critical export orders were being processed, in May 2000 when about forty war veterans and 
Zanu-PF supporters raided its Charter sawmills in Chimanimani (Buckle, 2002:97). Buckle 
(2002:97) reports that workers at the sawmill were forced to attend a rally for more than five 
hours and some of them were severely assaulted in the incident, although no aITests were 
made. Apart from job loses as a result of subsequent plant closures, Zimbabwe stood to lose 
millions of dollars in foreign cUlTency. 
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There were also a few isolated incidences of illegal farm occupations that made headline 
news in the OdzilRiverside area 20 kIn outside Mutare (along the Harare-Mutare highway), 
for example, the hostile takeover of Kondozi Farm by war veterans in June 2004. The Save 
Valley was similarly affected (Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002). Incidents of farm invasions 
and land pegging were also reported in Vumba and Burma Valley, for example, on Ferndale 
Farm were one invader came dressed in army uniform and claimed to be from the notorious 5 
Brigade which was responsible for the Gukurahundi atrocities in Matebeleland in the 1980s 
(Commercial Farmers' Union Information Centre, 2000). 
Despite these cases, however, illegal farm occupations in Manicaland's Vumba and Burma 
Valley area (Mutare district) were relatively isolated and peaceful compared to those 
experienced in Mashonaland East, West and Central provinces were war veterans, Zanu-PF 
youth militias and other landless people went on a rampage for most of 2000 and 2001 (Bond 
and Manyanya, 2003:79; Meredith, 2003: 18,176, 184 & 220; Moyo, 2000a:90). 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section describes Manicaland 
Province and Mutare's main geographical characteristics and the type of agricultural 
production that farmers are involved in. It also summarises the results of fast-track land 
reform in Manicaland province with respect to how much land was distributed in the 
province and how many families benefited from the land reform exercise. 
The second section outlines the research methodology used for this study and why it was 
chosen. Data was gathered through a focus group discussion (pilot study) and in-depth 
interviews with government officials, three white farmers and twenty black farm workers. 
The questions (interview schedules) posed to two of the three categories of respondents 
(farmers and farm workers, not government officials) covered similar substantive material. 
The final section profiles the 3 farms that make up the case study, followed by a qualitative 
analysis of how different socio-political and economic forces have influenced responses to 
fast-track land reform in the study area. The report is both descriptive and analytical in the 
presentation of its findings. 
7.2.1 Manicaland Province and Mutare's Main Geographical Characteristics 
Manicaland province has seven administrative districts namely; Buhera, Chimanimani, 
Chipinge, Makoni, Mutare, Mutasa and Nyanga (see maps 1, 2 and 3 on pages iv and v) . The 
province covers an area of 36 459 square kilometres and has a population of 1.6 million (J 
566 899). According to the Utete Report (2003:41), Manicaland province has a high 
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population density of 42 people per square kilometre (against a national average of 31 people 
per square kilometre) and about 70% of the province's population is found in the communal 
areas (Thomas, 1992 cited in Moyo, 1995:129; http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilManicaland). 
Out of Manicaland province's seven administrative district, Buhera is 100% communal 
(Utete Report, 2003). According to Moyo (1995:179), only 18% of Manicaland's population 
is found on large commercial farms, 3% on small commercial farms and 8% in resettlement 
areas. 
Zimbabwe has five agro-ecological or natural regions based on factors such as relief/altitude, 
soil type and the amount of rainfall received annually. The most pressure for land reform was 
in Natural Regions I, 2 and 3 which have reliable rainfall and soils that are well suited for 
crop farming. Modal farm sizes in Natural Region I vary between 1000-1500 hectares (Moyo 
et ai, 1991). According to Zinyama (2001:166), farms in Manicaland province are generally 
smaller within the vicinity of large urban centres and in the higher rainfall regions north and 
east of the country. Small-scale commercial farms are generally less than 100 hectares in 
size. Statutory Instrument 419 of December 1999 prescribes maximum farm sizes for Region 
1 as shown by Table 10 below. 
Table 10: Recommended Maximum Farm Sizes for Natural Region 1 
Agro-ecological Peri-urban Small-scale Medium-scale Large-scale 
ZonelN atural Commercial commercial commercial commercial 
Region Farms (ha) farms (ha) farms (ha) farms (ha) 
I 2-50 20 100 250-450 
(Human RIghts Watch, 2002: 13; Van den Bnnk, 2000:2) 
Mutare has a population of about 389 988 and a surface area of 5 650 square kilometres 
(http://www.statoids.comlyzw.html). The nearest communal area is Zimunya communal 
lands which lies twenty kilometres south of Mutare. Zimunya Township is a dormitory town 
with a few light industries and a vocational skills training centre. The township houses 
people who work in Mutare and commute between the two places everyday. According to 
Zinyama (2001; 172), Zimunya had a population density of 162 people per square kilometre 
in 1982; the third highest for any rural area in the country and successive years have 
intensified the economic desperation felt by poor people in the area. 
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7.2.2 Manicaland Province's Contribution to Zimbabwe's Economy 
Manicaland province falls under Zimbabwe's Natural Region 1, which is the most ideal for 
intensive farming (Moyo, 2000:28; see also Appendix 3). The Eastern Highlands of 
Manicaland province produce a diverse and specialised array of foreign currency earning 
crops. The area makes a significant contribution to Zimbabwe' s economy in terms of tea, 
coffee, timber/Agri-forestry (Border Timbers Ltd, the Wattle Company, the Forestry 
Commission), horticulture (tropical and sub-tropical fruits, vegetables and cut-flowers), seed 
potatoe production and dairy farming. Zimbabwe is a small tea producer compared to other 
countries but its tea is of such superior quality that 60% of it is exported (Riddell, 1992:78). 
Zimbabwe also exports 99% of its coffee (the Arabica variety). The parastatal (ARDA), 
through its Katiyo Tea Estates, and the Tanganda Tea Company have a monopoly over the 
country's·tea and coffee production in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands. 
Moyo (2000:28, 91-92) notes that Manicaland province had the second highest number of 
horticultural producers in the country in 1995. The main export destinations for Zimbabwe's 
cut-flowers, vegetables and fruits are Holland, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and 
more recently, Asian markets. Farmers in Manicaland are a jewel to Zimbabwe' s economy 
because their produce yields high returns. The Mutare City Council has even erected signs on 
the city limits which say: "Welcome to Mutare: The Jewel of the East" (Buckle, 2002:233). 
The drier areas of Manicaland province produce tobacco, sugar, wheat, cotton, sorghum and 
millet (Utete Report, 2003 :41). The province is also popular with tourists (chalets, cottages 
and lodges) because of its natural physical attractions, including inland lakes and scenic 
mountains. The Vumba Mountains form part of the Eastern Highlands mountain range which 
stretches from N yanga in the north to Chimanimani in the south. 
7.3 Land Reform in Manicaland Province 
It should be noted that the government designated and gazetted thirteen productive white-
owned farms (covering 17000 acres) for compulsory acquisition in Mutare district in 1992 
when the 1992 Land Acquisition Act was enacted. These farms were designated out of a total 
of approximately 130 farms in Mutare district. One of the designated farms was a dairy farm 
that supplied milk to Mutare and another was a leading tobacco producer. Seven of the 
thirteen farms designated for compulsory acquisition in 1992 where subsequently 
undesignated (Meredith, 2003: 124-126). 
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Despite Manicaland province's significant contribution to Zimbabwe's GDP and foreign 
currency earmngs, landholdings in the province were not exempted from compulsory 
acquisition during the fast-track land reform, except as specified in the official land 
acquisition criteria. Although Manicaland province is one of the most agriculturally 
productive of Zimbabwe's ten provinces, no additional exemptions were granted because 
provincial authorities regularly cited problems of land shortage and population pressure in 
the province's communal areas (Manica Post Farming Reporter, 2005:18; Vtete Report, 
2003). 
Buckle (2002: 130), a white farmer who lost her farm to illegal land occupiers in 2000 
comments that by June 2000; there seemed to be no distinguishable pattern to how land 
acquisition was being carried out. She notes that some properties that were being gazetted for 
compulsory acquisition measured 33 000 hectares and others measured less that 50 hectares 
in size. However, officials at the Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement offices 
in Mutare maintain that the land reform programme was evenly implemented countrywide 
and that any differences apparent in the process are because of local specificities that had to 
be considered. Government officials maintained that the official land acquisition criteria 
outlined in Chapter 4 applied to the whole country without exception. 
Government statistics show that 20 farms covering 16 449.9434 hectares out of a national 
total of 85 (168 263. 808ha) were acquired in Manicaland Province in the Inception Phase 
(October 1998-June 2000) of the fast-track land reform programme (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, 
Land Reform and Resettlement, 2004:28). Government figures also indicate that between 
June 2000 and February 2001 (the fast-track phase), 159 farms covering 153 997.5109 
hectares were gazetted for compulsory acquisition in Manicaland province against a national 
total of 2 706 farms covering 6 086 605.1317 hectares (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land 
Reform and Resettlement, 2004:30). The Vtete Report (2003:43) adds that Tanganda Tea 
Company, Ariston Holdings and Eastern Highlands Tea plantations offered the government I 
397 hectares of land for the fast -track land reform programme. More land was acquired 
through the subdivision of 119 white-owned commercial farms after negotiations with 
provincial and district land identification committees (Vtete Report, 2003:43 & 44). Table 
II below shows a breakdown of land acquisition in Manicaland Province. 
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Table 11: Land Acquired in Manicaland Province According to Districts 
District Figures from Figures by Land Gazetted Un gazetted De-Listed 
Dept of Lands Review District 
Team 
Buhera Nil Nil N/A N/A N/A 
Chimaniman' 108 108 43 65 12 
Chipinge 232 203 183 20 10 
Makoni 286 259 156 103 10 
Mutare 279 283 101 182 24 
Mutasa 106 337 67 270 23 
Nyanga 288 344 72 272 12 
TOTALS 1299 1 534 622 812 91 
(Vtete Report, 2003 :41) 
Government of Zimbabwe statistics show that 3 974 families were resettled on 56 721 
hectares in Manicaland province, against a national total of 51 543 landless peasant families 
resettled on 2 083 301.166 hectares (2 .1 million) (GoZ: Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement, 2004:7 & 29). About 1 080 former farm workers from an estimated 90 000 in 
Manicaland are reported to have been allocated land under model A 1 resettlement (Vtete 
Report, 2003:43). The Utete Report (2003:423) suggests that more land can be secured for 
model Al resettlement, with necessary modifications, from about 40 000 hectares of state-
owned land which is currently lying fallow in Manicaland's Chisumbanje and Middle Save 
areas because of low beneficiary take-up of allocated land (42% against a national average of 
66%) for allocated land under resettlement model A2. 
It is somewhat surprising that Manicaland province has such a low take-up rate for allocated 
land when the province is reported to have a problem with high population pressure (Manica 
Post Farming Reporter, 2005: 18; Vtete Report, 2003). The failure by applicants to take-up 
allocated land means that a considerable amount of land is officially unoccupied while 
thousands of would-be A2 beneficiaries have no land (Moyo, 2004:25; Southern African 
Regional Poverty Network, 2004; Utete Report, 2003:7); more so because government 
statistics show that Manicaland Province received 23 000 applications for resettlement land 
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under the A2 resettlement model by mid-2005; yet only 1 040 farmers have been resettled 
under the A2 model in the province. This situation has compelled government officials to 
seek ways of acquiring more farms for resettlement before the December 2006 deadline 
when the land reform exercise officially ends (Manica Post Farming Reporter, 2005: IS). 
Tables 12 and 13 below summarise fast-track land reform in Manicaland province. 
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Table 12: Total Designated Fanns and De-Listed Fanns in Manicaland 
Province Total Number Total Number Gazetted Farms Gazetted Farms De-listed 
of Farms According of Farms (Ha) Farms 
to Government According to 
Figures Figures 
Obtained By 
District 
Teams 
Manicaland 1299 1534 622 554713 91 
National Total 8758 9135 6422 10839108 1 012 
NB: Note the difference between fann totals according to government figures and district teams (Utete Report, 2003:24) 
Table 13: Fast-Track Land Allocation and Beneficiary Take-Up Rates in Manicaland 
Province Model Model Model Model No. of No. of % Take- % Take-
Al Al A2 A2 Beneficiaries Beneficiaries Up Rate Up Rate 
No. of Hectares No. of Hectares Al A2 Al A2 
Fanns Fanns 
Manicaland 246 195644 138 77 533 11 019 463 92 42 
National 2652 4231080 1672 2 198814 127 192 7260 97 66 
Total 
-
(Utete Report, 2003:24) 
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7.4.1 Methodological Framework 
This research was undertaken to find out why illegal farm invasions were not as prevalent in 
Vumba and Burma Valley (east of Manicaland's provincial capital, Mutare) compared to 
other parts of the country. The research also sought to find out people's reactions or 
responses to fast-track land reform in the study area. Underpinning this study, from a 
phenomenological or interpretivist point of view, is an evaluation of how successful the land 
reform programme was in terms of people's social and economic welfare (not land 
acquisition and redistribution), given the premise that the reform exercise (on paper) was 
planned as a deliberate and sustained intervention with specific emphasis on distributional 
outcomes, as well as a poverty alleviation orientation so that it would benefit the country's 
poor and landless people by improving their incomes through agricultural production (Utete 
Report, 2003). The study's focus on welfare issues is influenced by Moyo's (1995:287) 
observation that most commentary on land reform emphasises distributional outcomes and 
does not pay sufficient attention to the impact that the reforms have on the welfare and social 
reproduction of ordinary poor people. Moyo (1995:71) impresses the need for change in the 
scale of analysis on land reform, development and sustainability (from international and 
national levels to local levels) in order to adequately inform the premises on which 
appropriate policies evolve. 
Research was undertaken as an exploratory study to gain insight and comprehension of the 
socio-economic and political situation in the study area. Emphasis was put on the social 
reality of respondents directly affected by the land reform programme. No attempts were 
made to get definitive or replicable answers because the study is not representative of the 
country as a whole (Babbie and Mouton, 2001 :80). The research sought to answer the 
following key questions: 
• How many farms in the study area were affected by fast-track land reform and illegal 
farm occupations and how many are still operating at full capacity, or otherwise? 
• What are the general responses of farmers and farm workers to the fast-track land 
reform programme in the area and why is this so? What exists now in terms of social 
dynamics and how can they be explained? 
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A qualitative research design was chosen for this study because phenomenological and 
critical approaches (interpretivism) emphasise understanding and interpreting the world from 
the perspective of the insider; than would be possible through quantitative means because 
"knowledge is situated and contextual" (Mason, 2002:56 & 62; Silverman, 2000:2 & 8). 
Interpretivism is both an ideology and a methodology which guides the way in which a 
researcher collects data and produces valid knowledge. This process entails collaborating 
with subjects in order to understand how social phenomena, relationships and processes 
develop and operate (Mason, 2002:175). An interpretation of these accounts recognises or 
acknowledges the socio-economic and political location of respondents because the social 
world is experienced subjectively (Babbie and Mouton, 2001 :78; Barbour and Kitzinger, 
1999:198). According to Mason (2002:3), interpretivism attempts to understand "how the 
world is interpreted, understood, experienced, produced or constituted" because different 
people (individually and collectively) experience and interpret or understand the social world 
(the meanings they ascribe to things, their beliefs) or different situations in different ways. 
The methods employed when researching using this methodology include in-depth semi-
structured interviews and observation (Livesey, 2002:4). 
A case study was chosen to assess the social and economic impacts of fast-track land reform 
in Vurnba and Burma Valley. The case study is a cross-sectional study, as opposed to a 
longitudinal one (Babbie and Mouton, 2001 :76 & 78). Case studies offer the opportunity for 
one aspect of a problem to be studied in detail within a limited time; to identify various 
processes at work and to show the interaction of different factors and how they are linked to 
different events. According to Bell (1993 :9), a successful case study allows one to "illustrate 
relationships, micro-political issues and patterns of influences in a particular context." 
However, Bell (1993 :9) notes that it is difficult to cross-check information from a case study 
and generalisations are usually not possible. 
7.4.2 MethodslData Collecting Techniques 
A combination of different techniques (multiple research methods) can be used so that the 
data generated can be cross-referenced to enhance its validity. Barbour and Kitzinger 
(1999:6) and Bell (1993:64) suggest that cross-referencing is necessary because some 
respondents answer questions differently depending on whether they are interviewed 
individually or in a group (tendency to give normative responses in a group situation). In this 
study, triangulation was done to cross-check the accounts of different respondents by 
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gathering data from a number of participants and other sources and comparing them to 
produce a balanced account. A focus group discussion, in-depth interviews and observation 
are the three mutually reinforcing data gathering techniques that were chosen for this study. 
7.4.3 Research Implementation 
a) Focus Group Discussion: The interview schedules for this study were tested in an 
exploratory focus group discussion (FGD) that was conducted with nine farm workers (3 
from each of the 3 farms in the study) in June 2004. FGDs are cost-effective and quick to 
conduct and the focus group discussion was used as a pilot study to assess the interview 
schedules' suitability regarding both objective and subjective aspects of the issues covered. 
The discussion was conducted because it was expected that respondents would be a bit 
apprehensive (feel intimidated, unsure or alienated) about discussing this topic. Respondents 
were informed about the research and what it wanted to achieve (ethical considerations) in 
order to get their consent and gain their trust (Mason, 2002:80-82; Barbour and Kitzinger, 
1999:62). The FGD was conducted in the Shona vernacular and discussion centred on farm 
workers' experience of fast-track land reform; what they thought it was about; their 
experience of it and their life after the land reform exercise. The interview schedules for the 
study were modified accordingly after the discussion. 
Focus group discussions (FGDs) fall in the broad category of group interviews where small 
groups of people participate in a planned discussion on a defined topic. FGDs are a practical, 
quick and efficient way of gaining access to a relatively large forum of identified participants 
for in-depth discussion than is afforded by individual interviews (Macun and Posel, 1998:115 
& 121). FGDs are used in the social sciences to help us understand how individuals and 
collectives perceive, organise, give meaning to and express their understandings of 
themselves and their experiences (Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999:5; Mishler, 1986 in Macun 
and Pose I, 1998:118). FGDs afford researchers access to subjective meanings with a 
"complexity and depth" which quantitative methods cannot offer because FGDs rely on 
group dynamics (interaction) which allows participants to "draw on tacit assumptions and 
values and express themselves in ways that reveal particular discourses or systems of thought 
in which particular ideas or attitudes are embedded" (Macum and Posel, 1998:122). FGDs 
combine in-depth interviews with participant observation (what is said, the respondent's tone 
of voice, posture, facial expressions) to answer 'why' and 'how' questions (explanation, not 
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enumeration) on topics that cannot be answered adequately or accurately using closed or 
open-ended survey questionnaires (Isiugo-Abanihe and Obono, 2002:73-76). 
According to Zeller (1993 cited in Macun and Posel, 1998:127), FGDs are used in settings 
characterised by considerable levels of inequality and social or cultural distance; where it is 
suspected that respondents will be reluctant to give information on sensitive topics in an 
individual interview. FGDs, therefore, allow the researcher to canvass both verbal and non-
verbal responses on a given topic in order to explore and account for human behaviour and 
experience (Isiugo-Abanihe and Obono, 2002:73-76; Silverman, 2000:176; Barbour and 
Kitzinger, 1999:7; Macum and Posel, 1998:116). 
There are some weaknesses associated with FGDs as a research technique. The general 
criticism against FGDs is that they are 'exploratory' and 'impressionistic.' Quantitative 
researchers regard data from FGDs as inconclusive and needing verification through more 
rigorous methods. Although the group forum has the potential to elicit a wide range of 
responses, it also contaminates (inhibits or distorts) individual responses (Merton, 1987 cited 
in Macun and Posel, 1998: 116-117). Albretcht (1993 cited in Macun and Posel, 1998:127-
128) elaborates on this point by commenting that participants may be compliant in their 
desire to please the facilitator or researcher. Participants tend to offer normative responses 
which do not give an accurate picture of the situation. The researcher's mere presence or the 
fact that people are aware that they are being studied produces the Hawthorne Effect, 
whereby respondents or participants role-play certain behaviour because they think it is the 
correct or expected response. Albretcht (1993 cited in Macun and Posel, 1998:127-128) notes 
too that individual responses can be shaped by "processes of identification, interpersonal 
solidarity and perceived pressure to conform to a dominant group position" (' group think'). 
Regarding this particular criticism, female participants in the FGD conducted for this study 
were less forthcoming in the discussion, perhaps because Shona society discourages women 
from voicing their views/opinions in public, especially in the presence of men. 
Secondly, power differences and presumed researcher bias/subjective judgment (where the 
researcher has economic, social and educational advantage over participants) can negatively 
affect the quality of data generated in any research, as well as its analysis and interpretation 
(Isiugo-Abanihe and Obono, 2002:84; Silverman, 2001:57-60; Macun and Posel, 1998:123 & 
129; Morgan 1988 in Macun and Posel, 1998:115). Isiugo-Abanihe and Obono (2002:77) 
note that participants might deliberately withhold information because of "psychological 
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impediments produced by the sum of social differences between the researcher and people in 
the focus group" (discomfort or embarrassment), for example, the researcher is a black, 
middleclass, university educated female interviewing mostly uneducated farm workers. 
These shortcomings limit the reliability and replicability of responses and data generated 
through FODs. However, the reliability of focus group data is enhanced by combining 
different research techniques (complementing focus group data through the triangulation 
method) to produce a complete and accurate picture of the issues under investigation (Macun 
and Posel, 1998:118, 129 & 132). The reliability of the data is determined by the coherence 
between all the techniques used and the integration ofthe data generated. 
b) In-depth Interviews: The bulk of the research is based on individual interviews with 
farmers and farm workers, as well as observation. Individual consent was given before all 
individual interviews were conducted (Mason, 2002:80-82; Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999:62). 
Semi-structured, flexible and relatively informal interviews were used because they can be 
developed as the interview progresses (when clarity is needed) to generate a fairer and fuller 
representation of respondents' perspectives (Mason, 2002:62 & 66; Silverman, 2000:89-90; 
Bell, 1993:91). Open-ended, explorative questions were asked to solicit responses 
(perceptions and accounts of experiences) on the research topic. Interview questions related 
to whether or not there have been as many land invasions in the study area compared to other 
places. Some questions centred on how both farmers and farm workers are coping (socially, 
economically and emotionally) in the aftermath of fast-track land reform; whether they think 
and feel they are better off because of it, or not (Appendix 1). 
Considerable rapport was necessary in the interviews (with both farmers and farm workers), 
particularly regarding questions that involved attitudes and emotions because respondents 
tended to gave half-hearted responses or partial explanations to the questions asked. One-on-
one interviews were chosen to encourage farm workers to talk freely and fully in response to 
the questions after introducing the research as a study on farm workers' socio-economic 
status over the past five years. However, some respondents remained somewhat reluctant to 
participate for fear of repercussions (victimisation by fellow farm workers or government 
agents) or their responses were inhibited as they did not want to discuss their problems in 
great detail because of the politically charged nature of events surrounding the land reform 
exercise. Fears and suspicions about the motives of the study could not be eliminated entirely 
but the female respondents opened up more and were easier to talk to than the men after a 
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few interviews had been conducted. Most of the interviews lasted between an hour and an-
hour-and-a-half on average. Interviews with government officials were deliberately kept short 
in order not to antagonise the government's position on the matter because too much probing 
could easily have been construed as dissent and the interviewer might have been identified 
with the political opposition or as an informant for foreign forces. 
c) Observation: More insights were gained from what was seen (and over-heard) during 
visits to the three farms. Observation was used to cross-check the accuracy of what 
respondents revealed in the interviews (Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999:6). Observation also 
allowed the researcher to get an idea of how the community relates, for instance, the 
relationship between white farmers and farm workers. Media reports (television and 
newspapers) also provided valuable insights. 
7.S.1 Respondents 
Three white farmers, twenty black farm workers and provincial government officials were the 
chosen respondents for the study, although the different categories of respondents were asked 
slightly different questions. These respondents were chosen because Donnison (1994 cited in 
Macun and Posel, 1998: 124) maintains that the people who experience a particular thing 
should be consulted about it because "they are experts on the issue in ways that no-one else 
can be." Zimbabwe's white farmers and farm workers were targets for politically motivated 
violence during fast-track land reform and it is worthwhile to find out their views about the 
programme and how it affected them. 
a) Farmers and Farm Profiles: 
This section profiles three fanns that were selected for the study from Manicaland' s Vumba 
and Burma Valley area. Two of the farms (Farms I and 2) exceeded the maximum sizes 
recommended for large-scale commercial farming in Natural Region 1 (250-450ha) by 
Statutory Instrument 419 of December 1999. 
Table 14: Characteristics of the Three Farms in the Study 
Size Production 
Farm 1 707. 5235ha. Dairy 
Farm 2 866. 18ha. Mixed Farming 
Farm 3 376.0419ha. Mixed Farming 
194 
The government gazetted farms that were designated for compulsory acquisition in batches or 
Lots (not necessarily according to province) and the farms in this study were affected by the 
notices below. The Manica Post of 22-28 October 2004 (pB6-pB7) carried a notice in terms 
of paragraph (iii) of subsection (l) of section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20: I 0 
regarding the "Vesting of land, taking of materials and exercise of rights over land" by the 
government. The notice affected at least ten districts in the country [Lot 15 with a total of 193 
farms) and Mutare district accounted for 28 of the 193 farms gazetted. Farms 2 and 3 were 
listed in this particular notice. 
The Manica Post of 17-23 December 2004 (pBS & pB7) carried a "Preliminary notice to 
compulsorily acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10." This notice 
applied to Lot 160 (229 farms across the country) and Mutare district accounted for 11 of the 
229 farms. This time, Farms 1 and 3 were affected. 
The Manica Post of 28 January-3 February 2005 (p13 & p14) carried a "Notice of 
application for confirmation of Section 8 Order in terms of Section 7(3) of the Land 
Acquisition Act Chapter 20 :10." This notice applied to Lot 10 (274 farms across the country) 
and was issued in respect of disputed lands (where acquisition is contested). Mutare district 
accounted for 29 of the 274 confirmed acquisitions and the 29 farms included two of the 
farms in the study (2 and 3). 
Farm 1 
The farm owner is 65-years old. He is originally from Britain but is a Zimbabwean citizen. 
The farmer's wife and children are also Zimbabwean citizens. The farmer has been involved 
in farming since buying the farm before independence in 1980, although he would not say 
how much he paid for it (Interview notes, 2004). 
Farm I is a dairy farm with a herd of about a hundred 100 pedigree Brahman bulls, Hereford, 
Ayrshire, Jersey and Holstein cows. The farm also owns several Charolais heifers and a few 
cows of the indigenous varieties. The farm is also involved in sheep breeding and market 
gardening (mostly vegetables) on a smaller scale. The farm produces milk and milk products 
such as yoghurt, cheese, butter, buttermilk and sour milk. The dairy operation is highly 
mechanised and requires a lot of electricity, for example, to milk the cows and for 
refrigeration. The farm has four refrigerated trucks that transport its produce to supermarkets 
in Mutare and Harare (for export). The farm has 50 full time workers and the farmer believes 
that he has a good working relationship with his employees. The farmer communicates with 
his workers mostly through the farm's black foreman. The farmer admitted that the 
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relationship can best be described as paternalistic, although it is significantly different from 
the despised master-servant relationship reminiscent of the colonial era (Interview notes, 
2004). 
Manicaland province has two dairy processing factories (in Mutare and Chipinge) but they 
are currently operating at 30% capacity according to the Utete Report (2003). Borland and 
Moyo (2004) add that Mutare alone produces 6% of Zimbabwe's total milk production. 
The reduction in milk production is attributed to resettlement on some dairy farms and the 
escalating prices of stock-feed. According to the Utete Report (2003), Manicaland' s 
provincial dairy herd was about 8 200 and has reduced to about 4 900. 
Farm 1 was not occupied or invaded but in April 2005 the government gazetted a list of 
farms whose compensation had been determined and whose planned acquisition was going 
ahead as previously gazetted (notice in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20: 1 0). A 
total of 822 landholdings were listed countrywide (The Manica Post 8-14 April 2005:pll-
13). The farmer said he is cautious about expressing his views regarding the fast-track land 
reform programme because he, or his family, might be victimised. He said: 
There is always the threat that someone will come and order you off the farm at 
anytime, for the smallest reason ... We are not safe, I do not think anyone is safe 
but what can we do? The fear we feel here is no different from people in the 
towns who are harassed on a regular basis for all sorts of reasons (Interview notes, 
2004). 
The farmer agrees that land reform was overdue but disagrees with the lawless manner in 
which it was implemented. He realises that white farmers are still targets of random 
politically motivated violence and that their cooperation is of no real consequence in a 
country were the rule of law is disregarded (Interview notes, 2004). The elderly farmer is 
struggling to accept that he is going to lose years of back-breaking hard work and 
investments and feels powerless to do anything about it. He put his life into the business, 
built it from nothing, mortgaged everything he owned to secure his family's future but now 
he is considering retirement because he is too old to start a new career. The farmer said that 
as things stand; there is no incentive for him to make long term plans or invest in the business 
(expand the dairy operation) because he does not know whether he will be on the farm for 
another week, month or year. The farmer concluded by saying that it was up to his sons to 
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decide whether to continue farming or to try something else because they have become more 
directly involved in the day to day running of the farm in recent years. One of the farmer's 
sons also owns a farm in the area which is registered in his own name (Interview notes, 
2004). 
Farm 2 
The farmer is 58-years old. His parents trekked from South Africa in the I 940s, when he was 
just a small child, and got involved in farming. The farmer's parents still have a farm 
registered in their name in the Burma Valley area. The farm owner is a Zimbabwean citizen 
and he speaks Shona's Manyika dialect. Before fast-track land reform, the farmer owned two 
farms which were registered in his name. The farms were bought from white farmers who 
were leaving the country just before independence in 1980 and one of these farms has 
already been compulsorily acquired for redistribution (Interview notes, 2004). 
Farm 2 is involved in mixed farming. It mainly grows fruit and vegetables (paprika, green 
beans, peas, carrots, potatoes, tomatoes, onions, cabbages, maize), and cotton and sunflowers 
(extraction of oilseed for the manufacture of cooking oil) on a small scale. The farming 
operation has high capital costs in terms of irrigation equipment, electricity for pumping 
water from reservoirs to the fields as well as chemicals (fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides). 
Tomatoes, for example, are very susceptible to Red Spider Mite if chemicals are not sprayed 
on time. The farmer also cited frequent electricity cuts as a big problem where temperature 
control (cold room storage) is essential or at crucial times for irrigating crops. Farm 2 has 60 
full-time workers and hires about 100 casual workers during the peak seasons because 
horticulture is labour intensive. Permanent farm workers have small pieces of land 
designated for their own use every year (maize and a variety of leaf vegetables). The farmer 
said he has a good working relationship with his workers and communicates with them 
directly (not through the foreman) (Interview notes, 2004). 
The government gazetted a notice (in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20: 10) 
announcing that compensation for 822 landholdings listed countrywide had been determined 
in April 2005. Farm 2 was one of the 822 listed farms (Manica Post 8-14 April 2005 pll-
13). The farmer said the future of the farm (as a viable business operation) is hanging in the 
balance because there are about fifteen settler families that moved onto the farm almost a 
year ago. The farmer added that the financial future of the farm is almost certainly ruined 
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because he, like many other displaced farmers across the country, owes banks millions in 
loans, which he might not be able to service (Interview notes, 2004). Ironically, the farmer 
was grateful that "the settlers have not made any demands and so far the situation has been 
relatively peaceful, but there are no guarantees ... one cannot plan too far ahead." He made this 
comment bearing in mind that invaders in other parts of the country (particularly 
Mashonaland) were reported as being hostile, arrogant and spiteful, more so when invaded 
fanners retaliated or confronted them (Meredith, 2003 ; Buckle ,2002). 
Although the farmer does not reside on the farm permanently, he said he did not feel safe 
because farmers have been harassed on occasion and their homes have been vandalised and 
looted by people claiming to be war veterans (Interview notes, 2004). Despite the violence, 
fear, insecurity, tension and uncertainty (growing criminality) in most commercial farming 
areas around the country, the farmer has decided to continue farming for the meantime until 
the acquisition of the farm is finalised (or the government changes its mind and de-lists the 
fann as it has been known to do). Although many white farmers across the country opted to 
sell their properties at prices far below their market value in panic before they were invaded, 
this farmer believes that the only options available to him are to either stop farming or carry 
on ("ride the storm"); or to leave the farming community for the city. This farmer has chosen 
to continue farming in the meantime. The farmer says he has not undertaken major 
developments on the farm (expansion or diversification) since 2000 because he does not want 
to incur heavier losses if, or when, the rest of his land is eventually taken. The farmer is 
hopeful that he can keep at least a small part of the farm for his children and their children 
(Interview notes, 2004). 
Farm 3 
The farmer is 49-years old, married and has children. He is of Dutch descent but he was born 
in Zimbabwe and is a Zimbabwean citizen. The farmer is one of three brothers who own land 
(separately) in Burma Valley and farming is all they have known their entire life. The farmer 
took over the running of Farm 3 from his aging father (Interview notes, 2004). 
Farm 3 is involved in mixed farming, mainly poultry farming and fruits (bananas, oranges, 
plums, mangoes and pineapples). The venture has a high capital outlay in terms of reservoirs 
and boreholes to supplement normal rainfall in drought years so that fruits that would 
otherwise not be viable can be irrigated. The fruits also need to be sprayed with chemicals 
regularly and the poultry part of the operation is susceptible to outbreaks of New Castle 
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Disease. Apart from poultry and fruits, the fann has a small gum/eucalyptus plantation (for 
making treated poles) and a small general dealer store. Farm 3 employs forty permanent 
workers and about 100 seasonal ones all year round, depending on which fruits are ready for 
picking. The farmer speaks Shona' s Manyika dialect but communicates with workers mainly 
through the farm's black foreman (Interview notes, 2004). 
The fanner is upset about the fast-track land reform programme. Although he agreed that the 
reform was inevitable, he objected to the extent to which white farmers were demonised by 
political forces in the country. He said that the Vumba and Burma Valley area did not escape 
the harassment that has become so common in the country and this state of affairs has 
deterred him from making further investments on the fann. Fann 3 was invaded and 
vandalised and part of it was occupied in early 2004 by a mix of people including peasants, 
unemployed youths from the surrounding areas, self-proclaimed war veterans and some 
excited fann workers who joined the land occupation bandwagon. The fanner said the illegal 
occupiers pegged-out individual plots with short wooden truncheons that were hammered 
into the ground to mark the boundaries and have been stealing from him (fertiliser, seeds). 
The fanner has a house on Fann 3 and another one in Mutare but he does not feel safe in 
either of them anymore and has hired private guards to protect his homes in case the 
occupiers become aggressive (Interview notes, 2004). 
The fanner has considered selling the fann to the state to minimise his losses. He has also 
considered exploring other investment opportunities in the country but Zimbabwe's economy 
is very volatile and there is a possibility that white Zimbabweans will be muscled out of other 
sectors of the economy like they were in agriculture. The farmer said that instead of 
acquiring land in Mozambique and Zambia or emigrating to South Africa, Australia and New 
Zealand like some of Zimbabwe's displaced white farmers, he is considering starting a new 
life by opening businesses in Mozambique's main holiday destinations (Interview notes, 
2004). He is optimistic about his chances of success because he believes that there are a lot of 
opportunities in Mozambique, provided one has enough business savvy (Mozambique is 
rebuilding its economy after years of civil war). 
b) Farm Workers 
Twenty farm workers were chosen as respondents and all of them were black. Different 
categories with respect to fann workers were incorporated into the study (permanent and 
199 
seasonal, men and women, Zimbabwean and foreign, plus different educational levels) for 
the sake of comparison. Women were interviewed although they constituted a small 
percentage of the labour-force on the three farms. More than half the women were seasonal 
or casual workers or they were dependents living on the farms with relatives or spouses that 
work on the farms. Tables 15 and 16 below show the main characteristics of farm worker 
respondents in the study. 
Table 15: Demographic Characteristics of Farm Workers in the Study 
20 Respondents 
10 Permanent farm workers 10 Casual/seasonal workers 
15 Male 5 Female 
12 Zimbabwean 8 Foreign 
Table 16: The Age Distribution of Farm Workers in the Study 
<30 6 
31-40 10 
41-50 2 
51-60 1 
61-70 1 
Characteristics such as age, gender, nationality and educational levels can be aggregated to 
provide a composite picture or summary description of respondents using percentages and 
measures of central tendency (averages) to explain differences in attitudes and reactions 
among respondents (Babbie and Mouton, 2001 :85 & 90). 
Half the farm workers interviewed (10 or 50%) did not have formal education of any kind 
and casual workers made up the majority of these. This category is comprised mostly of 
immigrants and women. Seven of the farm workers interviewed (35%) have some primary 
school education (up to about grade 5) but many did not complete the seven years of primary 
schooling. Three of the farm workers interviewed (15%) have secondary school education 
between Forms 1 and 4 (Zimbabwe Junior Certificate and Cambridge Ordinary Level) and all 
of them are men. 
c) Government Officials 
Provincial government officials were asked how many farms there were in the Vumba and 
Burma Valley area and how many of these were designated for compulsory acquisition and 
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redistribution during the fast-track land reform programme. It was established that there were 
approximately 127 individual landholdings in the Vumba and Burma Valley area before the 
land reform exercise and that about half of these were designated or acquired for 
redistribution, mainly because they were either too big or the farmers owned more than one 
farm (Chapter 4). The three farms in the study were not derelict or under-utilised and they 
have infrastructure of a permanent or semi-permanent nature (boreholes, irrigation pipes, 
buildings). Provincial goverrunent officials in Mutare said that two of the three farms in the 
study (Farms I and 2) were in breech of the maximum sizes recommended for large-scale 
commercial farming in Natural Region I (250-450 hectares) by Statutory Instrument 419 of 
December 1999 and the excess land was needed to address problems of land shortage and 
population pressure in the province's communal areas (Interview notes, 2004). 
7.5.2 The Farmers' Sense of Social Responsibility 
When asked whether the farmers thought they had an obligation to their workers and 
community in areas like health, education/vocational skills development and income 
generating initiatives, all three farmers agreed that they had a moral obligation to the 
community. The farmers noted that Zimbabwe's white commercial farmers are often 
criticized for being indifferent and showing no compassion to their workers and other poor 
people. The same sentiment was expressed by Human Rights Watch (2002:12) in its 
observation that with time, the criteria for fast-track land acquisition came to include whether 
or not farm owners ill-treated their workers or whether they were in conflict with villagers in 
neighbouring communal areas. The three farmers in the study demonstrate their social 
responsibility by affording their workers and the community several non-cash benefits like 
firewood and small family gardening patches on designated sections on the farms. 
The farmers provide accommodation, pit latrines and safe water for drinking and other 
household use in farm compounds for farm workers and their families. Farmers in Vumba 
and Burma Valley (including the three farmers in the study) helped build and maintain two 
farm schools and a clinic. The farm schools are run jointly by several farmers and cater for 
their combined workforce. The schools might not be the best (or even meet the standard) but 
they provide the educational basics for the local community. The clinic provides basic 
healthcare for workers and their families, as well as others in the vicinity. The clinic educates 
the community about sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS and distributes condoms. It 
also offers supplementary feeding for children who are at risk of malnutrition. 
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Farmers in the area also operate several farm shops, for example, Glenburn farm store in 
Vumba which sells cooking oil, salt, candles, paraffin, bread, milk and other small household 
goods. The shops are for the convenience of workers who cannot afford to go to Mutare 
several times a month. As far as shopping is concerned, the three farmers in the study have 
arrangements where they provide transport to and from Mutare for their workers to do their 
month-end shopping. 
The three farmers in the study have either owned or managed their respective farms as family 
businesses for an average of thirty years. All three farmers said they have made significant 
infrastructural improvements on their land to raise the productive potential of their 
enterprises and the value of their properties. The farms studied have reasonably decent living 
quarters for their workers (compounds), planters, tractors, farm trucks, barns, boreholes and 
small darns for irrigation. Farm roads and fences are also well-maintained because the 
farmers thought they would always have their land (Interview notes, 2004). The feelings 
(deceived, betrayed, humiliated, isolated and helpless) of the three white farmers in the study 
are shared by many others like them who have been affected by fast-track land reform. 
Buckle (2002) was born and raised in Zimbabwe. Buckle (2002) and her husband were the 
proud owners of 1 000 acre Stow Farm in Marondera, 67km east of Harare. They had bought 
the farm with government approval (with a certificate of 'No Current Interest') and their farm 
was never designated for compulsory acquisition. Stow Farm was invaded in February 2000 
and the Buckles lost everything as invaders pegged-out plots for themselves on their farm 
and plundered every resource in sight (Buckle, 2002). The Buckles were angry because their 
belief in justice and truth did not count for anything anymore when white farmers were 
stripped of any legal rights during the land reform process (Buckle, 2002). 
The despair, depression, low morale and mental anguish (because of the general lack of 
security in farming communities and the fact that the police refused to intervene) eventually 
ate away the resilience that some farmers initially had when they refused to walk away from 
a lifetime of hard work, investment and many memories which they had scrimped and saved 
for (Meredith, 2003:184; Buckle, 2002). For the first time ever (or for the first time in many 
years) some farmers and their families had to find jobs in the formal sector after having been 
their own bosses and employed others for many years. The Buckles left Stow Farm towards 
the end of 2000 (Buckle, 2002) and in August 2005, the owner of Farm 1 decided to sell all 
his assets (farm equipment, cars and town house) and emigrate like many others had done 
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(Buckle, 2002:143). Zimbabwe's white commercial farmers can hardly be called cowards or 
quitters for leaving their farms or emigrating, given everything they have had to deal with. 
7.6.1 Data Analysis 
Sociology is concerned with establishing the fundamental organising principles of society. 
Data analysis (qualitative) involved interpretive reading of focus group data, individual 
interview transcripts and direct observations (Mason, 2002:66). Data analysis focused on 
socio-political and economic factors and how these have influenced people's responses to 
fast-track land reform in the study area. Data was grouped according to key areas of interest 
or relevant interpretive categories for content analysis (to give meaning according to themes) 
(Mason, 2002:179). Data analysis tried to identify the main elements in the data generated 
and how these are linked. Fielding and Fielding (1986:12 cited in Silverman, 2000:176) note 
that " ... the act of analysis is an interpretation, and therefore of necessity a selective 
rendering ... " One acknowledges that the researcher is not always a neutral data collector and 
one needs to reflect on their influence on the research process. A constant-comparative 
method of analysis (on-going inspection and comparison of different fragments of data) was 
used to "synthesise and integrate data" (Silverman, 2000: 179), thus reducing the effect of this 
inherent subjectivity. The three farmers in the study were given feedback on the findings. 
They were also given an opportunity to review the data with the researcher so that they could 
validate its accuracy by confirming whether or not the researcher's interpretations are 
accurate (Mason, 2002:193). 
7.6.2 Why Illegal Land Occupations Where Less Prevalent in the Study Area 
It has already been mentioned that the incidence and severity of illegal farm invasions was 
highest in Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central provinces as well as the northern 
sector of Mashonaland West (Karoi, Hwedza, Acturus, Bindura, Mvurwi, Mutepatepa, 
Marondera areas) (Meredith, 2003:184; Moyo, 2000a:90). The violence experienced in 
Mashonaland can be explained first in terms of the fact that the most intense conflicts over 
land in Zimbabwe have traditionally (dating back to the second Chimurenga war of 
liberation) been around Mashonaland East, West and Central provinces which cover 
Kadoma, Mazowe, Marondera, Chinhoyi and Mt Darwin (Chitiyo, 2003: 170). Moyo 
(2000a:90) suggests that illegal land occupations were more prevalent in these areas because 
very little land redistribution had OCCUlTed there before 2000. Mashonaland East, West and 
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Central provinces have some of the best soils in the country and as late as 2000; 70% of the 
land there was still owned by white commercial farmers (Moyo, 2000a:90). 
The Tangwena people had lived in the Nyanga area of Zimbabwe' s Eastern Highlands for 
hundreds of years and steadfastly refused to move when the Native Reserves where created 
in 1969. Their homes and crops were burnt down and their cattle were impounded by security 
forces. Chief Rekai Tangwena was charged under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act for 
making subversive statements against the colonial regime but the defiance of the Tangwena 
people caught the attention of the international community. Consequently, much of the land 
in the Nyanga area remained in black hands until independence when the state took over 
ownership of the timber plantations and national parks that form part of the Eastern 
Highlands. Chief Rekai Tangwena was a staunch supporter of Zimbabwe's liberation war 
and assisted guerrillas, including President Mugabe, across the border into Mozambique. 
Chief Tangwena also initiated contact with Frelimo officials on behalf of guerrillas who were 
fighting Zimbabwe's liberation war (Meredith, 2003:116-118). This link between 
Zimbabwe's eastern border districts and the liberation war might have influenced the 
government (and war veterans) to look favourably on the area during the fast-track land 
reform. 
It is also possible that Vumba and Burma Valley did not experience land invasions on the 
same scale or intensity as the rest of the country because Manicaland province generally has 
a mountainous terrain with rock out-crops (Nyanga, Chipinge, Chimanimani, Mutasa and 
parts of Mutare and Makoni districts). Farms in these districts are generally small, measuring 
approximately 150 hectares or less in some cases. The landholdings in Mutare district, in 
which Vumba and Burma Valley fall , are typically smaller than the national average. 
The relatively small size oflandholdings in Manicaland is also influenced by the superior soil 
quality and generally high rainfall that it receives, which make it suitable for intensive 
agricultural production, as opposed to extensive, ranch-style farming (Utete Report, 2003). 
Zinyama (2001: 166) also notes that farms in Manicaland province are generally smaller 
within the vicinity of large urban centres, of which Mutare is the provincial capital. The 
Utete Commission (2003 :42) reports that these features made land acquisition in the area 
difficult. As a result, there are still about 62 400 people on official waiting lists for land 
allocation in Manicaland (Manica Post Farming Reporter, 2005:18; Utete Report, 2003:42). 
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Another explanation why illegal land occupations were not as frequent or destructive in 
Vumba and Burma Valley compared to the three Mashonaland provinces is that 
Mashonaland, particularly Mashonaland East province, registered the highest "No" votes in 
the February 2000 constitutional referendum (Meredith, 2003:165; Buckle, 2002:105). The 
rejection of the revised constitution greatly humiliated and riled the ruling Zanu-PF party and 
its war veteran allies and Mashonaland East province was deliberately targeted for the worst 
politically motivated violence (chastisement), including the illegal land invasions (Buckle, 
2002). The government regarded Mashonaland as an oppositionJMDC stronghold (apart from 
the main urban centres) because of its concentration of white commercial farmers who 
supported the political opposition. In comparison, Manicaland province'S white farmers , 
including Vumba and Burma Valley, were politically less conspicuous. The illegal land 
occupations that did occur lasted for short periods (transitory) and the invaders did not leave 
the same trail of destruction as what happened in the three Mashonaland provinces 
(Meredith, 2003: 196-221; Buckle, 2002). The invaders merely made their presence felt by 
pegging-off small individual farming plots of land on occupied farms, planting crops, pulling 
down fencing, stealing fertiliser and threatening farmers who questioned them about their 
presence on the farms. 
One cannot ignore the politicised nature of the fast-track land reform programme. The ruling 
party narrowly won the 2000 parliamentary elections although it lost in major urban centres, 
including Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare. Zanu-PF also lost a significant number of votes in 
some rural parts of Manicaland Province (Chitiyo, 2003: 179; Raftopoulos, 2002:420-21; 
McGregor, 2002: 11; Krieger, 2000:448). The MDC won seven of the fourteen contested 
seats in Manicaland province in the June 2000 parliamentary election. The ruling Zanu-PF 
won six of the seats and the last one went to a smaller party, Zanu Ndonga (Herald 
Reporters, 13 April 2005:1-2). Although Manicaland's support of the MDC might explain the 
reported cases of illegal farm occupations in hot spots like Headlands and Chimanimani, the 
political allegiance of farm workers in Vumba and Burma Valley partly explains why the 
area was spared the trauma of large-scale land occupations. Chitiyo (2003 :20 1-202) notes 
that in 1999, 30% of Zimbabwe's farm workers were of Malawian, Zambian or Mozambican 
descent and Manicaland had one of the highest concentrations of foreign migrant workers. 
Vumba and Burma Valley's agricultural workforce is comprised of a significant number of 
Mozambican immigrants who fled the civil war in their country and others whose fathers 
came from Malawi and Zambia many years ago. This constituency is detached or 
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disconnected from Zimbabwe's nationalist cause, which the government claims the fast-track 
land reform programme symbolised. 
The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act of July 2001 compelled thousands of 
naturalised Zimbabweans to reapply for citizenship or lose it. Children born in Zimbabwe of 
foreign parents were also affected and had to renounce their parent's citizenship in order to 
qualify as Zimbabwean citizens. Kabemba (2005:23) notes that the most affected were 
migrants (or their children) from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (Kabemba, 2005:23; 
Chitiyo, 2003 :201-202; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; IRlN News, 2003a; 2003b). The 
effect of amendments to the Citizenship Act were evident in the results for the March 2005 
parliamentary election in which the ruling Zanu-PF won in thirteen of the fifteen 
constituencies contested in Manicaland province (except Mutare Central and Mutare North 
constituencies) (Herald Reporters, 13 April 2005:1-2). The majority of Vumba and Burma 
Valley's farm workers have no real interest in Zimbabwe's politics (apathy) because they 
cannot vote in Zimbabwean elections without the requisite documents. Labour migrants' 
feelings of disaffection are compounded by the fact that they cannot own or be allocated land 
in Zimbabwe and this would negate any attempts that might have been made to mobilisation 
them to invade farms. The concentration of labour migrants in Vumba and Burma Valley 
means that the area was not identified as closely with white farmers and the MDC as was the 
case in Mashonaland where white farmers were literally hunted down and victimised 
(Meredith, 2003; Buckle, 2002). 
This investigation showed that several landholdings in the study area have been listed for 
compulsory acquisition under the land reform programme but several of them are still 
officially in the hands of their white owners and farming operations are still being carried 
out. In terms of Zimbabwe's constitution, the compulsory acquisition of land by the state has 
to be confirmed by the Administrative Court (Utete Report, 2003:88) and in some cases, this 
has not yet happened. According to the Administrative Court in Manicaland, a significant 
number of white commercial farmers are seeking to reverse the government's decision to 
compulsorily acquire their farms for resettlement. Mushonawari (2005:1) reports that 352 
such cases had been brought before the Administrative Court in Manicaland Province alone 
by January 2005 and this might have deterred some of the unscrupulous activities of war 
veterans and their allies. 
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The low incidence of destructive, illegal farm occupations can also be explained in terms of 
Mutare's high poverty rate which might have compelled farm workers (and others) to want to 
protect their sources of livelihood on commercial farms (purely for economic survival). 
According to Buckle (2002:233), Mutare's population has grown massively in the past two 
decades but the city has suffered tremendously because service provision has not grown at 
the same rate. Mutare attained a high poverty rate in the period covering the fast-track land 
reform because of the country's deepening economic crisis. The lack of employment 
opportunities means that farm labour for Vumba and Burma Valley farms, apart from foreign 
migrants, is drawn from Mutare's main urban slum (Sakubva high-density area which has a 
population of 23 600) and Zimunya communal lands which lies twenty kilometres south of 
Mutare (http://en. wiki pedia. org/wikiIM utare). 
7.6.3 Human Agency: Survival Strategies in the Study Area 
The fast-track land reform programme has entrenched pervasive insecurities regarding 
personal and economic survival. Hundreds of thousands of people (farm workers and white 
farmers, teachers) were violently displaced from the rural areas and forced to flee to the cities 
were they have no real economic prospects because of the escalating economic crisis 
discussed in Chapter 6 (Mlambo, 2003; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; Sachikonye, 
2002:18; Buckle, 2002). The study of Vumba and Burma Valley is an analysis of a 
microcosm of the general situation in most of Zimbabwe's devastated farming communities 
following fast-track land reform. This section discusses the plight of Zimbabwe's farm 
workers in the context of political repression and economic collapse. It outlines the survival 
strategies/alternative livelihoods that people are adopting in Vumba and Burma Valley to 
cope with this tragedy. 
Bhaskar (1989) contends that social phenomena are a "synthesis of multiple determinants" at 
a particular place and time; and these in tum influence how people react to different 
situations. Refslund-Sorensen and Vincent (2001:266) support this view and draw attention 
to the fact that the ability (capacity to adapt) of internally displaced people to cope with such 
trauma is often overlooked because displaced people are seen as victims. Vincent (2001:1-5) 
suggests that there is a need to analyse the support mechanisms adopted by displaced 
communities in order to satisfy their immediate and long-term needs because such analyses 
can inform policy makers, donors and developers about the constraints faced by displaced 
communities and the available resources that can be used to assist them. 
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This analysis is concerned with how people have been affected by fast-track land reform and 
how they are dealing with the trauma of the losses they incurred in the process. Barth's 
(l966) ' transactionalist' , 'actor-oriented' framework of analysis is used to assess this aspect 
because it advocates that fieldwork must focus on the goals and strategies of individuals as 
they seek to maximise their economic and political interests, bearing in mind the role of the 
state as the locus of conflict and domination. Zimbabwe's farm workers, for example, 
made/make up a considerable part of the country's population but they were excluded or 
neglected in the planning and execution of the fast-track land reform programme. They 
became victims of displacement and politically motivated violence instead of being 
beneficiaries of the land reform programme. Farm workers across Zimbabwe lost their jobs 
and sources of livelihood, homes and sense of community. 
Survival strategies refer to people's motivations, their creativity and the comprehensiveness 
of their responses towards improving their material well-being and social cohesion in the 
face of adversity (Vincent, 2001 :8). Subsistence strategies are aimed at improving people's 
access to basic goods and services (sanitation, shelter, food and water). Subsistence strategies 
also offer or increase opportunities for employment and other economic activities (Refslund-
Sorensen and Vincent, 2001 :266; Vincent, 2001: 11-12). 
There have been varied responses to the fast-track land reform programme because as 
Raftopoulos (1996: 13) notes, "a common experience of racism or inequality does not 
necessarily produce a homogenous national unity." Christodoulou (1990:74-75) comments 
that casually employed agricultural workers are detached and mobile because of the 
precarious nature of their employment. This group is unlikely to act in a concerted way 
because they lack the necessary group cohesion. In contrast, regularly employed agricultural 
workers (skilled, semi-skilled) are more attached to their job and employer and are normally 
content with secure, regular employment, fair remuneration and acceptable working 
conditions. However, despite this lack of homogeneity amongst farm workers, the potential 
for concerted action always exists. 
Veltmeyer (2003 cited in Moyo, 2003:9) supports Christodoulou's (1990:74-75) view and 
comments that marginalised groups in the rural areas are often assumed to be passive and 
disempowered when in fact they are not. Instead of regarding peasants as powerless, defeated 
people, Petras (l997a, 1997b cited in Moyo, 2003:9) regards peasants as "an active and 
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empowered force" that is capable of defending its own interests. Veltmeyer (2003 cited in 
Mayo, 2003:41) supports this view when he explains Zimbabwe's land invasions as "a tactic 
of class struggle and direct collective action." The invasions can be seen as a strategy by 
peasants and other marginalised groups to gain access to land. Alavi (1973 cited in 
Christodoulou, 1990:86) also notes that "militancy or non-militancy are not absolute 
conditions, but, rather, they are contingent on changing conjunctures of social circumstances 
and movements." All these arguments highlight the role of human agency in coping with 
catastrophes such as those induced by Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform. 
The arguments submitted above highlight the fact that the on-going struggle for survival in 
the aftermath of fast-track land reform cannot be discounted in terms of the seeming passivity 
of constituencies such as farm workers (Kibble, 2004:370). This study shows that response 
strategies differ according to respondents' gender, age and nationality (the status of 
immigrants discussed above). The farm workers interviewed had considerable insights about 
their situation and were pessimistic about what the govermnent, or land reform, can do for 
them. Farm workers (Zimbabwean nationals) understood land reform to be a process 
whereby the poor and landless would be given land to improve their lives through 
agriculture. However, they feel that the fast-track land reform programme negatively 
impacted their lives instead of improving them. The farm workers said they know of people 
who lost their jobs on acquired farms and are now destitute (seeking shelter in disused 
tobacco barns and other places that are unfit for human habitation) or engaging in criminal 
activities to survive because very few ofthese people were allocated land by the govermnent. 
The Utete Report (2003 :43) notes that about 1 080 former farm workers out of an estimated 
90 000 in Manicaland have been allocated land under model A 1 resettlement. The remainder 
are either still employed on the farm sub-divisions retained by white cormnercial farmers or 
they have taken up employment with newly resettled model A2 farmers. 
Farm workers said they feel abandoned by the govermnent and resent the growing class 
differentiation within the black population. They highlighted the fact that the govermnent's 
policies and actions are erratic, unpredictable and disappointing because black elites are more 
concerned about their own enrichment when the poor continue to live in abject poverty. The 
govermnent's rhetoric over inadequate housing and unemployment, for example, has lost its 
previous allure and the disillusionment was evident in the voting patterns of some rural areas 
that have traditionally been the ruling party's strongholds. There seems to be a growing 
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realisation that radical measures such as the fast-track land reform programme are not 
enough to solve people's poverty and unemployment woes and some farm workers' loyalty 
(Zimbabwean nationals) is torn between their employers (white farmers) and being patriotic 
and supporting a government that has let them down many times before (Interview notes, 
2004). 
Respondents' testimonies show a shifting balance of power between farmers and their 
workers following fast-track land reform. The relationship between the two parties was 
previously regarded as one-sided and dominated by white farmers. Paternalistic relations 
existed on most white commercial farms because farm workers were isolated from other 
people and other identities outside the farming communities (many born and bred on the 
farms). Farm workers in Vumba and Burma Valley have adopted small and subtle ways 
through which they are able to alter the balance of power between themselves and the 
remaining, disempowered (because of the land reform) white farmers. Farm workers are 
more willing to express their anger or discontent than before (for example, deliberately 
working slowly and not meeting targets, damaging machinery or insulting the farmer without 
fear of reprisal); not because they are a strong or significant constituency on their own, but 
because of the weakened position of white farmers (Interview notes, 2004). This behaviour 
shows that the farm workers have capitalised (somewhat) on the chaos ensuing from the fast-
track land reform exercise. 
Farm workers admitted that there have been several farm occupations in the area but added 
that many of the occupations were short-lived because the invaders were not from the area. 
Farm workers (Zimbabweans and foreigners) also said they were afraid of being attacked or 
victimised by war veterans. For migrant farm workers; being foreigners means being 
subjected to xenophobic attitudes and behaviours (Interview notes, 2004). Labour migrants 
are discriminated against or treated with contempt because they do not enjoy the same rights 
as citizens (Chitiyo, 2003 :20 1-202; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; IRlN News, 2003a; 
2003b). Although farm workers on the studied farms are in limbo because the government 
has not allocated them any land, they are not keen to move onto new land or forcibly take-
over control of the farms they work on, especially now since the government (armed police) 
is forcibly evicting illegal land occupiers by torching their houses and belongings (Mungoshi, 
2004:6). Most peasants and former farm workers who illegally occupied farms do not have 
secure land tenure because they do not have title deeds to the land they currently occupy. It is 
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not just illegal land occupiers who have insecure land tenure. Some new farmers who were 
allocated land under the reform programme are being evicted from resettlement land even 
though they were given permission to farm without official ownership documents/title deeds. 
The farm workers believe that some newly resettled people are being displaced to make way 
for government officials and military personnel who will probably be absentee landlords and 
this state of affairs makes people's future very uncertain (Interview notes, 2004). 
Based on a cost-benefit analysis, most of the form workers interviewed did not want to rock 
the boat or change the status quo because they believe that both the farmers and farm 
workers can benefit from continuing with life as before (preference for stability). Farm 
workers believe that the only realistic option they have is to make do with what is available 
because there is a form of mutual interdependency between the remaining white farmers and 
farm workers. In practice this means co-existing with white farmers for as long as possible 
(better the devil you know). Some of the workers who have been on the farms for a 
generation or more feel a strong sense of loyalty or close relationship with the farmers 
(Interview notes, 2004). The farm workers are reluctant to risk losing what they have by 
being aggressive if there was not much else to be gained in return. This response has been 
informed by concerns over job security (regular incomes) and subsidised benefits (seemingly 
small things) that have helped foster a sense of community in the area. 
Farm workers appreciate what the farmers have done for them; which they say is infinitely 
more compared to the government's rhetoric and neglect of farm workers. White farmers 
sunk boreholes and built small dams for water. They provide their workers and communities 
with subsidised schools and clinics, free housing in farm compounds and allow them access 
to thatch/grass, wood fuel, grazing land/pastures for small livestock (Interview notes, 2004). 
Pearson (2000:394) notes that women tend to supplement public services with their own 
labour because they carry the burden of shielding their families from potential diseases when 
there are inadequacies or a lack of access to basic water, sanitation or health services. The 
assistance rendered by farmers in these areas is appreciated more because the government 
has been unable to provide these lately. In essence, the old paternalistic relations prevail 
between farm workers and white farmers on the farms studied. Nothing much has changed on 
the farms, except for the down-scaling of operations since the government has expressed its 
intentions to compulsorily acquire the farms. 
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With the country's high unemployment rate, rural-urban migration is no longer a viable 
option out of poverty. Although there was an initial surge in rural-urban migration by people 
displaced from white commercial farms in search of better economic prospects, high 
unemployment and inflation rates forced many to return to the farming areas. Chitiyo 
(2003:206-207) and IRIN News (2003a; 2003b) report that some former farm workers who 
moved to the cities have ended up in temporary squatter settlements and are earning meagre 
incomes in the informal sector or from criminal activities. 
All the farm workers of foreign descent in the study do not have Zimbabwean citizenship and 
realise that they have nothing to gain from land reform. They said they prefer regular 
employment and remuneration on the farms because the farms are the only homes they have 
known, some for more than twenty years. The insecure rights of migrants mean that they 
struggle to get essential documents such as national identity cards, birth, death and marriage 
certificates (Refslund-Sorensen and Vincent, 2001 :278). In turn, this difficulty means that 
female farm workers of Mozambican or Malawian origin (as primary care-givers) also 
struggle to access basic social services, especially since they do not qualify for welfare grants 
(Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2003; IRIN News, 2003b). 
The younger farm workers in the study did not wish to settle elsewhere because they were 
born on the farms and grew up there. They do not have roots in the communal areas or their 
countries of origin (Interview notes, 2004). The immediate survival strategies that have been 
adopted by individuals and families to generate income in Vumba and Burma Valley include: 
• Having just one meal a day and eating wild fruits and roots (some poisonous) 
• Petty crime/theft 
• Cattle rustling 
• Prostitution 
• Begging (street kids) 
• Beer brewing and selling 
• Bulk buying of foodstuffs like sugar to sell in Mozambique (illegal cross-border 
trading). 
• Increase m child labour (children of school gomg age are doing piece-work to 
supplement family income. 
• Illegal gold panning along flvers (Penhalonga in Mutasa district, Chimanimani) 
which creates physical hazards to both people and animals. 
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A significant number of displaced women and girls are engaging in high risk activities like 
prostitution in a country where a reported 5 000 people are dying from AIDS every week 
(Zimbabwe had an AIDS prevalence rate of 33.7% among adults in 2002) (United Nations 
estimates cited in Bookstein and Lawson, 2002:636; Sachikonye, 2002:15; Buckle, 2002). 
Most of the women interviewed expressed concern about their health and dignity but 
invariably concluded that they are doing what they have to do, using what is available, in 
order to survive with limited resources in a radically altered physical and social environment. 
Some of the long-term survival strategies adopted in the study area include: 
• Forming small farming cooperatives engaged in market-gardening or horticulture 
(citrus fruits, paprika), poultry farming, egg production, piggery projects and rabbit 
keeping. 
• Crafts such as sewing/dressmaking, pottery, carpentry, wood and stone 
carving/curios, reed or tree bark weaving to make carpets, baskets, mats, hats and 
bags for tourists who frequent the area (Eagle Training Centre in Vumba). 
The organisation, Zimbabwe Women in Agriculture is urging new women farmers to be 
trained in buying, selling and costing of agricultural produce. The organisation offers training 
in these areas at provincial, district and ward level to encourage the involvement of people at 
grassroots levels. Women farmers are being encouraged to engage in horticulture by growing 
a range of fresh vegetable produce including butternuts, tomatoes, baby-com and cabbages. 
They are also encouraged to grow citrus and deciduous fruits as well as export flowers. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Admittedly, a sample of twenty farm workers and three farmers is small but it is adequate for 
a case study that seeks to describe and link events in order to give an explanatory hypothesis 
about the social reality of survival in the area studied; within the broader context of the sea of 
despair that has engulfed the majority of Zimbabweans since 2000. The conclusions drawn 
from the study apply strictly to the farms in the study and no claims are made to portray the 
situation as being the same on other farms in Vumba and Burma Valley, Manicaland 
province or the country as a whole. 
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The study revealed that some farms in the area have been invaded but that these incidences 
were not as violent and widespread as those witnessed in the three Mashonaland provinces 
(Meredith, 2003 ; Buckle, 2002; Moyo, 2000a). In most cases, the invaders (suspected Zanu-
PF party militias from outside the area) who came onto farms in Vumba and Burma Valley 
left after a short while, probably because they got bored once the excitement wore off. 
Buckle (2002) reports that most illegal land occupiers across the country did not have the 
means to work the land they occupied or 'liberated.' In a few of the cases, the invaders have 
stayed and apportioned parts of the affected farms for themselves and have been planting 
crops. In such instances, the affected farmers and the illegal occupiers are sharing existing 
infrastructure, although the occupiers do not pay rent in cash or produce (Interview notes, 
2004). It has also been noted that the remaining white farmers in Manicaland province are 
co-existing peacefully with newly resettled farmers. The Utete Report (2003:43 & 44) 
observes that this cooperation is mainly through out-growers programmes in tea and coffee 
production in Chipinge and through tillage and seed production for tobacco in Mutare and 
Makoni districts. 
White farmers are distressed by the tum of events in Zimbabwe and fear for their lives on a 
daily basis. They feel anxious because they feel like they are being watched constantly and 
have to keep looking over their shoulders. Farmers in the study insisted that they should be 
judged based on their contribution to the economy as well as the welfare of their workers and 
other underprivileged people in their community. The farmers believe that their contribution 
explains, in part, why they are still on their farms with little or no animosity between 
themselves, their workers, the community and the few illegal occupiers who have set-up 
house on farms in the area (Interview notes, 2004). 
The study uncovered an interesting range of localised socio-political and economic responses 
(new patterns of social organisation) as those directly affected by fast-track land reform, 
particularly farm workers, attempt to address everyday issues of social reproduction/survival 
given the many constraints that they face. The majority of ordinary poor people in Zimbabwe 
are faced with real and immediate economic or fmancial challenges which need to be 
addressed through creative strategies in order to improve individual and family incomes, 
livelihoods and quality of life. 
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8 
Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
The failure to resolve Zimbabwe's land question in the first decade of independence is not a 
unique experience. According to Sidiropoulos (2004:114), the fact that "whites owned a 
disproportionate share ofland in Zimbabwe had substantial resonance in the region." Former 
settler colonies identify with most of Zimbabwe's experiences up until the fast-track land 
reform, for example, the resolution of the land question in South Africa, Swaziland and 
Namibia has been constrained by factors similar to those faced by the Zimbabwean 
government (willing-buyer-willing-seller clauses and other conditions that come with 
negotiated transitions to independence or democracy) (Lineback, 2001). Sidiropoulos (2004) 
and Bush and Szeftel (2002:11) contend that it is for this reason that African leaders were 
reluctant to support the international community in imposing sanctions on the Zimbabwean 
government over the controversial fast-track land reform programme. However, the 
perceived indifference, vacillation and contradictory pronouncements of SADC/regional 
Heads of States over the Zimbabwean government's systematic use of repression and 
disregard for the rule of law and human rights (attacks on political opposition, the white 
community, the judiciary and the press) during the fast-track land reform programme became 
a cause for concern for the rest of the free world (Kibble, 2004:365-369; Hall, 2003:275; 
Sachikonye, 2002:18-19; Bush and Szeftel, 2002:7 & 9; Lahiff and Cousins, 2001:654-655; 
Krieger, 2000:448). This concern was raised because as Bush and Szeftel (2002:12) note, 
protecting and respecting the sovereignty of nation states when that sovereignty does not 
have a democratic base and a popular mandate is no more than supporting a dictatorship and 
such a situation can have serious and dire implications. This chapter concludes the current 
study with a discussion of the similarities and differences between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe' s experience of colonial land dispossession and their subsequent land reforms. 
The comparison is meant to highlight the possible implications of the latter' s recent land 
reform experience and what it could mean for on-going or future land reform efforts in 
Southern Africa. 
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8.2 Comparison between South Africa and Zimbabwe: Possible Implications 
About 87% of South Africa's land was expropriated from the indigenous black people by 
colonial settlers through the Glen Grey Act of 1899, Native's Land Act of 1913 and the 
Native's Trust and Land Act of 1936. Deininger (2003:150) notes too that blacks were also 
removed from designated white areas from 1913 onwards through what were known as 
'black spot removals.' Black South Africans were prohibited from acquiring land outside the 
Native Reserves until the passing of the Abolition of Racially Based Measures Act of 1991 
(Hendricks, 2001 :290; 1995a:49). Despite this, however, the conciliatory nature of 
negotiations that led to South Africa's democracy restricts what the post-apartheid state can 
do in terms of land reform (Hendricks, 2001 :294-297), similar to Zimbabwe's Lancaster 
House Agreement. South Africa's Kempton Park negotiations involved compromises, 
including the adoption of policies of reconciliation and nation-building, which subsequently 
led to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The new democratic 
governments in both South Africa and Zimbabwe tried to reconcile the aspirations of landless 
indigenous people and the property rights of white landowners and this conditioned the slow 
rate and modest achievements of land reform in both countries (Hall, 2003:255; Muthoni-
Wanyeki,2003:2). 
The governments of Zimbabwe and South Africa, post-colonial and post-apartheid 
respectively, inherited stark inequalities in their resource distribution such that the black 
majority in both countries expected the redistribution of wealth and resources, including land, 
as a condition for the political legitimacy of the new democratic governments (Jenkins and 
Knight, 2002:287). Both countries had dualistic agrarian structures in which whites owned 
most of the high value agricultural land and were engaged in commercial export production 
and blacks lived in overcrowded Reserves or Homelands on infertile soils (Hall, 2003; 
Hendricks, 2001 :291; Palmer, 2000: 18; Hendricks 1995b:44). The land question is an 
emotive issue in both countries because as Jenkins and Knight (2002:293) and Hendricks 
(2001 :300) note, the greatest poverty and underdevelopment is experienced in the rural areas 
of both Zimbabwe and South Africa. Jenkins and Knight (2002) note, however, that 
agriculture is relatively less important in South Africa because it contributes less to the 
country's GOP than is the case in Zimbabwe. Agriculture is also a less significant employer 
and contributor to South Africa's foreign currency earnings than in Zimbabwe and these 
differences mean that the pressure for land reform is weaker in South Africa than it was in 
Zimbabwe (Jenkins and Knight, 2002). 
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South African 's 1993 Reconstruction and Development Programme contains provisions for 
land restitution for individuals and communities that were forcibly removed from their land. 
It also aims to redistribute land in order to broaden access to the landless, land tenants, farm 
workers and new farmers who need it but cannot afford it, as well as to protect land tenure 
rights through tenure reform (Hall, 2003:262-264; Hendricks, 2001:295; 1995a:51). South 
Africa's post-apartheid constitution upholds existing property relations by protecting rights to 
private property, thereby inadvertently entrenching existing material inequality in respect of 
land distribution and ownership (Hendricks, 2001 :299). The contradiction between protecting 
existing white property rights and turning the social and economic rights of the previously 
disenfranchised black majority into a reality has, thus, helped to maintain South Africa's 
unequal land distribution. So far, the South African government has implemented its land 
reform programme by buying privately owned land on a willing-seller willing buyer basis (at 
market related prices) and by transferring state-land to benefit landless individuals and 
communities. Hendricks (2001 :298) notes, however, that the impact of this approach has 
been limited because of the government's administrative and resource (human and material) 
constraints. 
Zimbabwe's experience of land reform under the provisions of the Lancaster House 
Agreement showed that the willing-seller-willing-buyer principle retards the rate of land 
reform, especially since current landowners determine when, where and at what price they 
will sell their land. As was the case in Zimbabwe, Nkosi (1992 cited in Hendricks, 2001 :291 
and 1995a:49) notes too that after the abolition of apartheid, the white minority in South 
Africa is not inclined to give up control of the land they hold. Compensation for expropriated 
land is also prohibitive and the land reform process is slow because of protracted 
administrative and judicial procedures through the Land Commission and the Land Claims 
Court (Hendricks, 2001 :296; 1995a:52). The result is that whites (approximately 60 000 
farmers) retain monopoly over South African agriculture and the m~ority of blacks remain 
excluded and dispossessed (Hendricks, 2001:293 & 296; Hendricks; 1995a:41; 1995b:39). 
Hall (2003:274) also draws parallels between land reform in Zimbabwe in the 1990s (ESAP 
period) and South Africa's land reform in which issues about productivity and efficiency, 
good farming and good land management skills are pre-eminent in land reform debates. Hall 
(2003) contests this preference to allocate land to experienced small, medium and large-scale 
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previously disadvantaged commercial fanners who have their own capital at the expense of 
the poor majority. Hall (2003) contests this on the basis that it does not meet the criteria of, 
among others, social justice, equality and fairness that should ideally inform the land reform 
exercise given the country' s history. 
The similarities between Zimbabwe and South Africa regarding colonial land expropriation 
and subsequent attempts to implement land reforms have caused alann and panic in the wake 
of Zimbabwe' s fast-track land reform programme. The social, economic and political 
carnage wrought by the fast-track land reform programme has led analysts to ponder whether 
South Africa (the government and landless peasants) will eventually take their cue from 
Zimbabwe' s radical reform exercise in a bid to implement comprehensive land reform; and 
with what consequences (Lahiff and Cousins, 2001; Lineback, 2001; Palmer, 2000). Despite 
differences in the pre-eminence of land as a primary resource, South Africa and Zimbabwe's 
economies are closely integrated and Zimbabwe's experience of land reform can be 
instructive for South Africa' s (and Namibia) on-going land reform. Fears abound that the 
violence which characterised Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform programme will spill over 
into other countries in the region that have pending land reforms. These fears are justified 
insofar as these countries have their own land crises and would like to avoid the lawless, 
chaotic and destructive Zimbabwe-style land grabs (Lahiff and Cousins, 2001; Palmer, 
2000). According to Chitiyo (2003:185), South Africa suffered a wave of farm invasions in 
Kwazulu-Natal and farm murders in Gauteng Province in 2000. Hall (2003:260) also 
mentions land grabs that occurred in 200 I in Bredell, Kempton Park near the Johannesburg 
International Airport and in Khayelitsha outside Cape Town. In this regard, it is important to 
note that despite its history in social activism, the South African government recognises the 
importance of property ownership, protecting property rights and respecting the rule of law. 
Consequently, the police reacted swiftly to remove the squatters in the incidences mentioned 
above (Hall, 2003 :260). 
South Africa's Constitutional Court has had to clarify key issues regarding the rights of the 
different parties (land owners, squatters, the police/government) involved in the event of land 
rights violations. Below are two of the cases that provide precedents for future land disputes. 
In the cases: Modder East Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd, (SCA 187103) and President of the Republic of South Africa, the Minister of Safety 
and Security, the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, the National Commissioner of 
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Police v Modderklip Boerdery (Ply) Ltd, (SeA 213103), the government disputed it obligation 
to landowner in question resulting in a protracted legal process to settle the matter. 
Cilliers (2005:16-17) reports that 74-year old farmer, Braarn Duvenhage, bought 2 300 
hectare Modderklip Boerdery farm near Johannesburg in 1965 and had worked it for forty 
years. The farm was first invaded on 20 May 2000 because of overcrowding and a shortage 
ofland and shelter in the nearby Daveyton and Chris Hani informal settlements adjacent to it. 
A criminal charge of trespass was made to the police so that they could remove the squatters 
and the Johannesburg High Court granted an eviction order on 12 April 2001 against IS 000 
illegal occupiers. The squatters were ordered to vacate the land within two months of the 
issuing of the order but failed to do so. The Ekhuruleni Council did nothing about the 
squatters and the police failed to assist the landowner in his attempts to get the state to assist 
in executing the High Court' s eviction order (Christmas, 2004). 
The squatters built shacks on about 50 hectares of the farm, stole crops and planted their own 
vegetables without consulting the farmer. They also hunted birds and rabbits, stole a tractor, 
a bakkie, diesel fuel and looted the farmer's bams (CiUiers, 2005:16-17). More squatters 
moved onto the farm every year but the government failed to intervene. The value of 
Duvenhage's property dropped drastically because of the invasion and he continued to incur 
heavy losses. The squatters plundered his crops such that where he used to harvest 8 tonnes 
of maize per hectare; he could barely harvest a tonne per hectare (Cilliers, 2005: 16-17). Up 
to 70 000 people eventually moved onto Modderklip farm and built shacks in a squatter 
settlement that carne to be known as Gabon (Modder East squatters). This state of affairs 
forced the farmer to erect electric fences around the farm house and to hire guards to patrol 
the fields in a bid to prevent theft on the farm (Cilliers, 2005: 16-17). 
Police inaction in the Modderklip case compelled Duvenhage, together with Agri-SA (for the 
benefit of South Africa's land owners in general), to seek further legal recourse. The original 
eviction order was confirmed and the Ekhuruleni Council was ordered to do something about 
the squatters. However, the government took the case to the Supreme Court of Appeal to 
appeal the order, and lost. The government took the case to the Constitutional Court and lost 
again in what many South African property owners see as a positive development (Cilliers, 
2005:16-17; Christmas, 2004). The Constitutional Court "unequivocally stated in a far-
reaching judgement" that illegal land invasions would not be tolerated in South Africa 
(Cilliers, 2005:16-17). Judge Pius Langa ruled that it is the government's duty to protect 
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property rights and to provide housing for the homeless. Judge Langa stated that the 
government (Ministers and the police who ignored eviction orders issued to remove the 
squatters from Modderklip) were negligent (constitutional breach) in their failure to assist 
Duvenhage. The Constitutional Court also ruled that it was "lUlfeasonable to expect 
individuals to shoulder the government's responsibility of housing the homeless" (Lourie 
Bosman, President Agri-SA cited in Cilliers, 2005: 16-17). The judgment emphasises that 
landowners should not be unduly prejudiced by the failure of the state to fulfil its obligations 
to cater for the socio-economic rights of vulnerable (but unlawful) occupiers. The Court 
stated that the government has a responsibility to remove squatters from land that is occupied 
illegally and to provide squatters with alternative accornmodation (Christmas, 2004). The 
state (Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs) was ordered to remove the squatters from 
Modderklip farm and to compensate Duvenhage for the losses that he incurred over the five 
years that Modderklip was illegally occupied. Alternatively, the Court suggested that the 
government could buy Modderklip farm at a market related price. The state was also ordered 
to pay Duvenhage's legal costs (approximately R70 000) together with its own legal costs 
(CiUiers,2005:16-17). 
The housing obligations of the state to vulnerable occupiers were first laid down in the 
landmark case; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom and Others (1) SA 
46 (CC). The Modderklip case demonstrates how these obligations impact on the possible 
eviction of vulnerable occupiers from private land (Christmas, 2004). The Modderklip 
judgment clearly states the rights and duties of the government and individuals involved in 
land disputes. In essence, the judgment gives landowners greater certainty over their rights in 
the event of land invasions. According to Christmas (2004), the Modderklip judgments are 
considered to be progressive in dealing with the thorny issue of the protection of property 
rights versus the socio-economic rights of occupiers because South African landowners can 
depend on the government to protect their property (land) rights in future (Cilliers, 2005: 16-
17). 
8.3 Conclusion 
Chapter I dealt with land reform theory and the agrarian question in general. It also provided 
an introduction to the Zimbabwean land reform process and the specifics of the chosen study 
area. Chapter 2 began with an exploration of the land question in Southern Africa and 
discussed the two phases of the Zimbabwean land reform process before the introduction of 
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fast-track land reform in 1998. Chapter 3 analysed the multi-faceted historical (political, 
economic and administrative) problems encountered in Zimbabwe's land reform process 
since they undermined a major developmental aim, that is, for land reform to positively 
impact the lives of the poor. The problems encountered in the land reform process between 
1980 and 1998 and the unfolding social dynamics (continuing class divisions between blacks 
and whites, as well as growing class divisions amongst blacks themselves because of 
corruption) provided the context for the controversial fast-track land reform progranune. 
Chapter 4 dealt with the policy blueprint for the fast-track land reform programme 
(theoretical underpinnings, institutional framework, donor positions), as well as the political 
imperatives and social justification for the Zimbabwean government's 'no compromise' 
stance on the issue. Chapter 5 traced how fast-track land reform unfolded in practice and how 
this eroded the citizenship status and property rights of white Zimbabweans (and the 
independence of the judiciary), especially after the illegal farm invasions began. 
Chapter 6 contextualised and discussed the consequences of the fast-track land reform 
progranune. A deliberate attempt was made to look beyond just the amount of land 
transferred, but to focus on the immediate and long-term developmental impact of this land 
reform process. The conclusion is that fast-track land reform adversely affected different 
groups of people and different sectors of the economy. Ironically, fast-track land reform 
devastated Zimbabwe's most economically vulnerable people (including the 300 000 
internally displaced farm workers); who where supposed to be the main beneficiaries of the 
programme. Further, lack of adequate government support has led to declining agricultural 
production since many of those that benefited from land redistribution are unable to utilise 
the land. The last part of Chapter 6 dealt with the international community's response to how 
Zimbabwe' s fast-track land reform progranune unfolded and exposed hundreds of thousands 
of people to the extremes of poverty. 
Chapter 7 discussed the methodology employed in the case study of three farms in Vumba 
and Burma Valley. The case studies illustrate the consequences of fast-track land reform 
which are raised in Chapter 6 and goes further to explore the localised responses (survival 
strategies) that have been adopted by people in the study area. 
The main point made by the study is that short-sighted, hasty and radical reforms can 
compromise the economic and democratic (political, legal and social) systems of a country. 
Instead, land reform needs to be well-timed, planned and budgeted for in order for it to 
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benefit the majority of landless people in a sustainable manner. Jenkins and Knight 
(2002:287-290) and Hendricks (2001:292; 1995a:51) impress the need for governments to 
have both administrative (political will and skilled personnel) and financial capacity to 
implement land reform and to support it in terms of infrastructure provision. Zimbabwe's 
recent experience shows that whilst radical land reforms do succeed in transferring land from 
one group to another, they have the potential to be counter-productive in terms of broader 
development objectives, for instance, to transform agricultural sectors whilst enhancing 
people's welfare through improved standards of living and consumption patterns. The 
significance of the South African land rights cases mentioned above is that they highlight the 
need to balance the needs of different groups and to uphold the rule of law by operating 
within the confines of the law. 
It is hoped that the theories, narratives, analyses and reflections that make up this study make 
a contribution to the field of rural development, particularly the social impact of land 
reforms. 
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Annexes/Appendices 
1. Interview Schedules 
a) Government Officials 
I. How many farms are in the Vumba and Bunna Valley area and how many of these 
were designated for redistribution? 
2. What were the criteria for land designation and how many designated farms were in 
fact redistributed during the fast-track land reform programme? 
3. Do you think that the Vumba and Bunna Valley area's experience of fast-track land 
refonn is an exception to the general trend countrywide? 
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b) Farmers 
I. What is your nationality? 
2. How old are you? 
3. Geographically, where do you originate from and how long have you been engaged in 
farming in Zimbabwe (I ",2nd or 3rd generation Zimbabwean)? 
4. Who owns the farm and how was it acquired (inherited or bought from another farmer 
or the government)? 
5. What type of agricultural production are you involved in (dairy, horticulture or 
other)? 
6. What are your feelings and attitudes about the fast-track land reform programme? Do 
you accept or recognise the legitimate need for land reform in the interest of social 
justice? 
7. Has your farm been occupied or looted by peasants, war veterans, the urban poor or 
farm workers? Have you or your family been attacked physically or harassed? If not, 
how long do you think this reprieve will last? Do you think the situation is sustainable 
or is the compromise superficial? 
8. Given the violence that characterised most land occupations across the country, do 
you feel safe or secure in your own home? 
9. What are your plans for the future? Are you considered retiring, emigrating overseas, 
taking up farming in a neighbouring country, selling your farm and taking up another 
business here? 
10. How would you describe relations between you and your farm workers? Is there a 
sense of community on the farm that both you and your workers want to preserve? 
11. Do you think that you have a social obligation to your workers or community? Are 
you active in improving the plight of your workers and that of other underprivileged 
people in the community? What assistance have you given your workers in areas like 
health, education/vocational skills development and income generating initiatives? 
12. What entitlements or benefits do your farm workers enjoylhave? 
13. How do your farm workers negotiate their demands? Do you think the farm workers 
are organised or unified as a group (not necessarily as a Union)? 
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c) Farm Workers 
1. What is your nationality? 
2. How old are you? 
3. What level of formal education do you have? 
4. How do you feel (attitudes/views) about the recent fast-track land reform programme? 
5. Do you believe that radical land reform or land ownership alone can alleviate rural 
poverty? 
6. What are your plans for the future following this reform? 
7. Would you like to own a big farm (individually or as a collective)? 
8. Do you think you have the necessary skills (knowledge of farm management, 
production economics or marketing) to continue farming at the same level/standard as 
the commercial farmers? 
9. Would regular employment, fair remuneration and acceptable working conditions 
suffice as an alternative to owning land? 
10. How do you negotiate your demands to the farmer? Are workers organised, not 
necessarily in a Union? 
II. What is the nature of relations between the farmer and farm workers? Are relations 
good or bad and what entitlements or benefits do farm workers enjoylhave? 
12. Is there a sense of community that both farmers and farm workers want to preserve? 
13. Do you think farmers have a social obligation to farm workers? Are farmers 
facilitating the social advancement of farm workers and other underprivileged people 
in the community? 
14. What assistance have farmers given in areas like health, education/vocational skills 
development and income generating initiatives? 
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2. Properties in Vumba and Burma Valley (including Fern Valley and Fern Hill). 
There were approximately 130 landholdings in Manicaland' s Vumba and Burma Valley area 
and about half of these were designated for compulsory acquisition during Zimbabwe's land 
reform Phase 3. These properties are listed below: 
I. Amsterdam Farm P/L- C. C. Hildebrand 
2. Arusha Estate (Vumba)- A. W. F. Vermeulen 
3. Away Farm P/L (Vumba) 
4. Batanai Farm 
5. Batterby Spruit Farm- D. Matongo 
6. Bauline Farm (Rowa East) 
7. Beastkraal of Clare Estate Ranch- Varmland Investments P/L 
8. Begin Farm- H & A Vorster 
9. Beulieu Farm 
10. Bomponi/Bomhoni (Vumba)- M. B. Brown 
II. Border Streams Farm (Vumba) 
12. Braintree Portion, Lawrenceville (Vumba)-R. F. Hadden-Tebb 
13 . Britannia- Britannia Orchard P/L 
14. Brooklands Farm- H. M. Bonyongwe 
IS. Brownhill Farm 
16. Bunga Farm (Subdivided) 
17. Burma of Clydsdale (subdivided)-Burma Park P/L (Burma Valley) 
18. Burma Valley Bananas P/L (Burma Valley) 
19. Bvumba Mountain Stream Rainbow Trout Farm (Vumba) 
20. Casuarina Farm PIL (Vumba) 
21 . Chewood Court Farm- Du Toit 
22. Chikonga Farm (Subdivided) 
23. Chinyamete Farm (Vumba)- Marron Farm PIL 
24. Chinakatori of Maonza- T. J. Grant 
25. Chinyamanda Farm (Burma Valley)- Valley Coffee Plantation P/L 
26. Chinziwa Farm (section 2 of The Park Farm) (Vumba) 
27. Clare Estate Ranch (subdivided) 
28. Cloud Seven (Vumba)- J. A. Robertson 
29. Cloudlands (subdivided) (Vumba) 
30. Copplestone- B & P. L.Van Niekerk 
31. Crake Valley Farm (Vumba)- B. H. Brown 
32. Derema Farm (Vumba)- Dr. C. Chikuku 
33. Devon ofUmvumba- Prince Julia Investments P/L 
34. Devonshire Farm- W. J. Taylor 
35. Dun Mow Farm (Vumba)- S. Makonyere 
36. Duri Farm (Vumba) 
37. Dutsi Farm- G. R. Matthews 
38. Eastiands Farm- G. D. Mundell PIL 
39. Edendale-Freezing Point Estate P/L 
40. En Vant (subdivided)- En Vant Farm P/L 
41. Epson (subdivided) (Vumba)- Border Timbers Ltd 
42. Fairview Farm (subdivided) 
43. Fairview South of Fairview- D. T. Z. Ozgeo P/L 
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44. Fallen Angels (subdivided) (Vumba) 
45. Falling Water Farm (Vumba)- Gibsons Investments 
46. Fangundu Farm (subdivided) (Vumba) 
47. Felsted (subdivided) (Vumba) 
48. Fern Hill Farm- A. T. Mupota 
49. Ferndale Farm (Vumba)- E & R. C. Palmer 
50. Five Streams Farm (Vumba) 
51. Fletcher C. C. Dairy Farm 
52. Freshwater Farm (Vumba) 
53. Glenburn Farm and Nurseries (Vumba) 
54. Green Valley Vineyards P/L (Vumba) 
55. Greencroft Coffee Estates T/A Fallscroft Estates (Vumba) 
56. Greendale Farm (Vumba) 
57. Gubinchen Farm 
58. Gwindingwe Farm (Burma Valley)- H. J. Vorster P/L 
59. Harmony Farm- R. M. Sithole 
60. Have-S. Vivier 
61. Hawkshed Valley Farm- D. T. Z. Ozgeo P/L 
62. Hawling Farm 
63. Headlands- Freezing Point Estates P/L 
64. High Henge Farm 
65. Highlands (subdivided) (Vumba)- R. C. Donald 
66. Hivu Estates and NurserylSalime P/L (Vumba) 
67. Howth (subdivided) (Vumba) 
68. Kostad of Clare Estate Ranch- C. E. Kok 
69. Leicester Farm 
70. Lot 1 of Cloudlands Estates- I. L. Cripps 
71. Lot 1 D of Highlands- Hill Billy Estates P/L 
72. Lot 1 of Fangundu Farm (Vumba)- Brightside Farm P/L 
73. Lot 1 of Or key of Howth- P. D. Hulley 
74. Lot 1 ofOukar Estate- C. H. Van Vuuren 
75. Lot 1 of subdivision M of Manchester Brackenridge Farm (Vumba)- Chinamata Farm P/L 
76. Lot 1 of Tobruk of Clare Estate Ranch- A. P. Sanderson P/L 
77. Lot l2A of Bunga Farm- Firkinn Investments P/L 
78. Lot 1 of Lot l2A of Bunga Farm- Sala Holdings P/L 
79. Lot 2 of Cloud lands Estate- West Away Farm P/L 
80. Lot 2 of Lot 1 of Mazonwe Farm (Burma Valley)- B. A. Van Buuren & Co P/L 
81. Lot 5 of Lot 1 of Mazonwe Farm (Burma Valley)- O. W. Thawaties P/L 
82. Lot 7 of Lot 1 of Mazonwe Farm (Burma Valley)- Brandhill P/L 
83. Lot 8 of Mazonwe Farm (Burma Valley)- B. A. Van Buuren & Co P/L 
84. Lyndhurst Farm (Vumba)- Throb Enterprises (shelled pecan nuts). 
85. Manchester Brackenridge Farm/Chinyabakwe Farm (subdivided)(Vumba) 
86. Manyera Farm (Burma Valley)- D. M. Wiggins 
87. Maonza Farm (subdivided)(Vumba) 
88. Mapembi Estate- Mapor Estates P/L 
89. Matanuska Farm (Burma Valley)- R. C. Hildebrand 
90. Mazonwe Farm (subdivided)(Burma Valley)-Alvern Farming P/L 
91. Merrydown Farm- P & P Hulley 
92. Monkfield of Norse land- H. J. Vorster 
93. Mount Malenji (subdivided)- Ragdale Investments P/L 
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94. Mount Shalom of Clare Estate Ranch- J & R Tobacco Estates P/L 
95. Muneni Farm (Vumba) 
96. Munzeiro Farm (Vumba) 
97. Nahoon Estate Farm (Burma Valley)- Ferndale Investments P/L 
9S. Nahoon Farm(subdivided) (Burma Valley)- Ardingly Farms P/L 
99. Nezomba Farm 
100. Nimbus (Vumba) 
101. Nyamakari Farm of Burma of Clydesdale (Burma Valley)- A. McGregor 
102. Orkney Farm 
103. Oukar Estate (subdivided)- H. A. Lock 
104. Rillet Farm (Vumba) 
105. Rio Farm (Vumba) 
106. Rippling Streams (Vumba) 
107. Ruparara Trout Farm- Ruparara Trout Farm P/L 
lOS. Rutsenza of Mount Malenji- Makaba P/L 
109. Sloghtholme Farms P/L 
110. Subdivision A Portion Patridge Hill of Cloud lands- Patridge Hill P/L 
III. Subdivision C of Chikonga Farm- Green Valley Vineyards P/L 
112. Subdivision D of Chi kong a Farm- Green Valley Vineyards P/L 
113. Subdivision E of Chi kong a Farm- Rhotalia Winery P/L 
114. The Park Farm (subdivided) (Vumba) 
115. The Wattle Company Vumba Estate (Vumba)-(wattle plantation) 
116. Tree Tops (Vumba) 
117. Tregenna Farm 
liS. Umvumba (subdivided) (Vumba) 
119. Umwaouku- S. Vivier 
120. Valhalla Farm- J. R. Hildebrand P/L 
121. Vooruitsig of Clydesdale (Burma Valley)- Alvern Farming P/L 
122. Vumba Agricultural Collective Cooperative Society (Vumba) 
123. Vumba Gateway Gardens (Vumba) 
124. Walmer (subdivided) (Vumba)- Border Timbers Ltd 
125. White Horse Inn (Vumba) 
126. Witchwood Farm (Vumba)- Witchwood Nursery PIL 
127. Zaaihoek of Clare Estate Ranch- A. C. Kok 
241 
3. Economic Activities in Vumba and Burma Valley 
Vumba and Burma Valley farmers produce a diverse and specialised array of tropical and 
sub-tropical fruits and vegetables on contract for Manicaland' s hotels, restaurants, lodges and 
inns (White Horse Inn, Eden Lodge, Inn-on-the-Vumba). They also produce for the city's 
vegetable market as well as the country's canning factories, mostly situated in Mutare, for 
instance, Cairns Foods (incorporating Tomango, Border Streams and Cashel Valley brands). 
Flowers are grown for local florists and for export, together with grapes (and wines). 
The area is also home to tobacco farms (for export), coffee plantations (export), dairy farms 
(cheese, butter and yoghurt for the local market and for export), trout farms (for local hotels 
and export) and timber plantations (local market and export) as shown by Table 17 below. 
Table 17: Agricultural Production in Vumba and Burma Valley 
Timber Plantations I. Epson Estate owned by Border Timbers Ltd. 
2. The Wattle Company Vumba Estate owned by The 
Wattle Company. 
Fruits OrchardslPlantations 1. Border Streams Farm. 
(nectarines, bananas, peaches, 2. Britannia Orchard P/L. 
oranges, grapefruit, mangoes, 3. Burma Valley Bananas PIL. 
guavas, pineapples, apples, 4. Clare Estate Ranch. 
plums, litchis, avocados and 
strawberries). 
Grapes 1. Green Valley Vineyards. 
Tobacco 2. Mount Shalom of Clare Estate Ranch. 
Coffee 1. Greencroft Coffee EstateslFallscroft Estates. 
2. Chinyamanda Farrn/Valley Coffee Plantation P/L. 
PlantlFlower Nurseries 1. Glenburn Farm and Nurseries. 
(cut-flowers such as roses, 2. Hivu Estates and Nursery/Salime P/L. 
Proteas and 
Chrysanthemums for export). 
Nuts (shelled pecan nuts) Lyndhurst Farm. 
Trout Farms 1. Ruparara Trout Farm. 
2. Bvumba Mountain Stream Rainbow Trout Farm. 
Dairy Farms 1. C.C. Fletcher Dairy Farm 
2. Crake Valley Farm. 
ChickenlPoultry Farms I. Valhalla Farm. 
ConservationlTourist I. Vumba Gateway/Botanical Gardens. 
Attractions 2. Vumba National Park. 
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4. Properties Designated or Compulsory Acquired in Mutare District 
The Manica Post is Manicaland province's state-owned weekly newspaper. Below are 
notices given by J. L. Nkomo, Minister of Special Affairs in the office of the President and 
Cabinet in charge of Land, Land Reform and Resettlement. The notices were given in terms 
of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 20:10) and paragraph 
(iii) of sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 20:10). 
Compulsory land acquisition affected the following main administrative districts: Beitbridge, 
BikitalNdanga, Bindura, Bubi, Bulawayo, Bulilimamangwe, Charter, Chipinge, 
Chirumhanzu, Darwin, Goromonzi, Gutu, Gwanda, Gweru, Hartley, Hurungwe, Hwange, 
Hwedza, Insiza, Kadoma, Kwekwe, Lomagundi, Lupane, Makoni, Mangwende, Marondera, 
Mashava, MasvingoNictoria, Matopos, Mazowe, Mberengwa, Melsetter, Murehwa, 
MutarefUmtali, Mwenezi, Nyamandlovu, Nyanga, Sabi/Save, Salisbury/Harare, Shamva, 
Shurugwi, Sipolilo and Umzingwane. 
The Manica Post 22-28 October 2004:pB6-pB7 
Notice in terms of paragraph (iii) of subsection (1) of section 8 of Land Acquisition Act 
Chapter 20:10 (Vesting of Land, taking of materials and exercise of rights over land) [Lot 15; 
193 Farms]. 
Affected Districts: Bindura, Chirumhanzu, Chipinge, Goromonzi, Kadoma, Gutu, Gweru, 
Hartley, Nyanga, Lomagundi, Makoni, Marondera, Mazowe, Melsetter, Murehwa, 
NdangaiBikita, Mwenezi, Shamva, Salisbury/Harare, *Umtali/Mutare, Hurungwe and 
Masvingo. 
*Mutare district accounts for 28 of the 193 farms gazetted as shown in Table A below: 
No. Title Holder/Owner Farm/Plot Size 
1. Burma Park PIL Remainder of Burma of Clyesdale 1251.299ha. 
2. S. Vivier Have 202.7145ha. 
3. Five Streams P/L Five Streams 1388.7402ha. 
4. R. F. Hadden-Tebb Remaining extent of Braintree 215.7834ha. 
Portion, Lawrenceville 
5. Freezing Point Estate PIL Edendale 1362.000ha 
6. C. H. Van Vuuren Lot 1 of Oukar 
7. A.C.Kok Zaaihoek of Clare Estate Ranch 11034826ha 
8. Patridge Hill P IL Subdivision A Portion Partridge 246.7650 acres 
Hill of Cloudlands 
9. H. 1. Vorster Monkfield of Norse land 866.l8ha. 
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10. Ragdale Investments P/L Mount Malenji 1602.4808ha 
II. J & R Tobacco Estates P/L Mount Shalom of Clare Estate 
12. Alvern Farming P/L Lot 6 of Lot I of Mazon we 560.3347ha. 
13. A. McGregor Nyamakari of Burma of Clydesdale 879.4323ha. 
14. R. C. Donald Remaining extent of Highlands 40.4694ha. 
15. J. R. Hildebrand P/L Remaining extent of Valhalla 376.0419ha. 
16. F. J. Barry & Co P/L L'amour Estate ('Old Mutare) 625.3807ha. 
17. Freezing Point Estates PIL Headlands 1405.000ha. 
18. Border Timbers PIL Imbeza Estate C*Penhalonga) 
19. Rhotalia Winery P/L Subdivision E of Chikonga Farm 
20. Britannia Orchard PIL Britannia 
21. Greenvalley Vineyards P/L Subdivision C of Chi kong a Farm 54.2747ha. 
22. Greenvalley Vineyards P/L Subdivision D of Chikonga Farm 31.0987ha. 
23. Border Timbers Ltd Mahugara ofEpson 771.164 morgen 
24. Border Timbers Ltd Remainder of Walmer 635.7329ha. 
25. En Vant Farm P/L En Vant 332.0578ha. 
26. En Vant Farm P/L Lot I of subdivision A of En Vant 878.6539ha. 
27 C. E. Kok Remaining extent of Kostad of Clare 408.8969ha. 
Estate Ranch 
28. Odzi Farms PIL Remaining extent of Farm Odzi 942.4541 morger 
(*Odzi-Riverside, Mutare) 
Table A 
The Manica Post 17-23 December 2004: pBS & pB7 
Preliminary notice to compulsorily acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 
20:10 [Lot 160; 229 Farms]. 
Affected Districts: Beitbridge, Bubi, *Bulilimamangwe, Bulawayo, * Charter, Chipinge, 
Kadoma, * Goromonzi, * Hartley, Lupane, Gwanda, Nyanga, Insiza, Lomagundi, Makoni, 
*Marondera, Matopos, Murehwa, Mazowe, Nyamandlovu, Sabi/Save, Salisbury/Harare, 
UmtalilMutare, Umzingwane, Hwange and Hwedza. 
*Bulilima-Mangwe, Charter, Goromonzi, Hartley and Marondera account for the bulk of 
farms gazetted under Lot 160. Mutare District accounts for II of the 229 farms as shown in 
Table B below: 
No Title Holder/Owner Farm/Plot Size 
1. Freezing Point P/L Edendale I 362ha. 
2. Freezing Point P /L Headlands I 405ha 
3. Valley Coffee Plantation P/L Remaining extent of Mazonwe 3746.2964ha. 
4. J. C. Franklin Lot I of Premier Estate 1657.05ha 
(*Old Mutare) 
5. D. T. Z. Ozgeo P/L Fairview South of Fairview 413.4455ha. 
6. Ferndale Investments PIL Nahoon Estate 444.2658ha. 
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7. J. R. Hildebrand P/L Remaining extent of Valhalla 376.0419ha. 
8. H. A. Lock Oukar Estate 867.5035ha. 
9. Mapor Estates P/L Lot 2 ofMapembi Estate 1903.6362 acres 
10. M.B.Brown Lot 12 of Bomponi 707.5235ha. 
11. Claremont/Nyanga Orchards P/L Claremont (*Nyanga) 3327.218 morgen 
Table B 
The Manica Post 24-30 December 2004: p12-13. 
Preliminary notice to compulsorily acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 
20:10 [Lot 160; 229 Farms]. 
Affected Districts: Beitbridge, Bubi, *Bulilima-Mangwe, Bulawayo, * Charter, Chipinge, 
Kadoma, *Goromonzi, * Hartley, Lupane, Gwanda, Nyanga, Insiza, Lomagundi, Makoni, 
*Marondera, Matopos, Murehwa, Mazoe, Nyamandlovu, Sabi/Save, Harare, Umtali/Mutare, 
Umzingwane, Hwange and Hwedza. 
* Bulilima-Mangwe, Charter, Goromonzi, Hartley and Marondera account for the bulk of 
farms gazetted under Lot 160. 
Mutare accounts for 11 of the 229 farms (same as Table B above). 
The Manica Post 28 January-3 February 2005:p2 
Notice in terms of paragraph (iii) of subsection (1) of section 8 of Land Acquisition Act 
Chapter 20: 10 (Vesting of land, taking of materials and exercise of rights over land) [Lot 19; 
2 farms] . 
Of the two farms gazetted, one is in Mutare district: 
Owner/title-holder Farm/Plot Size 
P.D. Hulley Lot I of Orkey of Howth 438.0069ha. 
Table C 
The Manica Post 28 January-3 February 2005:p15 
Preliminary notice to compulsorily acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 
20:10 [Lot 16; total 41 Farms]. 
Affected Districts: Chipinge, Nyanga, Mazowe, Goromonzi, Makoni, Ndanga/Bikita and 
UmtaliIMutare districts. 
Mutare District accounts for 17 of the 41 farms shown on Table D below: 
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No Title Holder/Owner FarmlPlot Size 
I. O. W. Thawaties P/L Lot 5 of Lot I of Mazon we 762.6040ha. 
2. A.P. Sanderson PIL Lot 1 of Tobruk of Clare Estate 385.4713ha. 
Ranch 
3. Brightside Farm P/L Lot 1 ofFangundu 251.4106ha. 
4. Turnbuka P/L Odzi Drift Estate (*Odzi) 553.5915ha. 
5. B & P L Van Niekerk Copplestone 103.0394ha. 
6. Brandhill P/L Lot 7 of Lot 1 of Mazonwe 272.7641ha. 
7. Ruparara Trout Farm P/L Remainder of Ruparara 1374.2128ha 
8. C. P. Bezuidenhout PIL Welverdiend Estate 533.01ha. 
9. B. A.Van Buuren & Co PIL Lot 2 of Lot 1 of Mazonwe 1138.4673 acres. 
10. Sala Holdings P/L Lot 1 of Lot 12A of Bunga 118.1740ha. 
11. Firkinn Investments P /L Lot 12A of Bunga 151.6515ha. 
12. I. L. Cripps Remainder of 107.1483ha. 
Lot 1 of Cloudlands Estate 
13. Hill Billy Estate P/L Lot 1D of Highlands 102.3411ha. 
14. Chinamata Farm P/L Lot 1 of subdivision M of 204.5362ha. 
Manchester Brackendrigde Farm 
15. Alvern Farming P/L Lot 1 ofVooruitsigofClydesdale 1181.2093ha. 
16. Prince Julia Investments PIL Devon ofUmvurnba 244.1564ha. 
17. West Away Farm P/L Lot 2 of Cloudlands Estate 538.8640ha. 
Table D 
The Manica Post 28 January-3 February 2005: p13 & p14 
Notice of application for confirmation of Section 8 Order in terms of Section 7(3) of Land 
Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 (disputed lands) [Lot 10; 274 farms]. 
Affected Districts: Mberengwa, Bikita, Bindura, Charter, Chirurnhanzu, Chipinge, Darwin, 
Goromonzi, Gutu, Gweru, *Hartley, Nyanga, *Lomagundi, *Makoni, Marondera, Matopos, 
Mazowe, Melsetter, *Ndanga, *Mwenezi, Kwekwe, 'Salisbury/Harare, Shurugwi, Mashava, 
Shamva, Sipolilo, Umtali/Mutare, Umzingwane, *Hurungwe, *VictoriaIMasvingo and 
Hwange. 
*More than 10 farms listed from each of the marked districts. 
Mutare District accounts for 29 of the 274 farms as shown on Table E below: 
No Title Holder/Owner FarmlPlot Size 
I. S. Vivier Umwaouku 915.52ha. 
2. B. A. Van Buuren & Co P/L Lot 8 of Lot I of Mazonwe 1046.7774 acres 
3. Odzi Flats P /L Mukowe ofWreys Drift (*Odzi) 131.5444ha. 
4. Varmland Investments P/L Beastkraal of Clare Estate Ranch I I 76.49ha. 
5. Makaba P/L Rutsenza of Mount Malenji 822.26ha. 
6. T. J. Grant Chinakatori of Maonza 136.51 llha. 
7. Burma Park P/L Remainder of Burma of Clyesdale 1251.299ha. 
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8. S. Vivier Have 202.7145ha. 
9. Five Streams PIL Five Streams 1388.7402ha. 
10. R. F. Hadden-Tebb Remaining extent of Braintree P 215.7834ha. 
Lawrenceville 
II. Freezing Point Estate P IL Edendale 1362.000 
12. A. C. Kok Zaaihoek of Clare Estate Ranch 11034826ha 
13. Patridge Hill P IL Subdivision A Portion Partridge 246.7650 acres 
Hill of Cloud lands 
14. H. J. Vorster Monkfield of Norse land 866. I 8ha. 
15. Ragdale Investments PIL Mt Malenii 1602.4808ha 
16. Alvern Farming P/L Lot 6 of Lot I of Mazonwe 560.3347ha. 
17. A. McGregor Nyamakari of Burma of Clydesdale 879.4323ha. 
18. R. C. Donald Remaining extent of Highlands 40.4694ha. 
19. J. R. Hildebrand P/L Remaining extent of Valhalla 376.0419ha. 
20. F. J. Barry & Co PIL L'amour Estate ('Old Mutare) 625.3807ha. 
21. Freezing Point Estates PIL Headlands 1405.000ha. 
22. GreenValley Vineyards PIL Subdivision C of Chi kong a Farm 54.2747ha. 
23. Green Valley Vineyards PIL Subdivision D of Chikonga Farm 31 .0987ha. 
24. Border Timbers Ltd Mahugara of Epson 771.164 morgen 
25. Border Timbers Ltd Remainder of Walmer 635.7329ha. 
26. En Vant Farm P/L En Vant 332.0578ha. 
27. En Vant Farm P/L Lot I of subdivision A of En Vant 878.6539ha. 
28. C. E.Kok Remaining extent of Kostad of Clare 408.8969ha. 
Estate Ranch 
29. Odzi Farms P/L Remaining extent of Farm Odzi 942.4541 morgen 
(*Odzi-Riverside, Mutare) 
Table E 
The Manica Post 8-14 April200S:pll-13 
Notice by the Minister of Special Affairs in the Office of the President and Cabinet 
responsible for Land, Land Reform and Resettlement. 
Notice in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20: 1 0 (Farms whose compensation has 
been fixed). The schedule listed 822 farms countrywide (across the 10 provinces). 
Manicaland Province had 91 farms li sted and UmtalilMutare District accounted for 29 of the 
91 farms as shown on Table F below: 
No Name of Landholding Owner Size 
1 Beeste Kraal of Clare Estate Varmland Investments P IL 1 I 76.49ha 
2 Brooksville Bezuidenhout Bros P/L 301.49ha 
3 Charlgrove Farm Chari grove PIL 521.49ha 
4 Cloudlands Estate Nyameni P/L 603.54ha 
5 Cynara Cynara 614.54ha 
6 Delamore Dikanai Estates P/L 2047.38ha 
7 Dieguns of Minverwag(Clare Estate) Saalhoek Estates P IL 613.67ha 
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8 EpsonFarm Border Timber P/L 874.00ha 
9 Greendale Chenyakwaremba Farm PIL 1657.38ha 
10 Gwinanzira of Clare Estate Ranch M.M De Kok & Son P/L 1141.61ha 
II Gwindingwi H. J Vorster 419.15ha 
12 Have S. Vivier 202.71ha 
13 Leaconhill of Bell View South P.P.M Hadden Tebb 44.61ha 
14 Leekuil Estate L. C Slabber! 646.98ha 
15 Lot I of Oukar of Clare Estate C.H Van Vuuren 1278.59ha 
16 Lot I of subdivision A of En Vant Invant P/L 870.65ha 
17 Lot 43 of Middle Sabi Chipangai Estate P/L 209.95ha 
18 Lot II of subdivision of Manchester CrakeValley Farm 202.34ha 
19 Manyera ManyeraPIL 809.37ha 
20 Maonza Charles John Allen 799.32ha 
21 Orkeney of Howth Keppel Estates 158.25ha 
22 Premier R.C.K Truscott 2705.3 1ha 
23 Remaining extent of GoodHope MabakkaP/L 507.97ha 
24 Remaining extent of Wreysdrift W. Schaffer 160.72ha 
25 Ruanda S. Bernard 996.00ha 
26 Shigodora Farm Jack Hally Farm PIL 1262.04ha 
27 TaaikoekEstates A.C. Kok 1103.48ha 
28 The Grange Farm Kalevala P IL 973.39ha 
29 Valhalla H. 1. Vorster P/L 342.02ha 
Table F 
Tile Manica Post 8-14 July 2005:pll 
Preliminary notice to acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 20:10 (notice 
given by D.N.E Mutasa, Minister of State for National Security, Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement in the President's office) [Lot 172; 30 Farms]. 
Only 1 farm was from UmtalilMutare District. 
Deed Name of Landholding 
Deed of transfer 471174 Peplow Farm P/L-remainder of Dice Box 
Table G 
Tile Herald 15 July 2005:pB13 
Tile Manica Post 15-21 July 2005:pll 
Tile Manica Post 22-28 July 2005:pll 
Size 
338.4737ha. 
Preliminary notice to compulsorily acquire land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act Chapter 
20:10 [Lot 175; 5 Farms]. 
Mutare District accounts for 2 of the 5 fives in Lot 175. 
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Deed Name of Landholding Size 
Deed of transfer 1688/86 Valley Coffee Plantation P/L, remaining 3746.2964h, 
extent of Mazonwe 
Deed of transfer 2564175 Meidon Farm P/L lot 2 of Burma ofClydesdalf 1236.6570h, 
Table H 
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